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Abstract
This thesis offers an alternative narrative why the Juba Peace Talks between 
the Government of Uganda and the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and 
its political wing, the Lord’s Resistance Movement (LRM), did not produce a 
Final Peace Agreement. Widely considered the most promising peace effort 
in the history of a violent conflict that began in 1986, talks were mediated 
by the Government of Southern Sudan from 2006 to 2008. During this time, 
the parties signed five separate agreements on a range of issues, yet in 
2008 the LRA’s leader, Joseph Kony, failed to endorse them through a final 
signature. An aerial attack on the LRA by the Ugandan army spelled the 
end of the Juba Talks.
It is commonly argued that as the first peace talks conducted with people 
wanted  by the International Criminal Court, the Juba Talks collapsed 
because the arrest warrants made a negotiated agreement impossible. 
Another widely accepted reason is that the LRA/M were not committed to 
peace. This thesis, however, argues that how the LRA/M experienced the 
muddled and convoluted peace talks was the crucial factor because the 
dynamics of the process confirmed existing power dynamics. Internally, the 
LRA/M’s dynamics were profoundly influenced by their perception of being 
trapped in an established hostile system, causing a struggle to transform 
their own dynamics constructively. 
Offering an analytical chronology of the Juba Talks with an empirical 
emphasis on the perspective of the LRA/M and an analysis of LRA/M 
structures and behavioural patterns that emerged in the process, this thesis 
further outlines that judging success or failure of a peace process on 
whether agreements have been signed is misplaced. Despite not producing 
a final agreement, the Juba Talks contributed to peace and change in 
Uganda.
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Acronyms, Abbreviations and Protagonists
AFRICOM  United States Africa Command, Unified Combatant 
   Command under the US Department of Defense, 
   created in 2007 by presidential order, currently 
   headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany
Agenda 1  Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between LRA 
   and GoU, first signed in August 2006 and periodically 
   renewed 
Agenda 2  Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions 
Agenda 3  Agreement on Justice and Accountability
Agenda 4  Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
   Reintegration 
Agenda 5  Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire
AU   African Union
AURTF   African Union Regional Task Force, established to fight 
   the LRA
CAR   Central African Republic
CHMT   Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency
CoH   Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (Agenda 1)
CPA   Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the 
   Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s 
   Liberation Army/Movement
DDR   Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration
DPA   Department of Political Affairs (UN)
DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo 
ESO   External Security Organisation, Uganda’s intelligence 
   agency
EU   European Union 
FDRC   Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du 
   Congo; DRC’s army
FPA   Final Peace Agreement, the chapeau document to be 
   signed by President Museveni and Joseph Kony to 
   validate all previously signed Agenda items 
GoS   Government of Sudan (Khartoum)
8
GoSS   Government of Southern Sudan (Juba) between 2005 
   and 2011
GoU   Government of Uganda
HQ   Headquarters
ICC   International Criminal Court
ICG   International Crisis Group
IDP   Internally Displaced Person
IGAD   Intergovernmental Authority on Development
JIF   Juba Initiative Fund, established by the UN to attract 
   donors to specifically contribute to the Juba Talks
LC   Local Council (administrative unit in Uganda)
LRA   Lord’s Resistance Army
LRM   Lord’s Resistance Movement
MONUC  Mission de l'Organisation de Nations Unies en 
   République Démocratique du Congo; UN Mission in 
   DRC until 2010
MONUSCO   United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in 
   the Democratic Republic of the Congo (follow-up to 
   MONUC since 2010)
MP   Member of Parliament
NGO   Non-governmental organisation
NRA   National Resistance Army (original name for Uganda’s 
   army)
NRM   National Resistance Movement (Uganda’s ruling party 
   under President Museveni)
OCHA   UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
OIF   Operation Iron Fist, conducted by the Ugandan army 
   against the LRA in 2002
OLT   Operation Lightning Thunder, conducted against the 
   LRA from December 2008 - March 2009, when it was 
   renamed to Operation Rudia
RA International Dubai-based construction, logistics and maintenance 
   company which runs a hotel in Juba
RDC   Resident District Commissioner (Uganda)
SAF   Sudan Armed Forces (army of the Khartoum 
   government)
SESG   Special Envoy of the Secretary General (UN)
SPLA   Sudan People’s Liberation Army
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SPLM   Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
TRC   Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN   United Nations
UNLA   Uganda National Liberation Front
UNMIS  United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNSC   United Nations Security Council 
UNRF II  Uganda National Rescue Front
UNSG   United Nations Secretary General
UPC   Uganda People’s Congress; opposition party and party 
of    former president Obote
UPDF   Uganda People’s Defence Forces (current name of 
   Uganda’s army)
US/ USA  United States of America
VP   Vice President 
WNBF   West Nile Bank Front
Individuals and Groups Mentioned 
Ray Achama   LRA/M delegate, rank Lt. Col., later seconded to 
    CHMT, dismissed by Kony in January 2008
Rwot Onen Achana II Acholi paramount chief
Cesar Achellam  Senior LRA field commander, surrendered to or 
    captured by UPDF in 2012
Yusuf Adek   Long-time LRA sympathiser, LRA/M delegate, 
    crucial f igure in 1994 and Juba Peace 
    Talks 
Santo Alit   LRA Lt.Col., present at 2004 peace talks as LRA 
    representative, reported killed in August 2009
Michael Anywar  LRA/M delegate and now member of LRA/M 
    peace team, seconded to CHMT, former UNLA 
    Colonel
Josephine Apire  LRA/M delegate 
Krispus Ayena Odongo LRA/M delegate, legal advisor, former NRM 
    political candidate
Godfrey Ayoo  LRA/M delegate and spokesperson, member of 
    UPC
Betty Bigombe  former Ugandan minister for Pacification in the 
    North, instrumental in previous LRA peace talks
Lubwoa Bwone  LRA Colonel
10
Joaquim Chissano  former president of Mozambique, Special Envoy 
    of the Secretary General for LRA-affected areas, 
    mandate terminated in June 2009
Core Group for northern Uganda: U.S., UK, Norway, Netherlands
Jan Egeland   former UN-Undersecretary for Humanitarian 
    Affairs (head of OCHA)
Enough! Project  US advocacy group against genocide and crimes 
    against humanity, headed by John Prendergast
Jendayi Frazer  U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African 
    Affairs to Condoleeza Rice as Secretary of State in 
    the second Bush Administration from 2005 – 
    January 2009
Invisible Children  US evangelical activist organisation founded by 
    three film makers
Salva Kiir   President of southern Sudan in the Government 
    of Southern Sudan, First Vice-President of Sudan; 
    now president of the independent Republic of 
    South Sudan (RoSS)
Sam Kolo   Former LRA spokesman, defected in early 2006
Joseph Kony   Leader of the LRA, commonly referred to as “the 
    chairman” or “Number One”
Justin Labeja   LRA/M delegate, now member of LRA/M Peace 
    Team
Alice Lakwena  Leader of the Holy Spirit Movement
Riek Machar    Vice President of the Government of Southern 
    Sudan, now the Republic of South Sudan
Norbert Mao   Chairman of Gulu municipal ity, former 
    MP, Chairman of Ugandan Democratic Party
David Nykorech-Matsanga  LRA/M delegation leader, owner of Africa World 
    Media, LRA spokesperson in the 1990s
James Obita   LRA/M delegate, LRA Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
    in the 1990s
John Baptist Odama  Archbishop of Gulu
Okot Odhiambo  LRA Brigadier, wanted by the ICC
Richard Odong  LRA contact person
Luis Moreno Ocampo Chief Prosecutor of the ICC during the Juba Talks
Betty Acan Ogwaro  MP Magwi County, Sudan, now Minister for 
    Agriculture of the RoSS
Martin Ojul   LRA/M delegate, delegation leader, dismissed in 
    January 2008
Denis Okirot   LRA/M delegate, rank Major, later seconded to 
    CHMT, dismissed by Kony in February 2008
Obonyo Olweny  LRA/M delegate and spokesperson
Leo Onek   Pax Christi Associate, Sudanese Acholi
Peter Ongom   LRA/M delegate
Dominic Ongwen  LRA Brigadier, wanted by the ICC
Henry Okello Oryem  Uganda’s Deputy Foreign Minister
Willy Oryem   LRA/M delegate
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Charles Otema  UPDF Brigadier
Alfred “Record” Otim LRA senior commander 
Vincent Otti   LRA second-in-command, wanted by the ICC
Sunday Otto   LRA liaison person
Joshua Otukene  LRA/M delegate
Rwot Joseph Oywak  Chief of Koyo Lalogi
IKV Pax Christi  Dutch relief, development and social service 
    organization of the Dutch Inter-church Council
Resolve   US-advocacy group, previously Resolve Uganda
Carlos Rodriguez  Catholic priest, long-term resident of Gulu
Ruhakana Rugunda  Leader of the GoU delegation, Ugandan Minister 
    of Interior Affairs, then Uganda’s ambassador to 
    the UN 
Tim Shortley   US State Department Special Advisor on Conflict 
    in the Great Lakes region, formerly National 
    Security Council
Simon Simonse  Employee of Pax Christi
St Egidio Community Roman Catholic lay movement based in Rome, 
    local and international conflict issues
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1.Introduction 
In the late morning of Friday, July 14, 2006, the representatives of the 
Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and its political wing, the Lord’s 
Resistance Movement (LRM), started to get ready. Delegates adjusted each 
other’s ties, smoothed stray hairs and helped each other shave. The opening 
ceremony for what would be known as the Juba Peace Talks between the 
LRA/M and the Government of Uganda (GoU) was scheduled for 2pm. With 
an hour to go, the delegation of suited men was ready to depart. As a final 
preparation, a few briefly gathered in one of the prefabricated container 
hotel rooms of the RA International Hotel for a private prayer. At 4pm, the 
delegation was still waiting under the hotel’s mango tree. Bored with 
hanging around, one of the delegates asked me to film him. He shouted 
into the camera: “We want peace, the LRA wants peace!” Just after 5pm, 
cars sent by the Government of southern Sudan (GoSS) arrived to take the 
delegation to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly building.
Juba, the capital of what was at the time called southern Sudan, had at that 
point only been the headquarters of GoSS for a few months. The 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan 
in Khartoum and the former rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army and 
Movement (SPLA/M) had been signed in 2005, starting a six-year interim 
period until the referendum on South Sudan’s independence, to be held in 
2011. After years as a besieged garrison town for the Khartoum 
government’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Juba was in July 2006 in the 
early stages of reconstruction. The Legislative Assembly was among the 
biggest buildings left standing after the war. 
As they walked up the big staircase and across the sandy-coloured spotted 
carpet of the dusty lobby, nobody within the LRA/M delegation spoke. 
Nobody smiled. When the assembly was in session, the deep brown 
armchairs were filled with people engaged in heated debates or friendly 
banter. As the weekend approached, the two dimly lit corridors on either 
side of the assembly hall were deserted. SPLA soldiers ushered the 
delegates into a room adjacent to the meeting hall. In the room, 
representatives of the Acholi, the main population group in northern 
Uganda, were waiting: the Ugandan Acholi Paramount Chief Rwot Achana 
II was there, accompanied by religious leaders and other delegates. When 
they hugged some delegates and patted others on the shoulder, the 
atmosphere instantly lightened.
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Until that afternoon, I had only ever seen the parliament half-filled with 
newly appointed members voting on new laws for southern Sudan. Now 
the hall was packed with Ugandans, SPLA soldiers in uniform, South 
Sudanese politicians, and reporters from major Ugandan and international 
news outlets. The BBC’s Khartoum correspondent Jonah Fisher was speaking 
into his recorder. Reuters had sent a reporter from Kampala. Al-Jazeera was 
rolling a camera. For the journalists there had in recent weeks been a 
marked shift in how the armed rebels of the LRA dealt with public 
relations. Its elusive leader, Joseph Kony, had for the first time given a 
television interview—to me—just a few weeks earlier, announcing his 
interest in peace.1  He had not been heard from or seen for years before 
that; appearances had been scarce in 20 years of war. The LRA now seemed 
accessible. The broader message was that this new attempt was going to be 
different from previous peace efforts. 
The GoU delegation was already seated to the left as one looked towards 
the podium when the doors on the right opened for the LRA/M. At first 
glance, the two groups on either side of the room looked rather similar—
with two exceptions. Seated among the men of the LRA/M delegates was 
one woman: Josephine Apire, a well-known LRA supporter based in 
London. And perched between the men in suits who were representing the 
GoU was one man wearing military fatigues and sunglasses: Ugandan 
People’s Defence Force (UPDF) Colonel Charles Otema, who had for years 
been in charge of the military operation against the LRA. LRA/M delegate 
Otto, who had been arrested by Otema a few times in northern Uganda’s 
main town of Gulu, kept staring at the army man even while bowing his 
head for a prayer. Speaking first, Southern Sudan’s President Salva Kiir and 
Gulu’s Archbishop John Baptist Odama invoked a spirit of hope. The leader 
of the GoU delegation, Interior Minister Dr Ruhakana Rugunda, reiterated 
the GoU’s commitment to peace. Then Martin Ojul, chairman of the LRA/M 
delegation, walked up to the microphone to announce that he would leave 
the opening words to his spokesperson Obonyo Olweny. Olweny, in the first 
official public appearance by the LRA/M at the Juba Talks, launched into 
what in my scribbled notes I described as “a symbolic RPG [rocket-propelled 
grenade] attack”. First, he gave a long list of grievances the LRA/M wanted 
to discuss:
My delegation wishes to take this opportunity to inform the 
international community that the political agenda of the LRA/M is 
premised on the mission to address the basic issues of among 
others, political persecution and marginalisation, demeaning 
attitude designedly expressed by people in power to insult and 
1 This refers to an interview I conducted with Kony, which in English was not published under my name. See M.Schomerus, "Chasing the 
Kony Story," in The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T.Allen and K.Vlassenroot. London: Zed Books, 2010.
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demonise some ethnic groups in the country, deliberate imbalance 
and disparity in the development of our country, protection of the 
people’s land against state-sponsored and state-backed land 
grabbers, respect for and protection of cultural diversity, abuse of 
democratic principles and good governance, genuine respect for 
international law and the territorial integrity of and peaceful co-
existence with all countries, compensation and reparation for all 
the losses suffered as a result of civil strife and/or state-instigated 
schemes such as cattle rustling by NRA [National Resistance Army, a 
previous name for Uganda’s army] soldiers that swept all the 
livestock in northern and eastern Uganda, equal opportunity for 
all, partisan army and other forces, peace and reconciliation, 
private sector-driven economy, professional and motivated civil 
service, zero tolerance for corruption, sectarianism and abuse of 
office, affirmative action for women, youth and the 
disadvantaged, IDP [internally displaced persons] camps and 
protection of human dignity.2 
During preparations for the opening ceremony, Olweny’s speech had caused 
heated discussions in the LRA/M. Some delegates—and representatives of 
IKV Pax Christi, a Dutch organisation that played a crucial part in bringing 
about the Juba Talks—had advised against putting a sweeping collection of 
issues on the table and instead suggested sticking to pleasantries. Others 
wanted to use this unprecedented publicity opportunity to establish the 
LRA/M’s political agenda. They argued that this would prove that the LRA/M 
had fought a legitimate war, and would set the appropriate tone for the 
negotiations. Unsurprisingly, Olweny’s main point, in addition to 
“explain[ing] the root causes of the war to those who are genuinely 
concerned about the conflict in northern Uganda, its manifestations and 
ramifications”, was that the LRA wanted to 
give our side of the story against extremely negative and malicious 
distortions, misinformation and outright lies about the role of the 
LRA/M in the conflict, and to a no less extent, against the people 
of northern Uganda... [and] appeal to the international community 
to reassess its position on the LRA/M, based on prejudices and 
misgivings prompted by NRM’s [National Resistance Movement, 
President Yoweri Museveni’s ruling party] elaborate propaganda 
machinery.3
As he concluded his speech, Olweny’s tone became firm: 
Our clear and unequivocal message to the regime in Kampala is 
that our acceptance of these peace talks should not be interpreted 
that LRA can no longer fight or that we are now militarily weak. 
No, we are not. Should the regime in Kampala choose the path of 
violence and militarism in the belief that they can settle the 
current conflict in the battlefield by decisively defeating the LRA, 
then they shall be in for a rude surprise.
2 LRA/M Delegation in Juba/O.Olweny, "LRA/M opening speech at first Juba Peace Talks opening ceremony", 14/7/2006.
3 LRA/M Delegation in Juba/O.Olweny, "LRA/M opening speech at first Juba Peace Talks opening ceremony", 14/7/2006.
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Colonel Otema, seated only a few rows away from me, let out an audible 
snort. Olweny continued:
The LRA is strong and the unfolding political events in Uganda, the 
ever manifesting clearer dichotomy between a small clique of an 
ethnic-based regime and the majority of the marginalised 
Ugandans can only make a now focused, more pro-people and 
more sophisticated and committed LRA stronger. The LRA has 
come of age. Never shall we remain silent about the intransigent 
and rapacious machinery of the NRM/UPDF.4
The audience was noticeably taken aback. I heard someone say loudly: 
“That was a bit harsh!” Such a strong statement, delivered with military 
verve by someone most people attending knew to be a member of the 
Acholi diaspora, was unexpected for some, frustrating for others. Most 
journalists construed the speech as an attention-grabber to counter 
allegations that, as a spent force, the LRA was not a credible negotiation 
partner. Olweny’s debut also fuelled a separate discussion. Who were the 
LRA really? A safe haven for an embittered but out-of-touch diaspora? Die-
hard commanders with forced recruits at their mercy? Considering that the 
LRA was known for recruiting through abduction, were these delegates 
brainwashed abductees, volunteers for a cause they believed in or, as 
someone behind me whispered, down-on-their-luck individuals who had 
joined the delegation in anticipation of a generous per diem?5  Father 
Carlos Rodriguez, a long-time resident of Uganda and a significant figure in 
previous peace negotiations with the LRA, turned to his neighbour and 
asked loudly: “When has this man last been to Uganda?”6 
Within the walls of the windowless Legislative Assembly, within the space 
of a few minutes, I had heard or overheard a whole set of issues that 
somehow needed to be tackled at the Juba Talks—including how the LRA/M 
wanted to present itself.7  Within the delegation, Olweny’s speech had 
created dissonance. One delegate, a middle-aged man with an army rank 
who was now living in Europe, was concerned that the strong tone of the 
speech had closed down the possibilities for negotiations: “The Government 
of Uganda will feel snubbed. They might withdraw… The speech should 
have been more humble, without any inclusion of military power. 
Otherwise this can be seen as a threat of war.”8 Other LRA/M delegates left 
4 LRA/M Delegation in Juba/O.Olweny, "LRA/M opening speech at first Juba Peace Talks opening ceremony", 14/7/2006.
5 Fieldnotes, Juba: 14/7/2006.
6 Fieldnotes, Juba: 14/7/2006. Father Carlos’s memoir of his time in northern Uganda is C.Rodríguez Soto, Tall grass : stories of suffering 
and peace in northern Uganda. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2009.
7 Fieldnotes, Juba: 14/7/2006.
8 Fieldnotes, Juba: 14/7/2006.
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the opening ceremony in a visibly triumphant mood, convinced that their 
having voiced their anger and demands would allow the conflict to be 
resolved. Asked how he felt during the ceremony, one of the younger 
delegates with reportedly close connections to Joseph Kony said: “I feel 
that I have done something good.”9 
The Thesis in a Nutshell
This delegate’s feeling that something positive had been started in Juba 
was initially reflected in how the Juba Talks were perceived. Despite the 
doubtful whispers in the audience and the LRA/M’s awkward opening 
speech, the Juba Talks were widely considered the most promising attempt 
at peace in the history of a violent conflict that has its beginnings in 1986. 
Yet in 2008 the Juba Talks ended when, despite several opportunities, the 
Final Peace Agreement (FPA) remained unsigned by LRA leader Kony, and 
the Ugandan military (UPDF) then dropped bombs on the camp of the LRA 
in the north-eastern corner of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). A 
military offensive against the LRA continues to this day. It is widely argued 
that the peace talks failed because the LRA/M was not serious about finding 
a negotiated solution, or because the arrest warrants issued for LRA senior 
commanders by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2005—the young 
court’s first ever arrest warrants—made a peace agreement impossible. Both 
arguments imply that the content of the negotiated agreements was the 
most important part of the Juba Talks, by suggesting either that the LRA/M 
was unable to settle on an agreement or that no agreement could be found 
that satisfied both the conflict partners and the ICC.10  These are easy and 
lazy interpretations. The reality behind the failure is less clear-cut and a 
detailed account of what actually happened is important, not only because 
these were the first peace talks directly influenced by the ICC and because 
the fall-out has been violent for civilians in South Sudan, DRC and the 
Central African Republic (CAR). How the Juba Talks are remembered and 
conceptualised also has long-term implications, for example regarding how 
military partnerships between the US and Uganda are understood. For that 
it is necessary to shine light on the complex and convoluted events that 
were set in motion in Juba, beyond the obvious chronology of agreements 
signed. This thesis contributes to such understanding by providing an 
ethnography of the Juba Talks as experienced by the LRA/M.
9 Fieldnotes, Juba: 15/7/2006.
10 The content of the agreements is not discussed in this thesis. 
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I suggest that dynamics and how they were experienced by the LRA/M were 
the crucial element that led to the non-signing of the final agreement. My 
broader endeavour is a more nuanced analysis of this particularly confusing 
and multilayered process in which many actors with often conflicting 
objectives played a part. However, while the Juba Talks represent a unique 
case, they offer broader lessons about peacemaking. As a case study and 
benchmark peace process in a changed international environment, the Juba 
Talks can help explain why broadly speaking, the emphasis in current 
peacemaking on negotiated agreements is misplaced as a measure of 
success.  
I shall argue that one of the main reasons for the failure of the Juba Talks 
can be found in how the LRA/M experienced the process of working 
towards a peace deal, rather than their rejection of the content of specific 
agreements. As I spent prolonged periods of time with the LRA/M during 
the Juba Talks to watch and ask questions—as outlined further in the brief 
comment on methods—an ethnographic perspective emerged that 
established that behind seemingly accepted events, a separate set of 
evolving dynamics and challenges called the meaning of the negotiated 
agreements into question for the LRA/M.11 As this thesis shows, the key to 
making peace might instead be found in engagement with dynamics and 
developments that occur around the talks. In Juba, the LRA/M did not 
experience a deep peace process and instead encountered the same power 
patterns that had kept the conflict alive. Yet on another level the Juba Talks 
brought peaceful change to Uganda, strengthening the argument that 
despite the failure to sign a final agreement, negotiating holds a value in 
itself. 
One thing that the thesis does not do, however, is to discuss the content of 
the agreements. There are two reasons for this: first, the agreements are 
publicly accessible for everyone to analyse.12  Attention on the agreements 
would in this thesis need to come at the expense of my empirical fieldwork, 
which I conducted solely outside the negotiation room. Secondly, restricting 
myself to observations rather than written outcomes underscores my 
argument that what happens on paper and what actually happens in the 
broader process are two rather disconnected phenomena. Focusing instead 
on the experience of the LRA/M, I will demonstrate how fragmented 
narratives and dynamics within the group and in the encounters between 
11 Clark’s analysis of the gacaca courts in Rwanda starts from a similar perspective. The courts are often considered a somewhat static and 
legalistic institution, but Clark instead argues that the courts are “a kinetic social institution that is shaped heavily by the population’s 
perceptions and actions.”(Clark, P. The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010. p.7.) Hence what happens during a process in turns shapes the meaning of the process. 
12 All agreements can be found, for example at http://www.beyondjuba.org/BJP1/peace_agreements.php (accessed September 27, 2012)
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the group and outside actors failed to amount to a shared understanding of 
what could be achieved through negotiations. Piecing together the 
developing dynamics behind the events in Juba using observational 
fieldwork, I establish that individuals within the LRA/M experienced the 
Juba Talks as a confirmation of existing power dynamics. This further 
entrenched the fault lines between the LRA and the GoU, setting the stage 
for the next stage of the conflict between the two actors. However, the 
Juba Talks were nevertheless valuable in aiding transformation in Uganda.
Overview of Findings
Peace is often assumed to be better than war; yet solving entrenched 
conflicts within the existing system is extraordinarily difficult. A few days 
before the opening ceremony of the Juba Talks, I was writing notes on 
what I then considered the main challenges for the talks. The challenges to 
me seemed pretty straightforward: Actually conducting the negotiations 
would be difficult, I noted. The heavily armed LRA and the LRA leaders 
were camped out about 300 miles away in the Congolese jungle, with no 
intention of joining the negotiations at the table in Juba, so getting their 
input and feeding them would be difficult. Facilitation through the young 
GoSS might be unreliable. There was a need to figure out how to navigate 
the arrest warrants issued by the ICC for LRA commanders Joseph Kony, his 
deputy Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya and Dominic Ongwen, 
and with that to establish how to manage the tensions between localised 
conflicts and international justice frameworks. I presented these challenges 
to one of the LRA/M delegates. These were all good points, he said, but 
that he was unsure that these were the biggest problems.
Peace, he said, will require a lot of change, both inside and outside the LRA. 
Adjusting to new situations, thinking of the world they lived in as a 
peaceful environment in which tackling issues with violence was not an 
option, was going to be as difficult for the outside world as it was for the 
LRA. He explained that people mistook peace for something that was very 
easy and could be achieved by simply wanting to achieve it. This was not 
the case. Instead, he said, it was more important that the talks be done 
properly. He was unsure whether the LRA would be able to get their points 
across, and thus he was sceptical that the negotiations would work. Using 
an Acholi proverb, he put into words that how the LRA and those affected 
by the conflict experienced the process would be the most important part, 
and that getting all these things into place to reach peace was full of 
potential hurdles: “Every easy thing can be very complicated,” he said. 
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“Even something that you think is very easy and normal to do. Even eating 
you can bite your tongue.”13
This thesis’s main finding is that how actors experience peace talks 
determines their negotiation conduct and the extent to which they can 
change their own behavior. As such, it is the process that takes centre-stage, 
rather than its achievements. The process, however, was for the LRA/M an 
often contradictory experience with shifting loyalties and interests. Another 
finding is that internal dynamics within the LRA/M were profoundly 
influenced by their perception that they were trapped in an established 
hostile system. They encountered an uneven playing field, as the analytical 
narrative of the Juba Talks provided here brings out. Yet the LRA/M also 
struggled to transform their internal dynamics of distrust. Instead, the Juba 
Talks confirmed the workings of the “system” LRA/M that continues to 
function on its internal trust and distrust between actors of the LRA and the 
LRM, as well as in collaboration with the government as both groups 
continuously infiltrate each other. This permanent playing-off of loyalties 
and betrayals in a system that connects everyone to everyone is a crucial 
part of why the conflict has continued for so long and why civilians 
continue to suffer.
These complex internal functions made engaging with international actors
—who functioned very differently from the LRA—even more challenging. 
Where the LRA/M maintains momentum and connections by establishing a 
pattern in which they often simultaneously reach out and pull back, 
international actors were aiming to establish consensus to deal with the 
challenges of the ICC. These two different operational modes created 
encounters that to the LRA/M confirmed the unlevel playing field. In the 
end, the sum of these experiences encouraged the LRA/M to maintain the 
status quo of the conflict, including continuing to play their own 
established role that had kept the conflict alive for two decades. 
Individuals within the LRA/M embraced the notion of peace with ambiguity. 
Personal stories give an insight into how LRA/M members experience the 
day-to-day realities of their often shifting identities, expressing an 
ambiguity vis-à-vis being an actor in war and in peace. Some of this 
ambiguity stems from the history of the conflict and the many frustrated 
attempts to end it. Crucially, the finding that peace comes with ambiguity 
for LRA/M members questions a range of common notions in scholarship 
and practice. Scholars have long recognised that contemporary 
peacemaking is not a linear process with clear goals. Yet often an 
unquestioned assumption persists that conflict actors ultimately want to 
13 Fieldnotes, Juba: 5/7/2006.
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achieve peace and are willing to sacrifice their own position for this goal. 
With this assumption, conflict resolution theory and practice fails to capture 
the experience of the LRA/M in the peace talks. 
As a case study, the Juba Talks allow for broader conclusions about 
obstacles to peace. The thesis identifies that in current approaches to 
peacemaking the dynamics of the process and how it entrenches existing 
conflict-prone structures—including internal structures—receive too little 
attention, which often inadvertently contributes to the continuation of 
violent conflict. The thesis further concludes that methods of investigation 
and analysis of these elements currently fall short of providing the empirical 
information needed to develop a broader holistic perspective on how to 
measure success and failure to allow for a transformation of conflict 
resolution strategies.
Thesis Structure
Following a chapter on the history of the conflict and attempts at 
peacemaking, as well as the history of the discourse on the conflict, this 
thesis intersperses a detailed account of events and experiences in Juba 
with analytical chapters. Three detailed chronological chapters provide a 
broader account of what occurred between the opening ceremony and 
Kony’s failure to sign the Final Peace Agreement by the deadline of 
November 30, 2008. In these analytical chronologies I sometimes use 
secondary information on events that I did not witness myself, however, the 
narrative of events is punctuated with insights into how what happened 
frustrated or elated the LRA/M. 
The chronology, divided by years, is alternated with analytical chapters. The 
first of these is a narrative enquiry that gives an insight into how LRA 
members explained the inner workings and values of the LRA, including the 
amorphous and contradictory LRA identity. Further analytical chapters 
reveal the LRA/M’s patterns and logic beneath the confusion by outlining 
the ideological and systematic obstacles encountered and distilling the 
particularities of the LRA/M as a negotiation partner.  A final chapter 
concludes on broader achievements of the Juba Talks, as well as what 
general insights on peacemaking can be derived.
The Scholarship on Peace Negotiations
For a brief moment, it all seemed easy. The Juba Talks recovered from the 
rocky start in the opening ceremony; over the following months, several 
countries pledged their financial and political support. Success appeared 
22
within reach. Experienced practitioners seemed convinced that this time a 
peace deal was inevitable—primarily because by entering the talks, the LRA/
M had sent a signal that most analysts read as a sign of weakness or of 
running out of options. In October 2007, Jan Egeland said that the Juba 
Talks had largely progressed in patterns familiar to conflict resolution 
practitioners. Egeland had retired from his position as UN Undersecretary of 
Humanitarian Affairs (the head of the United Nations Office of 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)) the previous year, having 
been engaged in northern Ugandan issues for a long time. He had visited 
Juba twice during the talks, including a visit to the bush to meet with the 
LRA high command. Looking back in 2007, he was not concerned that both 
negotiation partners had assured each other that they were prepared to 
continue fighting: 
It was classic negotiation in a sense that they both take very tough 
positions vis-à-vis the third party. But I was not that nervous, I felt 
that we had had a turning point by the end of 2006 for the simple 
reason that we could see that everybody enjoyed the several 
months of peace and quiet in northern Uganda, the first ones in 18 
years.14
Yet since no peace deal was achieved, the assumption that the negotiations 
were on track and that the LRA/M had no choice but to agree to peace 
were proven wrong. A brief look towards existing scholarship on peace 
negotiations helps explain the basis of the expectations that made the Juba 
Talks seem a certain success, and highlights the existing gaps. From the vast 
amount of general scholarship on peace negotiations, two areas are of 
particular relevance for this thesis. First is the science that aims to 
understand negotiation behaviour primarily through modelling. What this 
approach crucially overlooks is the experience of those doing the 
negotiations. Second is the contested question whether a negotiated peace 
agreement does bring peace, or whether it instead sets the stage for a 
different phase in the conflict. 
Modelling Negotiations
Social science has established the fine-grained complexities of conflict. 
Ramsbotham, for example, describes the need to understand the complexity 
of “hybrid struggles” that transcend “international state and societal 
levels” and stresses the necessary “shift towards seeing conflict in its 
context”.15  Yet implementation of conflict resolution remains for practical 
reasons largely driven by a monolithic view of conflict parties and the 
14 Telephone interview with Jan Egeland, former UN Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs, 15/10/2007.
15 O.Ramsbotham, T.Woodhouse, and H.Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Cambridge: Polity, 2005, p. 25.
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assumption that context can be altered through negotiations. In the Juba 
Talks, the tacit understanding that any kind of deal would be attractive for 
the LRA created the notion that the LRA/M had more to gain than to lose 
from getting a deal and would thus come together around that goal. It 
seemed as if concluding the talks successfully was only a matter of working 
out the bargaining positions. Pruitt’s iconic 1981 representation of a 
simplified game-theoretical view of negotiations might seem dated in light 
of more nuanced understandings of conflict, but the basic message that 
negotiations function according to game theory models remains rather 
dominant.16
Game theory is not simplistic, but in creating models, it fails to capture the 
finer dynamics of complex conflicts,17  falling short of taking into account 
subtle motivations and behaviour within a group and among individuals in 
the group. The practical application of negotiation models tends to be 
simplified, politicised and, as Rubinstein says, misunderstood as a tool to 
predict behaviour instead of as “an abstract inquiry into the concepts used 
in social reasoning when dealing with situations of conflict”.18 Hemmer has 
argued that an emphasis on game theory has meant that more complex set-
ups “involving networks of many actors” remain under-studied, as they do 
not fit measurable patterns. Crucially, game theory tends to present 
negotiations as an isolated event starting with a blank slate, whereas, 
argues Hemmer, they tend to be a continuation of “ongoing networks of 
relationships and social processes”.19 Richards makes the point that a game-
theoretical view overlooks the social context: “The worst wars are between 
groups whose basic social assumptions lead them to define quite 
incompatible—indeed incommensurable—needs and desires,” he writes. 
“Stakeholders can bargain, but first they need to agree they hold stakes in 
common.”20  Bates’s criticism of “off-the-shelf models” that reduce each 
situation “to one of a small number of models (prisoner’s dilemma, battle 
of the sexes, principal agent with moral hazard, principal agent with 
adverse selection)” is particularly pertinent in this context. He argues that 
16 Dean G. Pruitt, Negotiation Behavior. New York: Academic Press, 1981.
17 See for example P.K. Dutta, Strategies and Games: Theory And Practice. Boston: MIT, 1999,  and J. Watson, Strategy: An Introduction to 
Game Theory. New York: Norton, 2002, for a comprehensive discussion of game theory’s applicability in conflict resolution.
18 A.Rubinstein, "Comments on the interpretation of game theory", Econometrica 59, 4, 1991. Game theorists counter that the gap 
between practice and theory is due to different methods: a practitioner sees limited appeal in randomisation. See R Radner and R. 
Rosenthal, "Private information and pure strategy equilibrium", Mathematics of Operations Research 7, 1982.
19 B.Hemmer et al., "Putting the 'Up' in Bottom-Up Peacebuilding: Broadening the Concept of International Negotiations", International 
Negotiation 11, 2005.
20 P.Richards, "New War: An ethnographic approach", in No Peace No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, ed. Paul 
Richards. Athens/ Oxford: Ohio University Press/ James Currey, 2005, p.19.
24
models only become informative through context, which calls into question 
the usefulness of the model in the first place.21 
Naturally, models struggle to include the finer political context, such as the 
internal dynamics of negotiators, the memories and narratives of the war 
and previous attempts to end it, and crucially the changing perspectives of 
individuals within the group of negotiators as they go through the process 
of negotiation. Broader issues, such as for example the Juba Talks’ 
particularly challenging set-up in a country emerging from war and the 
need to navigate tensions between national conflict resolution and an 
international justice framework, are overlooked. In modelling, such 
intricacies would simply be marked as b or o for other things. 
Unsurprisingly, Hemmer complains that other things in modelling are 
“usually seen as static or uncontrollable”.22  This thesis’s focus on how 
conflict actors in Juba perceived the negotiations shows how dynamic and 
tremendously important such other things are—to the point that they can 
influence whether agreements get signed or not. 
What Do Peace Agreements Achieve?
The pursuit of a written peace agreement at the heart of the Juba Talks is 
hardly surprising. A large number of conflicts are now settled by peace 
agreements, rather than by outright victory. The belief in the power of 
negotiation, writes Spector, remains strong as “a meaningful and viable 
technique to address the conundrum of apparently irreconcilable 
differences, though the need for creativity is stressed”.23  Opponents of 
military intervention remain focused on peace agreements as the 
acceptable, more humane and humanistic way to end violent conflict. 
Relationship-building, trust, incentives and reconciliation are elements of 
an idealised model of conflict resolution. Egeland himself, despite 
presenting a whole range of peace processes in his autobiography as 
successes that ultimately did not lead to peace, retains this unshaken belief 
in the system.24 Scholarship rarely goes beyond rather general statements in 
providing frameworks for negotiation. Seguya, in her work on the Juba 
Talks, emphasises broad participation as essential. The Juba Talks, she 
writes, “could have benefited from a ‘bottom-up’ approach”, which she 
elaborates to include “addressing root causes of the conflict, and the 
21 R.Bates, A.Greif, and M.Levi, "Analytic Narratives Revisited", Social Science History 24, 4, 2000.
22 B.Hemmer et al., "Putting the 'Up' in Bottom-Up Peacebuilding: Broadening the Concept of International Negotiations", International 
Negotiation 11, 2005.
23 B. I. Spector, "Negotiation in an Insecure World." International Negotiation. 11, 2006.
24 J.Egeland, A Billion Lives: An Eyewitness Report from the Frontlines of Humanity. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008.
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inequalities in the country’s economy, the changing dynamics of the 
conflicts”, among others.25
Much like in the Juba Talks—which produced five separate signed 
agreements, but no final signature to endorse all of them—many peace 
agreements do not have the desired effect. Only a few prominent peace 
agreements actually brought lasting peace between specific conflict parties, 
such as the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, the Good Friday 
Agreement, and the work done by the Nyere Foundation.26  With such a 
poor record of accomplishment, particularly in settling interstate conflicts, 
there is no conclusive answer to the broader question whether peace talks 
are a good way to achieve peace. Generally, argues Toft, peace agreements 
are the least reliable way to bring peace, because systemic change needs 
the destruction of one conflict party, usually through military means.27 
Luttwak suggests that letting a war runs its course is a less costly and more 
reliable way to achieve peace.28  Peace negotiations and peace agreements 
might simply contribute to a continuation of the conflict. Dolan has written 
that before the Juba Talks, peace talks between the GoU and the LRA had 
been a tool to entrench existing power relations and thus could be seen as 
“a continuation of war by other means” which “in essence created the 
space for further militarisation.”29  This thesis makes a similar argument 
about the long-term effects of the Juba Talks on dynamics between the two 
conflict actors. 
This thesis also shines a light on what might be the greatest challenge in 
contemporary peacemaking: the vast gap between theory and practice, 
between what scholars and analysts know is necessary to de-escalate and 
change conflict dynamics, and what processes are supported particularly by 
international organisations. In conflict resolution scholarship, theory has 
long moved to a more sophisticated understanding of the holistic and 
structurally changing processes that are required to transform entrenched 
conflicts, with Lederach and Galtung being the first scholars to widely 
25 N. Seguya, Challenges in Conflict Resolution: Case of the Juba talks in Uganda: Challenges faced at the Juba Peace Talks in Uganda 
(2006-2010). Saarbruecken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010, p.92.
26 O.Ramsbotham, et al., Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Cambridge: Polity, 2005. Wallensteen argues that from 1946 to 2004, durable 
peace agreements were achieved in more than a third of all conflicts. P.Wallensteen and M.Eriksson, Negotiating Peace: Lessons from Three 
Comprehensive Peace Agreements. Uppsala/ New York: Uppsala University/ Mediation Support Unit UN, 2009, p. 13.
27 M. Duffy Toft, Securing the peace: The durable settlement of civil wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.
28 E.N. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance." Foreign Affairs July/ August, 1999.
29 C.G.Dolan, "Understanding War and Its Continuation: The Case of Northern Uganda", PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, 2005, 
p. 109.
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introduce this language. ⁠30  Broadly speaking, scholarship on conflicts tends 
to work with the notion of transformation, rather than resolution, even 
though Botes questions whether fine-tuning the semantics in this way has 
brought a chance to theory and practice, as the muddled use of 
terminology continues to muddle practice. ⁠31  How the notion of conflict 
transformation can make the practice of peace negotiations complicated 
becomes clear when looking at what schools of thought exist. Burgess and 
Burgess categorise three conceptualisations of the term conflict 
transformation: The first requires a recognition of national aspirations, the 
second encompasses deep-ranging structural institutional changes and 
power redistribution in order to not allow the conflict to return, and the 
third requires adjustment of individual beliefs and behaviour. ⁠32
In practice, despite this understanding, particularly peace talks with an 
international interest tend to fall back on a range of established procedural 
templates. Approaches such as negotiations (including track one and track 
two negotiations), mediation, diplomacy, peacebuilding are well 
established and preferable for peace processes under public scrutiny as they 
seemingly are more measurable. The Juba Talks in particular are an example 
how such limited procedural tools ultimately stood in the way of conflict 
transformation—or even just prevention from moving the conflict into its 
next military phase. 
The idea of transformation does not come from a realisation that 
negotiation and mediation often fall short of expectations, but that in fact 
in situations of entrenched conflict those seemingly streamlined processes 
do not mirror the kind of conflicts they are trying to solve. These 
entrenched social conflicts—of which the LRA conflict is one—instead move 
through phases of social change, along the lines of the conceptualisations 
of Coleman and Boulding. ⁠33  Even though scholars of conflict have since 
30 Lederach, J. P. “Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive Network.” and Galtung, J. 
“Conflict Resolution as Conflict Transformation: The First Law of Thermodynamics Revisited.” Both chapters in Rupesinghe, K., (ed.), 
Conflict Transformation. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1995.
31 Botes, J. “Conflict Transformation: A debate over semantics or a crucial shift in theory and practice of peace and conflict studies?”, The 
International Journal of Peace Studies. 8, 2, 2003.
32 Burgess, H. and G. Burgess, eds. Encyclopedia of Conflict Resolution. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO Inc, 1997, pps.285. Burgess and 
Burgess cite Kriesberg, Northrup and Thorson as the most important proponents for concept 1, Harrington and Merry and Burton for 
number 2, and Bush and Folger for the focus on individual change. See Kriesberg, L, T.Northrup and S. Thorson, (eds.) Intractable Conflicts 
and Their Transformation. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992.  Harrington, C. and S. Engle Merry. “Ideological Production: The 
Making of Community Mediation”, Law and Society Review, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1988, pp. 708-735. Burton, J. Conflict Resolution, Its Language 
and Processes. Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, Inc, 1996.  Bush, R.,  A. Baruch, and J. Folger. The Promise of Mediation. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1994.
33 Coleman, J. Community Conflict. New York: Free Press, 1956. Boulding, K. Conflict and Defense. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.
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debated the exact meanings of the terms, practice in the heat of the 
moment tends to boil down to the much more limited procedural templates 
discussed above which are aimed at resolving a particular part—usually 
violence—of a broader structural issue. What these templates do not do, 
however, is accommodate the long-term fluidity of a transformative 
process. Botes argues that conflict resolution attempts are a set-up for 
failure as they leave the system within which the conflict occurred intact. 
On the other hand, conflict resolution processes through the readily 
available toolkit are, as Mayer argues, seemingly more manageable because 
they seem focussed on a set of tangible issues and have a timeframe 
attached to them. ⁠34 Further, the negotiated agreements tend to hold some 
procedural, some substantive and some institutional components to agree 
on schedules, ways to address grievances, agreements on root causes, and 
implementation monitoring. ⁠35
Research Gaps on Peacemaking and the Juba Talks
With procedural toolkits to end war rather limited, the question does 
remain: How does the end of war come about? Research on how to best 
end war peacefully is a relatively young field that emerged in this definition 
only in the mid-1980s.36  The field is still better at asking questions than 
providing answers. Chirot and McCauley, for example, question the viability 
of a range of approaches to end violent conflict, such as “pursuing leaders 
responsible for mass murder and bringing them to justice? Education 
campaigns? Strengthening international institutions? Alleviating poverty? 
Building civil society? Promoting truth and reconciliation commissions?”37 
Tarrow wonders: “What are the factors and the mechanisms that are likely 
to produce post-war civil peace? Power sharing? Vigorous peace-making by 
34 Mayer, B. The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution: A Practitioner's Guide. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 2003.
35 Yawanarajah, N. and J. Ouellet. "Peace Agreements." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information 
Consortium. Boulder: University of Colorado, 2003.
36 Conflict was initially covered in scholarship largely by qualitative examinations, yet with the emergence of conflict studies as a discipline, 
the methodological focus shifted. Gurr, often referred to as the founder of conflict studies, moved scholarship towards a quantitative 
approach to describing violence. Although Gurr paid some attention to individual experience of “relative deprivation”, he largely focused on 
state-level reasons for rebellion. Tilly moved the debate from the state-level focus to finding reasons for political violence in the context of a 
conflict. Building on that, even scholars who had previously focused on quantitative data sets began to advocate a qualitative angle. See 
T.R.Gurr, Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970; C.Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003; N.Sambanis, "Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War", Perspectives on Politics 2, June 2004.
37 D.Chirot and C.McCauley, Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Political Mass Murder.  Princeton/ Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2006, p.5. 
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international institutions? Or simply stalemate and exhaustion of the 
internal antagonists?”38 
In the past, as conflicts were often studied quantitatively, the need for data 
sets pushed aside any focus on the internal processes of conflict parties; 
political context as experienced by individual conflict actors was largely 
absent. More recently, even scholars who focus on quantitative approaches 
have complemented their work by including political narratives.39 The study 
of conflict resolution is thus rapidly evolving, drawing on various disciplines 
to understand the complex nature of conflicts that can be rooted in history, 
politics, geography, economics or sociology, and more recently with an 
increased emphasis on culture.40  Doom and Vlassenroot stress that more 
attention needs to be paid “to the actors, to the concrete motives of those 
who engage in war”.41  Weinstein, for example, does that by categorising 
the rational choices that drive people to join rebellions.42 However, a crucial 
gap exists even in approaches that focus on individual experiences. How 
dynamic processes continuously shape motivations is rarely captured. This 
includes processes experienced in the resolution of a conflict. Generally 
speaking, research on peace negotiations that puts actors’ experience, 
rather than technical issues, centre stage is almost non-existent. Reasons for 
this are methodological—access is a challenge, as outlined in my note 
below. Nevertheless, it is also the case that some processes are so 
multilayered that they become what Drexler calls a “black box”: a peace 
process so complex that it defies analysis beyond the identification of a 
start and an end.43 One way to counter this in scholarship has been to focus 
primarily on technical issues.
Scholarship on the Juba Talks is no exception. Analysis of the Juba Talks 
tends to foreground two primarily technical aspects. The first point that has 
received a large amount of attention remains the tension between 
international and national justice frameworks, and between peace and 
38 S.Tarrow, "Inside Insurgencies: Politics and Violence  in an Age of Civil War ", Perspectives on Politics 5, 3, 2007.
39 J.D.Fearon and D.Laitin, "Civil War Narratives", Estudios/Working Papers Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones n. 218, 2005. 
Laitin’s research involves presenting so-called random narratives to “assess the fit of the statistical model case by case and to establish 
whether the narrative of a conflict reflects the quantitative findings”. See D.Laitin, Random Narratives (n/d); available from http://
www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/random%20narratives.htm. 
40 O.Ramsbotham, et al., Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Cambridge: Polity, 2005; M.Adams  Trujillo et al., "Introduction: Conflict, 
Culture and Knowledge," in Re-Centering Culture and Knowledge in Conflict Resolution Practice, ed. M.Adams  Trujillo, et al. Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 2008.
41 R.Doom and K.Vlassenroot, "Kony's Message: A New Koine? The Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda", African Affairs 98, 390,1999.
42 J. M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
43 E.F.Drexler, "The Social Life of Conflict Narratives: Violent Antagonists, Imagined Histories, and Foreclosed Futures in Aceh, Indonesia", 
Anthropological Quarterly 80, 4, 2007.
29
justice as it emerged during peace negotiations.44  This is unsurprising, 
considering the benchmark significance of the Juba Talks as the first peace 
negotiations conducted with conflict actors who were wanted by the ICC. 
Although it was designed to end the worst of crimes, one of the main 
points of contention regarding the ICC has been the issuing of arrest 
warrants for actors in ongoing violent conflicts. The main argument against 
this instrument is that it closes off avenues for peace negotiations; the main 
argument for ICC activity in an ongoing conflict is that it might change 
conflict dynamics positively by putting actors under pressure. The second 
most common analytical approach to the Juba Talks zooms in only on the 
modalities of conducting the talks as they relate to how the text for the 
agreements was reached, for example in discussions over the extent to 
which the process was participatory and inclusive and addressed the root 
causes of the war.45  Additionally, accounts of the Juba Talks tend to be 
reduced to brief chronologies—with a few exceptions. Atkinson, for 
example, provides an analytical account.46 Yet no detailed analysis based on 
empirical data exists of day-to-day events at the Juba Talks and how their 
perception influenced proceedings. How actors experienced the process and 
how this might have contributed to the failure of the talks is not generally 
addressed —and if so, only by using retrospectively gathered data. 
It is now commonly understood that peacemaking is as complex as the 
conflicts it aims to resolve, that peace processes are not linear, and that a 
detailed understanding of actors’ motivations and experience is necessary.47 
In the months leading up to the Juba Talks, the LRA/M Information Bureau 
had published a paper that argued for a more detailed understanding of 
44 A few significant examples from a huge literature are B.Afako, "Negotiating in the shadow of justice" in Initiatives to end the violence in 
northern Uganda: 2002 - 09 and the Juba Peace Process. Update to Issue 11. E.Drew, ed. London: Conciliation Resources, 2010; M.Kersten, 
"Peace from Juba: Peace Talks between the LRA and the Government of Uganda (2006-2008)", in Beyond Kony 2012, ed. A.Taub. Leanpub, 
2012; P.Bukuluki, Negotiating Retributive and Restorative Justice in Conflict Transformation Efforts: The Case of Northern Uganda. Zurich: LIT 
Verlag, 2011; A.Little, "Three Strikes and Kony’s Still There: What I Learned from Negotiations with Joseph Kony and the International 
Criminal Court’s Efforts to Indict Him," in Beyond Kony 2012, ed. A.Taub. Leanpub, 2012; N.Waddel and P.Clark, eds., Courting conflict? 
Justice, peace and the ICC in Africa. London: Royal African Society, 2008; S.Wijeyaratne,"Promoting an inclusive peace: A call to strengthen 
Canada's peace-making capacity: Country Study Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda”, Ottawa: CCIC, 2008; S.Worden,"The Justice 
Dilemma in Uganda", Washington, D.C.: USIP, 2009; and P.Clark, “Chasing cases: the ICC and the politics of state referral in the Democratic 
republic of Congo and Uganda”, S. Nouwen, “Complementarity in Uganda: domestic diversity or international imposition?”, M. Wierda and 
M.Otim, “Courts, conflict and complementarity in Uganda”, all three in The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory 
to Practice, Volume II, C. Stahn and M. El Zeidy, eds.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
45 N. Seguya, Challenges in Conflict Resolution: Case of the Juba talks in Uganda: Challenges faced at the Juba Peace Talks in Uganda 
(2006-2010). Saarbruecken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010.
46 Atkinson has written an analytical chronology of the Juba Talks. R. R. Atkinson, "'The realists in Juba’? An analysis of the Juba Peace 
Talks", in The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T.Allen and K.Vlassenroot. London/ New York: Zed Books, 2010.
47 See for example D. Körppen, N. Ropers, and Hans J. Gießmann, eds., The Non-Linearity of Peace Processes – Theory and Practice of 
Systemic Conflict Transformation. Opladen/Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich Verlag, 2011.
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the conflict: “The interconnectedness of the issues and parties to this 
conflict is far broader and more complex than is currently being perceived 
by both the Sudanese and Ugandan authorities”.48  It remains the case that 
empirical information to feed these needs for understanding in general is 
rare—although the war in northern Uganda has been extensively studied. A 
very obvious gap exists when it comes to information what the experience 
of a peace process is actually like for conflict actors, and how this in turn 
influences the conflict.
Contribution of this Thesis
I aim to partially fill this gap by providing an empirical analytical narrative 
of the Juba Talks, and in doing so to shine light on the dynamics that 
contributed to the Juba Talks’ failure to achieve peace. The most commonly 
cited reasons for the lack of success were that Kony was not serious about 
peace, that the Juba Talks were an LRA ploy to regroup, that Kony’s 
position on many negotiation points remained unclear,49 that the LRA was 
torn apart by internal strife, that the mediation set-up was not conducive to 
reaching an agreement, and that the international community had lacked 
leverage.50  Opponents of the ICC argue that the ICC warrants had 
prevented a peace settlement, citing the Juba Talks as a watershed moment 
and reality check for international peacemaking. Supporters of the ICC 
claimed that it helped bring the LRA to the table but then laid bare the 
LRA’s lack of commitment to accountability. All of these points made the 
Juba Talks difficult, but they do not conclusively explain the complex failure 
to reach a peace deal.51 
Instead, my argument focuses on the day-to-day experiences and challenges 
of conflict actors and as such, on the process. It is tempting to approach an 
analysis of the LRA/M in the Juba Talks as a philosophical sceptic, 
maintaining that increased complexity, the interdependence of actors and 
the unreliability of those involved defy attempts at explanation and as a 
consequence undermine the idea that a peaceful negotiated solution is ever 
possible. In the Juba Talks such scepticism was particularly prominent, as 
many observers of the Ugandan conflict continue to explain the lack of 
48 LRA/M Information Bureau, "For immediate release", 15/11/2005.
49 P.Jackson, "Negotiating with Ghosts: Religion, Conflict and Peace in Northern Uganda", The Round Table 98, 402, 2009. 
50 See for example J.Spiegel and J.Prendergast,"A new peace strategy for northern Uganda and the LRA", ENOUGH strategy paper, 
19/5/2008. 
51 The talks took place during a time of international reorientation, driven by a shift in advocacy techniques and increased emphasis on an 
international human rights ideology. This increased the number of actors scrambling for recognition and acknowledgement in an already 
complex conflict. While these issues appear in this thesis, they are not the focus of it.
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peace by reference to the enigmatic inner workings of Kony’s mind. This 
obsession with Kony as a spirit-possessed wild card has obscured other, 
reliable and available evidence about what went wrong. Yet elements in 
the LRA’s behaviour can be explained through scrutiny of the LRA’s own 
point of view. This is particularly true because the LRA are aware of these 
complexities and at times willing to articulate them. They were also to a 
certain extent observable, although observation came with methodological 
challenges.
A Comment on Methods
My ethnographic methods were determined by the developments that 
brought me to this research. Ethnographic methods include, as O’Reilly 
summarises, staying with a community for prolonged periods of time or 
generally prolonged fieldwork, observation and participation—in sum 
watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions, 
and producing a richly written account that respects the 
irreducibility of human experience, that acknowledges the role of 
theory, as well as the researcher’s own role, and that views humans 
as part object/part subject.52
On November 7, 2005, I was sitting in broad daylight at a table in an open-
air nightclub in Gulu, northern Uganda, with three young Ugandan men. 
They were listening intently as I was speaking on the phone with the LRA’s 
Second-in-Command, Vincent Otti. Having checked that I had enough 
phone credit to sustain an expensive call to a satellite phone, they had 
dialled a number on my mobile and handed the cheap handset to me. The 
first thing I heard was a low, breathy giggle and then a voice addressing me 
by my nickname, Malaika, followed by an introduction: “This is Vincent 
Otti.”53
We made conversation. I talked cautiously, not sure whether the man at the 
other end of the line really was the feared deputy commander of the LRA. I 
had learned that many people in Gulu boast about their tight connection to 
the LRA high command. Having close connections to the LRA was 
dangerous—the UPDF was keeping a very close watch on assumed rebel 
sympathisers—but it also came with clout. For researchers like me, people 
claiming to be close to the high command were endlessly fascinating. We all 
52 K. O’Reilly. Ethnographic Methods. London/ New York: Routledge, 2005, pps.3 - 4. 
53 My name, Mareike, sounds very similar to Malaika, which in Swahili or Arabic translates as “angel”. Malaikas are also spirits. Discussions 
on spirit possession in the context of northern Uganda can be found in T.Allen, "Understanding Alice: Uganda’s Holy Spirit Movement in 
Context", Africa 61, 3, 1991; or H.Behrend, Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits. Oxford: James Currey, 1999. Kony is said to have been 
possessed by different spirits. These are outlined in detail by C.G.Dolan, "Understanding War and Its Continuation: The Case of Northern 
Uganda", PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, 2005, p.437.
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wanted to hear their stories and somehow get to the enigmatic Kony. 
When I asked Otti where the LRA was right at that moment, he laughed 
again. He could not say on the phone, of course, but he himself was 
somewhere far in the bush—maybe Sudan, maybe Uganda, maybe the DRC. 
The LRA was under attack, he said. 
This was not my first contact with Otti. We had been exchanging 
pleasantries by post, hand-delivered through messengers. A note I had 
written had supposedly been given to Otti in the bush; at least I had paid 
someone US$25 as a delivery fee and for transport costs. A few weeks later, 
I had received a letter in return. The neat handwriting on rough, lined 
paper stated that the letter had been written on August 28, 2005; the red 
stamp at the bottom of the page read “Lord’s Resistance Army/
Movement” (LRA/M). It was the first time I had seen an LRA letterhead. This 
one was signed with a simple “Thanks” and “Yours sincerely, Otti Vincent, c/
m II”.54
“Madam Malaika,” the letter read. “I would like to thank the almighty God, 
the God of Abraham, Isaic [sic], Jacob and our ancestors for allowing our 
meeting through this letter though not physically.” The letter went on to 
express concern: Otti wanted to know who I was, but also what I—as a 
representative of the outside world—thought about him. He did not think 
that the world had the story right.
The world currently has termed us as terrorist [sic], murderers, 
thugs and all they can call us but we are not such. It is only that 
our points, agenda of the war is not being represented to the 
international body. So my point of argument is only if you can 
promise to work with us secretly without exposing things to the 
Ugandan government then absolutely we are also ready to work 
with you.55
I was unsure what exactly Otti expected of me, what “working with” the 
LRA entailed. The young men I had met in Uganda had wanted to speak to 
me repeatedly over the course of several months. We had discussed why 
they thought that violence had been necessary to end the conditions in 
northern Uganda’s displacement camps, their disillusionment with recent 
attempts at peace, and their confusion about the involvement of the ICC. 
They had said that Otti also wanted to understand better what the ICC was. 
I asked Otti what he knew about the ICC. “I know that they take me to the 
ICC and then they will hang me,” he answered and laughed. It must have 
seemed funny to him that after two decades of barely leaving the bush 
between Uganda, Sudan and the DRC, he was facing what he believed was 
54 Vincent Otti, "Personal letter to author",  25/8/2005.
55 Vincent Otti, "Personal letter to author",  25/8/2005.
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certain execution in Europe. Equally funny must have been the thought 
that this institution called the “ICC”—with offices in Europe and an 
Argentinean prosecutor—was trying to get to him. He added that he did 
not want to be executed far away from his home, the town of Atiak in 
northern Uganda. This would not be a fitting end to his fight against the 
GoU and more specifically Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni.
In the weeks leading up to my first phone call with Otti, the young men had 
made clear that they also did not think much of the ICC, and that the LRA 
wanted to have another go at a negotiated solution. In his letter, Otti 
wrote a description of how he thought these peace talks ought to be 
conducted.
Peace talks can’t be under trees, on the road sides and in a 
gazetted area. Peace talks should be in different country where 
international observers can also be there. If that is followed, then 
we are ready to talk peace. 
My conversations with Otti continued over the following months, as the 
LRA pursued its contacts to start a new round of peace talks. He kept 
reiterating to me that peace was what the LRA wanted; to prove it, they 
would allow me to visit them in the bush and to talk to Kony. After months 
of regular phone calls, Otti considered me a personal contact who had 
something to contribute.56 This connection ultimately led me to the bush on 
the Sudan/DRC border to sit down and interview Kony. Circumstances 
helped, as powerful actors, namely the Vice-President of the Government of 
Southern Sudan, Riek Machar, made their moves towards facilitating peace 
talks with the LRA. 
With Machar’s logistical help, I arrived as part of a larger delegation of 
SPLA, LRA/M representatives and peacemaking organisations in the 
provisional camp of the LRA on Sudan’s border with the DRC in the 
afternoon of June 11, 2006. Along with those who were waiting to be 
nominated as the official LRA/M delegation for the peace talks, I was told 
to make myself comfortable for the night in a round clearing the LRA 
soldiers had created. The bush was so dense that when I strolled through, 
pushing aside the broad-leafed plants, I could not retrace my own steps 
after walking off the path for only a few seconds. Had I been lost, however, 
I would have easily been found. LRA soldiers were stationed at regular 
intervals in wide concentric circles. They were invisible to me; I could only 
make them out in the dense vegetation when I literally bumped into one. 
56 This gross overestimation of my capacity to influence peacemaking with the LRA shows, in my opinion, how disconnected the LRA felt. 
Venkatesh, who researched an inner-city Chicago housing project, had similar thoughts when he was asked to use his “connections” to help 
one of the residents: “That Ms. Bailey saw me, a middle-class graduate student, as having ‘connections’ said a lot about how alienated her 
community was from the powerful people in philanthropy and government who could actually make a difference.”S.Venkatesh, Gang 
Leader for a day: A rogue sociologist crosses the line. London: Allen Lane/ Penguin, 2008, loc 1535-39 (e-book).
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They could clearly see me much better than I could see them. At certain 
times, I could at least hear the decisive marching steps of the patrols 
circumnavigating the clearing, betrayed by the slurping sound of gumboots 
and the faint smell of unwashed clothes that had dried on someone’s body 
while walking through the bush. 
In the evening I was seated near Otti on a bench constructed from tied 
bamboo. Every now and then, a soldier entered the clearing with a military 
greeting and a loud request for “Permission!” before being allowed near 
Otti. I saw a few young men charging their communication gadgets, using 
solar panels with some haphazard wiring sticking out. The weaponry on 
display was less makeshift: most soldiers were wrapped in long ammunition 
belts and carried at least an AK-47 with a bayonet. One tall man shouldered 
an M-16 gun; another displayed a rocket-propelled grenade. Most soldiers 
wore green uniforms, or at least parts of a uniform. One combined his 
camouflage trousers with a blue UNICEF T-shirt with a slogan campaigning 
for polio immunisation: “Have you seen a paralysed child?” I spotted a 
woman among the armed troops, recognisable as a female only by her 
golden ear hoops. I asked Otti what her rank was. He pretended not to 
understand. “Is that a woman?” he said, pointing at her and winking at me. 
“What makes you think it’s a woman?” He then told me that she was a 
captain, a very good captain: “Women can also fight. She is an example.”
I had been invited to stay the night, and once the SPLA and Machar had 
left, the LRA soldiers noticeably relaxed. The young men mostly reacted 
with giggling fits when I came near them, especially when they witnessed 
how I tried to lug several bags at once. Immediately they came to my rescue 
and carried my luggage to the clearing. Three young LRA were helping me 
to put up my tent when another young woman appeared with freshly 
baked bread and mashed beans. She set down the metal pots without 
uttering a sound or making eye contact with anyone. The bread was still 
warm, and the men gathered around the campfire to eat. I was invited to 
join and to say grace for everyone. When I said that as a non-religious 
person I could not do that, one of the LRA members on the to-be-appointed 
peace delegation took off his baseball cap and quickly said a prayer. I was 
the first person to be offered food from the shared pot and red, syrupy tea 
in a metal mug.57 Shortly after, Otti sat down next to me. He ate and talked 
about his history with the LRA, but his mind seemed to be elsewhere as his 
eyes scanned the surrounding soldiers. It dawned on me over the course of 
the evening that my visit to the LRA was as much an occasion for them as it 
was for me. Several commanders told me that I was the first guest to be 
57 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 12/6/2006.
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invited by the very high command.58 One officer was relentlessly filming me 
with a small video camera. I later learned that his nickname was “Record” 
because he was always on filming duty. 
It was a moment of unmatched openness during a brief period from 
mid-2005 to mid-2007 when the LRA decided to voice their side of the story 
and to launch their first public relations campaign. It remains the only 
opportunity so far to get first-hand answers about thinking in the LRA and 
to observe the LRA’s interactions with the outside world. In the greater 
context of the LRA’s aim to start negotiations, it is not surprising that they 
changed their behaviour to allow this access. From a scholarly point of view, 
I was in the lucky position to observe this opening up of the LRA. As the 
Juba Talks got under way, I moved to Juba and became an uninvited 
observer of the talks, able to attend several meetings between officials and 
LRA in the bush, and conducting my own meetings as part of a community 
project to aid the Juba Talks. I was a beneficiary of the rather chaotic 
organisation of the early days of the peace negotiations, when not many 
questions were asked. I spent as much time as possible in the midst of it, 
sometimes exposing myself to intense—and justified—criticism about my 
unmandated presence. As the Juba Talks were taken over by the 
international community, the talks and the LRA became less accessible. 
Despite a few more public appearances by the LRA high command, they 
were starting to close the door in September 2007, slamming it shut in 
November 2008. 
As the Juba Talks were rapidly developing, so was my research topic, with 
new twists and turns happening at every moment. Recording multilayered 
day-to-day events and sentiments, and then linking these to the bigger 
picture of this particular process and theory on peace negotiations in 
general, proved both a methodological and analytical challenge. First, it has 
been acknowledged that peace processes are complex and need further 
research. In reality, the often explosive day-to-day interactions in peace 
negotiations tend to be off-limits for researchers. Only fragmented records 
exist of dynamics in peace negotiations as they and the political economy of 
the moment develop. Most in-depth research on peace processes happens 
after the fact and relies on the memory of actors. Second, research on the 
LRA has in the past largely relied on limited material provided by ex-LRA. 
Some researchers have deliberately avoided trying to make contact with the 
LRA when engaging with the war in northern Uganda, as people 
pretending to be LRA might too easily manipulate information. 
58 I believe they meant that I was the first white guest to interview Kony. Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 11/6/2006.
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Analytically, peace processes tend to be studied from a comparative or 
historical perspective, often using causal process theory to answer the 
broad question why a peace agreement does or does not work. These 
approaches are useful when combined with the benefit of hindsight, but 
are of lesser value in a developing process. Analysis of the motivations for 
and experience of being a member of the LRA (or any other military group 
engaged in violent conflict) is often necessarily reduced by lack of access 
and, as has been argued, constrained by the various analytical lenses used 
to view the war. The most prominent of these are humanitarian or legal 
frameworks. What is missing in the literature is detailed data and analysis 
of how actors in a peace process experience their own roles and constraints 
in the process. Wallensteen highlights the need for research to move away 
from “a consolidated set of insights on which strategies work or why 
agreements endure” and suggests that research should instead seek 
“plausible understandings that… help to highlight policy dilemmas for 
further study”.59  It is this plausible understanding of how processes are 
experienced by those caught up in them that I am after. 
Researching the dynamics of a complex process with guarded, manipulative 
or largely inaccessible actors provides its own set of methodological and 
analytical challenges: how I tackled those is also a contribution about the 
limitations and greater benefits of research methods in contested processes. 
It is in the nature of conflict actors that the information they provide is 
fractured, changeable and incomplete. Of course, as Mkandawire rightly 
stresses, asking perpetrators of crimes for their motivation usually elicits “a 
retrospective account of what drove them to commit the crimes” that “is 
likely to be self-serving”.60 As such, the information provided here echoes 
the nature of the conflict and the difficulties of capturing precise 
description and broadly applicable analysis, while also providing a detailed 
account of what actually happened at the Juba Talks. 
In documenting the experience of the LRA/M, this thesis builds on extensive 
fieldwork conducted primarily with the LRA/M as they were going through 
the Juba Talks. I interviewed several of the major players in the Juba Talks—
some of them several times—namely LRA leader Kony, his deputy Otti, 
South Sudan’s Vice-President Machar, who mediated the talks, and the then 
head of OCHA, Egeland. I visited the LRA camp in southern Sudan’s Ri-
Kwangba seven times, with two overnight stays in the LRA camp deeper in 
the bush across the border in the DRC. The longest visit had me stay in the 
nearby village of Nabanga for 10 days, making daily visits to Ri-Kwangba 
59 P.Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution. London: Sage Publications, 2007, p.5.
60 T.Mkandawire, "The Terrible Toll of Post-Colonial 'Rebel Movements' in Africa: Towards and Explanation of the Violence against the 
Peasantry", The Journal of Modern African Studies 40, 2, 2002, p.168.
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five kilometres down a bush road. I spent time at the designated assembly 
area for LRA forces in Owiny-Kibul near the Ugandan border. The first time, 
I travelled to Owiny-Kibul on a field visit with the Cessation of Hostilities 
Monitoring Team comprised of LRA, UPDF and SPLA. My second stay in 
Owiny-Kibul lasted two weeks, during which I pitched my tent in the SPLA 
barracks and was kindly fed by the soldiers. 
I was present at many of the milestone events of the talks, such as various 
opening and signing ceremonies and Egeland’s visit to the LRA in the bush. 
On many days in Juba, I talked, observed and debated what was going on 
with the LRA/M or members of the mediation team. Over the course of 
almost three years of travelling to Sudan regularly during the Juba Talks, I 
conducted at least 400 semi-structured interviews with participants and 
civilians, and held many more informal conversations with participants in 
the Juba Talks.61  While the “official” part of my research for this 
dissertation was done in Sudan, it is also informed by several months I spent 
in Uganda in 2005, working with Dr Tim Allen on a report on LRA returnees 
and the mechanisms in place to support their reintegration.62 In addition, I 
conducted research on the phone, making frequent phone calls to the bush, 
and met with members of the Acholi diaspora in Europe and Kenya.
This seems like astonishing access to the LRA, and in comparison with what 
had been possible before, it was. Despite this, this thesis is limited by what 
research was possible depending on the mood of the actors (and my ability 
to finance my stay at the Juba Talks). Numerous ethical and methodological 
issues appeared along the way. The Juba Talks happened in a confined and 
very guarded space. The situation among actors remained fluid and was at 
times remarkably open. Sometimes all doors were closed and I was met with 
hostility. With multiple actors in charge, from the LRA/M to GoSS or 
international agencies such as OCHA or the UN Department of Political 
Affairs (DPA), consistent access was at no point guaranteed. This means that 
the empirical insights presented here inevitably suffer from selection bias in 
the sense that I was only allowed access to information when it was 
deemed useful or not harmful by the various actors. However, in 
monitoring when the LRA/M granted me access and when they pushed me 
away, I experienced myself how the LRA/M keeps people engaged by at 
times rejecting them and then inviting them back. My own experience of 
61 I undertook fieldwork in Sudan and Kenya specifically focused on the Juba Talks during the following times: 25/5–13/6/2006, 28/6–
15/7/2006, 9/8–16/8/2006, 4/9–18/12/2006, 15/2–26/2/2007, 28/5–8/6/2007, 6/7–21/7/2007, 21/9–4/10/2007, 22/1–16/2/2008, 13/3–
2/4/2008, 8/4–16/4/2008, 5/6– 27/6/2008. Between 2008 and submission of the thesis I travelled to Sudan and South Sudan repeatedly. 
While not every trip had an LRA focus, I gathered information on a range of subsequent occasions.
62 T.Allen and M.Schomerus, A Hard Homecoming: Lessons learned from the reception centre process on effective interventions for former 
'abductees' in northern Uganda. Washington DC/ Kampala: USAID/ UNICEF, 2006. 
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being trusted, being used and being betrayed sharpened my focus on this 
particular characteristic. Overall, in the summary account delivered in this 
thesis, my ethnographic perspective underscores the subjectivity of analysis 
in complex processes of conflict resolution. This problem extends also to 
using other source material, an issue I discuss further below.
I grappled with the common researcher’s dilemma that I was dealing with 
unreliable information, because respondents might not be telling the truth, 
either inadvertently or to serve a purpose.63  One of the international 
facilitators at the Juba Talks said to me that he took every statement given 
by LRA/M members with a grain of salt, including all the quotes I present in 
this thesis, as they were all tactical statements.64  When asking an LRA/M 
member for information, I sometimes said that my basic assumption was 
that everyone was lying and that at most half of what I was told was true. 
While that usually created a light-hearted moment of laughter, it did not 
solve my basic problem of how to deal with information that might have 
been intentionally misleading. Often I had information that I could not 
even file under “exaggerated truths”, as the information environment was 
too murky to establish a relationship between facts and how they were 
perceived.65 
There is another element to following an information trail over the course 
of many years in a dynamic environment. In addition to my ethnographic 
fieldwork, this thesis uses primary material from the peace talks: speeches, 
public statements, position papers, and press releases. These papers were 
written as part of the peace negotiations--such as position papers--or in 
response to the ongoing negotiations. This is particularly true for press 
releases that reflect the LRA/M’s anger at how events were unfolding. 
This material augments the information I gathered from direct interactions 
and interviews. The official LRA/M material constitutes the more public face 
the LRA/M wanted to project, usually written by a smaller committee within 
the LRA/M. Some of the public statements and position papers were drafted 
by no more than two people within the delegation. At all times, some of 
the delegates would work on statements, not all of which saw the light of 
day. Some of the public materials were drawn from previous material 
written by individuals within the delegation; other content was developed 
63 G.Gardner, "Unreliable memories and other contingencies: problems with biographical knowledge", Qualitative Research 1, 185, 2001. 
64 Personal email to author from an international advisor to the Juba Talks, 7/8/2011.
65 Watson calls this “situated reliability” or the “shifts and gaps in the narratives people construct about their lives.”C.Watson, "Unreliable 
narrators? 'Inconsistency' (and some inconstancy) in interviews", Qualitative Research 6, 3, 2006, p.368. Bourdieu has introduced the 
concept of “logic of practice”, meaning that respondents also tend to give what they think might be an appropriate or expected answer. 
P.Bourdieu, The logic of practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990 (1980).
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as the talks went along. In a few cases I use material that was never 
published, but was shared with me by the author or authors as an example 
of the LRA/M thinking. That not all public statements were signed off by 
the delegation with consensus highlights the tension within the delegation. 
Further, the dynamics of the environment naturally shaped the kind of 
information the LRA/M produced. A separate thesis could be written using 
solely the public material the LRA/M produced during the negotiations and 
how the changing dynamics and the responsiveness in the international 
environment influenced the LRA/M discourse and how it presented its 
public face. One particularly prominent stream of how changing dynamics 
were reflected in the public materials is the LRA/M’s growing realisation 
that while the GoSS had been the initial facilitator of the Juba Peace Talks, 
the young government’s own challenges in implementing its peace 
agreement far overshadowed its ability to handle an extremely complicated 
second peace process. The documents reflect this through a gradually 
changed attitude towards southern Sudan’s Vice-President Riek Machar and 
more generally speaking the SPLA. When towards the end of the 
negotiations the SPLA re-emerged as a military force that might be 
deployed against the LRA, rather than for its protection, the public 
documents become accusatory. 
The documents further reflect international developments and the LRA/M’s 
struggle to deal with those. Most prominently among the international 
parallel processes is the waxing and waning support for the ICC warrants. A 
separate analysis that focuses on just this point would produce a changing 
LRA/M stance on the validity of having to be accountable for their crimes. I 
have used this material in an interwoven way with ethnographic material to 
piece together a bigger picture of the LRA/M discourse during the peace 
talks and how these were experienced.
While it is true that my access was without precedent, I am aware that for 
the LRA/M so much was at stake that I largely saw a controlled external 
appearance. Goffman calls the process in which an individual creates a 
front, or a biography or opinion that they would like to have, a “front-
stage presentation”.66 I witnessed front-stage presentation as life narratives 
of delegates or fighters changed with each month in the public eye. From a 
strictly methodological point of view, gathering research data that I knew 
at various times to be manipulated might seem rather counterproductive. 
Yet by spending time with people, I tried to understand the process that 
66 Goffman cited in C.Watson, "Unreliable narrators? 'Inconsistency' (and some inconstancy) in interviews", Qualitative Research 6, 3, 
2006, p.371.
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went into the creation of the front-stage and how the front-stage was 
negotiated.67  This seemed to me important information, as the adjusted 
truths of front-stage presentations were also a reflection of what Lloyd 
describes as “practical dealings with [experienced] reality”.68 When dealing 
with information about definitive events such as military encounters, I tried 
to triangulate, using LRA, SPLA and UPDF sources to establish a middle 
ground. Nonetheless, in trying to gain the insider’s perspetive of the LRA/M, 
as ethnographers would aim to do, I was at all times aware that embedded 
in this endeavour is the realisation that I could only ever deliver an 
outsider’s report, as Pollner and Emerson describe the irony at the heart of 
ethnography.69
Members of the LRA/M at various points shared insights with me, but being 
actors in a situation where information came at a premium, they 
undoubtedly found it difficult to trust me, therefore controlling what they 
said to me. Further obvious constraints in delivering an analysis of the Juba 
Talks are that I did not attend the negotiations and that I avoided speaking 
in depth to GoU delegates. Conducting consciously one-sided research was 
necessary to not compromise my endeavour to document and analyse how 
the LRA/M experienced the Juba Talks. If I had been seen to talk at length 
with GoU delegates, members of the LRA/M would have surely avoided 
talking to me. As it was, how much access I was allowed was entirely 
dependent on the mood of the actors and how the talks were going. At 
times, I was accused by the LRA/M of being a spy—although it was not 
made clear to me for whom—or an investigator for the ICC, possibly with 
the power to arrest. My silver pendant in the shape of a chameleon was at 
various times scrutinised by Otti. I was later told that he was checking 
whether it was either a recording device or held poison. GoU supporters 
openly accused me—sometimes jokingly, sometimes angrily—of being an 
LRA member. While being accused was not a comfortable position to be in, 
neither was being seen as too close to the LRA, as evidenced in the reaction 
when I told a few of the LRA/M delegates that I was being harassed about 
67 A.Giddens, The Constituiton of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984.
68 G. Lloyd, Being in Time: Selves and Narrators in Philosphy and Literature. London: Routledge, 1993, p. 99. Gardner refers to the ideas of 
the philosopher Richard Rorty in discussing how knowledge is formed through associations and bonds which are “thick, heterogeneous and 
complex; informed by and articulating multiple psycho-personal, social, political, economic, social [sic], cultural and fundamentally material–
visceral elements. Accordingly, biographical knowledge is (and is frequently recognized by actors as) fundamentally ‘fuzzy’: ambiguous, 
ambivalent, ironic, self-contradictory, multiple and contingent”. G.Gardner, "Unreliable memories and other contingencies: problems with 
biographical knowledge", Qualitative Research 1, 185, 2001, p.194.
69 Pollner, M. and R.M. Emerson. "Ethnomethodology and Ethnography". In Handbook of Ethnography, edited by P Atkinson, A. Coffey, S. 
Delamont, J. Lofland and L.H. Lofland. London: Sage, 2001.
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belonging to them. One LRA/M delegate commented: “What is bad about 
that? We can give you a membership card.”70 
Being under scrutiny and in danger of losing my access at any moment 
meant that I had to simply record as much as I could, through multiple 
methods within my personal constraints. I do not speak Acholi and thus 
could not rely on classic participant observation. However, I became 
something of a participant observer by simply being present at many of the 
Juba Talks’ important occasions. Additionally, as part of the programming 
to support the peace talks, I ran two community projects in Eastern and 
Western Equatoria. I had observed that communities in close proximity to 
the designated LRA assembly sites had no access to reliable information on 
what was happening in Juba. I assembled a team of young Sudanese men 
to act as liaisons between the local community, the LRA in Ri-Kwangba and 
organisations in Juba. 
In Owiny-Kibul, the team was on the ground for six weeks in late 2006, 
travelling the area to hold community meetings to answer questions about 
the Juba Talks and collecting community concerns to report back to Juba. In 
Western Equatoria, the team spent about a month in Nabanga to liaise 
between the community and the LRA. In July 2007, they facilitated the first 
direct meeting between the administrator of the payam (district) and the 
LRA commander in charge of the Ri-Kwangba camp. The payam 
administrator relayed two pressing concerns, asking the LRA to allow 
residents in the area to tend to their coffee plantations, which were close 
to the LRA assembly site. Further, he appealed to the LRA to stop harvesting 
honey and then destroying beehives, as honey was an important cash crop. 
The LRA and the payam administrator eventually agreed to share the honey 
harvest and to regulate access to the coffee plantations. I was present for 
parts of both missions.71 
I gathered data in the various situations in which I found myself—through 
observation, casual conversations, official interviews, daily reflections noted 
down in my research journals and feedback on my thoughts from LRA/M, 
GoSS or international actors. Quite often, my research consisted of 
spending days in the bush, exchanging a few words with LRA soldiers on 
duty who often did not speak English, hoping to get some time with one of 
the more senior commanders. On those days, or when I waited for hours 
70 Fieldnotes, Juba: 10/10/2006.
71 Sponsored by Pact Sudan under a UN grant, the project was supposed to support the Juba Talks. Otti and Machar signed off on the 
presence of the community teams. Moving in the LRA assembly areas would have been impossible without Otti’s consent, and was 
forbidden under the Cessation of Hostilities agreement. The Owiny-Kibul team had to leave the area when it became unsafe. Shortly after 
the team facilitated the beehive and coffee agreement, Otti was killed. Neither agreement was implemented. With the deteriorating 
communication situation with the LRA, UN funding for community work ceased.
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outside the negotiation room to catch a moment of conversation with 
members of the LRA/M, I wrote notes to capture quotes and observations, 
grouping observations under thematic headings as the weeks passed by. 
The information is presented here as a mixture of an analytical narrative of 
the Juba Talks, comments by LRA/M members, and an analysis of emerging 
dynamics. Detail about the atmosphere and setting of the talks is vital 
because, as Beattie points out, “even the most matter-of-fact descriptions 
are shot through with abstractions, usually unanalysed ‘common sense’ 
ones… So description does more than merely describe; it is also in some 
degree explanatory.”72
Because the research began through a personal connection and continued 
to be marked by how I related to the LRA/M and how they related to me, it 
would seem as if methodologically my approach could best be characterised 
as reflexive ethnography in a process in which I somehow became, as 
Kincheloe and McLaren describe, part of the inquiry.73  Reflexive 
ethnography serves to understand how the researcher’s own experience helps 
in understanding the people being studied, at times with the researcher 
being the focus of the analysis.74  Yet in both data collection and analysis, 
calling my approach reflexive ethnography would be misleading and also 
suggest an inappropriate method for investigating the Jube Talks in the 
way I have done. Davies suggests that “reflexivity, broadly defined, means a 
turning back on oneself, a process of self-reference” which “refers to the 
way in which the products of research are affected by the personnel and 
process of doing research”.75  Clifford and Marcus in 1986 lead the critique 
of ethnographies as an act of creativity placing unduly emphasis on the 
researcher’s subjectivity. While my account of what actually happened at 
the Juba Talks is open to the criticism that it falls short of being an 
authoritative account of all facets of the process, it nonetheless provides a 
broader chronology as a baseline understanding of events. A purely 
reflexive approach to understanding the process would have narrowed the 
account too much. 
I cannot discount my own perceptions and what is presented here is an 
account of the Talks from my perspective. Particularly where events are 
disputed I will attempt to emphasise to what extent a piece of information 
is informed through my own presence and perception, along the lines of 
72 J.H.M Beattie, "Understanding and explanation in social anthropology." British Journal of Sociology 10,1959, p.48
73 Kincheloe, J.L. and P. McLaren. "Rethinking critical theory and qualitative research". In Handbook of Qualitative Research, edited by N.K. Denzin and Y.S. 
Lincoln. Pp. 279 - 313. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2000.
74 Ellis, C. and A.P Bochner. "Autoethnography, personal narrative, reflexivity: Researcher as subject". In Handbook of  Qualitative Research, edited by N.K. 
Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln. Pp. 279 - 313. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2000, p.740.
75 C.A. Davies, Reflexive ethnography : a guide to researching selves and others.  London: Routledge, 1998, p.4
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Okely’s argument that in an ethnographic account “the specificity and 
individuality of the observer are ever present and must therefore be 
acknowledged, explored and put to creative use.”76  Fully subscribing to 
reflexive ethnography overemphasises my own function in a multi-layered 
process which I argue needs to be the focus of attention. Why this is 
problematic becomes clearer through Davies’ description of the limits of 
reflexive ethnography “Total reflexivity requires full and uncompromising 
self-reference. Thus, it is argued, no process of knowing is fully reflexive 
until it is explicitly turned on the knower, who becomes self-conscious even 
of the reflexive process of knowing…In this fullest form, reflexivity, in spite 
of its unavoidable and essentially desirable presence in social research, 
becomes destructive of the process of doing such research.”77 To tackle this 
contradiction, my personal perspective will be more emphasised in some 
parts of the thesis than others. 
Crucially, this thesis is not only based on ethnographic first-hand research. It 
draws on a range of other source material that is no less problematic. I 
discuss in the following chapter the history of information on the LRA war 
and why many published sources are so unreliable. Yet, I also use some of 
these sources to make claims in this thesis. Such sources include reports 
from international agencies, internal government reports (thanks to 
WikiLeaks, the whistle-blowing website that published them) and media. 
The challenge of dealing with unreliable testimony applies just as much to 
these reports--in the case of media particularly so when it comes to citing 
the Ugandan government-owned newspaper The New Vision. I face this 
challenge by only including source material that I know for a fact not to be 
false because I have been able to triangulate it. However, naturally this 
issue also highlights the broader methodological challenge in dealing in 
murky information environments. I can only assess sources if I already have 
some prior knowledge about their content. Without being omniscient, it is 
inevitable that this means that I sometimes dismiss a correct source based 
on previous incorrect knowledge I have, and vice versa. 
Concerning US internal government documents published by WikiLeaks, this 
control mechanism is less useful as many of the processes described 
happened behind closed doors. However, these documents are used to 
illustrate the parallel discourse that occurred within the upper echelons of 
US government and how information was used and dispensed.
My analytical methods resembled the steps necessary for grounded theory, 
even though my approach to data collection did not always. As an inductive 
76 J. Okely, Own or other culture. London: Routledge, 1996, p.28.
77 C.A. Davies, Reflexive ethnography : a guide to researching selves and others. London: Routledge, 1998, p.7.
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method, grounded theory explicitly rejects the notion of starting research 
with a theoretical framework, and instead reverses the process by 
developing a framework from the data gathered. Classical grounded theory 
assumes that the researcher starts without looking at the existing literature 
on the subject, although this interpretation of the method is now much 
disputed, and certainly does not reflect my approach. In my case, going 
through the analytical process as outlined by grounded theory seemed 
particularly appropriate, as it was not clear during my research whether I 
was observing a successful or unsuccessful process. Gathering my thoughts 
every night and grouping them to develop themes quite naturally veered 
towards the “memo writing” and “coding and developing of concepts and 
categories” suggested in grounded theory, with strong elements of the 
“benign introspection” that Woolgar describes as crucial to reflexive 
ethnography.78 
However, a crucial element of grounded theory ethnography is, as Charmaz 
writes, giving “priority to the studied phenomenon or process—rather than 
a description of the setting. Thus...grounded theory ethnographers study 
what is happening in the setting and making a conceptual rendering of 
these actions”.79  Charmaz argues, “grounded theory methods move 
ethnographic research toward theoretical development by raising 
description to abstract categories and theoretical interpretation.”80 
Crucially, in the analysis of processes a grounded theory approach leads 
towards interpretive theory, which Charmaz sums up as calling “for the 
imaginative understanding on the studied phenomenon. This type of theory 
assumes emergent, multiple realities; indeterminancy; facts and values as 
inextricably linked; truth as provisional; and social life as processual”.81  In 
drawing out broader lessons from the complex Juba Talks, interpretive 
theory allows to reconcile an understanding of the fluidity of the process 
with its broader generalisable implications.
I have anonymised quotes from observers or advisors to the peace talks, as 
well as those from various LRA members and LRA/M delegates, unless these 
were given in public or explicitly on the record. I have also retained names 
where public records exist that identify a particular situation. I refer to all 
delegates in the masculine, since there were only two women on the 
78 Woolgar, S. "Reflexivity is the ethnographer of the text". In Knowledge and Reflexivity, edited by S. Woolgar. London: Sage, 1988, p.22; 
K.Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis. London: Sage Publications, 2006, p.72.
79 K.Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis. London: Sage Publications, 2006, p.22.
80 K.Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis. London: Sage Publications, 2006, p.23.
81 K.Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis. London: Sage Publications, 2006, p.126 - 
27.
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delegation and avoid too specific description of people. Eighteen delegates 
or LRA members are directly quoted throughout this thesis, and losing 
background information on the speakers in exchange for anonymity is a 
flaw. Yet hiding people’s identities is necessary. Some delegates only spoke 
under the condition of anonymity. Crucially, former delegates have run into 
problems after the talks. In Uganda, two members of the delegation had 
land taken away from them; one’s family has been harassed. Outside 
Uganda, one delegate lost his job; another was detained, accused of 
terrorism and threatened with extradition when he travelled to the country 
where his family is resident. In all cases, delegates’ engagement in the Juba 
Talks was cited as a reason for the trouble. Other delegates have returned 
to Uganda and no longer talk about their engagement in the Juba Talks. 
Some of the quoted LRA members cannot be reached to check whether I 
have represented their views correctly; some are no longer alive. 
International staff often spoke on the condition of anonymity.
Conclusion
Providing an analytical account of the Juba Peace Talks and how these were 
experienced by the LRA/M presents a range of challenges. This thesis will 
examine what happened and then focus on a few pertinent issues that help 
to explain why approaches to negotiating peace need rethinking. However, 
this endeavour comes with a range of challenges. First of all, it requires me 
to provide an account of what happened at the Juba Talks, including all its 
convoluted detail. This analytical narrative is broken down into three 
chapters, each following the chronology of one year. Analytical chapters 
shine a light on how the events described influenced thinking and 
behaviour in the LRA/M.
The muddled events at the Juba Talks highlight another challenge. As a 
researcher, I often found it difficult to keep my finger on the pulse of 
realities and memories that were permanently being shifted and 
reconstructed using multiple layers and power reassignments. In accepting 
this, I attempt, as Acker et al. write, to give “full legitimacy to the 
subjectivity of the other as well as to our own”.82 As I did my own analysis 
and observed others making theirs, it became obvious to me that the 
unreliability of the narrator was a problem with regard both to my research 
subjects and to me. Both sides were editing thoughts and outputs according 
to their own frames of reference. While some of my interviewees might 
have been deliberately manipulative—which makes them no less valuable 
82 J. Acker, K. Barry, and J. Essveld, "Objectivity and truth: problems in doing feminist research", in Beyond Methodology: Feminist 
Scholarship as Lived Research, ed. M Fonow and J Cook. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991, p.42.
46
to me—it is important to be aware of my own shortcomings in 
interpretation and analysis in an extremely confusing environment. In 
trying to untangle this rather messy information situation and present my 
findings in a coherent way, I am hoping to also contribute by showing the 
challenges and limitations of researching the complexity of these kinds of 
processes.
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2. Brief Histories of War, Peace and Information
In June 2006, I was in the back of a car with the future LRA/M delegation. 
When we had left Ibba to tackle the final two hours’ drive to Nabanga to 
meet Kony for the first time, it had started pouring. The Land Cruiser was 
so packed with people and equipment that I struggled to find a space for 
my feet between piles of bags and damp arms and legs. I was sitting 
opposite two designated LRA/M delegates. They were talking themselves 
into a rage about how the actions of the international community were 
responsible for continued conflict in this part of Africa. “The UN is just a 
bunch of robbers, they are exploiting the wealth of Congo”, one of the 
delegates said. The other argued that the UN showed a pro-Museveni bias 
by not being present in northern Uganda. I said that the World Food 
Programme, UNICEF and the World Health Organization were working 
there, although whether supporting life in the displacement camps was a 
good idea was contentious.83  The main point was, one of the delegates 
responded, that there were no UN soldiers to prevent UPDF attacks on the 
LRA: “The soldiers are never there when you need them for protection.” UN 
troops, they argued, would make the situation much better for the LRA and 
thus stop the spiral of violence. I thought this interesting. I asked if they 
thought that UN peacekeepers would protect the LRA—or would UN 
soldiers instead bring peace to Uganda, including safety for civilians from 
LRA attacks? At this point, another delegate interrupted the debate. He 
spoke to all of us when he said: “To solve the problem, you have to 
understand it first.”84
In an unreleased draft paper, the LRA/M delegation in Juba had set out 
what they were aiming to do. 
It is vital to boldly deal with the root causes of the conflict. We 
need to boldly deal with the past. How did Uganda come into 
being? How have the various groups now constituting the British 
thing now called Uganda been relating with one another? What 
are the constitutional issues that bedevilled our country? How did 
the war start? Why has it persisted? A simplistic approach will not 
work. 85
The following day I asked Kony what the conflict between the LRA and the 
GoU was about. He offered a simple explanation. “Let me say it, Museveni 
83 For an explanation of how aid agencies came to inadvertently support the government anti-insurgency strategy see A.Branch, Displacing 
Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda. New York: Oxford University Press USA, 2011, p.94. 
84 Fieldnotes Nabanga/Ri-Kwangba, 11/6/2006.
85 LRA/M delegation in Juba, "Unpublished notes", 11/9/2006.
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he did not want Acholi to be in their land there,” Kony said to me. “He 
want Acholi to be out, to complete, to die all. To be completed [dead], by 
all means. This is what Museveni is doing.”86  It was a very simple and 
sweeping explanation of what in Kony’s opinion had been happening in 
Uganda in the previous two decades. This chapter aims to provide a brief 
overview of the history of war, peace and information on the LRA, to set up 
the perspective of the LRA on the history of war and peace, and to situate 
this thesis within the existing scholarship on the LRA. It provides a history of 
the conflict as well as the discourse about the conflict, which was hugely 
influential in Juba. In doing so, this chapter also highlights the baggage 
that many of those involved in the Juba Talks brought to the process
War
During the Juba Talks, LRA/M delegates, in their internal discussions, often 
invoked former Ugandan president Milton Obote’s description of 
Museveni’s ascent to power: “The people of Uganda started their struggle 
in 1986 against a rapacious, oppressive and massacring regime led by a 
demented man.”87  In that tumultuous year, Museveni’s forces, the National 
Resistance Army (NRA), overthrew the government of Tito Okello, a 
northerner. On December 17, 1985, Museveni’s NRA and Okello’s military 
regime had signed the Nairobi Peace Agreement on power sharing, a 
peaceful settlement of the civil war, and on keeping Ugandan political 
leadership in the hands of Okello.88  Despite the agreement, Museveni’s 
forces marched on Kampala and overthrew Okello. People of Acholi origin 
who had been working with Okello’s government were dismissed from 
positions of power. Violence continued after the coup, with the new 
government under Museveni focusing its counter-insurgency tactics on the 
northern part of the country, where they suspected strong support for 
Okello. Many of Okello’s supporters, however, had fled the country. The 
elite group amongst them would later form the prominent and influential 
diaspora opposition to Museveni. 
However, the long history of violence in Uganda before 1986 also informs 
this conflict in many ways, including riots and attacks that happened as a 
86 Author interview with Joseph Kony, Sudan/ DRC border: 12/6/2006. I have minimally edited Kony’s quotes because his points can be 
confusing in written English, due to the ellipsis of a pronoun or the like. Where content is unclear, I will give my understanding of what he 
said. 
87 A.M. Obote, "Notes on Concealment of Genocide in Uganda",  Lusaka, 1990. 
88 C.Barnes and L.Okello, "Introduction", in Accord: Protracted conflict, elusive peace: Initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda, 
ed. Lucima Okello. London: Conciliation Resources, 2002.
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reaction to Obote’s consolidation of power during his first reign, and 
during Idi Amin’s bloody regime.89  Museveni himself had been a rebel 
against both Obote and Amin, and other regimes in power, since 1971. For 
the LRA/M, the conflict in Uganda is largely a story of betrayal, starting 
with what they called in a position paper Museveni’s “abrogation” of the 
Nairobi Peace Agreement.90  They argue in another official statement that 
Museveni took power with “a dirty record of insincerity”, proving his 
“treachery in negotiating and then trashing the Nairobi Peace 
Agreement”.91  The impact of this treachery is all the greater for those in 
the LRA and elsewhere who contrast Okello’s attempts at national 
reconciliation (despite their shortcomings) with Museveni’s subsequent 
divisive record.92  Museveni, wrote the LRA/M, instead abandoned national 
unity when he 
embarked on a deliberate policy to divide the country, firstly 
between the Bantu and the Nilotics and Nilo-Hamites.93  Although 
the Hima ethnic group from which Museveni himself comes is not 
of the Bantu stock, but Hematic [sic], like the Tutsis of Rwanda, he 
has nevertheless conveniently used this as a gimmick to win 
political cohesiveness and capital to galvanize his political hold on 
power, not only in Uganda, but also to promote his regional 
ambition within the Great Lakes Region and Africa as a whole.94
The LRA/M outlined how the election results of 2006 showed that 
Museveni’s party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), was 
a regional, but not a national party… Whereas the Bantu people 
of the southern and western Uganda overwhelmingly voted for 
89 D.Berg-Schlosser and R.Siegler, Political Stability and Development: A Comparative Analysis of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990.
90 LRA/M delegation in Juba. "Agenda for Peace and All-inclusive Political Tolerance in Uganda", 21/6/2006.
91 LRA/M delegation in Juba /O.Olweny, "First position paper of the LRA Peace Delegation during negotiations", Juba: 16/7/2006
92 Lomo writes that Okello invited all insurgent groups to join him in government, followed by reports that reconciliation ceremonies were 
held among the Acholi and West Nile communities: “Despite its shortcomings the significance of the Okello period was the fact that groups 
that formerly could not agree and who were determined to destroy each other, had accepted to put their differences aside and work 
together to build a united and peaceful Uganda.” Z.Lomo and L.Hovil, Negotiating peace: Resolution of Conflicts in Uganda's West Nile 
Region. Refugee Law Project Working Paper No. 12. Kampala: June 2004, p.10.
93 The LRA/M’s use of these contested terms suggests an essentialised view that they themselves often contest when it comes to the Acholi.
94 LRA/M delegation in Juba,"Agenda for Peace and All-inclusive Political Tolerance in Uganda", 21/6/2006. This passage gives an insight 
into how the LRA/M instrumentalises ethnicity and history. The hamitic (here mistakenly spelt hematic) creation myth of the sub-saharan 
African people was extensively used by colonialists to argue the superiority of some groups of people over others. Seligman’s work of the 
1930s has been seminal in establishing these categories, and is today largely dismissed. Although nowadays the Hima are considered Bantu 
and are generally referred to as the Tutsi sub-group living in Uganda, their origins are usually located elsewhere. It is often argued that 
originally the Hima are Nilotic and from Sudan and were only absorbed into the Bantu languages after arriving in what is today Uganda. The 
fine and deeply historical distinctions presented here by the LRA/M show that they are utilising ethnic differences in a similar way to those 
they criticise. 
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Museveni’s NRM party, the people of the northern and eastern 
part of the country overwhelmingly voted against the NRM party.95 
The LRA/M’s version of history as presented here points to the deep 
divisions within Uganda, including the instrumentalisation of ethnicity—a 
prominent feature in previous peace processes with the LRA.96
After Museveni took power, armed resistance grew in northern Uganda, in 
Lango and Teso.97 Armed rebellions in the latter two areas were largely over 
by the early 1990s; resistance in the north was to remain active for the next 
decades.98  The Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) had become 
active in August 1986 and was, argues Atkinson, largely supported by a 
“violated and disgruntled Acholi population”.99  When the UPDA signed an 
accord with the NRA in June 1988, Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Mobile Forces 
became the most prominent and supported armed group in northern 
Uganda. The NRA defeated Lakwena’s troops in 1987.100  When Kony was 
mandated by a group of Acholi elders from his lineage to resist Museveni 
with force, he named his group of fighters the United Holy Salvation Army 
in 1988 (they renamed themselves the United Democratic Christian Army in 
1992, and then the Lord’s Resistance Army). The NRA seemed generally 
unconcerned, having just defeated Lakwena’s forces. Yet, Kony proved a lot 
95 LRA/M delegation in Juba,"Agenda for Peace and All-inclusive Political Tolerance in Uganda", 21/6/2006.
96 Dolan describes how in the 1994 peace talks ethnicity was essentialised and used to establish who had authority to pursue peace with 
the LRA. C.G.Dolan, "Understanding War and Its Continuation: The Case of Northern Uganda", PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, 
2005, p. 111.
97 Lango includes the Central, Apac and Lira districts, north of Lake Kyoga; the corresponding language is spoken by 1, 490,000 people in 
Uganda. Teso covers Katakwi, Soroti, Kaberamaido, Kumi, Pallisa, and Tororo districts as well as Lokathan, Madial area, Nangeya Mountains 
north end. Teso is spoken by 1, 570,000 people in Uganda. From "Ethnologue database," in http://www.ethnologue.com.
98 The literature dealing with the history of this conflict is vast and varied. What is striking is the shift in perspective as understanding grows 
about the war’s complexities, with Finnstroem’s work marking a seminal moment in how the conflict was understood. See S.Finnstroem, 
Living with Bad Surroundings: War, history, and everyday moments in northern Uganda. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008. Other articles 
are rooted in the time they were written and linked to events that were foremost in people’s minds and discussions at the time of writing. 
Examples are F. van Acker, "Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army: The New Order No One Ordered", African Affairs 103, 412, 2004; and 
R.Doom and K.Vlassenroot, "Kony's Message: A New Koine? The Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda", African Affairs 98, 390,1999. In 
addition to many of the academic sources quoted, Green’s account of the early days of Kony’s fight, including how he was supported by the 
Acholi elders, is comprehensive. M.Green, The Wizard of the Nile: The Hunt for Africa's Most Wanted. London: Portobello Books, 2008.
99 R.R.Atkinson, The Roots of Ethnicity: The origins of the Acholi in Uganda. Kampala: Fountain Publishers Ltd, 2010 (1999), p.286.
100 See T.Allen, "Understanding Alice: Uganda’s Holy Spirit Movement in Context", Africa 61, 3, 1991; or Heike Behrend, Alice und die 
Geister: Krieg im Norden Ugandas. Munich: Trickster, 1993, more widely known in its English translation.
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more resilient than expected.101 Africa’s most enduring armed rebel group 
was born. 
Initially, the LRA’s military successes against the oppressive government 
forces garnered support among the northern Ugandan civilian population, 
particularly so after the government’s military offensive, Operation North, 
which was meant to end the LRA insurgency and improve security for 
civilians, instead brought arbitrary arrests and harassment of civilians in the 
north. Following Operation North and faced with the successful 
consolidations of the government’s power over territory and people, the 
rebels increasingly turned against civilians, instilling fear through attacks 
and abductions and recruiting most of its fighting force by coercion.102 
However, atrocities by Kony’s troops against Acholi civilians were not solely 
a reaction to the military offensive, but had been reported as early as 
1987.103  The LRA’s reputation as a fearless rebel group, strengthened by 
their adherence to spiritual rules, was soon established along with the fault 
lines of this war. The LRA justified its violence as a protest against the 
oppressive GoU, although public statements by the LRA with a clear 
political agenda were rarely heard, except during the attempts at peace, 
namely in 1993–94, further discussed below. 104 
While Uganda’s south and west gradually became more peaceful and 
prosperous, other parts, particularly the north, north-east and north-west, 
fell behind. For a period of intense fighting in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, the war garnered hardly any international attention, yet in northern 
Uganda millions of people were affected by the violence committed by the 
rebels, the army and the government policy of forcing people into 
101 O’Kadameri and Green both give accounts of how a group of Acholi elders mandated Kony to go into the bush and fight for the 
Acholi. B. O'Kadameri, B. 2002. “LRA/Government Negotiations 1993-94”, In Protracted conflict, elusive peace: Initiatives to end the 
violence in northern Uganda. London: Conciliation Resources, 2002; M.Green, The Wizard of the Nile: The Hunt for Africa's Most Wanted. 
London: Portobello Books, 2008.
102 Just before and after the Juba Talks, the LRA also attacked civilians in DRC and the Central African Republic. Particularly in Uganda, the 
interaction between civilians and the LRA is complicated. Being a member of the LRA was at times a choice for those wasting away in 
displacement camps. For a further discussion, see T.Allen and M.Schomerus, A Hard Homecoming: Lessons learned from the reception 
centre process on effective interventions for former 'abductees' in northern Uganda. Washington DC/ Kampala: USAID/ UNICEF, 2006. For a 
more detailed outline of how Sudanese civilians developed protection mechanisms by working with the LRA, see M.Schomerus, The Lord's 
Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview. Geneva: The Small Arms Survey, 2007.
103 Lamwaka writes “the group justified the cutting of people to pieces by pangas as something that was allowed by God in the Old 
Testament, making it therefore a justifiable ‘verdict’ against ‘sinners.’” C.Lamwaka, The Raging Storm: A Reporter’s Inside Account of the 
Northern Uganda War, 1986 - 2005.   ed. R.R. Atkinson. Kampala: Fountain, 2012, p.146.
104 Finnstroem outlines how political pamphlets by the LRA were systematically discredited by the GoU. S.Finnstroem, Living with Bad 
Surroundings: War, history, and everyday moments in northern Uganda. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008, Chapter 3. Kony’s four-hour 
speech at the 1994 peace talks is generally considered to be his first major effort to give his perspective.
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displacement camps—so-called protected villages.105  The contested policy, 
officially implemented from 1996 onwards, was a government response to 
the war situation.106  However, several LRA officers, including Otti, stressed 
that the Acholi were systematically herded into camps as soon as Museveni 
took power. Some said that the first Acholi were forced out of their homes 
in the autumn of 1986. Others, among them Otti, put the year at 1987. One 
younger LRA officer, who said he was born in 1980, described how he 
remembered people being taken into camps when he was a young child.107 
Caroline Lamwaka, the late Ugandan journalist working in Gulu at the time, 
seemed to confirm the LRA version at least partially. She estimated that 
between December 1986 and June 1988, of the 400,000 residents of Gulu 
district, 28,000 were displaced in Gulu town and more than 25,000 were 
“residing near the various NRA detaches in the rural areas, showing signs of 
malnutrition and living under appalling hygiene conditions”. She described 
the early displacement camps:
The “Caribbean camp” was a grotesque structure with open doors 
and windows without frames and fittings. A few hundred people 
were residing there, brought in by the army from Atiak, 42 miles 
northwest of Gulu, in January 1987 after a fierce battle there... The 
displaced people relied mainly on meagre food from the Ministry 
of Rehabilitation and from relatives and friends in town. It was a 
humanitarian crisis of the first order.108
105 Detailed accounts and analysis of the displacement come from P.Omach, "Civil War and Internal Displacement in Northern Uganda: 
1986-1998", Network of Ugandan researchers and research users( (NURRU), 2002; A.Branch, "Gulu Town in War...and Peace? 
Displacement, Humanitarianism and Post-War Crisis", London: Crisis States Working Paper, 2008; C.Lamwaka, The Raging Storm: A 
Reporter’s Inside Account of the Northern Uganda War, 1986 - 2001986-2005.  ed. R.R. Atkinson. Kampala: Fountain, 2012; C.Rodriguez, 
"The northern Uganda war: The ‘small conflict' that became the world's worst humanitarian crisis", Health Policy and Development Journal/ 
Health Policy and Development Department of Health Sciences of Uganda Martyrs University. 2, 2, 2004. Displacement was at its height 
between 2002 and 2005, increasing as a reaction to the military offensive Operation Iron Fist (OIF). However, the causes of displacement are 
contested: Kabonero, for example, argues that “the truth is that the people were forced to the camps by the LRA terrorists and were not at 
all compelled by government but rather were protected by government forces, the UPDF in particular.” R.T.Kabonero, "No genocide in 
Uganda", posted on Uganda Net, 27/6/2006.
106 Most sources consider the early days of the conflict in northern Uganda a time of military turmoil, as the UNLA continued its fight 
against the NRM, rather than a decisive strategic phase of targeted anti-northern policies. Dolan and Hovil divide the war into six distinct 
phases: 1986–88, 1988–94, 1994–99, 2000–02, 2002–03 and 2003–06. See C.Dolan and L.Hovil. "Humanitarian protection in Uganda: a 
Trojan Horse?" London: ODI, 2006.   A UNOCHA report states that in Gulu district, most “protected villages” were established between 
August and October 1996 after “a decision by the military authorities”; in Kitgum and Pader the “villages” were established between 
1995-1997.” See W.Weeks,"Pushing the envelope: Moving Beyond ‘Protected Villages’ in Northern Uganda", New York: UNOCHA, March 
2002.  Some sources mistakenly connect the policy with OIF as late as 2002, such as R.Mukwana and K.Ridderbos, "Uganda’s response to 
displacement: contrasting policy and practice", Forced Migration Review Special Issue: Ten Years of the Guiding Principles, 2009. Others play  
down the intensity of population movement in the early days of the Museveni regime, such as P.Omach, "Civil War and Internal 
Displacement in Northern Uganda: 1986-1998", Network of Ugandan researchers and research users( (NURRU), 2002.
107 Fieldnotes, Juba: 5/7/2006.
108 C.Lamwaka, The Raging Storm: A Reporter’s Inside Account of the Northern Uganda War, 1986 - 200.  ed. R.R. Atkinson. Kampala: 
Fountain, 2012.
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Describing what the policy of protected villages had done, the LRA wrote in 
2009 that 
due to the brutality of the armed conflict, the region has 
literally been made into a wasteland….Tens if not hundreds 
of thousands of people in the region have died, and over 2 
million people were displaced and encamped under 
genocidal conditions—mainly as a result of the government 
army’s counter-insurgency measures.”109
From the LRA/M’s point of view, Museveni was singularly to blame. A 1996 
LRA position paper stated:
The Acholiland is threatened and it can be safe only if Museveni is 
toppled. The whole of Uganda will be safe only if Museveni is 
removed. Museveni is one man in this world that Ugandans must 
not trust.110 
Kony’s interpretation that the cause of the war and the reason for its 
continuation was Museveni’s anti-Acholi policy is shared fully by those who 
argue that the GoU has systematically attempted to destroy the population 
of northern Uganda, particularly by forcing the entire population into 
displacement camps.111 To substantiate the argument that the LRA war had 
continued as a fight against Museveni’s anti-Acholi policy, the LRA/M 
referred to an alleged personal letter from Olara Otunnu to Kizza Besigye, 
written in early 2006. Otunnu at the time had resigned as UN 
Undersecretary General and Special Representative for Children and Armed 
109 LRA/M Peace Team, "Juba Peace Talks:  The Record of Sabotage by the Government of Uganda; The Reasons General Joseph Kony 
Wants the Peace Agreement Revisited;  and, The Way Forward”, Nairobi: 6/11/2009.The literature on the IDP situation in Uganda is vast and 
ranges from very specific local case studies and research reports to broader discussion papers on humanitarian protection and internal 
displacement, as well as personal accounts and technical reports. Examples include ACORD, Research Report on Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs), Gulu District. 2001; M. K. A.  Hassen and M. H. A.  Keating."The Responsibility to Protect: A Plan of Action for Northern Uganda". 
Vancouver: Liu Institute for Global Issues,  2004;  C.Dolan and L.Hovil. "Humanitarian protection in Uganda: a Trojan Horse?" London: ODI, 
2006; A.Mawson,"Breaking the Circle: Protecting Human Rights in the Northern War Zone", London: amnesty international, 1999; 
J.Egeland, A Billion Lives: An Eyewitness Report from the Frontlines of Humanity. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008;  World Health 
Organization/The Republic of Uganda Ministry of Health, Health and mortality survey among internally displaced persons in Gulu, Kitgum 
and Pader districts, northern Uganda, Kampala: 2005. Allen has made the point that the camps might qualify as a crime against humanity 
under international law. See T.Allen, Trial justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army. African Arguments, 
London: Zed Books, 2006. Branch has argued that the camps were a government crime propped up by the international community. See 
A.Branch, "Against Humanitarian Impunity: Rethinking Responsibility for Displacement and Disaster in Northern Uganda", Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding 2, 2, 2008. For more recent policy developments, including the policy of “decongestion”, see Refugee Law 
Project, “‘Only peace can restore the confidence of the displaced’: Update on the implementation of the recommendations made by the UN 
Secretary-General's representative on internally displaced persons following his visit to Uganda”, Kampala: Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre, March 2006. 
110 LRA document, "LRA Policy Definitions and Explanations", 26/9/1996.
111 Doom and Vlassenroot describe the “fear of extinction held by many Acholi people. In the eyes of Alice [Lakwena], the eve of total 
destruction was near, and resistance along modern political-military lines had led to defeat.”R.Doom and K.Vlassenroot, "Kony's Message: A 
New Koine? The Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda", African Affairs 98, 390,1999, p. 17. Jackson reiterates that both Lakwena and Kony 
“believed that the Acholi were about to be wiped out in massacres and reprisals.”P.Jackson, "Negotiating with Ghosts: Religion, Conflict 
and Peace in Northern Uganda", The Round Table 98, 402, 2009, p.324.
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Conflict, and was preparing his political comeback in Uganda to run against 
Museveni in the elections of 2011. Besigye had returned from exile to run as 
Museveni’s most threatening opponent in the 2006 elections, and had faced 
treason and rape charges brought against him. In the letter, Otunnu 
criticises Museveni’s remark—and by implication the government’s use of 
racism—that part of the reason for the continued violence was that it was 
“Acholi soldiers causing the problems. It is the cultural background of the 
people here; they are very violent. It is genetic” and that “the chauvinism 
of the Acholi has to be destroyed.”112  Otunnu went on to write that 
because of such attitudes within the government and the political 
consequence, the Acholi had suffered the “death of culture and values 
system” in addition to 20 years in which 
two generations of children have been denied education as a 
matter of policy. They have been deliberately condemned to a life 
of darkness and ignorance, deprived of all hope and opportunity... 
These children are being targeted for systematic deprivation in this 
way within the twisted and racist logic of genocide—to ensure 
that “those people” will never rise again!… In a society renowned 
for its deep-rooted and rich culture, values system and family 
structure—all these have been destroyed under the living 
conditions imposed and prevailing over the last 10 years in the 
camps. This loss is colossal and virtually irreparable; it signals the 
death of a people and their civilization.113
Few academics would go as far as Otunnu, who, having finished his tenure 
at the UN, in an acceptance speech for the Sydney Peace Prize also launched 
a scathing public criticism of the international response to the crisis in 
northern Uganda: 
I must draw your attention to the worst place on earth, by far, to 
be a child today. That place is the northern part of Uganda. What 
is going on in northern Uganda is not a routine humanitarian 
crisis, for which an appropriate response might be the mobilization 
of humanitarian relief. The human rights catastrophe unfolding in 
northern Uganda is a methodical and comprehensive genocide. An 
entire society is being systematically destroyed—physically, 
culturally, socially, and economically—in full view of the 
international community.114
112 O.Otunnu, "Private letter to Dr Kizza Besigye (Forum for Democratic Change)",  4/1/2006. 
113 O.Otunnu, "Private letter to Dr Kizza Besigye (Forum for Democratic Change)",  4/1/2006.
114 O.Otunnu, "Saving our Children from the Scourge of War: The Sydney Peace Prize 2005 Acceptance Speech,"Sydney: 9/11/2005. The 
language of genocide had been used before Otunnu’s speech; however, his status brought new levels of attention. Doom and Vlassenroot 
wrote in 2004 that the view that the Acholi population were “on the verge of genocide” was “widely accepted”. R.Doom and 
K.Vlassenroot, "Kony's Message: A New Koine? The Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda", African Affairs 98, 390,1999, p.22. When Otunnu 
went public with his criticism in 2006, the impact of his speech was not dampened by concerns about his own political interests in Uganda 
and his well-publicised antagonism towards President Museveni.
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Repeating his argument in an article in Foreign Policy magazine, he 
challenged the common line that the situation in northern Uganda 
stemmed from a one-sided killing campaign by insane rebels.115  While 
Otunnu offered the most radical interpretation regarding the intent behind 
northern Uganda’s neglect, most scholars of the conflict in northern 
Uganda agree that northern Uganda’s marginalisation was deliberate 
government policy, and that the government’s commitment to finding a 
negotiated solution to the conflict has been and remains questionable.116 
Otunnu’s suggestion that the international community was complicit in 
what was happening in northern Uganda was not new—amongst scholars, 
Branch, Dolan and Finnstroem have provided empirical material to argue 
international complicity.117  As early as 1990, former president Obote had 
concluded that a better future for Uganda was possible despite the 
international complicity: “I am convinced that however long it may take 
and whatever protection the world affords to the oppressors, freedom shall 
be won and that the Pearl of Africa shall rise and shine again.”118 
The atrocious conditions in the camps finally attracted the wider attention 
of the international community. In 2003, the then UN Undersecretary for 
Humanitarian Affairs, Egeland, made a highly publicised visit to the region, 
focusing in his subsequent press appearances on the plight of displaced 
civilians. Egeland described the situation at the time in an interview in 
2007:
It was very much a forgotten conflict, neglected conflict. I was 
myself shocked to my bones coming in the autumn of 2003 and I 
could not believe how bad it was in northern Uganda. And also 
checking, even in the couple of days, the international community 
why so little had been done really to alleviate the suffering but 
also to try to bring the conflict to an end. Everybody had failed. I 
then went very dramatically public on BBC and later other big… 
the whole BBC system and later CNN and said we have all failed, 
the international community, the Uganda government in northern 
115 O.Otunnu, "The Secret Genocide", Foreign Policy  (2006b): pps. 45 - 46.
116 Whitman presents a note from Museveni that seems to outline a plan for an Acholi genocide; the authenticity of the letter is contested, 
however. The author himself acknowledges this. T.D.Whitmore, "Genocide or Just Another "Casualty of War"? The Implications of the 
Memo Attributed to President Yoweri K. Museveni of Uganda", Practical Matters 3 Spring, 2010. Dolan outlines the governance system at 
the heart of the conflict as akin to “social torture”. C.Dolan, Social Torture: The Case of Northern Uganda, 1986 - 2006. Oxford/ New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2009. Egeland states in his book that he felt Museveni did not want a negotiated solution. J.Egeland, A Billion Lives: An 
Eyewitness Report from the Frontlines of Humanity. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008. Quinn points out that in the 2004–05 budget, 
the GoU only allocated 0.01% of the national budget to conflict resolution attempts in northern Uganda. See J.R. Quinn,"Getting to Peace? 
Negotiating with the LRA in Northern Uganda", Human Rights Review 10, 2009, p.61.
117 A.Branch, Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda. New York: Oxford University Press USA, 2011; C.Dolan, 
Social Torture: The Case of Northern Uganda, 1986 - 2006. Oxford/ New York: Berghahn Books, 2009; S.Finnstroem, Living with Bad 
Surroundings: War, history, and everyday moments in northern Uganda. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008.
118 A.M. Obote, "Notes on Concealment of Genocide in Uganda",  Lusaka, 1990.
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Uganda. So why had it not been brought on the international 
agenda or on the Security Council agenda? I think because 
everybody wanted Uganda to remain a success story.119 
Egeland’s visit refocused attention on alleviating civilian suffering in the 
camps, but also on getting a peace agreement with the LRA. The renewed 
emphasis on peace led to another failed attempt at a negotiated 
agreement by the end of 2004, discussed below. With new international 
attention on Uganda, 2005 brought a dramatic turning point. The newly 
established ICC concluded a controversial two-year investigation, which in 
July that year led to the issuing and later the unsealing of arrest warrants 
for five LRA commanders, including Kony and Otti. It was just after the 
unsealing of the warrants that Otti sought to speak to me on the phone to 
ask questions about the exact procedures behind this ominous organisation 
“ICC” that was coming after him—and to reiterate the LRA’s commitment to 
peace. 
Peace
Internationally, the ICC’s intervention was the most high-profile attempt to 
address the conflict in northern Uganda before the Juba Talks. Yet the 
history of  efforts to end the conflict is as long as the history of the violent 
conflict itself. When the Juba Talks opened on July 14, 2006, I saw many 
different expressions in the audience. Some faces showed excitement and 
enthusiasm; others looked sceptical with an air of weariness. This was 
because many of those in the room themselves were part of the history of 
peace attempts. There had been several efforts at negotiated peace 
between the LRA and the GoU, in addition to peace negotiations with 
other armed groups who had emerged from Uganda’s post-1986 turmoil—
most prominently the 1988 talks with the Uganda People’s Democratic 
Army (UPDA).120  LRA/M delegates in Juba often described previous peace 
attempts as two-faced. Museveni, they argued, had in the past shown the 
same duplicitous attitude towards peace deals that he had first displayed in 
1985. They said that for as long as he had been in government, Museveni 
had continued “to renege on so many agreements with so many other 
fighting forces, including with the LRA”; peace efforts in the past had been 
seen as a trap “to either kill the LRA leaders or lure them out of the 
119 Author telephone interview with Jan Egeland, 15/11/2007.
120 An account is at C.Lamwaka, "The peace process in northern Uganda 1986-1990", in Protracted conflict, elusive peace: Initiative to 
end the violence in northern Uganda. Accord Issue 11. O.Lucima, ed. London: Conciliation Resources: 2002.
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bush”.121 Establishing trust in another peace endeavour after so many failed 
attempts was to prove a major challenge in Juba.122 
The first government initiative to end LRA insurgency came in 1988. 
Museveni appointed Betty Bigombe to the new post of Minister of State for 
Pacification of Northern Uganda, Resident in Gulu—later renamed (to 
remove the offensive reference to “pacification”)—Minister of State in the 
Office of the Prime Minister, Resident in Northern Uganda. Having tried 
unsuccessfully for a few years to end the rebellion by encouraging family 
members to send messages to their fighting sons in the bush and arming 
villagers with arrows to defend themselves, Bigombe initiated peace talks 
by asking one of Kony’s main civilian confidants, Yusuf Adek, to connect her 
with Kony. Adek had then signed the Gulu Ceasefire in 1994 as a witness for 
the LRA. At the opening of the Juba Talks, Adek was seated as an LRA/M 
representative on the right side of the stage. 
Thanks to Adek’s initiative, the first ever face-to-face meeting between LRA 
and GoU representatives occurred on November 25, 1993, in Pagik, near 
Gulu.123 While the so-called Gulu Ceasefire gave Betty Bigombe the space to 
conduct these talks,124 failure to reach agreement over security issues at the 
second meeting on January 10, 1994, almost ended the effort.125 Crucially, 
the LRA were adamant that they were not defeated and were to be treated 
with respect by the government. They also stressed that the talks should be 
genuine negotiations, rather than an opportunity to set the conditions for 
surrender.126  The GoU’s dismissal of the LRA and the LRA’s endeavour to 
seek recognition for their struggle created irresolvable tension.127 
121 LRA/M Delegation in Juba/ O.Olweny. "First position paper of the LRA Peace Delegation during negotiations", Juba, 16/7/2006. 
122 Different perspectives on peacemaking in northern Uganda can be found in O.Lucima, ed., Protracted conflict, elusive peace: Initiatives 
to end the violence in northern Uganda. Accord Issue 11. London: Conciliation Resources, 2002; and Elizabeth Drew, ed., Initiatives to end 
the violence in northern Uganda: 2002 - 09 and the Juba Peace Process. Update to Issue 11. London: Conciliation Resources, 2010.
123 O’Kadameri was a rapporteur. B. O'Kadameri, “LRA/Government Negotiations 1993-94”, in Protracted conflict, elusive peace: Initiative 
to end the violence in northern Uganda. Accord 11. O.Lucima, ed. London: Conciliation Resources: 2002.
124 Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army, “The Gulu Ceasefire”, Gulu: 1994.
125 Apart from Dolan, O’Kadameri, and Branch, the 1994 peace talks tend to be dealt with in the literature in a cursory and summative 
manner—for example, B. D. Westbrook, "The Torment of Northern Uganda  A Legacy of Missed Opportunities", Online Journal for Peace 
and Conflict Resolution June, 2000; or P. J. Quaranto, "Ending the Real Nightmares of Northern Uganda", Peace Review 18, 1, 2006. Vinci 
offers an analysis of LRA motivations, but little insight into the talks A. Vinci, "Existential motivations in the Lord's Resistance Army's 
continuing conflict", Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, 4, 2007.
126 C.G.Dolan, "Understanding War and Its Continuation: The Case of Northern Uganda", PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, 2005, 
p. 113.
127 IC.G.Dolan, "Understanding War and Its Continuation: The Case of Northern Uganda", PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, 
2005, p. 109.
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After the second meeting in January, Museveni travelled to Gulu on 
February 6, 1994, for a public visit. Speaking to the crowd, he announced a 
deadline of seven days for the LRA to surrender before talks would be 
abandoned in favour of a military strike.128  Looking back, one LRA/M 
delegate in Juba described the situation: “Museveni’s deadline 1994 was a 
directive, not a deadline. It was a directive.”129 When the deadline was not 
met and the LRA retreated into Sudan, the talks had failed. The war had 
entered a new phase. Although the LRA had been present in Sudan since 
the early 1990s, it was after the failed talks of 1994 that it grew into one of 
the most destructive forces in southern Sudan and the most effective proxy 
army for the Government of Sudan.130  While the GoU generally maintains 
that talks ended because of Sudan’s involvement, Branch, amongst others, 
argues that Sudan’s involvement was a consequence of the failed talks, 
rather than the cause.131 
In retrospect, it became clear that the talks failed because the parties had 
irreconcilable objectives: the LRA wanted a political process and recognition 
of a political struggle, the GoU wanted the elimination of the LRA. 
Agreeing on security arrangements proved impossible. Government 
commitment to the talks was shaky: Bigombe herself has stated that there 
were attempts from within the government to sabotage the talks.132 Branch 
also asserts that 
the sabotaging of the peace talks made it clear that certain sectors 
within the NRA wanted the LRA to continue to exist, and would do 
whatever necessary to ensure that they remained in the bush. 
Thus, one aspect of their strategy would be to refuse, or sabotage, 
negotiations. The other aspect would be to repress political 
organization among the Acholi to ensure that they could not 
effectively demand an end to the war.133  
Describing what they were experiencing in Juba, delegates regularly drew 
parallels between the time of the Gulu Ceasefire and the Juba Talks: their 
own quest for a political process and recognition, the equivocal 
government commitment, and the struggle to agree on security issues had 
128 C.Rodriguez, "The northern Uganda war: The ‘small conflict' that became the world's worst humanitarian crisis", Health Policy and 
Development Journal/ Health Policy and Development Department of Health Sciences of Uganda Martyrs University. 2, 2, 2004.
129 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/7/2006.
130 G.Prunier, "Rebel movements and proxy warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986-99)", African Affairs 103, 412, 2004; 
M.Schomerus, The Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview. Geneva: The Small Arms Survey, 2007.
131 A.Branch, "Political Violence and the Peasantry in Northern Uganda, 1986-1998", African Studies Quarterly 8, 2, 2005.
132 B. O'Kadameri, “LRA/Government Negotiations 1993-94”, in Protracted conflict, elusive peace: Initiative to end the violence in northern 
Uganda. Accord 11. O.Lucima, ed. London: Conciliation Resources: 2002, p.40.
133 A.Branch, "Political Violence and the Peasantry in Northern Uganda, 1986-1998", African Studies Quarterly 8, 2, 2005.
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in their mind remained the same. The LRA might have felt betrayed in the 
1994 talks, but analysts had doubts over the LRA’s sincerity and rationality, 
too. Pain recounts that Kony was making decisions “on a ‘spirit’ basis, not 
rational. Therefore what is agreed today may be reversed tomorrow.”134 
The 1994 talks had shown that there was a flexibility and unpredictability in 
Kony’s decision-making process; the mainstream conclusion drawn from this 
was that there was a spiritual element in dealing with the LRA, which was 
soon mystified. A document by USAID later gave a less transcendental 
assessment of the 1994 talks and concluded that “Kony is willing to reach 
out to talk when he is pressured and when he trusts the person/people he is 
dealing with.”135  Yet when in 1996 the LRA killed a group of elders from 
Acholiland under the pretence of continuing the talks, doubts over the 
LRA’s sincerity about wanting to end the war were reinforced. 
Many who had played a role in trying to bring peace over the years 
gathered again at the Juba opening ceremony, bringing along their 
personal and institutional baggage. The memories they had of previous 
talks, and their histories of interaction would become crucial particularly in 
the first year of the Juba Talks. In addition to Adek, other LRA delegates 
had been representatives during various peace efforts. After the failed 1994 
talks, the Dutch organisations IKV Pax Christi and the Rome-based St Egidio 
had made peace attempts. Their representatives were also seated in the 
audience during the opening ceremony, as was the Sudanese Acholi Dr 
Leonzio Onek, who had become an important figure in the aftermath of 
the Gulu Ceasefire. 
After the 1994 talks had failed, Onek had contacted the GoU to offer help 
as a negotiator between the LRA and the GoU.136  His initiative was 
sanctioned at the time by Ruhakana Rugunda, then Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. In Juba, Rugunda was leading the GoU delegation as Minister for 
Interior Affairs; during the opening ceremony, he was seated to the left of 
the stage.137  Once the GoU had supported Onek in his quest to make 
contact with the LRA again, Onek sent the lawyer Owiny Dollo to 
134 D.Pain, “‘The Bending of Spears’: Producing consensus for peace and development in Northern Uganda”, London: International Alert/ 
Kacoke Madit, December 1997.  Pain’s work on the peace process with the LRA is influenced by his own beliefs as a born-again Christian. 
His analysis of the spirit-driven peace talks became very influential, yet much less attention was paid to Pain’s spirituality than to Kony’s. In 
Juba and beyond, the influence of Christian advocacy groups has become overwhelmingly powerful.
135 USAID, "Analysis of Lessons Learned From Past Efforts to End the Conflict in Northern Uganda”, Washington, DC.: 2006. 
136 Onek was at one point accused of being the secret leader of the LRA delegation. He explained his connection, which went back to 
1995, in a newspaper article: “I had written to the government of Uganda that I wanted to offer myself, as a Southern Sudanese Acholi, to 
assist with negotiations between the government and LRA”. See B.Kenyi, "Onek denies being head of the LRA delegation", Juba Post. Juba: 
22/6/2006.
137 Author interview with Sudanese advisor to peace talks. Juba: 8/12/2006.
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Khartoum, where reportedly Kony could regularly be found as a guest of 
his supporters in the Government of Sudan. Dollo had been involved in 
drafting the 1988 peace agreement with the UPDA and was about to 
become Minister of State for Northern Uganda. To cover up the real 
purpose of his trip to Khartoum, Dollo even dressed as a woman, Onek said. 
He would later give legal advice to the LRA on a visit to the bush in 
December 2006. In 1997 Onek succeeded in bringing representatives of the 
two sides face-to-face in Lancaster, UK, although not much came of that 
meeting. Still, some donors recognised the value of the efforts and 
strengthened the initiative by attaching Onek to people who were 
professionally involved in the field. Ethiopian Professor Hizkias Assefa was 
named to assist him in his mediating role.138  Dr Simon Simonse of Pax 
Christi, who in early 1998 had, as he described it, “stumbled on the secret 
initiative of the Equatoria Civic Fund of Dr Leonzio Onek in which Professor 
Hizkias Assefa was involved”, offered additional support.139 Pax Christi felt 
that they came close to success in 1998, having secured Dutch government 
support through Dutch Interchurch Aid “to bring the LRA leadership to 
Holland to meet with GoU… the Obita/Sant’Egidio connection frustrated 
this attempt.”140  Another speaker close to Pax Christi commented that this 
effort had been significant until “St Egidio came and hijacked the 
process.”141
What Pax Christi calls “hijacking” was a team effort by St Egidio and 
prominent member of the Acholi diaspora Dr James Obita. The Community 
of St Egidio is a Catholic lay organisation, headquartered in Rome, which 
runs humanitarian and peace-building programmes.142  In May 1997, 
representatives of the Acholi diaspora met in London for the first Kacoke 
Madit. Kacoke Madit (“big meeting”) was a unique attempt initiated by 
Acholi in the diaspora to bring people together in search of a new avenue 
for solving the conflict in northern Uganda through dialogue that was not 
138 B.Kenyi, "Onek denies being head of the LRA delegation", Juba Post. Juba: 22/6/2006.
139 Email to author from S.Simonse, IKV Pax Christi, 10/10/2007. Assefa, a prominent conflict resolution expert, was the Pax Christi-
designated mediator for the Juba Talks. See for example H.Assefa, "The challenge of mediation in internal wars: Reflections on the INN 
experience in the Ethiopian/ Eritrean conflict", Security Dialogue 23, 1992. Pax Christi’s description of their involvement in Juba can be 
found in S.Simonse, W. Verkoren, and G.Junne, "NGO Involvement in the Juba peace talks: the role and dilemmas of IKV Pax Christi", in 
The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T.Allen and K. Vlassenroot. London/ New York: Zed Books, 2010, p.226.
140 Email to author from S. Simonse, IKV Pax Christi. 10/10/2007.
141 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6.6.2006. The speaker expressed the feeling that a similar process was now happening in Juba, as the peace talks 
were being held rather publicly. See also S.Simonse, W. Verkoren, and G.Junne, "NGO Involvement in the Juba peace talks: the role and 
dilemmas of IKV Pax Christi", in The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T.Allen and K.Vlassenroot. London/ New York: Zed Books, 
2010.
142 See for example an explanatory article about St Egidio’s work by one of their representatives who participated in the Juba Talks: M.Giro, 
"The Community of Saint Egidio and its Peace-Making Activities", The International Spectator XXXIII, 3, July - September 1998.
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possible in Uganda. It also marked, as Doom and Vlassenroot say, a 
“departure from the historical trend that rebellions comparable to that of 
the LRA were always crushed by violence”.143  Kacoke Madit, although 
influential and adopting an ambitious approach, descended into infighting 
and was largely discredited by the Ugandan government, even though it is 
widely seen as a milestone attempt within the diaspora and remains active 
to this day.144 Attending for the LRA/M was Obita. Following the meeting in 
London, in late 1997 Obita sent an open letter to Museveni, confirming the 
LRA/M’s commitment to peace.145  The president reacted first in an open 
letter condemning what he called the LRA’s evasiveness and arrogance 
regarding peace negotiations. He then expressed the government’s 
willingness to end the war and give an amnesty to anyone but three top 
commanders.146  St Egidio offered Obita an alternative LRA/GoU meeting 
place in Rome, but the meeting never happened and the initiative 
dwindled. Instead, the LRA accused Obita of being insincere and he was 
dismissed by the LRA leader—narrowly escaping an assassination.147  Obita 
reappeared in Juba in 2007 as a member and later spokesperson of the LRA/
M. 
The crucial lesson from these various efforts was that rivalrous mediators 
had ended what was promising interactions with the LRA who withdrew 
from all contact after losing trust. The two organisations had now come 
back to Juba where the old rivalry instantly continued. That one 
organisation called the other’s effort a “hijacking” shines a light on the 
difficulty of managing diverse peacemaking interests. Crucially, it shows 
how the general baggage of the peacemakers—including those of the LRA/
M or the GoU who had been involved in previous efforts—remained 
unacknowledged. Thus a contradictory process was set up from the start, 
where the pronounced intention was to clear the air by addressing root 
causes and political marginalisation, yet without any explicit 
acknowledgment by any of the actors involved what lessons needed to be 
learned from past experiences.   
143 R.Doom and K.Vlassenroot, "Kony's Message: A New Koine? The Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda", African Affairs 98, 390,1999.
144 For more information on Kacoke Madit, see http://www.km-net.org.uk.
145 J.Obita, LRA/M Secretary for Foreign Affairs, "Letter to His Excellency Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda, 
State House, Kampala, Uganda", 6/11/1997.
146 Y.Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda, “Letter to J.Obita (Secretary for Foreign Affairs LRA/M)",  22/11/1997.
147 Obita’s account can be found in J.Obita, "First international peace efforts 1996-98", in Protracted conflict, elusive peace: Initiative to 
end the violence in northern Uganda. Accord 11. O.Lucima, ed. London: Conciliation Resources: 2002.
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An armistice in northern Uganda from January to December 1999 created 
space for the next steps.148  However, the armistice was followed by Carter 
Center mediation between the LRA, the GoU, and the Sudan government. 
The final settlement of this mediation—the 1999 Nairobi Agreement—was 
struck between the two governments only.149  Signed by Presidents 
Museveni and Omar Bashir of Sudan, and witnessed by former US president 
Jimmy Carter and Kenya’s President Daniel arap Moi, the Nairobi 
Agreement excluded northern Ugandan community leaders and terminated 
talks with the LRA. Describing the Carter Center’s involvement, one LRA 
commander said, “Jimmy Carter’s people did not speak to the right people, 
they did not have the right contacts, it was frustrating.”150  The Nairobi 
Agreement consequently did not include the LRA, but instead spelt out the 
end of each governments’ support for the other’s insurgencies, and paved 
the way for military intervention by the UPDF in pursuit of the LRA in 
Sudan.151  From then on, the UPDF was officially allowed to set up bases in 
Sudanese territory. Crucially, however, the Agreement also put in motion an 
amnesty law in Uganda as an incentive for rebels to put down their 
weapons.
In March 1999, Uganda signed the Rome Statute of the ICC. In a parallel 
development that would come to characterise the tension between 
international and national justice procedures in Uganda, parliament then in 
2000 passed Uganda’s Amnesty Act. The Act allowed rebels to return to 
their homes without fear of criminal charges, thus opening the possibility 
to end the war without prosecutions. In the opinion of some observers in 
Juba, the Amnesty Act created the space for Justice Peter Onega as the 
head of the commission and IKV Pax Christi to pursue the steps that would 
lead to the Juba Talks.152  However, Uganda’s ratification of the Rome 
Statute in June 2002 further complicated the interaction between the two 
parallel justice developments. That the US government had included the 
148 Jongomoi Okidi-Olal, a Ugandan who became an investment banker and soldier in the US Army Reserve who appeared in Juba in late 
2006 and seemed to be working closely with Riek Machar, in a letter to Machar takes credit for brokering the ceasefire—along with several 
other people. See J.Okidi-Olal, "Proposal by Lwo Development Incorporated Chairman",  Washington, D.C.: Lwo Development Inc., 2006. 
Various sources also state that Okidi-Olal was instrumental in moving the LRA into DRC.
149 The Governments of Sudan and Uganda and Sudan, "Nairobi Agreement", 8/12/1999.
150 Fieldnotes Nairobi/ Juba: 2/6/2006.
151 For a history on the UPDF in Sudan, see M.Schomerus, "They Forget What They Came For: Uganda's Army in Sudan", Journal of 
Eastern African Studies 6, 1, 2012.
152 Fieldnotes, 24/11/2007. The Amnesty Act has been allowed to expire in 2012, in violation of the Juba agreement. However, the expiry is 
being challenged. For an analysis of the Amnesty Act, see for example B.Afako, "Promoting Reconciliation: A Brief Review of the Amnesty 
Process in Uganda”, 2002; or L.Hovil and Z.Lomo, "Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda's Amnesty Act 2000: The Potential for Conflict 
Resolution and Long-Term Reconciliation,” Working Paper 15. Kampala: Refugee Law Project: 2005. 
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LRA on its Terrorist Exclusion List in 2001 had further muddled 
responsibilities.
In 2003, Museveni’s half-brother Salim Saleh was tasked with setting up 
talks with the LRA, but the initiative ceased without success after the LRA 
refused to assemble in government-appointed ceasefire safe zones and 
instead asked for a ceasefire in all of northern Uganda. In response, the 
GoU withdrew its safe zones offer in April 2003. Saleh reappeared as a 
player in the Juba Talks in the spring of 2007 in the infamous “Mombasa 
meeting”, discussed below. 
The 2004 talks, again initiated by Bigombe, used amnesty as the major 
incentive. Kony appointed Brigadier Sam Kolo to negotiate with Bigombe. 
The GoU declared a ceasefire in November 2004, which was extended after 
its initial run of seven days. The ceasefire was, writes Bismarck, “limited to 
specific zones where the rebels were expected to assemble so that 
negotiations could begin.”153 These zones included an initial area of about 
300 square kilometres included Patiko, Atanga, Palabek and Atiak. When 
Acholi leaders assured the LRA that their fighters would be safe in 
designated assembly zones after a peace deal had been agreed, 
negotiations seemed close to conclusion. However, Museveni soon reduced 
the ceasefire area from 300 to about 100 square kilometres and issued a 
new deadline for conclusion of the negotiations. The LRA stopped trusting 
the negotiation process. LRA Colonel Lubwoa Bwone emphatically argued 
in 2006, “last time, it was not peace talks.” Drawing a map of the proposed 
2004 assembly area along Palabek Kal road in the sand, he explained how 
the GoU “made the assembly area smaller and then they sent helicopter 
gunships within hours of our assembly”.154 
After the GoU bombed the LRA in the assembly area, the LRA attacked 
Alero in Gulu District on January 1, 2005. With this, the 2004 talks had 
officially collapsed; Museveni said that war had resumed. Just over a week 
later, on January 9, 2005, the South Sudanese rebels of the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army/Movement (SPLM/A) and the Government of Sudan signed 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). During the celebrations, SPLM/
A leader John Garang de Mabior announced that the LRA would be 
“treated as enemies of the united Sudan”.155 On February 3, 2005, the GoU 
declared a limited 18-day truce with the LRA in a bid to revive the flagging 
peace process. This effort was hampered when on February 16, 2005, LRA 
negotiator Kolo surrendered to the UPDF. The ceasefire ended on February 
153 S.Bismarck, "Traditional leaders meet LRA", Sudan Mirror, 13 - 26/12/2004.
154 Author interview with Col. Lubwoa Bwone and Lt.Col. Santo Alit (LRA). Ri-Kwangba: 22/9/2006.
155 IRIN, "Uganda - Year in Brief 2005 - A chronology of key events", 13/1/2006.
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22 with no significant achievements. The next news about the LRA came on 
March 8, when the UPDF and LRA clashed south of Tore in Sudan. A 
captured LRA lieutenant told the UPDF that the rest of his group was 
already in the DRC, and that he had been sent back to Sudan’s Central 
Equatoria to escort Kony to join the others.156
I asked various LRA/M members how they viewed previous attempts at 
peace. “Insincere”, “full of presidential directives” or “a trap” were 
common answers. Commenting on the 2004 attempt, one LRA member said 
that it had damaged their trust in any peace process tremendously because 
“Kolo took money, and he left a lot of people behind.” Otti wrote in his 
letter to me: “It is not that we are not interested in peace negotiations, but 
we don’t trust Bigombe and her peace team. These are bias people. They 
are after buying our people with money.”157 Bigombe’s very public handling 
of the peace talks and her close engagement with the GoU had led 
Kampala donors to nickname the 2004 peace talks the “friends of Betty 
parade”.158  A South Sudanese politician who had spent some time in 
Uganda during the 2004 process explained:
people were alienated from the peace process; it was not a people-
centred peace. The GoU was not interested in peace, because the 
more you engage northern Uganda, the more free is South and 
West Uganda and that is difficult for the GoU because fear of 
government has always been a factor in this war.159  
Quinn echoes the sentiment that in the process, the voices of civil society 
had been “largely eclipsed in the fray”, although some of the leaders, 
notably the Acholi religious leaders, had been engaged in peace efforts for 
years.160 
When the ICC announced Uganda’s referral of the situation in northern 
Uganda to the ICC prosecutor in December 2003, critics argued that the ICC 
was supporting the Ugandan government by portraying the war as a one-
sided LRA-problem and allowed the GoU to use this as a political tool.161 
The ICC’s engagement sparked a lively international debate on the court’s 
156 UNHCR,"Sudan Operations: Sudan/ Chad situation update 50", Juba: 9/3/2006. 
157 Personal letter to author from Vincent Otti, 25/8/2005.
158 Fieldnotes, Nairobi/ Juba: 2/6/2006.
159 Author interview with Dr Julia Duany, Undersecretary Parliamentary Affairs, Government of Southern Sudan. Juba: 15/10/2006.
160 J.R. Quinn,"Getting to Peace? Negotiating with the LRA in Northern Uganda", Human Rights Review 55, 2009, p.62.
161 A.Branch, "Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention", Ethics & International Affairs 21, 2, 2007; L.Parrott, "The Role of 
the International Criminal Court in Uganda: Ensuring that the Pursuit of Justice Does Not Come at the Price of Peace", Australian Journal of 
Peace Studies 1, 1, 2006; P.Clark, “Chasing cases: the ICC and the politics of state referral in the Democratic republic of Congo and 
Uganda”, in The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice, Volume II, C. Stahn and M. El Zeidy, eds.. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
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role in conflict situations and the politics of justice and accountability.162 
Local leaders in northern Uganda also voiced their concerns about the 
impact of potential ICC warrants on a peace process. On March 15, 2005, 
Acholi leaders from northern Uganda travelled to The Hague to ask the ICC 
to refrain from issuing arrest warrants against LRA leaders. 
In June 2005, just after the Ugandan Parliament had lifted restrictions on 
presidential terms to allow Museveni to run again for president, the 
President publicly pledged to forgive Kony if he surrendered to government 
forces, stating that Kony would receive the same treatment and immunity 
from prosecution as other former LRA commanders, such as former rebel 
spokesman Kolo.163  In Sudan, Garang reiterated his earlier commitment to 
get rid of the LRA, promising “Kony won’t be hiding there for long.”164 The 
lack of credibility of any peace process was confirmed from an unexpected 
source. When a report by the Ugandan health ministry and its partners 
revealed in August 2005 that 1,000 IDPs in northern Uganda died every 
week from violence or disease, notably malaria and HIV/AIDS, Egeland 
commented: “Given the conditions in the camps, it is not surprising that 
many LRA combatants remain in the bush. We have not done enough to 
create a ‘pull factor’ that could draw more of the LRA to disarmament and 
reintegration programmes.”165
On July 9, 2005, the ICC issued five sealed warrants—which means they 
were only shared with persons authorised by the court—for LRA 
commanders Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya 
and Dominic Ongwen. The warrants were unsealed—which means they 
were made public—on October 13 the same year.166 Reception was mixed. 
Some hailed the move as a historic step towards ending impunity for the 
162 Notable contributions include T.Allen, Trial justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army. African Arguments, 
London: Zed Books, 2006; amnesty international, "Left to their own devices: The continued suffering of victims of the conflict in Northern 
Uganda and the need for reparations", 2008; K.P.Apuuli, "Amnesty and international law: the case of the Lord's Resistance Army insurgents 
in northern Uganda", African Journal on Conflict Resolution 5, 2, 2005, p.57; Council on Foreign Relations, “In Uganda, Peace Versus 
Justice" Washington, D.C.: 2006;  P. Akhavan, "The Lord's Resistance Army Case: Uganda's submission of the first state referral to the 
International Criminal Court", American Journal of International Law 99, 2, 2005; J. N. Clark, "The ICC, Uganda and the LRA: Re-Framing 
the Debate", African Studies 69, 1, 2010;  B.Afako, "Negotiating in the shadow of justice" in Initiatives to end the violence in northern 
Uganda: 2002 - 09 and the Juba Peace Process. Update to Issue 11. Elizabeth Drew, ed. London: Conciliation Resources, 2010.
163 IRIN, "Uganda - Year in Brief 2005 - A chronology of key events", 13/1/2006.
164 UNOCHA-IRIN, "Sudan-Uganda: SPLM/A leader pledges to help Ugandan peace effort", 31/1/2005.
165 IRIN, "Uganda: Year in Review 2005 - rebel activity and political upheaval", 2005.
166 International Criminal Court, "Warrant of Arrest Unsealed Against Five LRA commanders",  The Hague: 14/10/2005. Cole gives a useful 
brief discussion of the pros and cons of keeping ICC warrants sealed or unsealed in active conflicts. See A.Cole, "Gaddafi might have been 
arrested by now if the ICC's warrant had been sealed", The Guardian Legal Network, 31/8/2011.
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worst of crimes.167 Others argued that the option to discuss peace had been 
curtailed and replaced with a politicised, but difficult-to-execute arrest 
warrant, leaving northern Uganda without any credible option to pursue 
peace.168  ICC supporters later argued that it was because of the warrants 
that the talks came about, as Grono and O’Brien write: “The threat of 
prosecution clearly rattled the LRA military leadership, pushing them to the 
negotiating table.”169 The ICC intervention, it was hoped by its supporters, 
could change dynamics to spell the end for the LRA, although precisely how 
local negotiations would be balanced with the international warrants was 
never clear. 
Opponents of the ICC warrants contended that they made ending violence 
look like an unattractive option, as Dowden holds: “Western policy, led by 
Britain, is to capture Kony and his fellow cult leaders and take them to the 
international court, while Museveni’s aim is a military victory. Kony has no 
incentive to talk.”170 Otti’s confusion as to how exactly the ICC would deal 
with him was not surprising—that he would not receive capital punishment 
was indeed the only clear point. Yet, with all the international attention, at 
the time of my first contact with Otti in late 2005, it seemed as if the LRA 
had been cornered. The LRA, however, had quite a different view. They had 
observed how outside peace-building initiatives were transforming Gulu 
from the centre of war into an aid-industry hub; the possibility of peace 
with the LRA was driving business.171 In addition to all the disincentives to 
engaging in peace talks, seeing the world come to Gulu was one reason 
why in late 2005 discussing peace became more attractive again to the LRA.
The LRA Moves Towards the Juba Talks
Otti argued that 2005 was a good moment to get the LRA’s points across, as 
the world was now paying attention. Others from the LRA stressed that 
they were confused by the complicated new situation and it seemed best to 
167 UN News Service, "Annan Hails International Criminal Courts’ Arrest Warrants for Five Ugandan Rebels", New York: 14/10/2005.
168 The literature on this discussion could fill a library. Apuuli and Rodman present concise arguments. K.P.Apuuli, "The ICC Arrest Warrants 
for the Lord's Resistance Army Leaders and Peace Prospects for Northern Uganda", Journal of International Criminal Justice 4, 1, 2006; and 
K.A.Rodman, "Is peace in the Interests of Justice? The Case for Broad ProsecutorialDiscretion at the International Criminal Court", Leiden 
Journal of International Law 22, 2009. 
169 N.Grono and A.O'Brien, "Justice in Conflict: The International Criminal Court and Peace Processes in Africa", Royal African Society, 
2007, p.15.
170 R.Dowden, "Inspiration behind the 'terror gang'", The Observer, 2/4/2006.
171 An insightful assessment of the impact of the aid industry in Gulu comes is A.Branch, "Gulu Town in War...and Peace? Displacement, 
Humanitarianism and Post-War Crisis", London: Crisis States Working Paper, 2008.
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tackle it through negotiations. However, the LRA wanted time to 
understand the new situation before making any commitment, and to 
prove that they were not yet defeated. When I spoke to Otti in January 
2006, he expected “to carry on with war until June, July”, which was about 
when dry season would end. He saw continued fighting until the rainy 
season as the only option because there was “money out on our heads”. He 
explained that Walter Ochora, the then Gulu Resident District Coordinator 
(RDC), had announced this on the radio, and the LRA now had no choice 
but to be “out to get Ochora”.172 “We are going to win, we are sure,” Otti 
said, explaining that Ochora’s announcement had left them with the only 
option to continue fighting until they were no longer threatened, since 
they could not have 
peace talks on the phone…. Every day in the bush, we are attacked 
several times. We have killed several [UPDF] commanders, George, 
the district commander 050. We are staying now in the bush as our 
home. We are scattered now, I am nowhere near the chairman.
He emphasised “the chairman is not with me, but I will organise a phone 
talk. Kony is fearing a call from somebody. He will call you, he cannot be 
called.” Otti told me to call him each day between 7.30 and 7.45pm, 
because the LRA would be in long prayers before that and they would keep 
“praying until the end of the month”.173
It was during this time in late 2005 and early 2006 that Riek Machar, with 
the help of IKV Pax Christi, was making contact with the LRA leadership to 
arrange a meeting in the bush. Machar, one of the most contentious and 
skilled personalities in Sudanese politics, had just been named Vice-
President of GoSS, after the former deputy Kiir had replaced Garang, who 
was killed in a helicopter crash. Machar’s war history connected him to the 
LRA: having split from the SPLA in 1991, his subsequent South Sudan 
Independence Movement was one of the groups acting as connectors 
between the LRA and their sponsor in Khartoum.174 Machar returned to the 
SPLA/M after reconciling with Garang in 2002; nonetheless, his past meant 
that there was substantial distrust of his motives. 
172 Colonel Walter Ochora was Gulu’s LC5 from 1996 to 2006. In 2006, he lost his position to Norbert Mao. In 1985, Ochora had marched 
with the UNLA towards Kampala to protest against President Obote’s treatment of Acholi officers; one interpretation of the event is that it 
led to Obote’s flight to Kenya, paving the way for Tito Okello’s government. A great supporter of the NRM, he was best known for leading a 
delegation of Acholi leaders into the bush to meet with Sam Kolo before the 2004 peace talks collapsed. For the LRA, Ochora remained an 
important contact: he was Gulu’s RDC, and was seen by the LRA leadership as a nemesis as well as an important contact.
173 Fieldnotes, Juba: 7/9/2006
174 See D.H.Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars. Oxford,Bloomington, Kampala: Currey; Indiana University Press; Fountain 
Publishers, 2003; and M.Schomerus, The Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview. Geneva: The Small Arms Survey, 2007.
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On December 20, 2005, members of the SPLM said that LRA representatives 
had been in touch by email to respond to an SPLM offer to mediate peace 
talks. Machar stated that the LRA had accepted, although there had been 
no direct contact.175  Parallel contacts developed through individual 
delegates, through Justice Onega from the Ugandan Amnesty Commission, 
and through IKV Pax Christi.176 Sudanese local leaders sought contact with 
the LRA by leaving messages in villages the LRA had attacked. For months, 
explained the then MP for Magwi County, Betty Acan Ogwaro, “Riek 
Machar did not succeed to make contact with the LRA leadership because 
every group he spoke to claimed to be able to make the contact, but 
nobody did.”177  In the end, she elaborated, it was a six-man team with 
people from Juba, the UK, Uganda and Kenya that made contact, possibly 
triggered by a false alarm in a newspaper. 
When the newspaper claimed that one team of those searching for 
an LRA contact had been contacted by Kony, another team, which 
was led by Dr Onek, received a phone call and he was told that he 
would be connected to the leadership. That is how Dr Onek met 
the LRA representative and they rung Number Two [Otti] and 
spoke to him. We were looking at that connection for five to six 
months.178 
On February 2, 2006, Machar succeeded in contacting Otti on the phone.179 
Shortly after, LRA representatives Richard Odong, Martin Ojul, Sunday Otto 
and Peter Ongom met with representatives of Pax Christi in Nairobi, having 
made contact with Pax Christi the previous December. For Pax Christi, 
judging the credibility of the meeting was a challenge. Despite having been 
working on a peaceful solution for Uganda for years, they had never 
previously encountered these men.180  Recalling the first meeting, Onek 
explained that two men in particular—who were also two of my initial 
contacts—were “very convincing. [One] was very articulate; he talked like 
an old man. He was very clever. Pax [Christi] thought we don’t have any 
chance. This might be it.”181 
After the meeting in Nairobi, on February 14 a small delegation of LRA/M 
and Pax Christi took a chartered plane to Juba, paid for by Pax Christi, to 
175 C.Etukuri, "LRA accepts southern Sudan peace mediation", The New Vision: 20/12/2005.
176 Fieldnotes, 24/11/2007.
177 Author interview with Betty Achan Ogwaro, MP Magwi County  Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly. Juba: 9/9/2006.
178 Author interview with Betty Achan Ogwaro, MP Magwi County  Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly. Juba: 9/9/2006.
179 "The Hot Seat Show Panel”, KFM Kampala 5/9/2006.
180 See also S.Simonse, W. Verkoren, and G.Junne, "NGO Involvement in the Juba peace talks: the role and dilemmas of IKV Pax Christi", in 
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meet Machar face-to-face.182  Upon arrival, they were ushered towards the 
Vice-President’s office. For the delegates it was significant that they were 
allowed to enter Sudan “without having our passports stamped”—akin to 
the way a diplomat on a covert mission would be treated, as one of the LRA 
representatives said.183 One of the original LRA/M delegates got a nickname 
out of this: they had entered Juba like diplomats on a mission, so the 
delegation from then on called him “Ambassador”. Because Machar treated 
them like respected diplomats, the LRA representatives trusted his motives. 
In a three-hour meeting in Juba that day, Machar—sceptical that he was 
indeed talking to LRA representatives—asked to call Otti. “He wanted to 
know if we were real,” one of the delegates explained.184  Delegates and 
SPLM then checked each other out by comparing phone numbers and text 
messages sent earlier. “Machar was friendly, he said he had been wanting 
to make contact for a long time,” another delegate said.185 
Machar needed to solve the LRA problem for his own country and to ensure 
that the CPA could be implemented in all of Southern Sudan, including in 
the areas in the Equatorias that continued to be affected by the LRA. 
Additionally, Machar was unhappy about the UPDF moving freely in Sudan: 
“I don’t feel very comfortable under an invasion,” he said in June 2006, 
referring to the fact that the UPDF’s mandate to operate in Sudan had 
expired the previous January.186  Machar was in a unique position to take 
the lead in a complicated situation. As Vice-President of a semi-autonomous 
country (which was southern Sudan’s status from 2005 to 2011), he was not 
bound to most international treaties. Sudan had not ratified the Rome 
Statute, thus it had no obligation to arrest and extradite those with an ICC 
arrest warrant against them. He had personal connections with the LRA 
going back to the times of the SPLA split. A successful peace deal with the 
LRA would boost both his and his new government’s international profile. 
Still, when Machar invited the delegation to stay in Juba overnight, they 
declined. “We had to get straight back, we did not trust him enough to stay 
182 GoSS’s announcements that they would facilitate peace talks immediately widened the circle of participants: Sudanese Acholi elders 
offered to try to establish trust with the LRA, and argued that they needed to be involved in the complex process. After meeting Machar, the 
community group connected with Dr Onek and Ojul. Ojul reportedly explained that the LRA did not trust anybody because of the ICC, but 
he thought that if a mediator could be found who could be trusted, there were possibilities for talks if they were not influenced by, as one 
of the Sudanese present phrased it, “those who want to crucify the LRA”. Staff from Gulu University met with Machar in early January 2006 
to discuss the specifics of how GoSS might function as a chief mediator. Various fieldnotes, Juba.
183 Fieldnotes, Juba: 12/9/2006.
184 Fieldnotes, Juba: 9/7/2006.
185 Fieldnotes, Juba: 9/7/2006.
186 Fieldnotes, Maridi: 13/6/2006.
70
in Juba.”187  However, the trust expanded far enough to allow a second 
meeting with Machar to be arranged through Pax Christi, said one 
delegate: “Machar said he can handle the peace talks.”188 Machar had set 
himself a huge task. On March 24, 2006, the UN Security Council passed a 
resolution that “strongly condemned activities of militias and armed groups 
such as the LRA, which continue to attack civilians and commit human 
rights abuses in Sudan”.189  A week later, Egeland pitched in with a 
comment, declaring the 20-year conflict in northern Uganda “the world’s 
worst form of terrorism” during a visit to Uganda’s Patongo camp for the 
displaced in Pader district.190
After the first meeting, the LRA/M had led Machar to believe that he would 
next, as one delegate phrased it, “connect with Otti” in Jebel Lien, just 
outside Juba, in April.191  At the last minute, Machar was given a new 
location for the meeting: Nabanga in Western Equatoria, on the border 
with the DRC. One delegate explained: “Machar thought we were mad 
when we were asking for Nabanga because [Nabanga and Jebel Lien] are so 
far apart. But we were in control of the territory; there was nothing he 
could do.”192 Exerting this control was particularly important for the LRA.193 
Onek described the first meeting in the bush on April 11: “It was 
interesting. It was scary.”194  Heavily armed LRA fighters led Machar deep 
into the bush in a stern atmosphere. The outcome was an agreement 
between Machar and Otti to meet again—next time with Kony in 
attendance. 
On May 3, 2006, Kony turned up at the second meeting in Nabanga. Most 
of those at the meeting described the moment as exhilarating. During the 
meeting, Machar handed Kony an envelope with US$20,000 to buy food. 
The interaction was filmed, presumably to provide proof to Museveni that 
Kony really had met with Machar. Reportedly, Salva Kiir showed the video 
to Museveni on May 13 as evidence that the LRA was engaged; Museveni 
187 Fieldnotes, Juba: 9/7/2006.
188 Fieldnotes, 24/11/2007.
189 IRIN, "Uganda: Chronology of key events in 2006", 2006.
190 IRIN, "Uganda: Chronology of key events in 2006", 2006.
191 Fieldnotes, 24/11/2007.
192 Fieldnotes, Obbo/ Magwi: 4/10/2006.
193 Dolan argues that in the 1994 talks, the LRA asserted control through rules such as searching outsiders for weapons, cleansing them 
with holy water, and being in command of where meetings took place.  See C.G.Dolan, "Understanding War and Its Continuation: The 
Case of Northern Uganda", PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, 2005.
194 Author interview with Sudanese advisor to peace talks. Juba: 8/12/2006.
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agreed that the amnesty for the LRA high command would remain in 
place.195  The video was leaked to Reuters in Nairobi on May 24, causing a 
stir: it was the first footage of Kony in more than a decade, and his 
reappearance made world news. Machar’s decision to hand over money was 
met with international criticism. However, internally in the LRA, enthusiasm 
for the peace effort was maintained when the SPLA held up their side of 
the bargain and started to deliver food provisions to Nabanga. The 
delegation went back to Nairobi to assemble fully, said one delegate: “We 
thought this was now possible, we could start negotiations, we could start a 
peace process to end this thing. We could bring all our people together.”196 
They said they were unfazed, even when, on May 17, Museveni announced 
that the LRA would now have a two-month ultimatum “to peacefully end 
terrorism” or face a combined force of Ugandan and Southern Sudanese 
troops. However, Museveni reiterated that if Kony “got serious about a 
peaceful settlement, the government would guarantee his safety”.197
On June 2, the same day Interpol sent wanted persons red notices to 184 
countries in connection with the ICC warrants against the LRA high 
command,198  a provisional LRA peace delegation travelled to Juba, 
accompanied by two representatives from St Egidio. A representative of Pax 
Christi followed a few days later and was surprised to find St Egidio in Juba. 
The two organisations did not speak to each other. Having waited a few 
days for a meeting with Machar, who was delayed in Khartoum, they met 
with the Vice-President in the evening of June 7. Both Machar and the LRA/
M reiterated their commitment to the peace effort; plans were made to 
travel to the bush to connect with Kony and Otti. The following day, 
representatives of the UN Security Council visited Juba for an extraordinary 
meeting on Darfur with Kiir and Machar. With the UN press corps in town, 
the first international news stories appeared about the rumour that an LRA 
delegation was in Juba.
During the meeting on Darfur, the United Kingdom Ambassador to the 
United Nations and head of the Security Council visiting delegation Emyr 
Jones Parry reiterated the international community’s position on the LRA: 
“LRA is a threat to the peace and stability of the region and [the Security 
Council] would very much like this scourge to be eliminated.” Kiir 
reportedly answered, 
195 IRIN, "Uganda: Key events in the northern conflict since May", 30/8/2006.
196 Fieldnotes, Juba: 28/9/2006.
197 IRIN, "Uganda: Key events in the northern conflict since May", 30/8/2006.
198 BBC News, "Interpol push for Uganda arrests",  2/6/2006.
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we think that arresting Joseph Kony   is not the solution to the 
problem by itself. Arresting Joseph Kony, another leader will just 
surface from nowhere and so, taking Joseph Kony or the other 
four indictees will not be the end of the problem. Some new 
commanders will come up they may even be worse than Joseph 
Kony.
Ambassador Jones Parry reportedly added that he would “support the 
proposition of the five indictments issued by the International Criminal 
Court (to) be given effect”.199
A few days later on June 11, 2006, again in Ri-Kwangba, near the small 
Western Equatorian village of Nabanga, Machar met once more with both 
Kony and Otti. The two LRA leaders were dressed in military fatigues and 
surrounded by armed young soldiers in mix-and-match uniforms. Machar 
arrived in civilian clothing with only minimal protection from unarmed SPLA 
soldiers. That the external pressures on the talks would be huge had 
become even clearer after the Security Council meeting on Darfur, but 
Machar seemed confident that it was going to be a worthwhile project to 
mediate between the GoU and the LRA.200  He had also tried to drum up 
international support. Waiting in the bush for Kony, he spoke on the 
satellite phone to representatives of President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa 
and President Mwai Kibaki of Kenya.201 Later he tried to convince the White 
House that his was a promising undertaking.202  While he said Mbeki and 
Kibaki had responded positively, broader support for his attempt at peace 
talks in the early days was underwhelming to outright hostile. Machar and 
the delegates left the bush on June 12, with Ojul officially appointed as the 
leader of the LRA/M delegation and Olweny as the LRA/M’s spokesperson.
After news of the latest meeting in the bush transpired, Kampala reacted 
with a turn-around on the earlier statement that the amnesty would stand 
even for the LRA leadership. The GoU now said that they could not meet 
LRA leaders who were indicted by the ICC.203  The to-and-froing was by 
many in Juba commented on as being typical of Museveni’s approach. A 
few days later, the ICC insisted that engaging LRA rebels in peace talks 
would not impede the arrest and prosecution of their leaders.204 
Nonetheless, after Kony had appointed his delegates, Machar was elated 
199 H.Jada and D.T. Pouch (Juba Post), "LRA deny attack on Juba outskirts", 15/6/2006.
200 Fieldnotes, Maridi: 13/6/2006.
201 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 12/7/2006.
202 Fieldnotes, Maridi: 13/6/2006.
203 IRIN, "Uganda: Key events in the northern conflict since May", 30/8/2006.
204 IRIN, "Uganda: Key events in the northern conflict since May", 30/8/2006.
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and convinced that this approach to peace was going to work. One reason 
for the optimism was that at the time of Machar’s efforts to start peace 
negotiations, a broad consensus seemed to exist within the Ugandan 
government and the international community that the LRA stood to only 
gain from entering peace negotiations and signing a deal. They were, at 
least according to their military opponents, a spent force, marginalised and 
deprived of their territory by the new Sudanese CPA. The LRA leaders were 
hunted individuals; it seemed that signing any kind of peace deal would 
allow them to stop being on the run. 
I talked to Machar at dawn the day after his meeting with Kony and Otti; 
he was already up and working through documents. He was well aware of 
the wave of international criticism that was about to hit him for engaging 
with wanted war criminals, and joked that dealing with Kony would 
probably be easier than dealing with all the peace-talks sceptics.205  He 
expected, correctly, that many would argue that even offering the option 
to pursue a peace deal was giving the LRA more than it deserved.206 
Nonetheless, on June 20, 2006, Uganda’s ambassador to Juba announced 
that a GoU delegation was coming to Juba. On June 28, the GoU reported 
that it had been formally invited by GoSS to attend talks with the LRA, and 
that it would send a technical team for preliminary meetings.207
This team arrived, led by Uganda’s Minister of the Interior Rugunda, on July 
3. After meeting with Kiir and Machar, Rugunda said at a press conference 
that Uganda’s government was prepared to talk, that talks would take 
place in Juba, and that Machar would chair them. Only two days later, 
Museveni reiterated his offer of amnesty for all LRA, including the top 
commanders. He failed to address the contradictions between his various 
statements that the GoU would grant amnesty, but would also not meet 
with the LRA leadership. The offer of amnesty was flat out dismissed by the 
LRA/M delegation. A delegate had previously explained to me that they 
could not take amnesty because it would imply that they had done 
something wrong. On July 7, newly appointed LRA/M spokesperson Olweny 
reacted to the amnesty offer in a radio interview, stating that the LRA was 
205 Critical writing on engaging in a peace process with the LRA is plentiful, ranging from polemical rants to informed debates about the 
issues involved, namely the perceived dichotomy between peace and justice. Some examples include: amnesty international, "Uganda strikes 
deal with LRA on trials”, London: 2008; R.Feldman, "A Deal with the Devil: Issues in Offering Joseph Kony Amnesty to Resolve the Conflict 
in Uganda". Small Wars and Insurgencies 18, 1, 2007; Human Rights Watch, "Uganda: No Amnesty for Atrocities—Turning a Blind Eye to 
Justice Undermines Durable Peace", New York: 2006; C.Onyango-Obbo, "Kony is Crazy, So Why Does Riek Love Him?", The Monitor, 
27/6/2007; J.R. Quinn,"Getting to Peace? Negotiating with the LRA in Northern Uganda", Human Rights Review 10, 2009; K.A.Rodman, "Is 
peace in the Interests of Justice? The Case for Broad ProsecutorialDiscretion at the International Criminal Court", Leiden Journal of 
International Law 22, 2009.
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not denying having committed atrocities, but they wanted to talk peace 
and that was why they were rejecting the idea of amnesty. On the same 
day, ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo insisted that Kony must 
eventually face trial.208
On July 11, Machar made a final attempt to convince Otti in a meeting in 
Ri-Kwangba to join his delegates in Juba. The following day, Otti declined 
the invitation and instead sent two additional officers as the most senior 
military representatives in Juba. Upon return to Juba on July 14, Machar 
announced that the Juba Peace Talks would start the following day with an 
opening ceremony. 
Representation and context
When the Talks opened with the scene described at the beginning of this 
thesis, media attention focussed particularly on the LRA/M delegation. A 
big question loomed large over any interaction: Who are these people? 
Who is the LRA/M and how do the two connect with each other? Chapter 8 
of this thesis provides more detail on who represents the LRA and the 
connection with the LRM. Yet that this question remains such a challenge 
points to its answer: both LRA and LRM are at the same time fixed and 
entirely flexible entities, both groups at times encompass a range of actors 
who are loosely affiliated. A trademark of contemporary conflicts is that 
they lack reliable boundaries in terms of geography, ideology, and 
affiliation. Let’s take these in turn to try and find a workable answer to the 
question who the LRA/M is. 
Space and ideology
Geographically speaking, the LRA/M conflict’s fighting territory has shifted 
from northern Uganda into other countries. To help with a definition of 
who the LRA/M is, broadening the understanding of geographic boundaries 
is useful. Spatial expansion has been a characteristic of conflict in other 
contexts, and it is worth thinking about what it means. Lomo documents 
how two other Ugandan rebel groups, the WNBF and the UNRFII, were in 
direct contact with the LRA when all three groups were operating from 
Sudan. Lomo’s point is that all conflicts are not only inter-related, but also 
evoke international geopolitical issues because of the wider geographical 
setting: 
Although the exact nature of the relationships between the 
groups is unclear, the extent to which insurgents were not acting 
2008 IRIN, "Uganda: Key events in the northern conflict since May", 30/8/2006.
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in total isolation is an important dynamic that has to be taken into 
consideration when attempts to resolving these conflicts are being 
made.⁠209
In the case of the LRA, the lack of focus on territorial control has often 
been used to argue that the group lacks a political agenda. Instead I 
propose that transcendence of geographical space, rather than being an 
expression of meaninglessness, emphasises that the conflict is more broadly 
representative of conflict dynamics in the region which lie in 
marginalisation. Pécaut states that “the perception of space is inseparable 
from social experience rooted in memory.” ⁠210  With the widening of the 
space of the LRA, the social experience of marginalisation, “rooted in 
memory” and in the experience of being ever further from home, 
strengthened the broader conflict landscape, which also involved other 
actors interested in hardening or ending marginalisation. The geographical 
reach thus includes the pattern of proxy wars so common to the region, in 
which actors reach across geographical boundaries to pursue goals at home. 
Additionally, the point about the memory of marginalisation links the LRA 
as an actor to the broader conflict landscape in time. This includes, for 
example, previous rebellions in Uganda, most prominently the above 
mentioned groups in West Nile. ⁠211
The fluid geographical reach also highlights the blurred boundaries of 
ideology. The most obvious one is the LRA’s military support of an Islamist 
agenda from Khartoum in exchange for material support in their fight 
against Museveni. Khartoum loomed large as a player during the LRA’s stay 
in southern Sudan. During the peace negotiations in Juba, its influence was 
much less clear, particularly because of the parallel challenges that were 
ongoing regarding implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement. During the Juba Talks, however, the relationship between the 
LRA and the government in Khartoum to a great extent came to symbolise 
narratives of power relations and collusion: at no point was Khartoum’s role 
entirely clear, including the crucial question of whether or not its support to 
the LRA continued, but as a looming player with major influence, Khartoum 
was never absent. 
Affiliation
209 Z.Lomo and L.Hovil, Negotiating peace: Resolution of Conflicts in Uganda's West Nile Region. Refugee Law Project Working Paper No. 
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The brief history of the war provided in this chapter has shown how 
individual attachments to the LRA were often fluid between force and 
volunteerism, between despair about the situation in which residents of 
northern Uganda found themselves and despair at the armed response that 
was contributing to making the situation worse. Individuals who were 
assembled in Juba to represent the LRA were there for a range of reasons: 
because they were close to Kony or others in the high command, because 
they had for years supported the LRA from the diaspora, or because they 
were so entrenched in the conflict spiral between government and LRA 
actors that they could turn to be on either side at any point, but carried 
valuable insider information that made them useful while they were openly 
on board. 
Not all delegates chose to be very public about their engagement, thus 
describing individual’s motivations and backstories could put them at risk. 
The chairperson and the spokespeople over the course of the Juba Talks can 
all be broadly put in the category of those who were very close to Ugandan 
politics: one chairperson had been known to work for government agencies 
and had lived in Kampala for several years, another was a member of the 
opposition party Ugandan People’s Congress, but had been in exile. A third 
delegate had run for Museveni’s NRM in the last elections before the talks 
and failed to gain a seat. A set of delegates were drawn from the diaspora 
in London; often these delegates held close connections to the elders who 
are perceived to have been the instigators of the rebellion against 
Museveni. ⁠212  Some had fled Uganda to Kenya and had never returned to 
their homeland. Quite a few delegates had never met Kony before, having 
been drawn from the often more vocal exiles. Yet who exactly the LRA and 
LRM is at any given point is impossible to say conclusively. 
The same applies when it comes to describing the exact nature of the 
relationship between LRA and LRM, and how these two are embedded in 
the broader conflictscape that also involves other actors. What this thesis 
aims to broadly show is that while conflict resolution processes aim to 
single out specific actors and their roles, entrenched conflicts are in fact 
characterised by the inseparable interaction and overlaps between actors. 
This thesis will show how, for example, Ugandan politicians used the Juba 
Talks to express their support for the LRA’s grievances. Some of these 
politicians used their past close connection with either LRA or the GoU to 
achieve a prominent position within the broader Juba debate. Titeca makes 
this point most strongly about civil society actors, pointing out that for 
example the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative has long claimed a 
212 Finnstroem. S. Living with Bad Surroundings: War and Existential Uncertainty in Acholiland, Northern Uganda. Uppsala Studies in 
Cultural Anthropology. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2003, 82ff.
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certain kind of ownership of the LRA and thus over its narratives of 
grievance. ⁠213
Finnstroem has attempted in the past to give a more accurate description of 
who the LRA is. He has pointed out, however, that the LRA/M tends to think 
of itself in terms of “what we are not”. ⁠214 He argues that this is a reflection 
of skewed outside perceptions which create the need for the LRA to justify 
itself in relation to what is being said about them. “What we are not”, a 
negative definition, thus becomes the dominant discourse within the LRA/
M, with the only steady connector being “what we are against.” However, 
the narratives of “what we are,” of change and ending armed resistance to 
enter a transformative process, are weak. The limitations caused by this 
overwhelming “presence of what is missing” as Freeman calls it, become 
apparent in a peace process. ⁠215 As particularly Chapter 8 will show, the need 
for the LRA/M to find its single voice to speak about what and who they 
were became an impossible task. 
The LRA/M at the Juba Talks struggled with an internal process of being a 
fluid entity and an external reality of having to present a united front in 
order to achieve any agreements. Chapter 8 shows that the internal 
narratives that nobody could ever be trusted to deliver structural change 
ultimately contributed to the failure of the Juba Talks. Internal betrayal and 
shifting affiliations are part of this. Richards suggests that to transform a 
conflict it is necessary to “remake social worlds,” a process that was absent 
from Juba. ⁠216  At best, the remaking of social worlds occurred in the 
corruption, back-channel processes and lack of transparency that 
undermined the main process and highlighted the fluidity and opportunism 
of affiliation.  
Information 
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In his letter to me, Otti had expressed concern about who I was and 
whether I would perpetuate the “wrong” kind of stories, those that 
confirm the established government narrative.217 
What I want to ask you are these: are you a rumour monger, an 
activist, a journalist or a researcher? If one of these; then whose 
interest are you representing? Let me hope you are trustworthy 
and somebody who keeps secrets because if not then definitely 
you will put the life of these boys at a very high risk.218 
The LRA notion that rumour-mongering and activism drove the availability 
of information was strong. Olweny argued: “We give our side of the story 
against extremely negative and malicious distortions, misinformation and 
outright lies about the role of the LRM/A in the conflict, and to a no less 
extent, against the people of northern Uganda.”219 Kony stated, 
People are fighting with propaganda. But for me as a guerrilla, I 
have not yet reached. I am lacking so many things, that is why you 
are here. All thing from Museveni side or from some other people, 
because I do not have proper propaganda machineries. I do not 
have some other people also.220 
As spokesperson of the LRA/M delegation, Olweny had also signed one of 
the early position papers, stating: “we appeal to NRM to stop its elaborate 
propaganda machinery that has caused the international community to 
treat the LRM/A with absolute scorn, disdain and contempt, based on 
prejudices and misgivings.”221  “Time has come when the truth must be 
told,” he exclaimed in another paper, “and all stake-holders challenged to 
give their side of the story.”222  This included establishing that it was not 
true 
that the LRM/A has no political agenda. To say so is to underrate 
the problem at hand and to give the false impression that LRM/A 
has no cause for its armed rebellion. Failure to express its political 
agenda loudly in intellection [sic] form does not mean the lack of 
it. Until now we have been speaking through action. We now want 
to use this forum, space and time to express our agenda in words. 
217 Although Otti confirmed to me that he had indeed written this letter, and the handwriting is very similar to what I saw when he wrote 
in my notepad in Ri-Kwangba, I remain sceptical. Producing a letter after a supposedly elaborate adventure to get it is precisely the kind of 
behaviour that some LRA associates display when they want to keep the interest of an outsider, although delivering a letter from the bush is 
a common way of communicating within the LRA. 
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Let the world and all the stakeholders grasp this opportunity to 
hear us out and be the final judges.223
Until the Juba Talks, information on the LRA/M message and their 
perspective on their own role had indeed been fuzzy. Written manifestos 
were scarce, and when they appeared, they were discredited by the GoU or 
by the LRA’s own atrocities.224  The delegation argued that they had been 
denied media exposure, but this “failure of the LRM/A to have access to the 
mass media to express its political agenda loudly in intellectual form does 
not mean the lack of it”.225 I asked Kony, Otti and other LRA members why 
they had been so reticent to state their side of the story. Kony emphasised 
that LRA manifestos were well known in Uganda; the fact that I did not 
know them was my own shortcoming.226 Otti argued that in a “bush war” it 
was difficult to distribute strong messages, especially because “rebel 
supporters” faced persecution.227  Another delegate thought my questions 
were misguided: “The cause is obvious and needs no explanation,” he said. 
“We have a cause.”228  When appointed spokesperson, Olweny was elated 
because the “LRA never had a proper spokesperson.”229 
Otti several times mentioned to me that he wanted to write a book, just as 
Museveni had done with Sowing the Mustard Seed, to explain what the 
world was like in Uganda and for the LRA.230 In November 2006, Otti asked 
me about the LRA’s image abroad: “Tell me, what does the outside world 
now think about LRA? Do they know about LRA? Do they understand about 
LRA?”231  The topic came up often. In July 2007, Otti said that he had just 
given another television interview—to Sky News—but had not yet been 
able to watch the story to see if it was “truthful”. His parting words were “I 
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northerners’ frustrations.”International Crisis Group. Northern Uganda: The road to peace, with or without Kony. In Africa Report. Nairobi/ 
Brussels, 2008, p.i.
225 LRA/M delegation in Juba /O.Olweny. "LRA/M opening speech at first Juba Peace Talks opening ceremony." Juba, 14/7/2006.
226 Author interview with Joseph Kony, Sudan/ DRC border: 12/6/2006.
227 Author interview with Vincent Otti, Ri-Kwangba: 14/11/2006.
228 Fieldnotes, Juba 23/10/2006.
229 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/6/2006.
230 Y.K.Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed: The struggle for freedom and democracy in Uganda. New York: Macmillan Education, 1997.
231 Author interview with Vincent Otti, Ri-Kwangba: 14/11/2006.
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will talk to you with your tape recorder to set the story straight.”232  Yet 
rather than being able to author the counterpart of Museveni’s founding 
Ugandan myth, Otti became overwhelmed. Within the LRA, he was seen as 
the best person to provide information on the LRA—and really the only 
person. An LRA member explained, “We did not have a manifesto because 
we did not have anybody who could do such thing. Otti could not be 
waiter, cashier and cook at the same time.”233 
The lack of LRA/M capacity to impart its message was for Olweny 
symptomatic of the cause of the conflict.234 His point was that the scale of 
GoU crimes, the displacement camps, and the lack of the educational 
opportunities that would have given the victims the political tools to deal 
with their plight had silenced Acholi people who resisted the GoU.235  The 
way the war between the GoU and the LRA had been conducted had closed 
down any public sphere in which to discuss the reasons for the war; the 
Acholi people’s livelihoods had been so severely curtailed that they were no 
longer able to change their situation.236 For the LRA, the Acholi people had 
been turned into anonymous victims, as outlined in an LRA position paper 
that addressed crimes committed by the NRA:
Our mothers, sisters and wives were raped in front of us; and in 
some extreme cases men were sodomised in public; and in front of 
their family members. This became infamously known as “Tek 
Gungu”… The NRA soldiers went to the extent of cutting men’s 
anuses with razor blades and pouring paraffin therein to enlarge 
them to fit their sex organs. Evidence of all these abound, but 
common decency compels us to keep the victims anonymous as this 
232 Author interview with Vincent Otti, Ri-Kwangba: 13/7/2007. 
233 Fieldnotes. Juba: 6/6/2006.
234 Kriesberg argues that communities need people such as intellectuals and politicians who have the power to shape a discourse, and thus 
to shape interpretations of the past. L.Kriesberg, "Conclusion", in Intractable conflicts and their transformation, ed. L.Kriesberg, T.A. 
Northrup, and S.Thorson Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1989, p.220.
235 Comerford makes a similar point regarding Angola, where history had left the public sphere with no space to discuss issues of war and 
peace. M.G.Comerford, "The Public Sphere and the Construction of Peace Narratives in Angola: From the Bicesse Accords to the Death of 
Savimbi", PhD Thesis, 2003.
236 Lack of voice equals lack of access to livelihood. The LRA consulted the blog of a Sudanese writer published in the Sudan Tribune on 
19/8/2006. Drawing on a wide range of supporting facts about the economic disparity between north and south, the blogger argues that 
the system established in Uganda resembles South Africa’s apartheid regime. J.A. Akec, "Can South Africa help dismantle Ugandan 
apartheid?," in JohnAkecSouthSudan Blog, 2006. Jackson recounts the evidence of the economic marginalisation of the Acholi, expressed 
initially through the depleting of cattle stocks through government theft. P.Jackson, "Negotiating with Ghosts: Religion, Conflict and Peace 
in Northern Uganda", The Round Table 98, 402, 2009, p.324
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phenomenon was hitherto unknown to the northern and eastern 
tribes of Uganda and remains anathema even to talk about it.237
The experience of such violence limited the extent to which information 
about it could be spread, according to the LRA/M’s argument. The LRA/M 
gave as an example of limiting information through violence “the case of 
the sub county chief of Patiko, Mze [Muzee] Owiny [who suffered abuse 
from the UPDF]… who consequently committed suicide”.238 
While the LRA/M continued to feel that no proper information on their 
plight was available, nonetheless the Juba Talks reignited interest in the 
LRA. Increasing internationalisation of the conflict had made information 
on many facets of northern Uganda and the LRA more accessible. 
Scholarship on the LRA conflict has covered a range of issues, such as the 
debate about international and transitional justice,239  the role and 
ineffectiveness of aid agencies in complex situations,240  health in the 
displacement camps,241 living conditions in the war zone,242 and later on the 
role of international advocacy.243  Much has been written about northern 
Uganda’s and the Acholi people’s marginalisation and deprivation, and on 
how both vertical and horizontal inequality has contributed to the long 
237 LRA/M delegation in Juba /O.Olweny, "First position paper of the LRA Peace Delegation during negotiations", Juba: 16/7/2006. The 
notion that the crimes committed were so bad that they cannot be talked about echoes Agamben’s concept of bearing witness to 
something so horrific it cannot be witnessed. G. Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, 2002. The challenge of 
“bearing witness” to violence has also been struggled with by scholars seeking to understand it, such as Kleinman et al. A.Kleinman, V.Das, 
and L. M. Margaret, Social Suffering. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
238 LRA/M delegation in Juba /O.Olweny, "First position paper of the LRA Peace Delegation during negotiations", Juba: 16/7/2006.  This 
underscores Chiwengo’s point that “bearing witness to African events in literature, the media, or human rights discourse is challenging 
because of the power relations that undergird its representation and visualization.” N.Chiwengo, "When Wounds and Corpses Fail to 
Speak: Narratives of Violence and Rape in Congo (DRC)”, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 28, 1, 2008, p.81.
239 For example T.Allen, Trial justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army. African Arguments, London: Zed 
Books, 2006.
240 For example A.Branch, Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda. New York: Oxford University Press USA, 
2011.
241 For example S. Accorsi et al., "The disease profile of poverty: morbidity and mortality in northern Uganda in the context of war, 
population displacement and HIV/AIDS." Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 99, 3 (2005).
242 For example S.Finnstroem, Living with Bad Surroundings: War, history, and everyday moments in northern Uganda. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2008.
243 For example A.Taub, ed., Beyond Kony 2012: Atrocity, Awareness and Activism in the Internet Age, Leanpub, 2012.
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conflict, as well as broader about political and social developments in 
Uganda.244 
Additionally, news coverage, personal writing, advocacy and popular 
culture (evident in Internet campaigns, feature films or graphic novels) have 
been abundant.245  The war and the LRA have a certain pop-culture allure. 
The elusive leadership, the brutality and duration of the conflict, the 
number of people affected in various ways, the geographical spread and 
the impact of the conflict on the developmental situation in four countries
—Uganda, South Sudan, DRC and CAR—remains baffling. In its later years, 
the conflict drew huge interest from new and established international 
advocacy groups, most prominently the California-based evangelical 
Invisible Children, which in 2012 with “Kony 2012” launched the most 
successful Internet advocacy campaign ever with the release of a video on 
the LRA.
However, with more information being produced and researched on the 
LRA, two opposing developments occurred. Scholarship and some 
journalism gave further nuance to the complex conflict dynamics and 
actions of a range of actors—most prominently the LRA, the GoU and 
international organisations—focusing increasingly on the political economy 
of the conflict,246  and along the way dismissing the simple label “the LRA 
244 F.Stewart,"Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development", CRISE Working Paper. Oxford: not dated. Some important 
examples include E.A.Brett, "Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: The Rôle of the Military in Politics", The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 33, 1, 1995; as well as three edited volumes by H.B. Hansen and M Twaddle, Uganda Now: Between Decay and Development, 
Oxford: James Currey, 1988;  Changing Uganda: The Dilemmas of Structural Adjustment & Revolutionary Change, Oxford: James Currey, 
1991; H.B. Hansen and M Twaddle, Developing Uganda.  Cleveland/ Oxford: Ohio University Press/ James Currey, 1998. Girling and Atkinson 
have both written on Acholi identity and leadership. F.K. Girling, The Acholi of Uganda. London: HMSO, 1960; R.R.Atkinson, The Roots of 
Ethnicity: The origins of the Acholi in Uganda. Kampala: Fountain Publishers Ltd, 2010 (1999).
245 International audiences became engaged, thanks to a whole series of films and documentaries on the plight of the children of northern 
Uganda, for example A.S.Ahadi and O.Stoltz, "Lost Children”, Germany/ France: 2004; B.Bailey, L.Poole, and J.Russel, "Invisible Children", 
USA: 2003; S.Fine and A.Nix Fine, "War/ Dance", USA: 2007.
246 S.B. Tindifa, Listen to the people! A call for an inclusive approach to the peace process in northern Uganda: A report on the study on 
peace and reconciliation in northern Uganda. Kampala: The Human Rights and Peace Centre, Makerere University, 2006;  M.Bøås and K.C. 
Dunn, African guerrillas : raging against the machine. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007; K.C.Dunn, "Uganda: The Lord's 
Resistance Army", Review of African Political Economy 31, 99, 2004. As the War on Terror got underway, the LRA situation was recast, and 
rather than analysing it as an internal political-economy conflict, primarily US analysis drove the storyline that the entire region was prone to 
become a breeding ground for future terrorists. See R.Feldman, "A Deal with the Devil: Issues in Offering Joseph Kony Amnesty to Resolve 
the Conflict in Uganda". Small Wars and Insurgencies 18, 1, 2007. This was accompanied by a shift in the understanding of the role of the 
GoU. It has remained challenging to move the understanding of the contributions of both sides in the war, rather than swinging the 
pendulum of blame back and forth between the LRA and GoU. However, the GoU has come increasingly under criticism for conditions in 
the displacement camps. The Enough Project wrote that “the Ugandan government holds the majority of blame for herding people into 
camps, a move they undertook because of their inability to provide sufficient protection to them in their home villages” J.Spiegel and 
J.Prendergast,"A new peace strategy for northern Uganda and the LRA", ENOUGH strategy paper, 19/5/2008. 
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war” as inadequate.247 Finnstroem and Dolan avoid using the term “war” 
altogether, both offering more socially inclusive terminology. Finnstroem 
describes the state of permanent warlike activities as “living with bad 
surroundings”, while Dolan uses the term “social torture” to describe how 
rebel and government activity destroyed the social fabric of the north.248 
During the Juba Talks, the LRA/M contested the title “LRA war” primarily 
because the issues were relevant to a larger group of people than just the 
LRA.249  In late 2009 the LRA/M delegation urged in its rejection of military 
action against the LRA “a return to the negotiating table, to save all the 
peoples affected by the ‘Northern Uganda’ conflict from further senseless, 
destructive and unnecessary military adventures”.250 
In a parallel development, the more prominent pop-culture public image of 
the LRA became increasingly jejune. Herwig has outlined how important 
events “are hardest to understand because they attract the greatest 
attention from mythmakers and charlatans”, and the LRA war was no 
exception.251 Most of the mainstream information on the LRA and the war 
was and remains heavy on atmospheric description, one-sided human rights 
reporting and simplifications about youth participation that creates and 
perpetuates myths about the LRA, but is light on analysis that might allow 
answers to the persistent basic questions.252 A simplistic view was presented 
even by those close to the issues in Uganda, such as the former Ugandan 
government minister and peace negotiator Bigombe, who asked in an 
article co-written by US activist John Prendergast: “How do you end a 19-
247 Lepore writes that in naming a war lies “a contest for meaning”. J.Lepore, The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of 
American Identity. New York: Vintage Books/ Random House, 1998, p.xvi. In the list of wars jointly published in 2003 by the Centre for 
Systemic Peace and the Uppsala Conflict Data Project, the LRA’s activities do not make the cut as a “war” at all: the list puts the combined 
deaths of conflict between the GoU and the LRA, West Nile Bank Front and Allied Democratic Front at less than 1,000 conflict-related 
deaths since 1994. O.Ramsbotham, T.Woodhouse, and H.Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Cambridge: Polity, 2005, p. 63.
248 S.Finnstroem, Living with Bad Surroundings: War, history, and everyday moments in northern Uganda. Durham: Duke University Press, 
2008; C.Dolan, Social Torture: The Case of Northern Uganda, 1986 - 2006. Oxford/ New York: Berghahn Books, 2009.
249 At other moments, however, they emphasise the “LRA” war to stress their role as Museveni’s adversary. They objected to the 
description of “LRA-affected areas” with the argument that the same areas might also be called “UPDF-affected areas”.
250 LRA/M Peace Team/ J.Labeja, "Open Letter: LRA/M Private Bag, RE: L.R.A. DOCUMENT ON JUBA PEACE TALKS”, Nairobi, 9/11/2009.
251 H.H. Herwig, "Clio Deceived: Patrotic Self-Censorship in Germany after the Great War." International Security 12, 2, Autumn 1987, p.7. 
252 Good examples of atmospheric, often disturbing memoirs that are at the same time infused with symbolism are K.Cook, Stolen angels : 
the kidnapped girls of Uganda. Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2007; D.H.Dunson, Child, victim, soldier : the loss of innocence in Uganda. 
Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2008; P.H.Eichstaedt, First kill your family : child soldiers of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army. Chicago, 
Ill.: Lawrence Hill Books, 2009; F.J. H. McDonnell and G.Akallo, Girl soldier : a story of hope for northern Uganda's children. Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Chosen, 2007; and N. Caruso, "Refuge from the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda: a report from a Medecins Sans Frontieres team 
leader", Emerg Med Australas 18, 3, 2006. An accomplished, humorous approach to the question why Museveni has not been able to 
defeat Kony has been offered by J.Bussmann, The Worst Date Ever: War Crimes, Hollywood Heart-Throbs and Other Abominations or how it 
took a comedy writer to expose Africa's secret war. New York: Pan, 2010.
84
year insurgency led by a messianic guerrilla leader with an army of 
abducted, tortured, and brainwashed children?”253 The imagery of an army 
of brainwashed child soldiers has sustained international outrage. The LRA 
has been accused of everything from cannibalism to drug-running. A 
particularly sensationalist example of storytelling without empirical 
evidence about the LRA’s cannibalism is Raffaele’s purported “adventures 
on the trail of man’s darkest ritual”.254  Feldman’s broad-brush assessment 
confidently asserts that Kony “appears to be a delusional madman”255  and 
claims that 
narcotics sales also help fund LRA operations. Being involved 
in the drug trade has the advantage of making them 
available for its own use. Some of the atrocities that are 
committed are reportedly so brutal that Kony’s followers rely 
on drugs for their courage to perform them.256 
As all returnees and active LRA agree that they are drug-free and no 
evidence exists that the LRA are drug dealers, it is worth noting that 
Feldman’s source for this information is a conference paper given in 
Washington, DC, by Uganda’s Director of Public Prosecutions on terrorist 
financing.257
Dowden writes that the LRA’s portrayal as a “mindless terror gang” that 
was “so evil it makes political or military analysis unnecessary” was fed by 
the general assumption that Africa is a place of darkness. Because of the 
war’s virulence, Dowden argues, the assumption had long been that “the 
LRA would quickly burn itself out.”258  In Juba, the LRA/M implemented a 
new information policy to strongly counter the notion that they had burnt 
out. Their aim to influence public opinion, however, did not generate a 
more nuanced picture. While many important points need to be made 
about the role of the GoU in the conflict, the public manifestation of the 
new LRA/M information policy hardly moved beyond a crude whitewash, 
with a focus on denying atrocities and deflecting guilt for attacks on the 
UPDF. Privately the LRA/M argued that the set-up of the talks had made a 
253 B.Bigombe and J.Prendergast, "Stop the crisis in northern Uganda", The Philadelphia Inquirer, 21/2/2006.
254 P.Raffaele, Among the cannibals : adventures on the trail of man's darkest ritual. New York: Smithsonian Books : Collins, 2008.
255 R.Feldman, "A Deal with the Devil: Issues in Offering Joseph Kony Amnesty to Resolve the Conflict in Uganda". Small Wars and 
Insurgencies 18, 1, 2007.
256 R.Feldman, "A Deal with the Devil: Issues in Offering Joseph Kony Amnesty to Resolve the Conflict in Uganda". Small Wars and 
Insurgencies 18, 1, 2007, p.138.
257 R.Buteera, "The Reach of Terrorist Financing and Combating It – the Links Between Terrorism and Ordinary Crime", in IAP Annual 
Conference Washington, D.C.: 2003. The paper is no longer available online, and the LRA has never been charged with narcotics-related 
crimes.
258 R.Dowden, "Inspiration behind the 'terror gang'", The Observer, 2/4/2006. 
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more nuanced public presentation impossible. I observed several moments 
during the talks when delegation members and the high command were 
cornered with hostile questioning about their own atrocities. Their visible 
reaction seemed to be embarrassment, as if atrocities and the past should 
not be discussed in public. An LRA member confirmed that this impression 
was correct—from the LRA point of view, he said, the LRA could not talk 
openly about crimes they had committed, because of the threat of ICC 
persecution and because “talking about it like that makes it hard to 
reconcile.”259 In less public situations, members freely admitted that the LRA 
had committed violent crimes, although they maintained that rape was not 
a crime sanctioned by Kony.260 However, it is important to note that while 
for a while rape of civilians by the LRA was limited and punished, the LRA’s 
definition of rape would not include intercourse in forced marriage.261  In 
the early days of the talks, delegates even argued that it would be 
beneficial for the LRA to go to the ICC in The Hague to be tried, as it would 
give them an opportunity to present their evidence of GoU atrocities and 
provide what they referred to as “proper information”.
A Focus on Joseph Kony
Multiple theories and hypotheses exist about the behaviour of the LRA, but 
these tend at best to be based on accounts by those who have left the LRA 
and at worst are speculative, driven by ideology or even propaganda that 
uses evidence selectively. During 20 years of war, not much was seen of 
Joseph Kony and not much was heard of the LRA, allowing fantastical 
accounts of exoticism to dominate the debate with no possibility of fact-
checking. Advocacy regarding the LRA has primarily been focused on Kony 
as the undisputed centre of the conflict whose movements and decisions 
determine its continuation or end. He has been portrayed by insiders and 
outsiders alike as a spirit-possessed leader of charisma and brutality who 
has fought the war fuelled by a mixture of spiritual force, religious 
extremism and outside military support. Of all of these, his reported 
spirituality usually fascinates most. 
259 Fieldnotes, Juba/ Magwi: 1/10/2006.
260 Fieldnotes, Juba/ Magwi: 1/10/2006.
261 For a discussion on definitions of rape, see H.E. Porter, "Justice and rape on the periphery: the supremacy of social harmony in the 
space between local solutions and formal judicial systems in northern Uganda." Journal of Eastern African Studies 6, 1, 2012; for statistics 
on rape of civilians, see Annan, J. And C. Blattman, D. Mazurana and K. Carlson, “Women and Girls at War: ‘Wives’, Mothers, and Fighters 
in the Lord’s Resistance Army”, Unpublished: 2008.
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Yet generally the assessment of Kony’s role has been based on hearsay, with 
little consideration or evidence of Kony’s own perspective or that of other 
active members of the LRA. Part of Kony’s appeal and his ability to evoke 
fear lay in his invisibility, as rebel leader characterised only in the stories of 
those who had escaped. The invisibility of the main actor also made the LRA 
war seem pointless, confused, and lacking a coherent agenda beyond being 
a thorn in the side of the government at the expense of civilians. Stories of 
Kony’s mysterious strength and unspeakable brutality made the descriptions 
of this ghost-like figure even more powerful and the use of fear became a 
strategic “force multiplier”, as Vinci calls it, for the LRA.262  Kony’s 
spirituality and his presumed madness were readily picked up by 
international organisations and advocates to drive often hugely successful 
fundraising campaigns, in a fine example of what Agamben calls the 
commodification of evil and the messianic.263  Professional consideration of 
what some claimed was a serious psychiatric condition was shambolic. 
Engagement with background spiritual beliefs or the notion that Kony was 
“evil” was righteous and thus lacked insight.264  Marchal is correct when he 
writes that in the labelling of conflict actors, “moralistic judgements 
obscure analysis.”265 
The focus on Kony as the sole responsible actor means there is little 
mainstream analysis of group behaviour, or of the individual choices by LRA 
actors. A pop-culture focus on Kony as the root of all evil has blurred 
understanding of the broader context. Both the LRA and those describing 
the conflict have commodified these fleeting characteristics to avoid taking 
apart the personal and societal issues at the heart of the conflict. Presuming 
that Kony’s military might was the result of afflatus—a transcendental 
inspiration—creates the perfect straw-man argument that no analysis is 
possible or necessary because divine forces are at work. As a broader 
problem, because of lack of data, most events were analysed as if macro-
level events, such as the behaviour of the GoU or the issuing of ICC 
262 A.Vinci, "The Strategic Use of Fear." Small Wars and Insurgencies 16, 3, 2005.
263 G.Agamben, The Coming Community. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
264 A good example is Vinci’s treatment of Kony’s spirituality, which draws entirely on a description given by Behrend of Kony’s engagement 
with spirits, but manages to misspell the crucial word “malaika” as “malailka”. A.Vinci, "Beyond Terror and Insurgency: The LRA's Dirty War 
in Northern Uganda," in Warrior's Dishonour: Barbarity, Morality and Torture in Modern Warfare, ed. G.Kassimeris. Hampshire: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2006, p.83. Vinci treats the idea that soldiers are given protection through spirituality as somehow exotic. Holmes, 
however, points out that soldiers in many cultures have relied on talismans for protection.R. Holmes, Acts of War: The Behaviour of Men in 
Battle. London: Free Press, 1970, p.238.
265 R.Marchal, "Warlordism and terrorism: how to obscure an already confusing crisis? The case of Somalia", International Affairs 83, 6, 
2007.
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warrants, could deliver direct explanations of micro-level, individual LRA 
behaviour.266 
In a conflict that involves armed rebellion against a government, empirical 
information on the rebel perspective tends to be rare. Cunningham argues 
that this is because “systematic information about the opposition” is 
missing or is only visible in “the occurrence of civil war”, creating a research 
focus on the role of states.267  While the interest in the LRA war has often 
focussed on the LRA—with a lot less attention being paid to the GoU or the 
UPDF, it was the case that until 2006 the only primary data available on the 
thinking within the LRA was provided by those who had left the LRA. 
Presumably they had also left behind some of their motivations—if they 
had stayed voluntarily—for being in the LRA. As much of the literature on 
the LRA is driven by agency-funded research reports, this has largely led to 
the cherry-picking of evidence to underscore previously held assumptions 
and programming goals. Agency research also requires a certain visibility of 
both issue and findings, which is achieved more powerfully through 
anecdotes, giving much greater presence to powerful individual stories of 
victims.268 
With a rebel leader silent on political causes and a government pushing the 
propaganda that the northern rebellion was nothing but a violent fight 
without reason—and the press largely following that line of thinking—
outside more nuanced scholarship the war was effectively depoliticised, a 
general characteristic of wars in recent years.269  This was echoed, for 
example, in remarks of the then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Louise Arbour, who called the LRA a “well-armed criminal enterprise” that 
did not have “any kind of political agenda” and ought not to be 
“romanticized”.270  Such remarks are characteristic for the Manichean view 
of the conflict which had infused each stage of war, peace and information. 
The dualism was emphasised by the ICC’s engagement. Overall, it is in this 
prevalent interpretation that an explanation can be found for why the first 
months of the Juba Talks struggled with establishing a level playing field 
for negotations. 
266 Uvin makes this point about the unbalanced use of evidence, whereby different levels of evidence and explanation are used. P.Uvin, 
"Reading the Rwandan Genocide", International Studies Review 3, 3, 2001, p.98.
267 D.E.Cunningham and D.Lemke, "Combining Civil and Interstate Wars"  (n/d), p.2.
268 Literature commissioned by agencies is endless. One of the more influential early reports to note is R.Gersony,"The anguish of northern 
Uganda: results of a field-based assessment of the civil conflicts in northern Uganda”, Kampala/ USAID: 1997. 
269 T.Allen and J.Seaton, "Introduction," in The Media of Conflict: War reporting and representation of ethnic violence, ed. T.Allen and 
J.Seaton. London/ New York: Zed Books, 1999.
270 Inner City Press, "UN's Louise Arbour Calls Lord's Resistance Army a ‘Criminal Enterprise’ With No Political Agenda", ed. Matthew 
Russell Lee (2007).
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Conclusion
Much has been written on the LRA war, peace and information. Yet, 
strikingly, only few scholars see the three as working on a continuum. 
Mostly, efforts at making peace tend to be seen in isolation and as if these 
are moments to reset the conflict. Understanding of conflicts is gradually 
changing, as they are seen in the context of long trajectories. However, 
peace efforts that occur along the way tend to be treated as exceptional 
situations that take the conflict away from its usual nature, rather than 
simply as an extension of the conflict. Yet such understanding was rarely 
applied in the more public discourse in Juba.
A look at the history of LRA war and peace clearly shows that moments of 
peace were integral elements of the conflict, including the continuation of 
conflict dynamics around the table. Yet when the Juba Talks started in 2006, 
they were widely—and mistakenly—treated as a blank slate. There was 
hardly any debate or analysis on what roles the actors who were now 
gathered in Juba had played in previous efforts at peacemaking and on 
what kind of information they were drawing. Instead, actors such as the 
various international organisations or the mediator succeeded in casting 
themselves in a fresh light. One reason for this might be found in their 
previous experiences with the LRA/M, which had all ended in the LRA 
withdrawing from engagement. A later chapter shines a light on how the 
LRA/M uses this pattern of connecting and disconnecting with outsiders to 
its advantage. Although this pattern was familiar to almost everyone in 
Juba, it was not addressed constructively. So while there was initially a 
public focus on the root causes and the broader history of the war, the 
same attention was not given to lessons learned from previous peace 
negotiations. 
Right away, this created a parallel reality between the LRA/M and everyone 
else. Most actors wanted to treat the Juba Talks as a clean slate to finally 
get the conflict resolved. For the LRA/M the Juba Talks were only another 
chapter in the long trajectory of the conflict and with that also a moment 
in which previous treatment specifically during peace processes needed to 
be addressed as part of paying attention to root causes. They were not 
surprised when the first year of the Juba Talks brought a repeat of 
previously experienced security concerns for LRA fighters called to assemble 
for peace negotiations. Crucially, 2006 from the beginning replicated hostile 
power dynamics that the LRA/M had wanted to tackle. 
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3. 2006: “While talking, there is troop movement”
Introduction
On July 12, 2006, two days before the scheduled opening ceremony, the 
LRA/M delegates learned that a minister would head the GoU delegation. 
The LRA/M delegation consisted of sympathisers who primarily lived in the 
diaspora, as well as some who had been involved in previous talks and a 
former NRM political candidate. Strikingly, neither Kony nor his deputy Otti 
were prepared to join the delegation in Juba. Faced with a high-level GoU 
delegation and the news that Museveni had extended the deadline for LRA 
disarmament to September 12, the LRA/M delegates had little hope that, 
with a deadline-driven negotiation process and a high-level counterpart, 
they would enter what they considered “proper” peace negotiations. The 
consensus in the delegation was that if Museveni wanted to come with such 
a prescribed approach, there was no hope of having genuine peace talks 
that would lead to lasting change. In addition, Museveni had stressed that 
there would be a deadline to his willingness to negotiate. The discrepancy 
between the political, multi-layered process the LRA/M said they wanted 
and the technical process that seemed to be emerging became clear even 
before the talks had started.
I had observed the delegates’ reluctance to trust that the GoU wanted to 
seriously engage in a political process for a few weeks at that point. In 
2006, I spent time with the LRA/M in the weeks leading up to the peacetalks 
and stayed for the opening ceremony. I returned again for a week in 
August, and then moved to Juba from September to December. Over the 
course of this time, my reflection on what was going on changed several 
times. In sum, 2006 started off with doubt for the delegation and they 
wanted to make their reluctance to trust the GoU known. Gradually, when 
they realised that the architecture of these talks was growing bigger than 
anything they had known before, they trusted that they could become 
meaningful. When problems emerged that were too reminiscent of the 
baggage of previous peace talks described earlier—such as competing 
actors, military pressure from the UPDF and harassment of LRA 
representatives—2006 ended with the sobering realisation that familiar 
unhelpful patterns had been repeated. In chronicling the convoluted events 
and dramatic challenges of 2006, this chapter outlines how previous 
baggage as well as muddled information almost led to a quick failure of the 
talks within a few months. 
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Being faced with Museveni’s deadline and a strong GoU delegation, the 
LRA/M debated how to react. Even in these early discussions, a range of 
challenges facing the LRA/M were clear. Some argued that they would only 
be wasting their time by engaging in a futile process that would be of 
limited benefit for the people of northern Uganda. Instead, they suggested 
countering Museveni’s approach by travelling to the ICC in The Hague to 
hand-deliver LRA evidence against Museveni and the UPDF. Those in favour 
of addressing the ICC viewed the institution as a sort of umpire that would 
arise as the unbiased voice of reason if only presented with the right 
evidence. Others argued that they needed to strengthen presence in Juba 
with as many representatives from northern Uganda as possible. Things 
grew complicated when the flipside to both approaches became obvious. 
Calling for justice also meant subjecting the LRA to justice; calling in more 
support from civil society also meant that the power of the delegation, 
intended to be the exclusive voice for Kony, would be diluted.271  In both 
discussions it was remarkable to me that the delegates seemed largely 
convinced that pointing out the guilt of their enemy would make the ICC 
automatically exonerate the LRA, and that all representatives of northern 
Uganda would be firmly on the side of the LRA. It certainly expressed that 
the LRA/M thought that their commitment to peace talks would allow for 
concessions from different actors and that they were in a good position to 
ask for these. 
Out of these debates emerged Olweny’s fiery opening speech. While 
delegates were divided over the speech, there seemed to be consensus that 
it was a good idea to remind everyone of the peace talks baggage. For the 
LRA/M this translated into making the point that asking for peace was not 
new territory, but that in the past, peace talks had in the end always been 
betrayed and created more military pressure.  
First on the Agenda: Ending Hostilities
When the designated LRA/M delegation arrived in Juba for the first time, 
GoSS—having moved to Juba in late 2005—had just started to buy new cars. 
Non-government cars and motorbikes were rare on the unpaved roads of 
the capital. Not even a year old when the peace talks started, the young 
government was struggling to find accommodation even for its own 
271 P.Wallensteen and M.Eriksson, Negotiating Peace: Lessons from Three Comprehensive Peace Agreements. Uppsala/ New York: Uppsala 
University/ Mediation Support Unit UN, 2009. It is a similar dilemma to the ambiguity Mergelsberg describes in encountering LRA members 
who are proud of being good LRA soldiers while acknowledging that they are LRA victims. B.Mergelsberg, "Between two worlds: former 
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parliamentarians who had been given the task of drawing up southern 
Sudan’s new laws. A few aid workers and engineers stayed in tented or 
prefabricated camps; SPLA officers or SPLM politicians took many of the 
beds. After 6pm, when the BBC’s Focus on Africa jingle wafted across the 
town from dozens of shortwave radios, it was difficult to find dinner in the 
markets or in the handful of local restaurants. International staff, hungry 
for anything that did not come from a US-$15 hotel buffet, made weekly 
pilgrimages to a corner supermarket on Hai Malakal, known to be the only 
one in town that sold cans of Diet Coke, Snickers bars and Heinz baked 
beans brought in from Khartoum.
One of the first hotels to be erected using a mixture of prefabricated and 
existing structures, the Juba Raha is a bamboo-covered building with a 
dining hall and two meeting rooms. In the yard, where frogs hopped 
around and lizards chased each other, the hotel initially consisted of a few 
dozen army tents scattered around a few piles of large rocks. The brick 
structure hosting the showers and toilets was cleaned once a day in a swift 
but effective way: the cleaner would block the sink with a rag and turn on 
the tap to let the water overflow the bathroom. Later, the Juba Raha would 
upgrade to “self-contained”, offering green military tents on a concrete 
base with a little porch in the front and a shower and toilet in the back for 
$260 per night. Booking the larger Juba Raha meeting room for a year for 
the LRA talks must have been one of the first commitments entered into by 
the new GoSS with a local commercial outlet.  
Most hotel guests were MPs without a place to stay in Juba, plus the 
occasional UN staff member, or SPLA who sat in the bar with their guns. 
Juba Raha staff served drinks wearing white T-shirts with red art deco 
writing that said: “Juba Raha. I stay. You stay. We stay.” The weathered 
dartboard declared the bar the “Dart Palace Juba”. Those who were not 
playing darts or nursing a beer were usually transfixed by the TV that hung 
from the roof in one corner of the bar. A few times a day, plane noise from 
the flight path directly above Juba Raha drowned out the TV. As plane 
arrivals were still a new and relatively rare occurrence, such noise tended to 
trigger a guessing game among patrons on whether it was a World Food 
Programme plane, the daily passenger jet from Nairobi, or the president 
returning from Khartoum.272 During peace-talk session breaks, every corner 
of the Juba Raha yard seemed to be occupied by small groups in heated 
discussions. 
The Juba Talks secretariat next to the meeting hall was a narrow military 
tent that doubled as the residence of the head of the secretariat, MP James 
272 Fieldnotes, Juba: 30/9/2006.
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Gony. Inside the tent stood a bed, a printer, a computer and a photocopier. 
Upon hearing the car siren signalling the arrival of Machar’s motorcade, 
whoever was staffing the secretariat would jump up. Following the signal, a 
handful of Ugandan or international journalist would come running from 
Juba’s most reliable satellite Internet café around the corner to catch a 
sound-bite. In the early days of the talks, the best communication was by 
word of mouth. Mobile networks were unreliable. The best was GemTel, 
operating calls in southern Sudan under Uganda’s country code, but SIM 
cards were always sold out. When making a phone call, people usually had 
to stand outside and away from trees, shouting into Thuraya satellite 
phones: “Can you hear me? Can you hear me? I cannot hear you. Change 
your location.” The delegation spent many hours shouting updates down 
the phone, communicating the complexities of goings-on in Juba at US$1 a 
minute to Otti or Kony.273 
At the start of the Juba Talks, the two parties swiftly agreed on five agenda 
items:
1. Cessation of Hostilities (CoH)
2. Comprehensive Political Solutions
3. Justice and Accountability
4. Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration
5. Permanent Ceasefire
Negotiations started with discussions on Cessation of Hostilities. The GoU 
took the position that there would be no end to hostilities until an 
agreement was signed; the LRA/M insisted it was a prerequisite for further 
talks. As negotiations got under way in Juba, in other parts of the world 
the Juba Talks were discussed at the highest level. A few days after the 
opening ceremony, UN ambassadors of the so-called Core Group met at the 
UN in New York. The Core Group is comprised of the Group of Seven plus 
one: Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom and Canada. The heads of the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Office for the Coordination of 
Humaniarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) 
joined them. It was disclosed to them that the UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan had suggested sending the former president of Mozambique, 
Joaquin Chissano, as a special envoy to the Juba Talks. All seemed 
supportive of the idea, going on to discuss various awkward scenarios 
regarding the ICC, including the possibility that if the UN Mission in Sudan 
(UNMIS) were to arrest LRA leaders under an ICC warrant, “they would have 
273 Fieldnotes, Juba: 30/9/2006.
94
to be turned over to the Sudanese government for further action.”274 
International support for the Juba Talks was thus hesitant, but the UN was 
putting structures into place to allow them to be supported. 
Back in Juba, the lack of confidence of the LRA/M delegation in the 
fledgling talks was obvious. To stabilise negotiations and build confidence, 
Machar and GoSS organised a large gathering of family, leaders and 
politicians from northern Uganda in Ri-Kwangba in late July 2006. It was a 
last ditch attempt to convince Kony or Otti to directly strengthen the 
negotiations. The gathering also created curious scenes, some of which 
were later publicly regretted. Ugandan politician Norbert Mao, for 
example, was photographed as he enthusiastically hugged Kony. Kony gave 
two significant speeches. He apologised—in Acholi, to representatives from 
northern Uganda and southern Sudan—for atrocities committed by the 
LRA. On August 2, he held a befuddled four-minute press conference, with 
the assembled international journalists shouting questions at him.275
Challenges in Ceasing Hostilities
The following day, Machar continued his mission to persuade Otti to join 
the delegation in Juba. He further insisted that the LRA needed to disclose 
their deployments in southern Sudan and northern Uganda, despite 
Kampala’s insistence that there would be no ceasefire before a final 
agreement was signed. Otti’s response expressed the level of distrust in the 
facilitation and environment: “Why is Machar making my presence in Juba 
a condition? There must be something hidden. After all there are no 
guarantees that I won’t be arrested.” For the LRA leadership, the pressure 
to come to Juba was suspicious. For the delegation, hearing rather publicly 
from Machar that he had no trust in their ability to speak for the LRA/M 
was embarrassing, particularly because they were surrounded by so many 
representatives from northern Uganda at the time. The situation became 
heated, even as Machar backed down from his demands that the LRA 
disclose their troops. To publicly express their distrust, Kony and Otti 
ordered the four men on the delegation considered representatives of the 
military wing to remain in the bush. Machar left, taking with him the means 
of transport that had brought the delegates to the bush.
274 UN Mission of the US, "06USUNNEWYORK1404  (For official use only): Gambari, Kalomoh, Guehenno, Egeland Attend Core Group 
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The delegates remained stranded in the bush for a few days. During that 
time they were also detained and questioned by the SPLA, who made it 
clear that they had no respect for the LRA/M. One of the LRA/M delegates 
would later address Machar to complain that this had been humiliating and 
had left one delegate in serious health trouble, as he had not travelled with 
enough medication to keep his blood pressure under control. On August 4, 
with his delegates still stuck in Ri-Kwangba without GoSS transport, Kony 
ordered a unilateral ceasefire to counter Machar’s distrust and express the 
LRA’s seriousness. Rugunda was not ready to respond by doing the same: 
“We will wait and see what it means on the ground because the previous 
ceasefires have been abused.” The next day, the LRA/M delegation returned 
to Juba without any military representation, furious at the treatment they 
had received. Yet it was announced that talks would resume on August 7. 
Machar had in the meantime issued invitations to Mao and community 
leaders from northern Uganda to strengthen the talks by coming to Juba. 
For the LRA/M delegates, such a unilateral move was again an expression of 
Machar’s lack of confidence in them.
When talks did continue on August 9, Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) was on 
the table again. The GoU insisted that they would not cease hostilities. The 
LRA/M team left the assembly hall, angrily explaining that Machar had 
promised that the GoU would agree to cessation if the LRA/M returned to 
the talks, but now the GoU had failed to reciprocate.276 Kampala described 
the walkout as unfortunate; the press widely reported that the LRA was 
quitting the peace talks. The following day, Ugandan military chief Aronda 
Nyakairima said that the UPDF would “pound Kony”. The GoU demanded 
that the LRA release women and children in their captivity.277 
Rugunda, who presented the GoU position paper on the cessation, also 
demanded that within one week the LRA spell out in precise detail the 
strength and positions of their forces, full particulars of members of the 
forces, inventories of arms and ammunitions and other military equipment. 
The position paper further proposed the creation of a ceasefire monitoring 
team composed of ten members led by a senior official appointed by GoSS. 
The others would be two representatives each from the LRA, UPDF and 
SPLA, and one each from the AU, UN and Core Group. The GoU further 
proposed locations at which the LRA was to assemble in the case of 
cessation: Waligo in Uganda’s Kitgum District, and Nabanga under the 
control of the SPLA.
276 F.Nyakairu and E.Okiror, "Govt rejects ceasefire", The Daily Monitor 10/8/2006.
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The LRA/M was enraged at the pressure to disclose their forces without a 
declared cessation of hostilities. Days went by without developments, until 
President Kiir on August 11 invited the LRA/M to his house. In a private 
conversation he talked about the SPLA struggle, and said that the SPLA 
never made a ceasefire a condition during peace talks because they knew it 
would create an early impasse and give them fewer means to exert 
pressure. LRA/M delegates afterwards said that Kiir’s talk was “very 
impressive and insightful”.278 Negotiations about a CoH were back on, but 
the tone had markedly changed, at least for a short while. The 
announcement of a death in Uganda made an agreement on CoH even 
more pressing.
When the UPDF announced that they had killed LRA commander Raska 
Lukwiya—one of the five LRA commanders wanted by the ICC—in Uganda, 
the LRA was at first reluctant to acknowledge that this was true. While they 
were still waiting for Lukwiya to be identified by their own sources, one of 
the LRA in the bush said that it was a ploy by the GoU to make them “feel 
bad. We don’t’ want nail for a nail, eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth. We 
don’t want to pull out, but this is not right. Raska’s ID and what happened 
is very hard to confirm. We don’t want to give them that.”279  When they 
received positive identification of Lukwiya, the LRA/M asked for three days 
of mourning away from the talks, returning to the first session with black 
armbands. Olweny stated that in the interest of truth, the LRA would 
continue talks with the GoU delegation, even if the government refused to 
cease hostilities and despite the fact that Ugandan government soldiers had 
killed Lukwiya: “We hope that all in good time the public shall put the 
blame where it lays.”280 
Still feeling betrayed by GoSS, and weakened by Lukwiya’s death, Otti 
demanded that South Africa should take over the mediation. Museveni 
rejected the demand outright, instead suggesting that the LRA should 
assemble in southern Sudan only, rather than also in Uganda, as a condition 
for the UPDF’s cessation of hostilities. Museveni also said that the DRC 
would allow the UPDF to attack the rebels in their DRC base in Garamba 
Park should peace talks fail.281 When Kiir returned from a visit to Kampala 
with the renewed demand that the LRA disclose their troop deployments in 
Sudan, DRC and Uganda to allow monitoring, the LRA countered that they 
would only assemble if the UPDF declared its weapons of mass destruction. 
278 Fieldnotes, Juba: 11/8/2006.
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The UPDF shrugged this off: “We have never owned and we do not intend 
to own any weapons of mass destruction,” said UPDF Captain Paddy 
Ankunda, the government team’s spokesman.282
On August 24, Museveni reportedly emailed his GoU delegates new terms 
for an agreement on Cessation of Hostilities: he required LRA fighters to 
assemble at designated points in southern Sudan, offered safe passage to 
the rebels through Uganda, agreed to declare a truce for 14 days renewable 
upon review, and mandated the SPLA to provide security at the assembly 
points. After the LRA/M agreed to concentrate all its forces in two assembly 
points, the GoU proposed to cease hostilities as a first step and expression 
of goodwill.283  Divided by the Nile and hundreds of miles apart, the two 
assembly points assured the GoU that the agreement would not simply 
allow the LRA to regroup all of its forces in one place with no threat of 
attack. The Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) was signed on 
August 26, 2006, to great fanfare.284
The breakthrough was astonishing. Since I was not there when the 
agreements were finalised and signed, I asked LRA/M delegates a few 
weeks later where the sudden success had come from, considering all the 
tension leading up to it. None of the explanations given to me were very 
clear. However, two delegates argued that they had to sign an agreement 
quickly to ensure that the Talks would continue. When asked why they 
thought the GoU had agreed to it, they explained that the GoU did not 
believe that LRA would assemble, thus signing the agreement was without 
consequences for them. I asked whether the LRA was genuine in its 
commitment to assemble. Of course, the delegates answered.285 
In retrospect, the unexpected signing established a typical pattern, but it 
was too soon to recognise it at this point. The LRA/M delegates saw the 
agreement as the only tool available to move things forward, yet also 
argued that its meaning was diminished by a GoU undercurrent that 
speculated that the agreement would be easy to dismiss. It was the first 
manifestation of the divergent dynamics between the process amongst the 
actors and the process on paper. From the LRA/M point of view, signing the 
agreement was a necessary act of maintaining engagement with the 
process, its facilitators and other actors in it. Additionally, the first sign of 
success crucially changed how the Juba Talks were perceived. 
282 Sudan Tribune/ Daily Monitor, "Sudan's Kiir says LRA must disclose troops positions for ceasefire”, 21/8/2006.
283 Fieldnotes, Juba: 7/9/2006.
284 The CoH was periodically renewed and at times amended. A total of five annexures exist, signed on 1/11/2006, 16/12/2006, 
14/4/2007, 3/11/2007, 30/1/2008.
285 Fieldnotes, Juba: 7/9/2006.
98
With one success under its belt, international actors were more inclined to 
give their support. Switzerland had been the first country to back the Juba 
initiative, even when success seemed extremely unlikely. As talks got 
underway, UNICEF joined the mediation team as the first UN agency. While 
very keen to get involved, UNICEF struggled with the sequencing of 
stressing its child protection mandate while aiming to support negotiations. 
Other UN agencies and the Core Group countries came on board after the 
signing of the CoH.286  Quinn writes that these countries had “pledged to 
support the peace talks morally and financially”.287 The UN Security Council 
(UNSC) called on the conflict parties “to  commit themselves fully” to 
finding “a long-term and peaceful solution to the conflict” and called for 
the peace process “to be concluded expeditiously”, in addition to affirming 
its commitment to bringing the LRA leaders responsible for war crime to 
justice.288
The international support was double-edged for the LRA/M delegates. On 
the one hand, they were unsure what position the donor countries would 
take vis-à-vis the ICC. On the other, seeing more money being pledged 
allowed them to voice demands for a support infrastructure. On August 28, 
two days after signing the CoH, the delegation wrote to Machar, 
apologising for delivering papers late because of 
failure to establish a well manned secretariat with sufficient 
logistical support. We would appreciate if you would finance the 
establishment of a secretariat with resource persons with the 
capacity to fully utilise the Internet, carry out research and supply 
the Delegation with information, while at the same time 
coordinating us with the international community and our people 
at home. You may also wish to be reminded that up to now, we do 
not have internet service at our residence.289  
Implementation Challenges
The CoH stipulated that by September 18, all LRA forces would be 
assembled in two sites in southern Sudan: Owiny-Kibul in Eastern Equatoria, 
and Ri-Kwangba in Western Equatoria.290  In preparation for the assembly, 
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the UPDF agreed to cease hostilities against moving LRA soldiers, withdraw 
all its troops from near the assembly areas, and cease further deployment in 
Sudan. The SPLA committed itself to providing protection for LRA forces in 
both assembly areas. The sites were chosen because Owiny-Kibul was easily 
accessible from Uganda and many of the LRA troops were said to be in 
Eastern Equatoria anyway; the leadership was already gathered in the 
vicinity of the second assembly site in Western Equatoria. How many LRA 
fighters were expected to emerge at the assembly sites was never fully 
clear: estimates ranged from 1,000 women and children to up to 15,000 
combatants, a number that was provided by the LRA/M.291 The agreement 
further created a Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT). This was 
to be made up of representatives of the LRA, UPDF, SPLA and AU.
The day after the signing, UPDF Colonel Otema instructed UPDF troops on 
northern Uganda’s Mega FM radio to halt all operations against the LRA 
rebels: “I have received communication from the president that beginning 
this morning at 6am, we should suspend operations against the LRA rebels 
to allow them to move to the designated areas for peace talks.”292 
Museveni declared: “It is hereby directed that the UPDF should withdraw to 
their barracks and to the guarding of internally displaced people. They 
should not shoot at the LRA unless in defence of the population.”293  Otti 
followed suit, announcing on Mega FM that LRA fighters were to meet the 
two main field commanders—Dominic Ongwen and Caesar Achellam—and 
proceed under their command to the assembly points.294  On their way, he 
ordered, troops were not to abduct, kill, harass or commit any violent act 
against civilians, or attack the UPDF.295 Instead, Otti made a plea to civilians: 
But I also ask the civilians to allow these fighters to get some food 
from their gardens as they move to assemble, and this would be 
the last time to do this because we are sure of the positive 
outcome of the peace talks… But you, as Acholi people and 
Ugandans, should have a close watch on those opportunists who 
may be interested in spoiling the peace. I know they are out there, 
very many and some would begin to do things that would spoil 
our name but tell them it is now time for peace in our land.296 
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The UPDF also announced 10 safe corridors in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader to 
“separate the LRA from some other criminals, who might take advantage of 
the situation”.297
When the CoH Agreement came into effect at 6am on August 29, 2006, 
Gulu was full of white flags waved by crowds of people parading through 
town. Flags were also planted along major roads in the municipality; UPDF 
General Katumba Wamala handed one to a son of Kony who lived in 
Gulu.298  Northern Ugandans perceived the expressed intention to cease 
hostilities as a major achievement. The LRA now had two weeks until 
September 12 to assemble before the CoH was to be reviewed again. The 
tight deadline also put the required assembly close to the government’s 
deadline for the successful conclusion of the Juba Talks, which the GoU had 
now declared for September 18, 2006.
The LRA fighters’ journey produced news of highly symbolic value. The 
Ugandan parliament endorsed a resolution commending the great successes 
so far in the Juba Talks. A few Ugandan MPs asked the ICC to revoke the 
warrants against the LRA’s top leadership,299  a request the ICC rebuffed, 
saying that they would not act on rushed “speculation” that the talks might 
succeed.300  Instead, the ICC reacted a few days later by ordering an urgent 
investigation into Uganda’s efforts to arrest Kony and others, arguing that 
such efforts were vital for the prevention of further crimes. The ICC insisted 
that the GoU submit a written report by October 6.301
Meanwhile Ongwen, a man on the ICC’s wanted list, celebrated a friendly 
encounter at Barayomo/Lacekot junction on September 3, 2006, with the 
UPDF 509th Brigade commander. Looking on as the enemies shook hands 
were Gulu Resident District Commissioner (RDC) Walter Ochora, Pader RDC 
Santa Okot Lapolo, and Bishop Onono-Onweng, who had brought 200 kilos 
of beans, 200 kilos of posho [maize porridge] and 20 litres of cooking oil to 
sustain Ongwen’s troops on their way to Owiny-Kibul.302  The UPDF 
proposed to load the LRA fighters on their trucks and drive them towards 
the border. Having pleaded for help from civilians in his previous 
appearance, Otti now came on the airwaves to reject assistance from 
297 C.Ocowun, "UPDF withdraws", The New Vision, 30/8/2006.
298 A.Okot, "North celebrates LRA truce", The New Vision, 31/8/2006.
299 R.Mutumba, G.Natabaalo, and R.Muhumuza, "Otti gives LRA rebels Sept. 19 deadline", The Daily Monitor, 8/9/2006.
300 R.Muhumaza and E.Gyezaho, "No deal on arrest warrants, ICC tells Kony", The Daily Monitor, 7/9/2006.
301 The New Vision, "LRA warrants to stay, says ICC", The New Vision, 26/9/2006.
302 C.Ocowun and C.Mukiibi, "Top LRA meets UPDF", The New Vision, 4/9/2006. S.Egadu et al., "Top Kony rebel contacts UPDF", The 
Daily Monitor 5/9/2006.
101
official quarters. He ordered his soldiers not to accept any offers of 
transport from either the SPLA or the UPDF. “All LRA fighters and 
commanders will have to walk to the assembling areas. Our legs are our 
vehicles,” Otti said on Mega FM.303  He also insisted that they were to walk 
to southern Sudan without detours to make sure they would arrive in 
Owiny-Kibul by September 19: “You should stop north and south 
movements. This will cause confusion.”304
Approaching the Assembly Deadline
However, the enthusiasm after the promising first steps towards peace was 
short-lived. Within days of the agreement being signed, the LRA/M 
announced that Owiny-Kibul was not a suitable assembly area as it was 
heavily mined. The claim could never be substantiated,305  but the choice of 
Owiny-Kibul became open to debate again. A rapid assessment by various 
UN agencies in Southern Sudan articulated some of the logistical challenges 
of preparing the assembly areas adequately: “Air and road transport 
constraints”, lack of “qualified staffing and availability in the very short 
term” as well as “staff security and psycho-social well-being” and 
“landmines and other UXO [Unexploded Ordinances] that may be in 
surrounding areas”.306
While Ongwen and the UPDF were engaged in conciliatory handshakes, the 
GoU delegation returned to negotiations in Juba with two people who had 
been mutilated by the LRA. The display of victims outraged the LRA/M 
delegation. One delegate said, “Getting the victims is bad taste. Who are 
the perpetrators?”307  The LRA/M retaliated by distributing a photograph 
showing a naked woman lying on the ground. In the photograph, someone 
is holding her arms stretched above her head; a UPDF soldier is pinning her 
legs apart while holding a razor to her crotch.308 The woman was identified 
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as Candida Lakony, with the picture reportedly taken in 1999.309  With this 
picture, the LRA/M wanted to counter the GoU’s move of bringing victims 
into the negotiations, to remind everyone in Juba that the army was also a 
perpetrator of crimes against civilians.310 
On September 11, Egeland visited Juba on an official OCHA mission to 
discuss the humanitarian aspects of the Juba Talks during negotiations and 
beyond. It had become clear that dispensing funds through the UN systems 
was going to be problematic, and OCHA took on the responsibility. In a 
meeting with NGOs in Juba, Egeland also asked for project proposals to 
support the peace talks—to which none of the present NGOs responded. 
Meanwhile, reports of LRA troops moving towards Owiny-Kibul continued 
to trickle through, but it was also clear that their progress was slower than 
expected. Otti made explicit in an interview on Mega FM on September 13 
that he was unhappy with government pressure to conclude the talks: 
You know I am telling you clearly listeners, peace talks have no 
date. If he [Museveni] says the talks are expiring, I don’t know 
what he is saying. It may be expiring on their side but not on our 
side because we are still continuing talking peace. You cannot say 
that you can talk peace and finish today while even one agenda 
among the five agendas has been signed just recently. The second 
agenda has not yet started. Now I don’t understand the meaning 
when you say, expiry date.311  
On September 14, Otti came on the radio again to announce that the GoU 
also had to extend its September 18 deadline for the peace talks, otherwise 
he would order all assembled fighters to disperse so as to not be attacked 
unawares if the UPDF should adhere to the peace talks’ deadline rather 
than the assembly deadline, which had been extended to September 21. 
Otti further declared that he himself and Kony would leave Ri-Kwangba if 
the deadlines were not clarified.312 
On September 17, the delegates, the facilitators and some journalists went 
to Ri-Kwangba to see the progress of the LRA assembly. When the plane 
touched down in Maridi, to the dismay of the LRA/M delegates there were 
no cars waiting and no UN peacekeepers keeping an eye on the situation. A 
few hours later, the swiftly hired cars pulled into Ri-Kwangba, in what 
309 Democratic Republic of Congo Permanent Mission United Nations, "Torture by Ugandan soldiers - Worse than animals", 20/6/1999; 
G.Matsiko, "Canadian nude photos mess up Juba talks", The Daily Monitor 9/9/2006. The picture and the accompanying story had been 
published in the Daily Monitor in mid-1999. The story purported that none of the soldiers in the photograph had been charged; Candida 
Lakony was imprisoned on charges of theft and later giving false information to the police. I have not been able to verify whether the 
purported UN document from 1999 is real.
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previously had been a humble clearing in the dense forest. The clearing was 
now expanded to about 400 metres wide. A few huts were sprinkled across 
and a little seating area made from logs had been arranged. LRA 
commander Colonel Lubwoa Bwone and Lieutenant Colonel Santo Alit were 
in charge of the area. When asked whether the LRA was now getting 
settled here and how many there were, Bwone was cagey: “Don’t mind 
about numbers, don’t mind about our time here. Don’t mind.” He seemed 
uncomfortable in the new Ri-Kwangba, eyeing both the CHMT and the 
journalists who had come with the team suspiciously. Alit was more at ease. 
“This is now our headquarter,” he said, waving his arms in the general 
direction of the clearing around him. Lubwoa interrupted him, clearly not 
pleased with the description. “Yes, this is what we have been given. This is 
now our country. This is where I came, I came here to announce 
liberation.”313  He was clearly irked at what the LRA had ended up with. 
Some of his concerns were later voiced in the LRA/M press release on the 
inadequate preparations of the assembly area: “No medical facilities, no 
water, no beddings, no tents; most of the food that was delivered is 
rotten.”314  “We have better food if we go to the bush,” Lubwoa 
commented before wandering off to talk to some soldiers.315
On September 21, the day full assembly was required, the SPLA head of the 
yet-to-be-constituted Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT)  had 
to confirm that the LRA had assembled. A group of more junior LRA 
holding watch in Ri-Kwangba, among them Otto, complained to the press 
that conditions in Ri-Kwangba were still not conducive to assembly. There 
was, for example, still no clean water, Otto said, walking reporters to the 
only water supply: a muddy puddle.316  Nonetheless, the SPLA general told 
reporters at a makeshift press conference that 804 LRA had assembled in Ri-
Kwangba, and that he was satisfied that the LRA had fulfilled the 
requirements of the CoH. Both SPLA and journalists then returned to the 
SPLA detachment in Nabanga. Two hours later, a Reuters journalist wanted 
to follow up with a few more questions. In this follow-up interview, the 
CHMT leader revised his assessment: “The LRA have not assembled, there is 
a violation of the ceasefire. The mediator will have to decide what to do 
next. Kampala will extend the deadline for assembly.” He explained that 
804 fighters had assembled, but three more large groups would arrive the 
313 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 17/9/2006.
314 LRA/M delegation in Juba, "LRA/M Press Release”, 23/9/2006.
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following day.317  The reporters present reported that there was obviously 
confusion about what had been achieved. 
The LRA/M reacted in a radio interview: Olweny stated that the conditions 
in the camp did not allow an assembly, and that in any case the CoH 
allowed a two-week grace period. Museveni responded in an interview on 
Mega FM, calling the LRA a terrorist outfit that would be finished. Ugandan 
Acholi leaders would later protest against his belligerent language.318
The following day, the SPLA head of the CHMT consulted with the LRA in 
Ri-Kwangba. Otti, angry about the assertion from the previous day that the 
LRA had not assembled, stated that the SPLA was “sympathetic to the UPDF. 
You reported that we violated the ceasefire when we did not. I was here 
and the chairman [Kony] was also here in Ri-Kwangba,” to which the head 
of the CHMT answered: “It is true the UPDF are our allies. You [LRA] were 
our enemies. We fought you but all this has been put behind us. We want 
this war to end. So do not doubt our commitment.”319  In a short press 
conference given by Otti with Odiyambo by his side, Otti stated that he 
would sign a peace deal before the ICC warrant was lifted as long as it was 
signed in Nabanga, but that no LRA fighter would leave the bush as long as 
the warrants stood. He said that the remaining women and children were 
all family members, so they would stay with the fighters.320
Museveni responded to the latest news coming out of Nabanga, saying that 
the ICC warrants would need to remain in place: 
The ICC… indictments have to continue until the LRA leaders fully 
embrace the peace talks... How do you ask for safety from the ICC 
when you haven’t given safety to Ugandans?… You have to give 
safety to Ugandans first. If you don’t do that, you will die.321 
He expressed his irritation that the talks were taking too long, and also that 
the set-up by which he had to call Rugunda and Rugunda then had to call 
Kony was too complicated. Museveni’s solution was to come to Juba to lead 
the government team himself.322  Otti commented on this declaration in a 
private conversation: 
If Museveni wants to come and join the peace talks in Juba, let him 
fight with Martin [Ojul, the chairman of the LRA/M delegation]. 
Let him have it out with Martin. Why does Museveni want to come 
317 Fieldnotes, Nabanga/ Ri-Kwangba: 21/9/2006.
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to Juba, does he not trust his own delegation? I am only sending 
two military men for the monitoring team. It actually means I have 
a lot of trust in my delegation.323
Upon return to Juba on September 23, the LRA/M delegation held an 
impromptu press conference in the Juba Airport VIP Lounge. Ayena, as the 
main speaker, first demanded that the GoU delegation be changed from 
mainly military and security personnel to a delegation with political 
credibility. He further announced that an estimated 7,000 LRA would 
assemble and that all UPDF troops stationed around Owiny-Kibul had to 
withdraw in order for talks to continue. This was a direct order from Kony, 
who, Ayena said, had in the past month travelled to Owiny-Kibul to inspect 
the conditions and the presence of UPDF troops there. The announcement 
that Kony had secretly travelled across southern Sudan’s Equatorial states 
caused great confusion.324  Most journalists and the GoU delegation 
dismissed it as impossible, yet Machar—who had received reports that the 
LRA had been crossing the Nile without notifying the SPLA, in violation of 
the CoH—said he thought “it is possible that Kony crossed, too.” He 
explained later that he had “told them off for letting Kony go because if 
something happens to him now it is a really bad thing to happen.”325  The 
same day, the LRA/M issued a press release that contradicted the findings 
that the LRA had not assembled in Ri-Kwangba: 
While at Ri-Kwangba, the chairman of the Cessation of Hostilities 
Monitoring Team, Maj. Gen. Wilson Deng, visited the designated 
Assembly area, where he found all the top commanders and more 
than 1,848 members of the LRA combatants now assembled. He 
was fully briefed about the inadequate preparations in the area, 
where there is [sic] no medical facilities, no water, no beddings, no 
tents; most of the food that was delivered is rotten; etc. This shall 
definitely impede the arrival of roughly 7940 combatants unless it 
is urgently addressed.326
Talks Continue Amidst Confusion
On September 25, 2006, the third round of peace talks started, and the LRA/
M issued a press statement. They claimed that the UPDF had increased its 
deployment near the assembly areas and that this posed a grave threat to 
the Juba Talks.327 The release countered a UPDF statement to the press that 
323 Fieldnotes, Juba: 7/9/2006.
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the army was ready to attack should the LRA fail to keep its side of the 
Cessation of Hostilities bargain.328  Otti commented a day later that the 
UPDF should not provoke the LRA: “Don’t play with war.”329  The LRA/M 
asked for a seven-day deadline for the UPDF to withdraw, and called on the 
international community to provide aid to fighters in assembly areas.330 
When the US Senate passed a bill to support the Juba Peace process, for a 
brief moment such aid seemed plausible.331 Despite all obstacles, it seemed 
as if the Juba Talks were riding a wave of support. 
It was thus jolting when two different sets of news arrived almost 
simultaneously: news about US support, and news about a UPDF military 
convoy travelling unauthorised towards Owiny-Kibul. The SPLA in Juba said 
that they had no knowledge of such a convoy; they implied that it might 
not be true, and that the LRA/M’s accusation of UPDF movement was 
unfounded. A delegate countered the SPLA line: 
Since we have our information from our people, our moles in the 
UPDF and local people, we know it is true. The GoSS says it is not 
true. What can that mean? Either they are complicit with the UPDF 
or they are not capable of controlling their territory. Both is [sic] 
worrying.332
At first, the story seemed to suggest that a group of journalists had 
travelled by themselves to Owiny-Kibul to see the assembled LRA, but had 
been turned back by the UPDF, who claimed that Ongwen and his men had 
left the Owiny-Kibul assembly point on September 25.333 The first version of 
the story said that UPDF soldiers had argued with the journalists that their 
safety could not be guaranteed now that the LRA was at large again.334 
UPDF spokesman Kulayigye was quoted as saying: “We were let down by 
the SPLA which was supposed to pick us from Ngomoromo but they didn’t. 
We proceeded with our own UPDF protection up to Pajok with hope that 
we could find more SPLA protection but that wasn’t the case.”335 
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In Juba, these snippets of news caused confusion. It was unclear whether 
the LRA had left Owiny-Kibul and whether the UPDF was moving troops 
towards the area. The LRA/M delegates said that their fighters had 
informed them of heavy UPDF deployment around the area; the added 
story about the group of journalists was yet another incomprehensible 
element. A leading delegate was concerned: “I do not want to have blood 
on my hands. I did not start the peace talks for these people to gather in 
the assembly points, to bring their women and children to be killed.”336 
Conjuring up the Acholi experience of being forced into camps, one LRA 
commander said he was worried that “the fighters will be kept in 
concentration camp conditions at the assembly points.”337  When the BBC 
called the unprotected open site at Owiny-Kibul a “reception centre” and 
reported that the LRA had broken the CoH agreement, without mentioning 
the information on alleged UPDF deployment, the LRA/M delegates in Juba 
were again enraged. 338 It was to be a sign of things to come. A few weeks 
later the Acholi Parliamentary Group (APG) would issue a report about their 
visit to Juba, stating that there was a feeling in Juba that “Ugandan 
newspapers are the worst enemy of the peace process.”339 
Within the delegation, the mood was volatile. A few remained convinced 
that the CoH was a great success and would be adhered to. Some 
implementation issues were to be expected, some argued, and the LRA/M 
remained adamant that they could prove they were right about UPDF 
deployment. On September 28, the LRA/M delegation presented a 33-
second video clip of a UPDF military vehicle, a mamba, to the mediator, 
claiming that the footage had been taken a few days earlier in Sudan. 
Machar responded with a quip: “I did not know we had such good roads in 
Sudan,” he said. Gulu District Chairman and former MP Norbert Mao who 
had been present during the showing, made fun of the huge billing the 
LRA/M had given to the few seconds of disputed footage.340  He laughed 
about Olweny’s interview on the BBC in which he had said that the LRA had 
“video clips” of UPDF deployment. Another LRA delegate was listening 
quietly to Mao’s amused depiction of the LRA/M’s PR manoeuvre. Finally, he 
responded: “That’s the war of the words.” In the end he also laughed when 
Mao concluded that the LRA/M reminded him of the Iraqi propaganda 
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minister Al-Sahaf who, in commenting on the US invasion, “kept claiming 
during Iraq war ‘we are pounding them, we are pounding them.’”341
Other LRA/M delegates were less light-hearted about the developing 
dynamics. They saw patterns emerging that they had seen in previous peace 
negotiations. One of the delegates described how tired he was of the GoU 
presenting a set of conditions for the talks and their outcome to the 
outside world as if these were negotiations. In his argument, the talks had 
not yet moved beyond the government setting the rules, thus limiting 
political debate. “The GoU delegation uses the same words, I wait for them 
every day,” he said, shrugging. “‘Amnesty, soft landing, deadline and 
expeditious’.”342
Although UPDF military deployment and the challenges of assembling were 
unresolved, the LRA/M moved forwards. They presented a 26-page 
document on comprehensive solutions. The GoU straight away rejected the 
suggestion to mandate the LRA as the official army in charge of the north 
during an interim period in which the national army was to be fully 
integrated. The LRA/M had also demanded that both forces be given “equal 
consideration and treatment as Uganda’s national armies.”343  In Kampala 
Museveni announced that Uganda would contribute US$1 million to the 
Juba Peace Talks.344  Despite Mao’s amusement at LRA/M tactics, the 
delegates also started engaging more with the group of Ugandan MPs who 
had arrived in Juba to support the talks. Their arrival had created mixed 
feelings in the LRA/M delegation. Most delegates felt that they were being 
stripped of their negotiating authority. The day after the LRA/M had 
presented its document on comprehensive solutions, the Ugandan papers 
reported that negotiations continued, but also that the LRA/M had 
threatened to abandon peace talks if the UPDF did not withdraw from 
Sudan, and that the LRA/M would review their position on this within seven 
days. A confidential letter from Uganda’s State House to Kiir claimed that 
all LRA had left the assembly areas on Kony’s orders, a statement which Otti 
denied right away: “We have not instructed anyone to withdraw from the 
assembly point. But because of the impending situation where we are being 
surrounded by the UPDF, when this situation continues I will ask them [LRA 
fighters] to take care of themselves.”345  Machar stated to the delegation 
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that increased UPDF deployment had been observed near the border, but 
not inside Sudan.346 
Throughout this time, the LRA/M delegates were staying in the Juba Bridge 
Hotel, located on a downward-sloping left turn just before the bridge 
crosses the Nile. At the beginning of the talks, the hotel was a muddy area 
of prefabricated containers lined up behind a bamboo gate. Thousands of 
bricks were stacked under a tarpaulin; a satellite dish was waiting to be 
installed. Heavy vehicles had left huge track marks that after each rain 
shower turned into puddles and drinking fountains for roaming white 
goats. Someone somewhere in the compound was always hammering or 
drilling. With construction advancing, the owner sometimes proudly 
remarked, he was doing his bit to “build the peace” in Sudan. The LRA/M 
delegates rolled their eyes at this suggestion. They lived in prefabricated 
rooms with communal washing areas in which showers or toilet flushes 
worked only erratically. 
During rain showers the intermittent crash of a mango outdid the steady 
drumming of rain on corrugated iron roofs. It sounded as if someone was 
launching an aerial attack. I was sitting with two delegates under the 
thatched roof of the bar area, waiting for the rain to stop, when we heard 
several close thumps in short succession. We all jumped. The two delegates 
regained their composure much more quickly than I did. I was still clasping 
my heart while they laughed and joked: “We are under attack now! See, we 
are under attack, but the LRA is in peace! Wherever we go, we are not safe! 
We are under attack. Even in peace talks, we are under attack!”347
A few weeks later, they had lost their sense of humour about mangoes 
masquerading as artillery. The SPLA raided two rooms in one of the 
prefabricated containers; the delegate inhabitants of the other two rooms 
were asked to leave. In the raided rooms, the SPLA found weapons stacked 
high—mainly AK-47s and ammunition. Hundreds of them, a soldier said 
vaguely, maybe more. Hotel staff who had seen a suspicious truck 
unloading dubious cargo in the parking lot had tipped off the SPLA. The 
truck’s driver had told the security guard to mind his own business. The 
driver was a former Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) soldier who was now part 
of the Joint Integrated Units. The CPA had established so-called Joint 
Integrated Units (JIU), which brought together SPLA and SAF in areas where 
both armies had had soldiers in order to facilitate the gradual withdrawal 
of SAF forces from southern Sudan. After seizing the weapons, the SPLA 
was very vocal about who they saw as the culprit. A stack of weapons in the 
346 Fieldnotes, Juba: 28/9/2006.
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LRA hotel, delivered by SAF soldiers? It seemed obvious that the LRA was 
“preparing for war”. The Ugandan press corps was also convinced that the 
LRA/M was now using the negotiations to launch an attack on Juba; they 
reported it as evidence that the LRA was “not serious”. 
Further investigation brought to light that the weapons had been stolen 
from the SPLA by SAF. SAF was securing extra weaponry as they were 
moving out of Juba to fulfil CPA obligations, and the Juba Bridge Hotel 
must have seemed like an easy place to use for storage. SPLA security and 
surveillance had slipped up. The delegation was outraged at this breach of 
their personal safety. “These weapons,” one delegate said, “could have 
easily been used against us.” The implication in the volatile environment of 
Juba in 2006 that all weaponry was connected to the LRA, rather than to 
intra-Sudanese tension, meant, said one delegate, that people had a very 
limited understanding of the challenges that arose in establishing peace, 
even after a peace deal had been signed. This had implications for the LRA/
M too: “Sudan is not in peace, even though they are supposed to be. So it is 
extremely volatile for peace negotiations, it is very easy to shake things 
up.”348
Security at the LRA/M hotel was beefed up instantly. Cars were now 
stopped at the bamboo gate, which was locked at night. Bags were 
searched and torches shone into the eyes of drivers. It was a big step up for 
the Juba Bridge Hotel, but still a long way behind security at other camps: 
at Civicon, where the GoU delegation was residing, the guards wrote down 
car registration numbers and asked for the ID of all passengers.349  A few 
days after the incident, a senior GoSS representative came to see Ojul over 
lunch to apologise for the mess. When I indicated that I could leave for the 
conversation, the GoSS person motioned for me to stay. “I think we have 
mishandled the situation,” he explained. Ojul accepted the apology 
generously, if a bit patronisingly, and turned to me as soon as the 
representative had left. “GoSS knows they screwed up,” he said. “Such 
thing could derail the peace process but we are here for peace. But how 
they do this, this is not peace. We are not moving in peace now. I don’t 
think this is what peace should look like.”350
The Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team Fact-Finding Mission
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On October 1, a couple of days after the gun incident at Juba Bridge Hotel, 
the hastily constituted CHMT left on its first fact-finding mission. The LRA/M 
representatives insisted that this was not to be seen as a full mission, as 
international representatives had not yet strengthened the team. Crucially 
for the LRA/M contingent on the team, they had not been given uniforms. 
They delayed the departure of the convoy by going to the market to at 
least buy themselves identical clothing to show, as they said, that they were 
“professional”. Led by international technical advisor Anton Baare and 
accompanied by a few journalists—and me—the team left for Owiny-Kibul 
on October 1. At the heart of the trip lay the question whether the parties 
to the CoH had violated the agreement. 
Travelling through Magwi to arrive in Owiny-Kibul the following day, the 
CHMT waited to make contact with the scattered LRA forces, discussed 
what the exact boundaries of the assembly area were, and met with the 
SPLA and the local chief to establish what had happened here in the past 
few days. Both the SPLA and the chief confirmed that the LRA had been 
present in the area and had come to collect some of the food delivered by 
the SPLA in preparation for the assembly, but that they had left just a few 
days prior to the CHMT’s visit. Both mentioned the incident involving a 
UPDF convoy which chased the LRA away. Upon hearing this, the LRA/M on 
the team argued that their people had stuck to the agreement, but had 
been forced away by the UPDF. The UPDF on the team pointed out that the 
LRA was nowhere to be found at Owiny-Kibul; hence they had broken the 
agreement. The latest information from LRA commander Achellam to the 
LRA on the CHMT had been that the LRA were in the immediate vicinity, 
but had to remain hidden because of the UPDF.351 The day ended when the 
CHMT agreed to wait until the morning to see if the LRA forces in the area 
would make contact. 
While everyone was getting ready for the night, news from Kampala came 
on the radio: the UPDF announced that as of then it was resuming 
operations against the LRA because the CHMT had conclusively established 
that the rebels were not assembled. UPDF spokesperson Kulayigye 
announced that the UPDF had closed all safe routes to the assembly areas: 
Our team of observers in Owiny-Kibul have confirmed there is no 
presence of LRA at that assembling point. They have abused the 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. For that matter, we are back to 
war because we do not know their motive and where they are. We 
are back to business. It’s business as usual. We are looking for the 
351 Fieldnotes, Magwi: 2/10/2006.
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LRA. It is because of the development that we have resumed 
operations against the LRA.”352 
Simultaneously, it was reported that Museveni had contacted US President 
Bush to ask for support a military “Plan B” for dealing with the LRA.353 
Tensions between LRA and UPDF representatives in Owiny-Kibul were 
unsurprisingly high. 
The next morning, October 3, 2006, Otti called the CHMT technical advisor 
to tell him that the LRA fighters could no longer make contact with the 
CHMT at Owiny-Kibul because the UPDF had announced that they would 
target the LRA. While the CHMT continued to travel towards Palotaka and 
Pajok, Museveni met with John Edwards, the former North Carolina senator, 
at State House in Kampala. During the meeting, Museveni reportedly said 
that unless a comprehensive peace agreement was signed soon, Uganda 
was expecting US support for a military plan against the LRA, and he hinted 
that such a plan was already underway since “the peace talks might 
improve Kony’s life expectancy, but cannot fix an insurgency.” State House 
released a statement that Edwards had promised to lobby for the passing of 
a resolution that would allow the pursuit, disarmament and demobilisation 
of the LRA.354
In Pajok, the CHMT settled down for a meeting with local residents to shed 
light on the incident involving the UPDF military convoy travelling from 
Uganda towards Owiny-Kibul. Major General Deng spoke encouraging 
words to the residents, who found themselves in the worrying situation of 
having to answer to representatives of the LRA and the UPDF. “Let there be 
no fear from your side. Just tell us the reality,” Deng said encouragingly.355 
The residents of Pajok then went on to explain that on September 27 one 
of the elders in Pajok had seen Ugandan military vehicles just before UPDF 
soldiers came to him to ask for a spade that they needed to dig out a bus 
that had become stuck in the mud. When the elder saw the military 
vehicles, he asked whether anything was wrong. The UPDF answered that 
the only problem was that the bus was stuck. The elder found a spade and 
then drove with the soldiers to the location where the bus was stuck.
352 F.Ahimbisibwe, "LRA war resumes", The New Vision 3/10/2006. Reuters, "Ugandan army resumes offensive against LRA rebels",  
4/10/2006. 
353 A.Matia, "LRA soldiers missing, peace talks continue", Juba Post, 5/10/2006.
354 R.Muhumaza, "Museveni Asks U.S. to Back Plan B Against LRA", The Daily Monitor, 3/10/2006. This Resolution would later became the 
LRA Act in the US.
355 Answers were given in Acholi and translated by the assistant to the chief (in Owiny-Kibul) and by Gulu’s Sheikh Khalil (in Owiny-Kibul 
and Parajok). Arabic answers from the local SPLA commander in Owiny-Kibul were translated by SPLA Major General Wilson Deng and SPLA 
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When he reached the location, he saw many people, men and women, 
black and white. Many of the people had cameras; even a musician was 
performing. Many photographers from the bus were busy taking photos. 
The music system was playing. The entire convoy was made up of a bus 
(which was light blue with a yellow-green top and Bugandan writing on the 
side), two mambas [armoured personnel carriers], two buffaloes [mine-
protected clearance vehicles], two Toyota double-cabin pick-up trucks, and 
a lorry. Each Toyota was carrying at least four UPDF soldiers. Another 
vehicle carried six UPDF soldiers and the mambas carried “the normal crew 
of two UPDF soldiers standing”. It was difficult for the locals to determine 
the number of men inside the buffaloes. The locals said that the entire 
convoy came like this from Uganda, “acting as the same team” and 
connected “just like the fish move in the river”. 
After the locals and UPDF soldiers managed to get the bus unstuck, the 
entire convoy was taken to the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) compound in 
Pajok. The locals asked where the convoy was headed and were told it was 
going to Owiny-Kibul. The residents then asked: had the delegation been 
properly cleared and authorised by the SPLA to go and visit the LRA in 
Owiny-Kibul? The answer given was: “No, we have just come to negotiate 
with the SPLA soldiers who are here to allow us to proceed to Owiny-Kibul 
and see the LRA.” The locals then asked the head of the delegation from 
“which side he was exactly in Uganda”. The head of the delegation was 
identified to the locals as the UPDF brigade commander from Kitgum.
Informing the Ugandan delegation that they had to gain permission from 
the SPLA, the residents insisted that in order to see the local SPLA soldiers, 
the convoy would have to go to Palotaka where the forces were located. 
The locals further stated that they could not give “any single authority to 
proceed” unless the SPLA, maybe even in Magwi [the county seat, further 
away], was informed, and that the delegation could only proceed in the 
presence of an SPLA officer. Letting the delegation proceed, explained a 
local elder later, was seen as potentially giving the residents of Palotaka 
problems. Also, the elder said, he was aware that the LRA had “just come” 
to the assembly point, so allowing the delegation to go there could be 
“kind of dangerous”. He said, expressing his fear, the delegation “had guns. 
And the uniform, they were putting… And things were still premature.” So 
he said that the delegation could cause a problem for the LRA because once 
“two brothers fought and they have just been separated, their eyes and 
anger still are within them and it can really cause a lot of problems.”356
356 Fieldnotes, Palotaka/ Parajok: 3/10/2006.
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The Ugandan delegation attempted to contact the SPLA by radio, but 
ended up spending the night of September 27–28 in the NCA compound. 
The Ugandan Media Centre, the GoU’s public relations branch, signed for 
the bill. In the end, the senior authorities of the governor and the 
commissioner refused permission to proceed to the delegation. Having 
received this news, the delegation returned to Uganda at around 10am on 
September 28. At the same time the chief of Parajok was working on the 
airstrip in Owiny-Kibul, where he saw members of the LRA and shared food 
from the same store with them. The food was stored under the roofs of the 
school structure in Owiny-Kibul.
The people working on the airstrip also told the LRA about the bus with 
strangers heading towards Owiny-Kibul from the Ugandan border and that 
the UPDF was moving towards Owiny-Kibul with a mamba [military vehicle]. 
Those working on the airstrip at that point had not heard that the convoy 
had turned back. The Parajok chief said he was “frightened” upon receiving 
this news. The SPLA commander based in Owiny-Kibul then sent his junior 
officer to tell the UPDF forces that “you people cannot go ahead,” and that 
they were to wait in Parajok unless there was confirmation from the SPLA 
that they were allowed to proceed. 
The news that the convoy had returned to Uganda after being “restrained 
by the SPLA” came shortly afterwards, so at that time the LRA was still in 
Owiny-Kibul. Nonetheless, the information that military vehicles were 
moving had caused unrest among the assembled LRA. Three days after the 
initial news, the locals in Owiny-Kibul found that food in one location had 
been poured onto the ground, presumably by the LRA, and they found an 
unsigned letter, presumably from the LRA, that instructed the finder of the 
food not to take it, but to please “cover it with canvas”. This location was 
visited and inspected by the CHMT on October 2, together with the chief of 
Owiny-Kibul and the local SPLA commander. The chief told the CHMT that 
the LRA forces had not informed him when they were leaving the area, but 
according to him they had left on September 30.357
After questioning the residents, the SPLA, UPDF and LRA on the CHMT 
agreed that this version of the story was correct. Later, Kampala reacted 
through Nankabirwa, who said, “the trip was sanctioned officially, it was 
innocent. It was genuine. It was meant to enable journalists and diplomats 
to verify whether the LRA had assembled or not. It was not meant to 
deliberately breach the agreement.”358 The CHMT also heard from residents 
that there was continuing UPDF movement near the border. As the CHMT 
357 Fieldnotes, Obbo/ Magwi: 4/10/2006.
358 A.Wasike, "'LRA must assemble'", The New Vision, 15/10/2006.
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was about to leave Parajok to investigate the areas towards the Ugandan 
border, news came that a group of LRA was crossing the Juba-Torit road. 
Despite protests by the LRA contingent that they needed to move towards 
the Ugandan border first, the CHMT returned to Magwi and then travelled 
onwards to Juba.359
On the same day, Uganda’s Solicitor General Lucien Tibaruha sent a letter to 
the ICC to confirm that “the commitment of the Government to cooperate 
with, and support the Court, remains unchanged.” The letter further stated 
that the GoU was working with the DRC, UNMIS, and the UN Mission in the 
DRC (MONUC) “to ensure effective operational planning and coordination 
to tackle the threat posed by the LRA”, but “for reasons of operational 
security, the government of Uganda is not in a position to provide the ICC 
with details of its operational planning or activities.”360
Violations
Having gathered information on their first trip, the CHMT established in its 
first report that all parties had violated the CoH agreement: the LRA had 
not fully assembled by the deadline, the SPLA had not provided the 
promised protection, and the UPDF had deployed military vehicles into 
Sudan and near the assembly area. The report was never made public: with 
all three parties in breach, the mediation team decided to keep details 
concealed. Additionally, the CHMT was clearly not working at its fully 
mandated capacity: AU members had not arrived, and the team barely had 
the resources to travel, never mind to quickly follow up on incidents. In 
early October the technical advisor to the CHMT repeatedly asked for a few 
relevant documents to be given to the LRA/M, such as copies of reports on 
small arms and the Cape Town Principles on Children Associated with 
Armed Groups and Armed Forces, because, explained one of the members 
of the CHMT, “not enough copies were given by OCHA.”361
OCHA and the UN showed their commitment in other ways. On October 5, 
the UN announced the launch of the Juba Initiative Fund (JIF) under the 
auspices of OCHA. Initially valued at $4.8 million, the fund was financed 
through GoSS and the GoU “to facilitate the basic necessities of the Juba 
peace talks and support the start-up of the Cessation of Hostilities 
Monitoring Team.” Commenting that talks had reached a critical point, but 
were hindered by the LRA’s failure to assemble “out of concern about the 
359 Fieldnotes, Obbo/ Magwi: 4/10/2006.
360 E.Gyezaho and F.Nyakairu, "Govt still wants ICC to rest Kony, Otti", The Daily Monitor, 11/10/2006.
361 Fieldnotes, Juba/ Magwi: 2/10/2006.
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deployment of the Ugandan Popular Defence Force in the vicinity” a press 
release also stated “the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team will return 
to Juba today with a full report verifying the situation in Owiny-ki-Bul.” 
Egeland was quoted in the press release: “The United Nations is firmly 
behind the peace process in Juba… A conflict that has dragged on for 20 
years may not be resolved according to the clock. Both sides need to show 
patience to ensure a successful conclusion to the peace process.”362  Other 
donor governments would later support the fund, although actually 
dispensing funds remained a problem.
With military pressure being kept on the LRA near the Eastern Equatoria 
assembly site, Otti retracted his earlier statement regarding the ICC 
warrants. On October 9, 2006, he announced that the LRA would not sign a 
peace deal before the ICC charges were dropped. He told his fighters that if 
they found themselves under pressure in Eastern Equatoria, they should 
cross to Western Equatoria: “They should quit [Eastern Equatoria] if 
possible, because they are my people. Why shouldn’t they come to live with 
me?”363 Intelligence reports a day later confirmed that Ongwen and about 
150 LRA had crossed the Nile north of Juba. There were reports that the 
LRA were carrying a white flag wherever they might be seen.364  It was 
presumed that they had gone so far north because the UPDF had deployed 
all along the east bank in response to Otti’s statement.365 
On October 12, LRA reportedly clashed with Mundari militias—a group of 
fighters that had been supported by the Khartoum government during the 
war—at Mangalla, 15 kilometres north-east of Juba.366 The LRA reported to 
the delegates that the Mundari fighters had attacked them marching in 
single file, as if under unified military command. “This is not militia 
behaviour,” was the message that was delivered to the delegates from the 
LRA fighters on the road. In their opinion this proved that the Mundari had 
been ordered to attack the LRA, although by whom was never made clear. 
The following day reports came through of more than 200 LRA attempting 
to cross the Nile near there. UPDF spokesperson Nankabirwa commented on 
the developments a few days later:
We are not satisfied at all. We expect the LRA to honour their side 
of the agreement we signed by assembling. We have written to 
362 United Nations, "United Nations launches Juba Initiative Fund to aid peace in northern Uganda (AFR/1439; IHA/1239)", 5/10/2006.
363 R.Muhumaza, F.Nyakairu, and S.Kasyate, "Kony rebels refuse to sign peace deal", The Daily Monitor, 10/10/2006.
364 Fieldnotes, Juba: 17/10/2006.
365 E. Allio, "LRA return to Garamba," The New Vision 13/10/2006.
366 UNMIS source. For an analysis of the Mundari militias, see Human Rights Watch, Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in 
Southern Sudan. New York: 1994, p.123.
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the mediator (Lieutenant General Riek Machar). The LRA moved 
away from the assembly points. They are trying to sneak back to 
their bosses at Garamba in DRC.367  
To counter the accusation that the LRA was breaking the agreement, Otti 
ordered his forces to again assemble in Owiny-Kibul. On the way towards 
the site, the LRA troops were ambushed by the UPDF near Bilinyang 100 
kilometers south-east of Juba, during the night of October 15–16 and then 
again in the morning and afternoon of October 16. Two LRA were critically 
injured in what the LRA/M called a “severe provocation” and a “very grave 
violation of the truce”.368  The UPDF rebuffed those claims as “theatrical”, 
with spokesman Kulayigye quoted as saying: 
We have not had any contact with the LRA in as many months… 
Bilinyang is not an assembly point, is not a safe zone and is not a 
safe corridor. So it cannot affect Juba at all. They have the safe 
zones to use so why should they meander through Bilinyang, 
which by the way used to be their [LRA] base? I am urging the LRA 
to stop these games.369  
He also stated that Bilinyang had been occupied for some time by UPDF 
troops, since it had formerly been an LRA base.370 Until that evening, the 
UPDF remained adamant that there had been no incident. In the evening 
the SPLA confirmed that there had been shelling.371
Having heard of the attack, LRA/M delegates went to buy emergency food 
to be sent out to the bush. They described an uncomfortable situation as 
“we were followed by UPDF wherever we went in the market,” said one 
delegate.372  They also requested—and were granted—authorisation from 
the SPLA to send food and medicine to LRA who had been injured and 
possibly remained surrounded by UPDF. The following day, October 17, a 
truck manned and authorised by the SPLA left Juba to deliver these goods 
to the LRA. Accompanying the truck was Achama from the LRA/M team on 
the CHMT. Not far south of Juba, a UPDF roadblock stopped the SPLA truck. 
The UPDF denied the SPLA passage and detained Achama in the UPDF 
barracks for about four hours. He described the time spent in the barracks 
as dangerous, and he said UPDF soldiers had repeatedly threatened to kill 
him because he was LRA. He said he replied to them: “I said you can kill me. 
367 A.Wasike, "'LRA must assemble'", The New Vision, 15/10/2006.
368 BBC News, "Uganda 'attack' threatens talks", 16/10/2006.
369 F.Nyakairu, E.Gyezaho, and P.Harera, "Museveni heads to Juba", The Daily Monitor, 17/10/2006.
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But you would only kill me because of the peace process. If it was not for 
the peace process, you would never find me to kill me.”373 
With Achama in detention, an enraged LRA/M delegation insisted in a 
meeting with Machar that UPDF hostilities had to stop, and that talks could 
not resume until it was investigated why the UPDF had more authority in 
southern Sudan than the SPLA. They expressed their doubt that the SPLA 
would provide the promised protection to the LRA, either outside or inside 
the assembly areas, if the SPLA could be bossed around in their own country 
by UPDF. A little later, news arrived that the LRA had killed a UPDF captain 
near Lyria.374  Machar was outraged at all developments, including the 
incident in Lyria. After all, neither the LRA nor the UPDF were supposed to 
be anywhere near there. 
On the same day, Machar briefed US Presidential Special Envoy Andrew 
Natsios on the mood at the talks. A confidential US diplomatic cable about 
the meeting recounted Machar’s description that “a pronounced lack of 
trust between the two parties” was making progress difficult. Machar said, 
according to the cable, “LRA negotiators question the GoU’s motives at 
every turn, and force protracted debate on even trivial matters like the use 
of the word ‘combatant.’ The GOU ‘stigmatizes’ and ‘castigates’ the LRA” 
and “some members of the GOU negotiating team believe the LRA can only 
be dealt with through military means.” Asked what type of support the US 
could provide, Machar noted the need for financial help and responded: 
“convince Museveni that there is no military solution.” The cable states that 
in response to Machar’s suggestions, “Natsios made no commitments.”375 
Starting the following day, a series of ambushes on the Juba-Torit road and 
an attack on the village of Gumbo outside Juba were carried out by 
unidentified perpetrators resembling the LRA.376 LRA commander Achellam 
in a phone call refused to take responsibility for the attacks: “No LRA has 
attacked civilians in southern Sudan… If attacks took place, it is more likely 
UPDF who are deployed around Juba. They do this, then accuse LRA.” He 
stated that some LRA had scattered north of his position towards Juba, but 
not as far north as where the killings had taken place, he said. “The UPDF 
surrounded us. We had to move for fear of being attacked… They did not 
373 Fieldnotes, Juba: 2/11/2006.
374 IRIN, "Gov't  says LRA killed army officer, demands action", 18/10/2006.
375 US Embassy Khartoum,"06KHARTOUM2564 (Confidential): GoSS Vice President tells Special Envoy that ‘distrust’ pervades LRA peace 
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go that far.”377  Both conflict parties suspended their participation in 
negotiations until the matters were clarified. With a prominent visitor 
about to arrive, the talks nonetheless had a sense of momentum, although 
the negotiation partners were not talking to each other.
Museveni Comes to Juba
On October 21, 2006, Museveni paid a visit to the Juba Talks. What was 
touted in the Ugandan government newspaper as a “major boost” to 
faltering peace talks soon turned into a disaster.378  Reports about what 
exactly happened in the meeting between Museveni and the LRA/M 
delegates, with Kiir and Machar present, were unclear. It remained 
questionable whether Museveni had been hostile to the LRA/M delegation 
first or whether the LRA/M delegation had treated Museveni very rudely. 
Everyone agreed that when Museveni moved towards the deputy LRA/M 
delegation chairperson Apire to shake her hand, Apire refused to take his 
hand. Reportedly, she demanded first an apology from him for what he had 
done to the people of eastern and northern Uganda. A scheduled joint 
news conference was cancelled; members of each delegation separately 
reported their perceptions of the encounter to the press. 
LRA/M spokesperson Ayoo told the BBC that Museveni had been abusive 
towards the LRA/M delegation, having been adamant that he was not 
interested in peace talks and calling the LRA/M delegates “uninformed 
Ugandans who have been out of the country for 20 years”. GoU delegate 
and Uganda’s Deputy Foreign Minister Henry Okello Oryem denied that 
Museveni had been abusive: “To the contrary, he used the opportunity to 
make it very clear that he had come all this way to support and encourage 
the peace process.”379  When Museveni later addressed the press, he 
commended Machar: “He is a very patient and persistent person who knows 
how to deal with unserious people like the LRA. If it were me ...” he trailed 
off, before bursting into laughter without clarifying what he would do.380 
After Museveni left, most delegates agreed that his visit had created more 
problems than it had solved. Between the LRA/M and GoU delegations, 
Museveni’s appearance had created further mistrust. The LRA/M delegates 
were no longer sure that the GoU delegates were really conveying the 
President’s opinion during their negotiations, since he had so clearly stated 
that he was not supporting the process. Internally, the delegates were split 
377 T.Cocks, "Commander denies LRA rebels killed civilians in Sudan", Reuters, 20/10/2006.
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over Apire’s reaction: some called it a necessary statement in light of the 
press exposure that the atrocities would receive if she refused to shake his 
hand. Others found it clumsy and strategically unwise to be so 
confrontational. 
Continued Violence
A few days after Museveni’s visit, Machar upset the UPDF by ordering them 
to withdraw from Aruu, Palotaka and Magwi.381  The LRA/M demanded a 
complete withdrawal of the UPDF from southern Sudan a few days later. 
The GoU countered that the LRA/M’s response was “ambiguous and 
diversionary… Their demand that our troops deployed in Eastern Equatoria 
leave or also assemble is unacceptable because they are there under a 
protocol we signed with the government of Sudan.”382 
Reports of individual car ambushes by unidentified gunmen and LRA 
increased.383  Uganda’s Defence Minister stated, “We are investigating the 
attacks. Partial results indicate there are other groups in southern Sudan 
that are involved, maybe groups that do not want the peace talks to 
succeed… Those could be people who are entrepreneurs of violence, who 
gain from the violence.”384  Who some of those were came to light at the 
end of October when the SPLA arrested 17 suspected former government 
militia members near Gumbo bridge after a shooting near Civicon Oasis 
Camp in Juba. It transpired from the arrest that a network of north 
Sudanese traders had staged the latest ambushes and shootings to interrupt 
the goods supply from Uganda. Increased trade across the Ugandan border 
after the CPA had pushed down prices in Juba markets—for example, from 
three dollars for a beer to one dollar. The north Sudanese traders had 
wanted to make the roads to Uganda unsafe so as to maintain their 
lucrative trade routes from Khartoum and their quasi-monopoly on 
supplying Juba with goods. This was done in close collaboration with 
former SAF military officers controlling the Juba Market.385 
381 F.Nyakairu, P.Harera, and G.Matsiko, "SPLA orders UPDF out of Owiny ki-Bul", The Daily Monitor, 26/10/2006.
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With no let-up in the military pressure on the LRA, Otti announced that LRA 
fighters should not assemble at Owiny-Kibul but rather stay hidden in the 
bush: “I have asked them to use their guerrilla tactics and hide from them 
[UPDF]. But if this intensifies, do not be surprised to hear that they have 
clashed with the UPDF because they are looking for this themselves.”386 
Museveni reacted a few days later by saying that DRC’s president Kabila and 
Vice-President Bemba had both “consented to Kampala’s request to flush 
out LRA insurgents in the Congo, whether or not the Juba talks succeed”,387 
adding that the GoU had only entered talks to avoid trouble with the 
Congolese government by going into DRC to get the LRA.388 
Two days later, an SPLA Colonel was shot dead in Juba outside a bank. The 
incident caused panic as rumours spread quickly that “Kony” had invaded 
Juba. Traders near the bank talked about having seen “Kony’s fighters” and 
said that the LRA had abandoned the peace process and was taking Juba. In 
Juba Market, the consensus was clear that the LRA could not be trusted as 
peacemakers. Rumours about the LRA abandoning the process persisted, 
even after it had come to light that the murderer was a member of Ismail 
Kony’s militia. Ismail Kony, a Murle from South Sudan’s Jonglei State, has no 
connection to his namesake Joseph Kony, but in the reporting of the 
incident, the names had been mixed up. Ismail Kony had led his militia 
drawn from Murle elements during the war; his soldiers were to be 
officially integrated into the SPLA.389  The man who killed the SPLA colonel 
was reportedly aggrieved at having received no pay from his new 
employer.390  With the two Konys continuously mixed up, the incident 
deepened persistent rumours, supported by Ugandan and Southern 
Sudanese security, that a new “LRA Sudan” had been established:
a militia recruited by Khartoum from the large Acholi community 
in South Sudan… Some of these groups organised as the Southern 
Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) by Khartoum never fully integrated 
into the new force created after the signing of the CPA. Some of 
these groups like the Mundari militia commanded by Major 
General Clement Wani and sections of the Equatorial Defence 
Forces (EDF) have remained out of the reach of the Southern 
Sudan government.391
386 F.Nyakairu, P.Harera, and G.Matsiko, "SPLA orders UPDF out of Owiny ki-Bul", The Daily Monitor, 26/10/2006.
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Comprehensive Political Solutions
The CoH periodically expired—and was periodically renewed in continuing 
attempts to make the LRA assembly happen and to move the talks 
forwards. Yet in early November, when negotiations turned towards 
Agenda 2 on comprehensive political solutions, the LRA/M failed to present 
a new position paper, saying they had been too preoccupied with the safety 
of their troops. The LRA/M’s lack of effort angered the GoU, who expressed 
doubt at the usefulness of the Juba Talks, as the LRA was failing to 
assemble or constructively move the peace talks forward.392  The LRA/M 
finally presented a position paper on Agenda 2 to Machar on November 6. 
Reflecting on experiences of the past few months, the paper included the 
demand for both parties to “recognise the need to ensure effective 
protection for LRA combatants and personnel during the implementation 
of the agreement and to that end, the parties to adopt special security 
measures including a designated assembly area in northern Uganda, to be 
elaborated in subsequent agreements”.393
Further, the paper suggested the establishment of a ministry in which the 
LRA/M would play a role by being consulted in the appointment of a 
minister. The LRA/M demanded that local leaders and the donor community 
be responsible for the rehabilitation, reconstruction, construction and 
recovery of war-affected areas and other regions affected by natural or 
other disasters, expressing their distrust in the GoU’s intentions to rebuild 
northern Uganda. The area concerned, the LRA/M suggested, should 
include Masindi as a war-affected district, which constituted a significant 
widening of the area under consideration. The LRA/M further requested to 
hold a referendum within 12 months of signing a final agreement to ask 
the population whether they would support Uganda’s transition to 
federalism. The LRA/M argued that a referendum would show that “there is 
genuine demand for a sizeable population of Uganda for a federal form of 
government as the only way for guaranteeing political stability of the 
country.”394
The GoU rejected most of the suggestions straight away, particularly taking 
issue with the preamble of the LRA/M’s position paper, which stated: 
“Having realised the futility of resolving the armed conflict... by military 
392 H.Mukasa, "LRA tactics irk govt", The New Vision, 5/11/2006.
393 G.Matsiko, "Govt rejects LRA demand for ministry", The Daily Monitor, 8/11/2006.
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means (the two parties) have heeded the hues and cries of the people of 
Uganda.” The GoU challenged the usage of the words “futility” and “hues 
and cries of the people of Uganda”. To the specific demand for protection, 
the GoU responded that the “parties recognise the need to offer protection 
to LRA combatants and personnel during the transition from conflict to 
peace and to the end the parties agree to adopt security measures in 
subsequent agreements.” The parties managed to agree that children of 
LRA combatants were to be given access to education and that a special 
fund for northern Uganda would be established, although the GoU argued 
that such a fund was already in place and the demand thus outdated. It was 
further agreed that Uganda would pass an Equal Opportunities Act and 
involve the international community in rebuilding northern Uganda.395
Continuation Doubts
A few days later, the UPDF made a statement regarding the LRA’s failure to 
assemble at Owiny-Kibul. In a newspaper statement, the spokesperson 
wrote that
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have neither shown any 
commitment nor willingness to implement their own part of the 
bargain signed in the document. UPDF on the other hand has 
played by the rules to the letter. Whereas the majority LRA moved 
out of Northern Uganda to Southern Sudan, it’s on record that 
only 45 LRA turned up at the assembly area of Owiny-Kibul for one 
day, picked food and moved away. As for Ri-Kwangba, LRA did not 
bother to make any attempts to assemble at all... We also have 
strong information that LRA has effectively used the peace talks in 
Juba to re-organise. They have now, through their financiers and 
collaborators, acquired more communication gadgets, especially 
satellite phones. They also for the first time managed to access 
their underground armouries and have re-armed themselves with 
more guns and ammunition which had hitherto been inaccessible 
because of UPDF pressure… LRA in Garamba has meanwhile 
moved deeper into Congo to the Ituri province and have struck 
alliances with Ugandan rebels there such as NALU, PRA and ADF... 
The Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT) is either not 
adequately empowered, weak to effectively monitor LRA 
violations or has deliberately chosen to treat LRA with kid 
gloves.396
The GoU delegation left Juba on November 8: they stated that the 
stalemate over the proposed assembly and the LRA’s unwillingness to stop 
committing violence made their stay superfluous. It had by now been weeks 
since tangible progress had been made regarding either the assembly or the 
negotiations. One LRA/M delegate felt that the LRA was being unfairly 
395 G.Matsiko, "Govt rejects LRA demand for ministry", The Daily Monitor, 8/11/2006.
396 UPDF Spokesperson, "LRA has committed gross violations of truce", The New Vision, 7/11/2006.
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blamed regarding the various attacks that had been happening. He said 
other perpetrators had been identified, but this had been largely ignored: 
“A hare does not eat meat, but if the leopard comes and kills the kid of the 
goat and then smears blood on the sleeping hare’s mouth, people will come 
and accuse the hare,” he said.397
On November 12, UN Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs Egeland 
arrived in Juba. His visit had been much anticipated, as he had announced 
his intention to meet with the LRA leadership in the bush. The high-level 
UN meeting with an armed group was unprecedented, and contentious 
within the UN system. LRA/M delegates saw its merit but were also 
sceptical. Otti said he was not sure whether Egeland had the power to 
arrest in the name of the UN, but finally agreed to allow a UN helicopter to 
land in Nabanga. Several helicopters descended on Nabanga, carrying 
Egeland, LRA/M delegates, the mediation team and a group of 
international journalists. UNICEF had provided a large canopy tent for the 
meeting, much of which was held without the journalists. While Kony and 
Otti were debating with Egeland over allowing NGOs to build a clinic near 
Ri-Kwangba to treat women and children, the BBC reporter stood not far 
away, giving a loud radio interview in which he reiterated the charges of 
abduction and sex slavery against the LRA for everyone to hear. Egeland, 
who had made clear before his visit to Ri-Kwangba that he would not 
discuss the ICC, said that when he asked Kony why the assembly had 
become the problem on which the talks were stuck,
Kony’s position was that they were trying, the LRA, to do their 
best, but they were harassed and persecuted by the Ugandan army 
all over Southern Sudan. So he said it is not going to last long 
because they are breaking the ceasefire. That was Kony’s position.
Straight after leaving Ri-Kwangba, Egeland travelled to Kampala to report 
to Museveni. During that meeting, said Egeland, Museveni “still maintained 
that the most probable outcome would be a military solution”. Egeland 
said of Museveni: 
Well, he did not offer much in a way. What he did offer was to go 
with the Juba process but he did not offer, at one point he also 
actually agreed with me to redeploy some of his soldiers in 
Southern Sudan as they were blocking access to one of the 
assembly points for the LRA. But he sort of played it two ways, as 
he often does. He both instructed his minister Rugunda to keep 
negotiating as well as he said, internal and publicly that he was 
very impatient and he would actually be considering ending it all 
at any point if there was not enough progress.398  
397 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/11/2006.
398 Author telephone interview with Jan Egeland, former UN-Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs, 15/10/2007.
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On November 23 the chief of Owiny-Kibul confirmed that as far as he knew, 
there were no more UPDF in the area. While LRA troops claimed to be in 
the area ready to assemble, the CHMT failed to make physical contact with 
them on its first helicopter-supported mission to Palotaka and Owiny-Kibul. 
On November 26, Caritas Uganda arrived in Owiny-Kibul to set up a support 
structure for the assembly. A day later, the SPLA reported that about 300 
LRA were “crossing outside Magwi near a bridge”, seemingly headed 
towards Owiny-Kibul. Two days later, however, attention was diverted from 
events in Owiny-Kibul to Malakal in Upper Nile when heavy fighting broke 
out. Having always been considered rather volatile unions, the Joint 
Integrated Unit in Malakal broke apart in a trice when pro-SAF militias 
attacked the barracks. Having broken up again into SPLA and SAF, the 
formerly integrated unit descended into the worst fighting since the 
signing of the CPA. This required Machar’s full attention; events in Eastern 
Equatoria faded into the background. 
Yet on November 29, 2006, three LRA fighters were killed during early-
morning clashes with the UPDF in the north of Eastern Equatoria, around 
Mogiri, Nisitu and Ngangala. Otti complained to the CHMT about constant 
military pressure on the LRA by the UPDF. That day the LRA/M announced 
its “suspension of face-to-face” negotiations until the UPDF’s withdrawal 
from Sudan, even though face-to-face negotiations had not happened 
anyway for quite some time. 
The next day, between 11am and 2pm, shots were fired between LRA and 
UPDF north-east of Lyria. The situation was confusing: Lyria in Central 
Equatoria was about 150km from the assembly area in Owiny-Kibul; both 
the LRA and the UPDF had yet to explain why their troops were in that 
area. The same day, the UPDF deployed helicopter gunships to bomb the 
LRA near Opari, a stone’s throw from Owiny-Kibul.399 The SPLA commander 
in Owiny-Kibul reported hearing helicopter gunship fire in the area from 
9.30am onwards, lasting about 45 minutes; UN security confirmed that on 
November 30, Ugandan Hind helicopter gunships and troops had moved 
across the Uganda-Sudan border, and also towards Nabanga.400  For the 
SPLA holding guard in Owiny-Kibul, it was clear that this was a full military 
assault by the UPDF. The LRA stated that its forces had come under attack, 
with delegates protesting against this violation of the CoH. They stressed 
that the CoH stipulated that there could be no new UPDF deployment and 
that any troops present had to be withdrawn; what was happening now 
was in direct contradiction of both clauses. They pointed out that the CHMT 
399 Fieldnotes, Owiny-Kibul,/Juba: 4/12/2006, D.Mwaniki and M.Wepundi. "The Juba Peace Talks: The chequered road to peace for 
Northern Uganda". Global Crisis Solutions: 2007. 
400 Fieldnotes, Juba: 30/11/2006.
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had officially confirmed that the UPDF had withdrawn from its bases in 
Tibika, yet had not actually been able to go there, calling into question the 
credibility of the work the CHMT was able to do.401  When the LRA/M 
delegation demanded credible protection of their troops, the GoU 
dismissed the demand, arguing that the LRA had no right to call for 
protection for their troops since most of the troops had been abducted in 
the first place.
On November 30, 2006, I noted that the mood in the Juba was at its lowest. 
The previous day, the LRA/M delegation had announced that it was 
suspending “face-to-face” negotiations until the UPDF had entirely left 
Sudan. They had expressed their lack of confidence in the chief mediator, 
and felt that their safety and reputation were not guaranteed in Juba, 
instead suggesting moving talks elsewhere. One delegate explained to me 
that for him, asking for a suspension of the talks was not an indication that 
the LRA was withdrawing from the peace process; on the contrary, giving 
such statements maintained engagement: “That is also fighting, by the way. 
Fighting with words.”402
Another LRA/M delegate explained how he—and others in the delegation—
felt about Machar’s mediation at that point. He said that in meetings, 
Machar was seen as abusive towards delegation leader Ojul. At one point, 
he said, Machar had said, “fuck you” to Ojul and told him to “get out 
here.” Machar was said to have yelled at an LRA delegate who was 
positioned near Kony for his protection to get away from Kony while the 
latter had been meeting Sudanese elders to shake hands. This was a clear 
sign to him that Machar did not respect LRA structures: “Riek does not 
listen. He always thinks he knows best.” He said that Machar was also 
yelling at the mediation team—including Professor Assefa who was seen by 
the LRA/M delegation as more competent to handle the mediation—“but 
all the mediation team keep quiet when he yells and when he is fairer and 
more respectful to government side.” In summary, he said Machar was 
“extravagant” and “not civilised”.403
In a briefing in Juba, UN security stated that they had confirmation that 
“large groups of LRA might become targets” and that some of the UPDF 
deployed in Sudan were from the 105th battalion comprised of former LRA. 
UN security stated that the “framing of incidents is a possibility”, and that 
the situation had made it difficult for the UN to enter Owiny-Kibul and get 
an understanding of the local situation. There was further suspicion, 
401 Fieldnotes, Juba: 30/11/2006.
402 Fieldnotes, Juba: 30/11/2006.
403 Author interview with LRA/M delegate, Juba: 15/10/2006.
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drawing on reports from border residents, that the “UPDF might be on the 
way to West,” meaning that troops might be moving towards the site in 
Western Equatoria. “Some [UPDF] elements are moving along border 
regions… there is an attempt of sorts to disrupt things on the Western 
side.” Overall, the UN concluded, albeit never publicly and officially, that 
the “UPDF is setting up a targeting mechanism for the assembly.”404
During that time, the LRA continued small-scale abductions. One young 
woman from Maridi, for example, recounted that in December 2006 she 
was taken by LRA fighters six miles from Maridi and into Garamba Park, 
from where she walked to Ri-Kwangba, although only to pick up food, not 
to stay. Most LRA, she said, were staying in Garamba Park at the time and 
only went to the assembly area in Ri-Kwangba to collect food, which was 
still being delivered through Caritas Uganda.405
By the end of November, there was no longer any sign of engagement by 
either IKV Pax Christi or St Egidio. Pax Christi write in their account of the 
Juba Talks that the reasons for their withdrawal were to be found in 
Machar trying “to get a firmer grip on the process” which meant a 
domination of the chief mediator that left the Pax Christi team wondering 
“whether it still added enough value.”406  For the LRA/M delegates who had 
remained in Juba, ending their pursuit of peace seemed for the first time a 
plausible option, despite their being encouraged by Otti to stick to their 
proposed agenda of negotiating comprehensive solutions even if, Otti had 
said, that meant death for the fighters who were still out in the bush 
unprotected. Otti’s reasoning was that the LRA expected to be betrayed 
anyway, so they had little to lose by sticking to their principles. These 
arguments came up in a heated debate on the reported helicopter gunship 
attacks by UPDF soldiers on moving LRA troops near the proposed assembly 
areas. 
On December 1, UN security reported that more UPDF gunships had been 
sighted above Owiny-Kibul; Caritas Uganda confirmed that non-UN 
helicopters had hovered over the designated assembly area at around 10am 
with at least one of the helicopters headed east towards Kapoeta.407 Two 
days later, residents of Owiny-Kibul reported helicopters passing at 8am and 
404 Fieldnotes, Juba: 30 /11/2006.
405 Author (with translator Zande/ English) interview with Sudanese abductee who spent March 2008 - December 2008 with the LRA. 
Yambio: 23/2/2009.
406 S.Simonse, W. Verkoren, and G.Junne, "NGO Involvement in the Juba peace talks: the role and dilemmas of IKV Pax Christi", in The 
Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T.Allen and K.Vlassenroot. London/ New York: Zed Books, 2010, p.232.
407 Fieldnotes, Juba: 1/12/2006.
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at 12 noon.408  Gunfire was heard again at 2pm.409  The LRA/M stated that 
their forces were attacked between 11am and 2pm by mixed forces of UPDF 
and SPLA, explaining that LRA fighters had been able to identify the two 
armies from their distinct fighting styles. In the days leading up to these 
events, the LRA/M had grown increasingly suspicious regarding the safety of 
their troops. They also said that they were witnessing a revival of the SPLA/
UPDF relationship in which they had become a pawn. “The SPLA is 
complicit,” one delegate said, explaining that Machar’s reaction to the 
news of the fighting between the UPDF and the LRA was that “[the LRA] 
should just go to the assembly areas now. After all, those people shooting 
you should not be in that area anyway.”410 
“So if we get peace and we are killed, not even the mediator will speak for 
us,” one member of the CHMT argued.411  They had expected that Machar 
would put the gunship attack on the agenda. I asked the SPLA leader of the 
CHMT why there had been no official statement by the CHMT regarding the 
attack. The CHMT had not inspected the site of the attack. A CHMT visit was 
scheduled to the site in question, but was not carried out.412 “All sides have 
confirmed this incident, there is no need to monitor,” was his response.413 
However, in the New Vision a few days later the UPDF publicly denied that 
they had attacked the LRA or had even used a helicopter in Sudan.414 On 
December 7, a few days after the gunship attack, I attended a meeting with 
Acholi leaders from Uganda and representatives of Caritas Uganda who 
were supplying the support structure for the assembly area in Owiny-Kibul. 
The Caritas representative announced that the LRA were being bombed on 
their way to and near the assembly area.415  “So in peace, it means that we 
can be killed, that we can be surrounded, that they can bring helicopters to 
kill us,” one LRA/M delegate said, visibly enraged.416 
On December 3, helicopters were again heard near Owiny-Kibul, first at 
8am and then at midday, circling near the areas of the LRA route into the 
408 Residents in the area confirmed that they had spotted helicopter movement and had heard gunfire around Owiny-Kibul on November 
30 and December 3.
409 Fieldnotes, Juba: 3/12/2006 
410 Fieldnotes, Juba: 30/11/2006.
411 Fieldnotes, Juba: 30/11/2006.
412 H.Mukasa, "Uganda: Monitors Set to Visit Scene of LRA Clashes", New Vision, 4/12/2006.
413 Fieldnotes, Juba: 30/11/2006. I later travelled to Lyria, where residents confirmed that a helicopter had been shooting in the area.
414 "UPDF Denies LRA Claims", The New Vision, 3/12/2006.
415 Fieldnotes, Parajok/ Owiny-Kibul: 7/12/2006.
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assembly area. The UPDF, with a presence along the Nile and along all roads 
in Magwi County, had positioned itself so that the troops could seal all 
entryways into Owiny-Kibul quickly.417  On December 9, the head of the 
CHMT denied in an interview with an international reporter that an 
incident involving a helicopter had taken place.418  “It is always the same,” 
one delegate said angrily. “How can the government say they want peace if 
they behave as if they are in war? They shoot, they kill, they lie. It does not 
matter if we are in Juba or in Gulu—it is exactly the same. This time, it is 
not the LRA obstructing the peace.”419
Strengthening Negotiations
In the midst of the military turmoil, other elements were put into place to 
strengthen the architecture of the Juba Talks. Mozambique’s former 
president Chissano was appointed the UN’s Special Envoy for LRA-Affected 
Areas on December 4, following the suggestion first made back in July. 
Mandated by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to “facilitate the search for 
a comprehensive political solution to address the root causes of the conflict 
in northern Uganda and the implications of the LRA activities in the 
region”, Chissano’s task was to “help develop a cohesive and forward-
looking policy approach among all external actors”. Annan wrote that 
“taking into account the independent nature of the judiciary process, my 
Special Envoy will also liaise with the International Criminal Court, United 
Nations missions in the Great Lakes region and regional actors concerned 
on matters pertaining to the indicted LRA leaders”.420 
Another sign that the peace talks infrastructure was developing conincided 
with Chissano’s appointment. The same day, a drilling rig arrived in 
Nabanga to ensure water supply for the LRA. Building a livable assembly 
area had been part of agreements made with the LRA; engagement with 
women and children by UNICEF and Save the Children Uganda who were to 
build a clinic for women and children and to send social workers to engage 
with LRA family members had also been sanctioned by the LRA. Although 
plans for the assembly seemed to strengthen again, two days later Save the 
Children Uganda reviewed its proposal to send social workers to Ri-
417 Author interview with international security expert, Nabanga: 13/4/2008. I was given this description of the situation in November/
December 2006 by a security expert who was working in the area at the time.
418 Personal email to author from an international reporter based in Kampala. 9/12/2006.
419 Fieldnotes, Juba: 9/12/2006.
420 Annan, K.F. (United Nations). “Letter dated 30 November 2006 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/
2006/930”. 1/12/2006. 
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Kwangba and Owiny-Kibul and withdrew its commitment to help the 
assembly. Save the Children Uganda explained that it was withdrawing 
because family tracing was not going to be a priority in the assembly area. 
However, a few months later the organisation’s position changed again 
when they along with UNICEF supported the clinic. Staff from both 
organisations expressed in private meetings how difficult it was to find 
internally and externally acceptable terms on which to engage with the 
LRA.421 
As the UN secured high-level support, leaders from Gulu worked on 
persuading the LRA/M to go back to the table. They were relaying messages 
from Uganda that people were very upset about the LRA’s refusal to go 
back to the table and about the UPDF shooting LRA fighters on their way to 
the assembly. Generally, said Rwot Oywak from Pader, “people in Gulu are 
very discouraged.”422
Then a delegation from Uganda, led by RDC Ochora and including Owiny 
Dollo—who had many years earlier dressed as a woman to find Kony in 
Khartoum to talk about the possibilities for peace—and Kony’s mother 
travelled to Ri-Kwangba, followed a few days later by representatives of 
UNICEF, OCHA, the mediation team and LRA/M delegates. The delegation 
now included the newly arrived technical advisor James Obita, who was 
well known to all parties from previous attempts at peace in the late 1990s. 
On December 12, Kony, Otti and other members of the LRA’s high command 
Control Altar held meetings with Dollo and the mediation team’s legal 
advisor to discuss legal options. In a long speech, Kony summed up why for 
him the preceding months had replicated previous failed peace attempts: 
“While talking, there is troop movement from Eastern Equatoria to here, 7 
miles from here”, he explained. He then complained about the unfairness 
of the international justice system. He stated:
It was us who initiated peace talks, so that we have a peaceful 
solution, a negotiated settlement. That is why we are talking 
openly about ICC. Suppose we had not opened up to peace talks, 
would there not be an opportunity for ICC to talk to us? If we had 
reported Museveni and ICC first, would they have pursued 
Museveni? No. They are only doing to Kony and commanders 
because they are weak. Is this the best way to handle matter? We 
are relying on lawyers to give good advice, we are committed to 
peace process but there are a lot of contradictions.
He gave his assessment of what had happened in the Juba Talks so far and 
the role the LRA had played:
421 Fieldnotes, Juba: 7/12/2006.
422 Author interview with leaders from Kitgum, Pader and Gulu. Juba: 6/12/2006.
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We are fully committed to the peace process. We want you to take 
note of our concern about this process. I am talking to you, 
lawyers. I am sure you are aware that there is no law in the world, 
even the law of God, that says people should not fights. God has 
created man and other creatures in anticipation of war. The lion 
has sharp teeth, the tree has thorns and the snake is born with 
poison. So we shall not relent on protecting ourselves.423
Two days after this meeting in the bush, the GoU delegation returned to 
Juba to restart talks for a final round before Christmas to make sure that 
the year would end with a sense of success. It was not to be. Talks were cut 
short when on December 15, 2006, SPLA soldiers, firing into the air, stormed 
into Juba via the bridge to take the Ministry of Defence to protest that they 
had not been paid. With many bullets being fired in the streets, Juba 
remained in lockdown all day. Instead of ending with another signed 
agreement and consensus on the way forward, the Juba Talks in 2006 
ended with uncertainty over whether an LRA assembly would be possible, 
whether Juba was a suitable place for these negotiations, and whether 
either party was committed to moving things forward. For the LRA/M, the 
end of 2006 also came with increased doubts over whether their pursuit of 
peace was being supported by either the mediator or the international 
community. 
Conclusion
The LRA/M went into the Juba Peace Talks in 2006 with both bad memories 
and high hopes. The same can be said for other actors in the talks, most of 
whom came with baggage accumulated during previous attempts to end 
the conflict either peacefully or militarily. For the LRA/M, 2006 quickly 
turned into a replica of previous ill-fated peace processes, which they had 
experienced as inadequate to open avenues that would allow discussion of 
substantial issues without the threat of violence. High hopes had come, 
however, from the unprecedented international profile—heightened even 
further by the ICC warrants—of the Juba Talks from the very beginning. Yet 
it was soon clear that chasms were emerging between how the LRA/M 
experienced the talks and what others expected. Conflict resolution 
scholarship puts a strong emphasis on a participatory process which involves 
representatives from different parts of the community in conflict, and on 
confidence-building measures. Neither were lacking in Juba. What was 
lacking, however, from the LRA/M perspective was a credible sign that the 
423 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 12/12/2006.
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talks would bring greater attention to UPDF attacks, both in Uganda and 
during the Juba Talks, and thus avoid a similar military ending that they 
knew from previous talks. With the safety and compliance of LRA troops 
called into question almost as soon as the CoH was signed, all achievements 
in 2006 were overshadowed by the looming question of how LRA fighters 
could assemble safely, so as to no longer be able to attack civilians, but also 
so as to be able to start their own transition to a peaceful existence. 
Crucially, the events regarding the assembly and the information 
management regarding UPDF attacks proved to the LRA that structures 
within the peace negotiations closely mirrored those of the conflict. From 
the outside, the Juba Talks were mostly hailed throughout 2006 as the most 
promising attempt at peace ever, and the LRA was periodically blamed for 
not showing enough seriousness. The LRA/M soon perceived the Juba Talks 
as a set-up that maintained the existing power structures. They cited as 
reasons the volatile security situation, the mediator’s murky information 
policy, clear signals that both the Ugandan military and the international 
justice actors maintained that they had a role to play in ending the LRA 
war, and growing demands from all sides. The GoSS was juggling a volatile 
internal situation with having to maintain good relationships with the GoU; 
the GoU maintained that the talks should be over soon and was unwilling 
to address the issues of attacks on the LRA. Internationally, the end of 2006 
brought a certain amount of disillusionment with the Juba Talks, fed by 
unclear information and a general distrust of the LRA/M’s motives. In 
addition to the points made about the existing structures in Uganda, the 
LRA/M also increasingly focussed on the relationship between the SPLA and 
the GoU. With Machar as a much-disputed mediator, the LRA/M’s trust in 
the impartiality of the SPLA towards their longstanding ally Uganda 
became more and more questionable. All in all, what had started with great 
promise in July was by December a lacklustre and complicated process. 
I left Juba on the day the SPLA marched into town to demand payment, 
driving to the airport as shots could be heard fired near Juba Bridge. A few 
points seemed to me particularly important: Having observed how 
international actors had struggled to navigate their own frameworks, 
including circumventing them, had emphasised that to a certain extent 
rules could be bend and mandates reinterpreted if needed. The lack of 
clarity that resulted from this process on paper did very little to move 
procedures forward, yet it had created a parallel space in which sideline 
engagements had contributed constructively to the discussion. When it 
came to enforcing the agreements, particularly the CoH, the muddle had 
also created a situation in which violations were not sufficiently 
condemned, thus damaging trust. Crucially, 2006 had been the opportunity 
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to discuss issues frankly with the LRA as the leadership and lower ranks 
were accessible and open. How they experienced the talks and what their 
hopes were, however, was somewhat drowned out by the broader focus on 
finding a way to conduct the talks in a way that would satisfy international 
standards. 
The end of 2006 also brought into focus the disconnect between the kind of 
transformative process conflict actors aspire to and the procedural toolkit 
available—mediation, negotiation, diplomacy and peacebuilding. 
Mediation and negotiation continued to confirm the LRA/M’s 
understanding of being trapped in an unequal power relationship: the 
uneven set-up of the negotiation teams, with the GoU’s team sporting 
highly qualified and powerful government representatives, rendered the 
tool of negotiation meaningless. Generally speaking, 2006 already showed 
a glimpse of why for the LRA/M actually committing to a signed agreement 
would pose a challenge, as a signature might become an endorsement of 
the hostile system in which the LRA/M found itself.
There was a contradiction in this: one the one hand, most observers and 
facilitators seemed to agree that engaging with individuals would go a long 
way towards encouraging the group to put down their weapons. On the 
other, opportunities to do that were not taken up. The next chapter 
provides such engagement with individual experiences, hopes and 
assessments of LRA actors during this time. 
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4. “Am I an Animal?”: LRA Members During The Peace Talks
Vincent Otti was drafting the LRA coat of arms on the last page of my 
notebook. Using a strip of thinly sliced wood as a ruler to draw the outline, 
he turned to ask one of his runners to first fetch first a red and then a 
green pen. He carefully divided the space around the crane in the centre of 
the emblem into equal parts, then added other elements: the Ten 
Commandments scroll, the palm leaf, the name Lord’s Resistance Army. He 
was so meticulous about the sketch that dinner was ready before he was 
finished. He packed away his coloured pencils and said he would continue 
the next morning.
The next day, while cross-hatching the shaded parts of the emblem, he 
explained each part. The crane signified Uganda, the palm leaves peace. 
The Ten Commandments scroll expressed the LRA’s Christian faith “because 
we are resisting in the name of the Lord.” Listening to his explanation, I 
watched the perfectionist crafting of the LRA symbol and thought that 
none of what this man believed he stood for seemed to me like it might 
even remotely resonate with the outside world. 
Yet Otti’s concern was to explain to that very outside world what the LRA 
was about, and crucially that the LRA was not about terrorism. He had 
written to me about being called a terrorist in August 2005: “…we are not 
such.”424 The emblem for him expressed more than the mission of the LRA. 
He often made the point that he was the best person to speak for the LRA. 
He finished the drawing, and then looked up to proudly tell me that each 
LRA uniform displays this emblem. He pointed to the sleeve of a soldier 
nearby, which sported a carefully needleworked version. “It is my work,” he 
said, signing the drawing in my notebook with his name and rank.425  
Introduction
In conflict studies, an understanding of actors’ motivations and experiences 
is an established necessity. However, such emphasis is often reduced to what 
has been experienced as a group during the conflict. The LRA group 
identity, while strong, does not adequately describe how individuals view 
their own complex LRA/M existence. Otti proudly stressing that he was 
solely responsible for the design of the LRA coat of arms was a reminder 
that even in an entrenched group conflict, individuals are important. They 
424 Vincent Otti, "Personal letter to author," 25/8/2005.
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have all, in an active or passive way, experienced a moment of commitment
—what Ricoeur calls an act of “attestation”.426  While spending time with 
the LRA/M, I collected snippets of conversations and remarks. This chapter 
brings these together in a narrative enquiry into individuality within the 
amorphous and often contradictory conflict landscape.427 As a snapshop of 
individual sentiments during the Juba Talks, this chapter gives an insight 
into the extent to which the LRA experienced this time as a deep peace 
process that would change their own and everyone else’s thinking—or as 
one heading towards written agreements. 
Experiencing the broken and fragmented individual views of LRA members 
also poses an analytical challenge, as establishing coherence through 
interpretation risks giving only my own rather limited perspective. It is only 
through narratives that a story can be told without explaining what the 
story is about and why things in the story proceed the way they do. The 
range of themes that emerged from at times very brief exchanges serve less 
as an exposition of the LRA and more as an illustration of individual 
experiences in the LRA. These include the need to have personal identities 
acknowledged and the hierarchies that emerge from that, the tension 
between having rules and breaking them, trust and distrust, and aspirations 
held in the past and the present. 
Identities and Personal Choices
In a conversation in the bush, Otti was talking again about how the LRA’s 
goals had been misunderstood. In a very matter-of-fact way, he mentioned 
the injustice of being labelled “terrorists”, “killers” and “animals”—three 
words regularly used to describe the LRA. It seemed as if the label terrorist 
was the greatest insult of the three. I was not surprised that he did not 
seem particularly fazed by the label “killers”. In previous conversations he 
had alluded to the fact that the LRA took a lot of pride in being such an 
efficient military force. Being called a good killer by your enemies was a 
badge of honour rather than an insult. In other conversations with LRA 
members, I had encountered that boasting about violent group successes, 
particularly against the UPDF and the SPLA, was common—as was being a 
lot less open about one’s own individual role. Otti’s being unperturbed 
about being called a killer was not jarring. His being publicly referred to as 
426 P.Ricoeur, Oneself as Another. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992.
427 Guidelines on writing narrative enquiry come from R. C. Bogdan and S. K. Biklen, Qualitative research for education: An introduction to 
theory and methods. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1982;D. J. Clandinin and F. M. Connelly, Narrative inquiry: Experience and story in 
qualitative research. San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1990.
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an animal, on the other hand, elicited a surprising reaction: it seemed to 
tremendously amuse him. He was laughing, waving his hands to loosely 
point at the LRA fighters around him to indicate that nobody there was an 
animal. He then got up and left. 
I took the opportunity to stroll over to join Colonel Lubwoa Bwone, who 
was sitting with Alfred “Record” Otim. They were seated too far away to 
have overheard my conversation with Otti. As soon as I asked if I could join 
them, they demanded that I take their picture, joking that I was 
photographing “jungle animals”. Another LRA soldier, to whom I had not 
been introduced by name, walked past. He stood for a moment, then lifted 
up his shirt and turned his backside to me. “Do you see my tail?” he asked, 
wagging his bottom at me. “Am I an animal? Am I an animal? Can you see 
an animal?” When I had asked Kony about the people who were still with 
him in the bush, he had argued that the LRA was also a protective force. 
“We capture nobody,” he answered. “They come to us for protection. 
Museveni has done very bad things, they want protection. We don’t 
capture, we don’t kill, we don’t rape. That’s not our work. They say we are 
animals. Can an animal take up a gun?”428
During the Juba Talks, the LRA spent considerable time contesting the idea 
that they were not human—at times in jest, at others in a more serious 
tone, seeking confirmation that the LRA’s public image was ridiculous and 
far-fetched. It seemed to me that there were a few motivations behind this. 
Since mainstream interpretation tends to discount the LRA’s rationality in 
executing violence, ridiculing the mainstream was a good way to reclaim 
such rationality. In addition, emphasising the humanity of the LRA 
recalibrated their violence from being animalistic to militarily astute. 
Moving the notion of the LRA from senseless to strategic was an endeavour 
to give them a more credible political position in the talks, an extension of 
the narrative they had set out to establish in the opening ceremony speech. 
They were well aware that their war had been depoliticised and that they 
had been dehumanised—and in both processes they themselves had played 
a substantial part. Reclaiming both politics and humanity was an important 
strategy, as was stressing the legitimacy of being a rebel against a hostile 
government.
Colonel Lubwoa Bwone explained to me how he came to be an LRA rebel. 
He presented it as a strategic decision to devote his life to armed struggle. 
He said that he remembered the exact moment: “I walked over to the LRA 
on September 28, 1986, at 4 pm from Lacor. I said goodbye to my family, to 
428 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 12/6/2006.
137
my mother, to join the rebels.”429  When he walked into his future as a 
rebel, he had just finished school level Senior 4. The situation in 1986 was 
bad and his family expected him to help the community in the struggle. He 
saw no other choice but to go, wanting to fulfil his family’s hope that he 
could do his share to make things better, expressed through the name they 
had given him: “My family had called me Lubwoa, ‘the social one’.” He 
wanted to make his contribution to his community, to live up to his name. 
He seemed to have a strong sense of identity, stressing several times the 
significance of his friendly name. When he said goodbye to his mother, he 
“could not imagine” that it would be 20 years until he would see her again. 
The rebellion was not supposed to be his lifelong occupation; he wanted to 
finish this business quickly and help re-establish some sort of northern-led 
control over the government. But despite having been in the bush all this 
time, he felt that he was still the same person as he had been in the 
autumn of 1986: “I did not stop being the ‘social one’. But I was now also a 
rebel.” For him, the Juba Talks had already been worthwhile because they 
had made it possible for his mother to visit him and see him again.430
At first, when Bwone had heard that Machar was bringing LRA family 
members to Ri-Kwangba in late July 2006, he had not wanted his mother to 
join the visitors’ delegation. He knew that at that point in the Juba Talks he 
would not be able to leave the bush and would have to say goodbye to her 
again. Even though he was very happy to see his mother once she had 
arrived, when she left to return to Uganda, it felt to him like 1986 all over 
again. Again he did not know when or if he would see her again, unsure if 
the peace talks would make it possible for him to return to northern 
Uganda. He did not want to be enticed, to be given false hope through his 
mother’s visit. After all, he had always thought that the war would make it 
possible for him to return to a better home, once the NRM was defeated 
and the situation improved. Now, sitting in Ri-Kwangba and waiting for the 
developments in the Juba Talks, he was no longer sure that either war or 
peace would bring about that improvement. 
He said that he still wanted to finish the “business of this war”, but only if 
the terms were right. Being a rebel for life had not been Bwone’s plan, but 
nonetheless in the summer of 2006 rebelling remained part of the plan 
because he still saw reason to do so. He explained that the situation that 
had pushed him to make the conscious choice to become a rebel on 
September 28, 1986, at 4pm remained unchanged. Another senior LRA 
commander who was sitting with us agreed that the armed fight of the LRA 
was still not over because the situation was still bad. He said they needed to 
429 The rebel force at the time would not have been called LRA—but Bwone chose to describe the rebels with today’s name.
430 Lubwoa Bwone’s mother, Mary Atenyo, was part of the delegation brought to Ri-Kwangba in July 2006.
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make sure the situation would be good, either through war or through 
peace talks. Later, I asked him how he felt about what the LRA had 
achieved so far in the war and what he himself had achieved. He answered 
by describing two kinds of achievement: “I feel wasted,” he said about his 
life. “But only wasted for myself. I am not wasted for the fight.”431 
Bwone and Alit often said that I should join their fight. One day they 
started discussing what LRA rank I deserved. At first they thought I should 
start as a private, as everyone does, but then agreed that I could be an 
honourable captain. They explained that I had earned that rank because I 
was tough enough to keep visiting them in the bush. Assigning a military 
rank to me was the highest reward they had to offer—even though they 
had giggling fits discussing the idea. Being tough was good, they said, and 
the only way to show one’s strength was through military rank. Before each 
visit to the bush I spoke to Otti on the phone to arrange a meeting with 
him. Each time he said that it would be his duty to meet with me. After all, 
he said, I, a woman, had taken on the hardship of coming to visit him in the 
bush. It would be impolite to not see me. 
After Otti granted me an audience on the day when I was told I could be an 
LRA captain, Bwone and Alit started discussing if I had anything to offer 
that would allow me to work up to a rank above captain. What did I have 
to offer beyond being able to spend time in the bush? Not much, I 
conceded. I did jokingly mention my green belt in judo, even though I have 
not donned a judogi since I was 16. Immediately I thought that competing 
in martial art skills was not a very good idea. The last situation I wanted to 
get into was one where LRA commanders would ask me to demonstrate 
judo throws, chokes and holds. The thought of judo clearly intrigued 
Bwone. He said that judo was new to him; usually the LRA fighters practised 
karate kicks or kung fu jumps. They knew these from watching DVDs; they 
liked Bruce Lee. Bwone now wanted to know more about judo. I explained 
that while it was a martial art, it was not really a contact sport and was a 
lot gentler than karate. It was a way to use your opponent’s strength to 
your advantage. “Maybe it is a softer way for when the LRA is in peace,” he 
said.
Bwone had devoted his life and existence to the LRA cause. He said that this 
choice had constrained his opportunities, but that he had still maintained 
other goals in life in case the armed rebellion worked out. He harboured 
the idea that he could still make up for lost time and start something new. 
Maybe, he said, he could even go back to finish Senior 5 and 6, just “like 
431 Fieldnotes, Juba: 30/6/2006.
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[former LRA spokesperson] Sam Kolo did after he left the LRA”.432  He told 
me that he wanted to be my bag carrier and travel the world with me, 
lifting up my heavy bag to show me that he was capable of the job. Most of 
his other ambitions were drawn from listening to the radio almost every 
day: “I want to see glaciers and the Danube River,” he said. “I want to learn 
more about globalisation and global warming and judo.” When he 
mentioned judo, he winked at me. 
Lieutenant Colonel Alit pitched in. He was keener on returning to his old 
life, rather than expanding his horizons after leaving the bush. He wanted 
to return to his job as clarinet player in a military brass band, so he asked 
me if I could bring a clarinet for him next time.433 On various occasions, Alit 
stressed to me that he was the only one in the LRA who knew how to play 
an instrument. A third commander chimed in when we were talking about 
ambitions. He said: “Me, I had a good upbringing. My English is better than 
that of the others. I keep it up.”434 He explained that when he was child, he 
had only one goal: “I wanted to be like a walking dictionary, back in school, 
learn all the words from A to Z. But then the war came and I stopped.”435 
He asked to me bring him a dictionary on my next visit, which I ended up 
doing. I gave the dictionary to a young soldier to pass it on. I do not know 
if the commander ever received it. 
Bwone is part of the senior generation of commanders; he has seen waves 
of war and peace efforts come and go. He talked about his conscious choice 
to become a rebel in a similar fashion to Otti or Alit. They all alluded to 
having been put under pressure because NRA forces had threatened their 
families. Kony’s explanation of why he was a rebel was different: he 
stressed that “the Acholi elders” had sent him to fight Museveni—without 
specifying that it was a small group of Acholi elders, rather than all of them
—and that he was fulfilling a task that had been assigned to him. Most 
senior commanders with whom I spoke seemed comfortable with their 
conscious choice to carry out the mandated fight for the Acholi. Several 
commanders hinted that Museveni had determined their lives because he 
had created a situation in which resistance at all cost was crucial. Therefore 
they had sacrificed what their lives might have been to resist him, not 
knowing that it would turn out to be a lifelong sacrifice. They were also 
slightly bemused by my obvious interest in their motivations, at times 
432 Former LRA spokesperson Sam Kolo went back to school after he defected from the LRA. He graduated from Gulu University with a 
business degree in January 2012.
433 Author interview with Col. Lubwoa Bwone and Lt.Col. Santo Alit (LRA). Ri-Kwangba: 22/9/2006.
434 Fieldnotes. Juba: 6/6/2006.
435 Fieldnotes, Juba/ Magwi: 2/10/2006.
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saying, with a laugh, that I was posing a lot of questions that asked “why” 
they were doing something. It was just how things were, and often they 
seemed resigned to that fact. 
Speaking to the younger soldiers, I came across this explanation regularly: 
things are the way they are because they just are. I talked to a group of 
younger LRA fighters about the kind of life they had. Captain Conggwok 
showed me his black arm bracelet. I asked him what it meant. “If I take this 
off, I die,” he said in broken English. “Joseph put this on me eight years 
ago. This is our life. This is our culture in the bush.” I grabbed his hand and 
pointed at his red nail polish, asking him why he was wearing it. He 
laughed. “This is life,” he said.436 I was not sure whether this was his answer 
because he spoke limited English or because some things do not need 
explanations. Not all of the younger soldiers spoke English, but those who 
did spoke it surprisingly well. I tried to engage with one boy. His name was 
Norbert; he had a sweet face and a beaming smile. His deep blue Hawaiian 
shirt added to the general impression of cheerfulness he radiated. He 
laughed at my attempts to speak Acholi. When I asked him how he liked 
doing this work, his eyes darted around. He continued carrying around the 
cooking pots he had been fetching, still smiling, but not answering.
Another young man was more receptive to talking to me. We struck up a 
conversation. He was 15 years old; he thought he had been in the bush for 
10 years. Being in the bush made no sense to him, he did not know what it 
was supposed to achieve. He maybe knew at some point because when I 
asked him what his job was he answered: “I forgot. It is too big a question. I 
am only 15.” He showed me a notebook he was carrying in his pocket and 
compared it with my notebook. He explained that he kept a notebook with 
him at all times because he was still hoping to one day go to school and he 
wanted to do as much as possible to be prepared. Unlike many of the 
others I spoke to, the status of being in the LRA was less definite for him. 
I encountered a difference in understandings of their situation between the 
older generation, the middle and the young soldiers. The older generation
—such as Bwone—seemed convinced that what they were doing was good 
and necessary for the community. Judging from their plans to go back to 
their old lives or start something new, they seemed to think that maybe 
they would come out of it unfazed. The younger generation, like Norbert, 
could not express the greater purpose of their existence. Some expressed 
hope that they would leave their current life behind. Yet most were too shy, 
too scared or too busy asking me to take their photo to explain in detail to 
me what their thoughts were. The middle generation mostly described the 
436 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 11/6/2006.
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LRA fight as a more personal issue. They talked about being proud of being 
an LRA member, but also about their hopes that a better future in Uganda 
might still be possible for them. 
The two spheres of the LRA and an imagined better world in Uganda were 
distinct, but tightly connected: The latter could not be reached without the 
former. This generation wanted to find the way to avoid being in the LRA 
forever as much as living under the current conditions in Uganda.437 
“I fight for the Acholi,” one man I considered to be from the middle 
generation explained, “but I also fight for a better life. I fight because of 
how I have been treated and my personal loss.” His father, he said, had 
been killed by Idi Amin, but he was not sure when exactly this had 
happened or whether it was even true. All he knew for sure was that his 
father had disappeared during the time of Amin’s regime. His brother—of 
this he was certain—was shot by the NRA in 1989 for having been a 
member of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLA) on the side of 
Milton Obote and Tito Okello.438 The young man remembered how people 
were later chased from their villages by government soldiers, shot and 
burnt. He made a gesture to illustrate how the soldiers took razor blades to 
437 Leonardi describes a very similar tension experienced by youth in southern Sudan. She calls it an “in-between role” (p.394) and argues 
that youth are torn between the two spheres of the home and the military/government ‘hakuma’ and resisting “full incorporation into 
either sphere” (p.395), including through capture by the military. See C.Leonardi. “‘Liberation’ or Capture: Youth in Between ‘hakuma’, and 
‘Home’ During Civil War and its Aftermath in southern Sudan”, African Affairs 106, 424, 2007. 
The interpretation of individual LRA being caught in the space between LRA and life in Uganda that I offer here departs from distinctions 
made by Allen and Mergelsberg.  Mergelsberg suggests that transitions from life at home (kit kwo ma gang) and life in the bush (kit kwo 
ma ilum) are “the most painful times”. B.Mergelsberg, "Between two worlds: former LRA soldiers in northern Uganda",  in The Lord's 
Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot. London/ New York: Zed Books, 2010, p.167. While it certainly 
seemed the case that the transition was considered difficult, the way the two spheres were described to me emphasised that they were 
connected, rather than separate. Allen makes a similar distinction between an inside and an outside world, with separate rules applying for 
each. Allen discusses the two terms gang and olum as the distinction between different spheres with different rules, with “‘the bush’ (olum) 
as a place of unpredictable and amoral phenomena”. T.Allen, Trial justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army. 
African Arguments, London: Zed Books, 2006, p.44. Also see T.Allen, “Violence and Moral Knowledge: Observing Social Trauma in Sudan 
and Uganda”, Cambridge Anthropology, 13,2, 1988; T.Allen, "Ethnicity and Tribalism on the Sudan-Uganda border," in Ethnicity and 
conflict in the Horn of Africa, ed. K.Fukui and J.Markakis, Oxford: James Currey, 1994. Girling describes the meanings of the word gang (the 
home or the village, p.7) and olum (which he translates as ‘grass’, p.23) .K. Girling, The Acholi of Uganda. London: HMSO, 1960. 
438 The various member groups of the UNLA initially included Obote’s, Okello’s and Museveni’s followers, who defeated the UNLA in 1986. 
See also F. van Acker, "Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army: The New Order No One Ordered", African Affairs 103, 412, 2004.
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cut the anuses of those who resisted.439 “I feel that my revenge is both for 
those who suffered, but it is also for me because I was not allowed to have 
a good life.” Another commander talked about the sacrifice: “I did this 
[being in the LRA] for my people, but for myself, it is very difficult,” said 
one middle-rank commander. “Sometimes, when I look back, I hate my life, 
how things have gone. I was always listening to command. Maybe it is too 
late for me now to have choices. I had a plan when I was in Senior 4. I 
wanted to study divinity. I was reading my favourite book. Things Fall 
Apart. But everything is washed away from my brain.”440
One of the delegates was reflecting on his own role in the peace process 
after returning from a visit to Ri-Kwangba, where he had met with Kony. 
He explained that he had a good experience meeting Kony: “I am proud of 
what I have done, for my people. I have fulfilled my mission. Even the 
chairman, he is proud. He looked at me and then looked away and he was 
proud.” I asked him what was more important to him—to be proud of 
himself or that the chairman was proud of him? He answered: “Myself, of 
course.”441
This exchange echoed what I had encountered before: while LRA members 
stressed that they had been fighting as a group and group identity was 
clearly crucial, individuals also said that the war was about themselves as 
individuals and what they had lost. At times, the importance of standing up 
for yourself was explained through the figure of Kony, who was also seen 
as an individual who in standing up for himself had stood up for the group. 
One day in Juba, while waiting for a meeting with Machar, one delegate 
turned his phone towards me and asked me to read a text message. He said 
that the chairman had sent this to him and the rest of the delegation to 
439 Amnesty international’s Uganda Country Report of 1999 lists numerous methods of abuse by Ugandan government soldiers in rural 
areas, including disappearing people, rapes, beatings and extrajudicial executions. See amnesty international, "Uganda Country Report", 
1999.  
A report by Human Rights Focus lists a range of abuses. Human Rights Focus,"’Between Two Fires’ The Plight of IDPs in Northern Uganda: 
The human rights situation in the ‘protected camps’ in Gulu District, Northern Uganda,"Kampala: 2002.  
The practice of tek gungu (bent over) is well documented as a systematic way of raping both men and women. In a 2012 report on the 
UPDF in Uganda’s north-eastern region Karamojong, amnesty international writes about abuses: “UPDF soldiers have allegedly used torture 
and other ill-treatment especially while undertaking searches. There have been reports of UPDF soldiers removing suspects’ teeth, burning 
suspects using hot metals and hitting the muscles and veins of men around the anus and the testis.”amnesty international. "Uganda: 
Human rights violations in Karamoja region guarantees impunity". Kampala: 2010.  In 2003 it was reported that a man had been awarded 
damages after being tortured by the UPDF in 1998. Although the exact methods of torture were not spelt out, doctors confirmed that he 
was no longer able to control his rectal function as a result of torture. Sheila C. Kulubya, "Torture victim to get Shs 60m”, The Daily 
Monitor, 26/2/2003. The LRA/M in their first position paper of the Juba Talks reiterated that “NRM soldiers went to the extent of cutting 
men’s anuses with razor blades and pouring paraffin therein to enlarge them to fit their sex organs.” LRA/M delegation in Juba /O.Olweny, 
"First position paper of the LRA Peace Delegation during negotiations", Juba: 16/7/2006.
440 Fieldnotes, Juba: 28/9/2006. Things Fall Apart is Chinua Achebe’s 1958 novel.
441 Fieldnotes, Juba: 27/9/2006.
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support their efforts in organising the peace talks. The text message read: 
“HEAVEN watches over its TREASURES and you’r one of its FINEST and most 
PRECIOUS. Live your life knowing GOD will never take His eyes off you! Am 
prayin 4 u al!”442  When I asked the delegate what this actually meant, he 
explained that “the chairman is telling us who we are.”443 While it seemed 
rather unlikely that the message was indeed from Kony, presenting it to me 
in this way nonetheless showed how I was supposed to perceive the 
connection between Kony and the LRA fighters. It seemed to be a double 
defence of their identity against their reduction the LRA in both the war 
and mainstream analysis to “animals”. An implication of this for the Juba 
Talks was that any change in circumstances would also lead to the loss of 
the one possession that LRA members had retained: their identity. 
In late 2009, I asked a former delegate what he would say the purpose of 
the peace talks was. He explained that in order for peace talks to be 
effective, they had to simplify and make goals very easy and achievable. 
This was difficult, he said, because with every issue tackled, it had become 
clear in Juba that “things break apart.” I asked him what he meant. 
“Sometimes I want other things for myself than I want for the LRA,” he 
explained. He wanted the LRA as a militant organisation to cease to exist, 
but for it to continue as an opposition movement ready to take up arms 
against Museveni if need be. He himself never wanted to take up arms 
again, but he felt that he might have to if the LRA came out of the peace 
talks too weak.444 When asked what he would do should talks fail, one of 
the LRM delegates who had been resident in Uganda answered: “What 
happens if talks fail? It will be very difficult for me. I may need to go 
somewhere else. If it goes wrong and there is no option, I might have to 
take the hellish choice and go into the bush to fight.”445 
Contained within a strong communal identity are personal identities that 
are shifting and multifaceted. Over the course of a few years, I observed 
how biographies were reinvented, and how within the system LRA, 
individuals changed their affiliations or even their names. In Uganda, it has 
been quite common for LRA fighters to present themselves as LRA 
abductees, or for those who have never been with the LRA claimed to have 
been abducted, depending on which category seems to bring more benefit 
442 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/6/2006, sender’s caps—I have my doubts whether this message was truly sent from Kony’s phone, but it is what I 
was told.
443 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/6/2006.
444 L Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 11/11//2009.
445 Fieldnotes, Juba: 11/10/2006.
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in any given situation.446  In different situations I heard five different 
autobiographies of one of the LRA members, told to either me or others. 
He was born in the bush, or he was abducted when he was very young 
because his uncle was in the LRA, or he was abducted as an adult, or he 
never fought in the LRA but had been one of the outside contact persons, 
or he had always been a government infiltrator. I am unsure whether the 
photograph he gave me of himself as a young boy in the bush, holding a 
gun, credibly rules out any of these.447 
The middle generation—medium-rank commanders who had been with the 
LRA most of their young adulthood—talked about their life in the LRA as 
the somewhat inevitable card they had been dealt: “You understand that 
that is what you have to do, what you believe is right,” one young 
commander explained. “Maybe a soldier is not blamed for the wrong 
decision of the command, like in Iraq, but as a soldier, you do believe it is 
right and then you do it.”448  Another middle-rank commander linked 
fighting for the Acholi cause to his own growing up to be a man, as a task 
comparable to providing for a family and having a son: “It is hard to be a 
man. You have many things to concentrate on. You have to look after your 
wife and children. You have to have a son and one thing to do also is to 
fight for your right.”449 Another expressed that shaking off the LRA identity 
was complicated: “I don’t know what I can do in the future. If I can go back 
to Uganda, I don’t want to be in the UPDF. I don’t want to be known only as 
former LRA. I don’t know what I can be”.450
One commander explained to me that the chairman of course knew that his 
fighters were using violence to fight for the community. However, he said, 
the use of violence did not make the chairman happy; instead he was full of 
regrets that this was the path individual lives had had to take. I failed to 
446 T.Allen and M.Schomerus, A Hard Homecoming: Lessons learned from the reception centre process on effective interventions for 
former 'abductees' in northern Uganda. Washington DC/ Kampala: USAID/ UNICEF, 2006. An obvious manifestation of conflicting identities 
is the fine line between perpetrator and victim, as discussed by C.Dolan, Social Torture: The Case of Northern Uganda, 1986 - 2006. Oxford/ 
New York: Berghahn Books, 2009; or by Baines for the case of Dominic Ongwen. E.Baines, "Complex political perpetrators : reflections on 
Dominic Ongwen." Journal of Modern African Studies 47, 2, 2009.
447 In theatre, fluid identity is best expressed in the anti-illusionism movement. In Pirandello’s classic play Six Characters in Search of an 
Author, the line between actor and character is blurred to suggest that reality and its clear distinction from fiction are merely a perception. 
Luigi Pirandello, "Six characters in search of an author," in "Six Characters in Search of an Author" and Other Plays ("Henry IV" and "So It Is, 
If You Think So"), London: Penguin, 1995 (1921). The point that the play makes is that fictional characters are more “real” as they remain 
unchanged, as opposed to real people who change as time progresses, and that outside forces influence a person and make them behave 
as if in a play by changing their character. I observed this very firm“real” character particularly when people talked about the LRA identity. 
448 Fieldnotes, Juba: 30/9/2006.
449 Fieldnotes, Juba: 7/12/2006.
450 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 19/9/2006.
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grasp what the young man was trying to say. He elaborated that when he 
was abducted, the chairman found out that he was the brother of a woman 
who was married to a person very close to the chairman. A few months 
after his abduction, the chairman personally came over to him and 
apologised for the abduction. I wanted to know if the chairman offered to 
let him go. No, the man replied, on the contrary. Kony said that it was good 
that he had come as he could now prove his worth, and that was just how it 
was.451 Another expressed both pride and weariness at being with the LRA, 
which was something, he said to me, that I would not be able to 
understand because I could always get on a plane back to Europe. “I am 
destined to do this,” he said when I asked why he was fighting. “The 
difference between your life and my life is that you have the ability to 
choose. I don’t.”452 
Prize Identity
While he was in a prominent position in the delegation, one delegate often 
stressed how long he had been an LRA supporter and how close he was to 
the leadership, particularly to Otti.453  Some of his colleagues never found 
this particularly convincing. Over the course of the next two years several 
delegates explained to me that this particular man was a con artist, that he 
was a government agent, that his contact with the leadership was very 
weak. The man in question, however, was obviously proud of being part of 
the Juba Talks—as were many other delegates. This was not surprising. 
Within the confined space of Juba, delegates had become celebrities, along 
with the LRA leadership. In Juba Market, at the time a small downtown 
market, various photo CDs were on sale, displayed prominently next to the 
David Beckham posters and pirate copies of the Nollywood hits The Abuja 
Connection and Rising Moon. The CD sleeves showed crude photocopied 
pictures: Ojul shaking Kony’s hand, Machar shaking Otti’s hand, Kony 
shaking Machar’s hand. Twenty photographs of great LRA encounters, to be 
viewed at home.454  While for example Ojul’s standing as a bona fide 
spokesperson was not entirely solid within his own group or with members 
of the international community working on the peace talks; to the outside 
451 Fieldnotes, Juba: 18/12/2006.
452 Fieldnotes, Juba/ Magwi: 2/10/2006.
453 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 13/72006.
454 Fieldnotes, Juba: 20/2/2007.
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world he—along with the LRA leadership—was a celebrity. His image had 
become marketable stock. 
“You should be called a hero,” Bwone said to me. “Nobody has managed to 
do what you did. If you write a book, there will be lots of fame for you.” It 
was an awkward exchange for me. Bwone was clearly teasing me, following 
on from a previous conversation in which he had pointed out that I was 
doing quite well establishing myself as an expert on the LRA. The 
conversation turned to a topic that I was uncomfortable discussing with the 
LRA: how I had managed to conduct the only interview with Kony, only to 
have it published in a distorted manner without receiving credit for it.455 In 
2006, after a year of preparation, I had managed to organise a sit-down 
television interview with Kony in the bush. I had brought along a BBC 
reporter to give the story the greatest possible play. After the interview, the 
BBC reporter distorted the factual story of the LRA war for the BBC and 
published my interview under his own name in The Times of London and 
Harper’s. Having been rather bruised by the experience, I cringed at 
Bwone’s suggestion that I was a hero and shook my head. “You are a hero,” 
he reiterated. “We know the interview with the chairman was a big prize. 
You got the prize.” Alit explained to me the story of Jacob and Esau, and 
said that he felt that the price of the interview had been taken from me by 
someone who wanted to take credit for what I had achieved, just as Jacob 
in the biblical story took the blessings meant for Esau.456 The prize had now 
been taken, he said; it was now up to LRA to show that there was more to 
them.
Others wanted the prize as well, and the LRA/M knew that. “It is the 
longest-running war in Africa, everyone wants the fame,” a delegate 
explained to me, commenting on how St Egidio had portrayed the signing 
of the CoH on their website. Just like Pax Christi, St Egidio had played a 
much smaller role in the peace talks than they had hoped, thanks to 
Machar’s role as the mediator. “St Egidio went back to Rome. They did a 
press conference to say that through their effort, the cessation paper was 
signed,” the delegate said. As a result, he said, Machar did not want St 
Egidio back, because they did not acknowledge the effort put in by 
everyone else. Machar was, as the delegate reported it, “pissed off, 
sincerely”.457
455 For a detailed account see M.Schomerus, "Chasing the Kony Story," in The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T.Allen and 
K.Vlassenroot. London: Zed Books, 2010.
456 Author interview with Col. Lubwoa Bwone and Lt.Col. Santo Alit (LRA). Ri-Kwangba: 22/9/2006.
457 Fieldnotes, Juba: 12/9/2006.
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Meetings with the LRA leadership had the air of celebrity encounters. On 
his first trip to Ri-Kwangba, Ugandan MP and later presidential hopeful 
Norbert Mao hugged Kony. Mao later somewhat sheepishly commented 
that this did not mean that he supported Kony. A reporter for Kenya’s 
Weekly Observer described the scene of the arrival of a group of Ugandan 
MPs in Ri-Kwangba: 
Otti then announces that there would be a handshake with the 
general. The visitors scramble to greet the man whose 20-year 
rebellion has caused mayhem in northern Uganda. “General, I am 
making history now. General, I am the first West-Niler to shake 
your hand General. General, I am now a hero,” goes an excited 
Arua Municipality MP, Akbar Hussein Godi. Another praise singer: 
“General, I am also a hero. General, they say a lot of bad things 
about you but I have seen you with my hands General. General, 
what they say about you is not true…,” that is Kumi LC-V 
chairman, Ismael Orot who, by the way, is an NRM member. An 
embarrassed Santa Okot, former Pader Woman MP, is forced to 
plead with Kony that the women should have their turn because 
they can’t match men in fighting for his handshake.458
I experienced similar scenes. During an impromptu press conference by Otti 
in the bush, a handful of reporters showered the second-in-command with 
questions. “Do you abduct children? Do you have children in the bush? Why 
do you attack civilians?” the reporters shouted. Otti’s answers were 
taciturn. At the end of the press briefing, the reporters put away their 
notebooks and tape recorders and asked to have their photo taken with 
Otti. All gathered for a group shot around the second-in-command. The 
reporter from Uganda’s government newspaper, who had asked why Otti 
attacked civilians, wanted an individual photograph of himself and Otti. 
The photos were taken as the journalists were shaking hands with Otti or 
patting his shoulder, smiling into the camera.459  Otti, while seeming a bit 
confused about the combination of hostility with reverence, clearly did not 
mind the attention or the celebrity status. In a few conversations, he talked 
about how the world was now understanding the LRA, judging somewhat 
prematurely that the delegation had negotiated a more favourable attitude 
towards the LRA—an impression that often fuelled their more rigid 
negotiating positions. They felt encouraged by what was perceived to be 
outside support. It was similar to how, as it was phrased in a position paper, 
continued support through the West “has emboldened Museveni to 
continue committing the genocide”. This was despite “selfish pursuit of 
political, economic and military interest by nation states enthusiastically 
embraced to the detriment of ensuring addressing issues that ensure the 
458 S.I. Nganda and B.H. Oluka, "Behind scenes: Mecca in DRC jungle", The Weekly Observer, 10/8/2006.
459 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 19/9/2006..
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realisation of Human Rights, democracy and rule of law in parts of the 
world where they are in danger”.460 
When I asked Otti what he was hoping to gain from the peace talks, he said 
that in wanting to receive recognition for their work, the “LRA is no 
different than the NGOs, the UN, and yourself.” All of you, he said, talking 
about the long list of international representatives, organisations and 
media, have pursued the LRA story for professional recognition. UN 
Undersecretary of Humanitarian Affairs Egeland had visited the LRA the day 
before. In Otti’s judgment, he had visited for the same reason that the LRA 
wanted peace talks: to get professional recognition. Even Egeland, Otti 
said, wants to be recognised and wants to be able to tell the story of 
meeting the LRA high command.461 In his autobiography, Egeland describes 
his encounter with Otti:
“Welcome!” says Vincent Otti, Kony’s deputy, striding toward us. A 
tall, elderly man in camouflage uniform with elaborate Soviet-
made red epaulettes, he has taken the title of lieutenant general. 
He is waiting to greet us at the assembly point in Ri-Kwamba 
together with a dozen silent LRA officials… It is an unprecedented 
meeting. No ranking UN official has ever met the LRA leadership in 
the twenty years they have been in hiding.462
I asked Otti what else he thought of the meeting with Egeland, of the large 
press corps following him and the frantic activity as reporters called in their 
quotes to their newsroom, shouting into satellite phones: “We are all here 
for two reasons: for money or because we want to be a hero. I would like to 
have money, too,” he answered.463 
Rules
Within the scholarship on the LRA, the emphasis on rules is very strong, to 
the extent that rules are at times presented as the defining factor of 
460 LRA/M delegation in Juba /O.Olweny, "First position paper of the LRA Peace Delegation during negotiations", Juba: 16/7/2006. Cockett 
describes a similar mechanism of perverse incentives in the Darfur conflict. Being touted as the good guys in the war, the Sudan Liberation 
Army and the Justice and Equality Movement received exposure to US support that allowed them to feel strengthened in their far-reaching 
demands for a settlement and their expectation of outside help in pushing those demands through. Richard Cockett, "Sudan: Darfur and 
the failure of an African state", New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010.
461 Author interview with Vincent Otti, Ri-Kwangba: 14/11/2006.
462 J.Egeland, A Billion Lives: An Eyewitness Report from the Frontlines of Humanity. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008.
463 Author interview with Vincent Otti, Ri-Kwangba: 14/11/2006.
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identity.464  Yet it was obvious that rules within the LRA were also 
negotiable and adjustable. It seemed to be less the case that rules shaped 
the LRA identity than that the LRA identity shaped the notion of having 
strict rules. Most rules that were explained to me were grounded in the 
LRA’s existence as bush fighters. They also, it seemed to me, served to 
narrow the category of unacceptable human behaviour to the smallest 
possible denominator. Thus establishing strict rules also granted a certain 
freedom and allowed actions that were very similar to what the rules 
forbade, but not exactly the same. That was why, they explained, even 
when violent, the LRA stuck to certain rules.465 Emphasising that these rules 
of conduct existed seemed important to LRA commanders. However, when 
nobody else was listening, they also spoke about knowing the rules and 
breaking them. 
Sudanese civilians in Owiny-Kibul and Obbo in Eastern Equatoria told me 
that whenever the LRA came to the market in either town, they only ever 
drank soft drinks in public, even though they sometimes asked for alcohol 
to take into the bush. The LRA were adamant that they did not consume 
any alcohol or drugs, so buying alcohol was either a bending of the rules or 
part of some trade that went on in the bush. One delegate explained to me 
that alcohol and womanising were forbidden because both distract the 
fighters from their mission. Smoking was prohibited because the smell of a 
cigarette could easily betray the secret location of a hideout.466 Despite the 
supposedly strict rules on cigarettes and alcohol, I saw LRA members 
smoking when outside the bush. One carried a camouflaged bottle of 
alcohol, taking regular swigs. I saw him being taken aside by his colleagues 
to be reprimanded. Afterwards I enquired about this scene. “Did [the LRA 
member] tell you that he drinks?” I asked another LRA. “We are not 
supposed to drink,” was the response. “They [the high command] do not 
need to know. When we get there I have to tell him stop this.467
Spiritual observance and worship was stressed as an important element of 
group interaction. Yet once the LRA moved out of the exact territory and 
464 The LRA as a normative communitas, in Turner’s phrase, is well documented: the group follows a tight set of rules, even though these 
are changeable depending on circumstance. Annan et al. have written about the strict set of rules governing LRA behaviour, regarding for 
example the prohibition of sexual violence against civilians, which served “an instrumental purpose, augmenting the LRA’s command and 
control of diffuse mobile units, and helping to curb the spread of HIV/AIDS”.Jeannie Annan et al., "Women and Girls at War: “Wives”, 
Mothers, and Fighters in the Lord’s Resistance Army”, New Haven/ New York: 2008, p.21. The extent to which the LRA committed sexual 
violence against civilians is unclear: Doom and Vlassenroot stated that the LRA raped both men and women in public. R.Doom and 
K.Vlassenroot, "Kony's Message: A New Koine? The Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda", African Affairs 98, 390,1999.
465 This data was gathered between 2006 and 2008. Some of these rules seem to have changed since.
466 Fieldnotes, Juba: 9/7/2006.
467 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/6/2006.
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structure for which these rules had been made, they seemed to be less 
important. Passing a mosque, I asked an LRA member whether he prayed. 
He looked at me with surprise, as if the answer was obvious. “It is a must 
for us. When we are [outside the bush] we pray three times a day. 
Sometimes we pray whole days in the bush. We are LRA.”468  In reality, 
praying seemed to be an afterthought on many occasions. Twice when I sat 
down in Ri-Kwangba to eat the honey with mandazis I had been offered, 
Lieutenant Colonel Alit apologised after the meal that he had forgotten to 
say grace. 
Out of earshot of superiors, individual commanders saw no reason to 
pretend that the LRA was a non-violent force, but reiterated that there 
were certain limits to LRA violence. Raping women, it was explained to me, 
was for example not allowed because it exposed the LRA to disease. 
“Abductions have happened,” said one man in the Ri-Kwangba assembly 
area. “I accept that. Killings have happened. I accept that. But not rape. If 
you rape in the LRA, you bring a big problem on yourself. The LRA does not 
rape. Ask the chairman. He will laugh.”469 
The LRA’s claims on rape are problematic. While for a while the ban on rape 
of civilians seemed to discourage LRA soldiers, nobody denied that women 
were forcibly taken and given to LRA husbands, yet this was never linked to 
the notion of rape. P’Bitek writes that in Acholi culture, desire is expressed 
very directly and often before the man and woman get to know each other 
in any other way. Crucially, the woman has to decline the advance, which 
tends to be treated as meaningless. Porter argues that social relations in 
Acholi culture determine how crimes are perceived. In the case of rape, if 
victim and perpetrator have a close social relationship, victims tend to 
demand lesser punishment to maintain social harmony. It is possible that a 
similar mechanism also works the other way round: because LRA individuals 
feel they are doing something good for the community, forced sexual 
encounters are not perceived as rape. 470
I confronted the young man with this obvious contradiction: that there had 
been abductions, but the LRA maintained that everyone was with them 
voluntarily. He explained that of course there were abductions; he himself 
had been abducted. However, the abductions worked differently than how 
468 Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 28/5/2006.
469 Fieldnotes, Juba: 18/12/2006. In the violence that followed the Juba Talks, the LRA were implicated for mass rape. Human Rights 
Watch, "The Christmas Massacres: LRA attacks on Civilian in Northern Congo". New York: February 2009.
470 See H.E. Porter, "Justice and rape on the periphery: the supremacy of social harmony in the space between local solutions and formal 
judicial systems in northern Uganda", Journal of Eastern African Studies 6, 1, 2012;  O.p’Bitek. “Acholi Love.” In The Anniversary Issue: 
Selections from Transition, 1961-1976. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1964 (1997).
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they were generally portrayed. Yes, the LRA targeted able young women, 
but not, as he saw it, to abuse them: “We ask them [the soldiers in the field] 
to bring girls, not old women. So they bring girls, but people do take care 
of them.”471  To him, abduction and forced marriage were a fact of life 
rather than an atrocity. He said that all of the United States was built using 
abducted people from Africa, so it was normal to strengthen your own 
power by taking in other people. Moreover, he said that the LRA as a 
community had a lot to offer to anyone who joined them, including to 
women, because there was good friendship in the LRA camp.
Another time, I was being served food in the LRA camp. A short-haired 
young woman in a blue T-shirt and ankle-length skirt placed a metal plate 
in front of me. Alfred “Record” Otim was standing by, as always filming my 
visit to the camp. He shouted out in English, to me, to look at the camera. 
The woman barely looked up, not making eye contact with either Otim or 
me. I asked Otim if both of us, the woman and I, should look at the camera 
and if we should ask the soldiers standing guard to get into the picture. I 
addressed the woman with an Acholi greeting and smiled. Otim was not 
pleased. “Don’t mind, don’t mind,” he said. The woman reacted with a 
quick, uncertain smile and retreated backwards, half-bent. Otim waved her 
away and said that I was the guest of honour. He mumbled that the others, 
the woman serving food and the foot soldiers were… I did not catch the 
word and asked him to repeat it. They were, he said, “normal”. But they do 
all the work, I said, laughing, trying to make light of the awkward 
situation. They cook and clean and they watch over you. When I turned to 
ask one of the young soldiers standing by to ask him for his name, Otim 
interrupted: “I am also working,” he said, waving his camera. His, he said, 
was an important job. Commenting on my effort to get a soldier’s name, he 
just said again “don’t mind, don’t mind.”472
Kony was adamant that everyone who was with him in the bush had come 
there for protection, voluntarily. Leaving aside whether this was credible, it 
was clear that most abductees ended up as nameless, “normal” elements in 
a hierarchical society. Without being held in high esteem, they supported 
the society with their everyday work and were vital to its functioning. 
Having many “normal” ones also elevated the identities of those above 
them. How the normal ones were perceived internally points to the LRA/M’s 
contradictory understanding of itself. After the failed signing, one delegate 
explained to me that the biggest shortcoming of the FPA was that it did not 
clearly state what would happen to the foot soldiers and did not provide at 
all for foot soldiers from countries other than Uganda. It is important to 
471 Fieldnotes, Juba: 18/12/2006.
472 Fieldnotes, Owiny-Kibul and Palotaka: 26/11/2006.
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take care of them, he said, because “most of these people are not there 
voluntarily.” He said because they were not volunteers and were vulnerable 
within the LRA and within their communities, they needed to be afforded 
double protection.
Otti did not tire of pointing out my achievement in travelling to the bush as 
a woman. He said usually women are not be strong enough for such a hard 
journey, that I was more like a man.473 I said I had seen LRA women carrying 
great loads over long distances in the burning sun. Surely they were 
tougher than I. He shook his head in disapproval. Having spotted a female 
captain among the group of soldiers, I asked another commander what it 
was like to have women as soldiers. “Women are the worst fighters,” he 
answered, and because of the conversation I had just had with Otti, I 
misunderstood. Having had my own achievements as a tough woman 
touted solely by virtue of having been driven along a bumpy road, I 
thought he was telling me that women were not good at fighting. “Why 
are they the worst fighters?” I asked. “You should be telling me, by the 
way,” he responded, his pointed finger implying that I was the expert on 
my own gender. I shrugged to encourage him to keep speaking. When he 
continued it became clear that he meant the opposite of what I had 
thought. “Because they make up their mind to do something, they want to 
do it and then they are fierce in pursuing. Women are commanders, we 
have many women as high as major.”474  What happens if a woman is a 
major, does she get married in the bush? “No,” he answered. “Women with 
rank do not have children. Because women do not let having children be a 
coincidence. But if a woman commander wants a child they can have, they 
can make that decision.”475
A few years later, I spoke to a man from the Dinka Ngok people from Abyei, 
who had been a SAF soldier in the Equatorias. He had been paired with the 
473 This rather light-hearted remark might hide another explanation why the LRA was open to engagement with me. Along the Sudan-
Uganda border, women are often seen as bearers of outside knowledge. This particular quality means that they become like men as they get 
older. T.Allen, "Ethnicity and Tribalism on the Sudan-Uganda border," in Ethnicity and conflict in the Horn of Africa, ed. K.Fukui and 
J.Markakis, Oxford: James Currey, 1994, p.132. My initial contact with the LRA largely came about because I was seen as the bearer of 
outside knowledge about the workings of the ICC. Often, LRA members found it remarkable that in my mid-30s, I had no children. In their 
eyes, I was probably indeed much more like a man.
474 In an article about women in the LRA that draws largely on existing stereotypes of the LRA while simultaneously aiming to refute them, 
Graham emphasises that Kony’s spirit Silli Silindi is female and leads the female part of the LRA, the “Mary Company”. She argues that 
women are seen only as less valuable fighters than men, but does not present any original evidence to prove the finding. S.Graham, 
"Mother and Slaughter: A comparative analysis of the female terrorist in the LRA and FARC", in African Politics: Beyond the Third wave of 
Democratisation, ed. Joelien Pretorius. Cape Town: Juta and Co, 2008.
475 That the power of decision-making is not denied to women is unsurprising in the context of northern Uganda. After all, Alice Lakwena 
had been the most powerful rebel leader prior to Kony himself. T.Allen, "Understanding Alice: Uganda’s Holy Spirit Movement in Context", 
Africa 61, 3, 1991; H.Behrend, Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits. Oxford: James Currey, 1999.
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LRA for many months, and he remembered how he used to fight side by 
side with the LRA and that their soldiers were “better than Arab soldiers”. 
This was because “all soldiers in the LRA were good fighters, even the 
women, the women were very good fighters.” He observed that only 
officers were allowed to bring their wives near battle sites, but “those 
wives were also fighting.”476 
One LRA fighter explained that often after a battle the women would be 
unfazed, while he would cry with anger about his experiences: “I get very 
angry, and then I fight. Last time I got into a fight, I walked away, that was 
four months ago. Before that I got into big fight eight months ago.” I 
asked him what kind of fights, what were these fights about. He did not 
want to say; all he said was, “then I go and cry and I get better.” When I 
said that crying was usually for women, he laughed, shook his head and 
explained that he could also get very angry and uncontrollably violent: 
“Me, I am very bad also, but I restrain myself.”477 
More senior commanders could express preferences when new women were 
abducted. The more senior the rank, the more likely it was that the 
commander would get to choose the woman of his liking. Younger soldiers 
had to hand over their shirts and the new women were required to wash 
them. The young man would then find his wife based on who had washed 
his shirt. Once the woman was handed over to the “husband” there were 
certain expectations of how he would treat her. These expectations did, in 
the eyes of the LRA, protect the woman from rape. A commander told me 
that a husband could not beat his wife—if he did, he would be punished 
with death. The reasoning behind this rule, I was told, was that for the LRA 
to survive, it was very important to “take care of each other”.
Otti and Kony insisted that the LRA was not abducting and that everyone 
who was with them had come for protection. In June 2006 Mary Sungu, 
then commissioner of Ibba County in Western Equatoria, confronted Otti in 
a meeting with Machar and demanded that he release women and girls 
abducted from her county in early 2006. Otti denied that the girls were 
with the LRA. Later on, in a side conversation with one of his delegates, he 
made the point that “the girls are there” and had been with the LRA ever 
since their abduction. Machar suggested that the LRA should stop 
abducting because then the girls might want to voluntarily marry LRA 
soldiers. Everybody laughed—except the commissioner, who was the only 
476 Author (with translator) interview with former SAF soldier, Port Sudan: 11/1/2011.
477 Fieldnotes. Juba: 6/6/2006. Finnstroem recounts the story of two young Acholi men who said that men are more resilient than women 
and that women’s weakness shows, for example, in their public display of grief at funerals. Restraint was considered a virtue that marked 
manhood S.Finnstroem, "Gendered War and Rumours of Saddam Hussein in Uganda", Anthropology and Humanism 34, 1, 2009, p.64.
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female official in the meeting. For me, observing from the sidelines, the 
episode confirmed the parallel realities of the LRA, in which conflicting 
facts could live side-by-side. The realisation that abduction was wrong sat 
comfortably with the notion that abduction was necessary; being a tough 
fighter could be reconciled with crying to get better; taking possession of 
women, including sexual possession, did not seem at odds with rejecting 
accusations of being rapists.
Achievements
During the Juba Talks, the LRA/M initially focused on publicly reshaping the 
narrative of the war, away from a focus on violence and spirituality towards 
a politicised view of the conflict. When asked whether spirits had told him 
to fight this war, Kony answered:
No, no, no, no. It is not like that. God did not tell me to fight this 
war, no… Many people say like that. But God did not tell me to 
fight the people of Uganda or to fight the government of 
Museveni. Only the government of Uganda want to fight us 
because they said that we are we are we are we are using spirits, 
or spirit is with us so he want to kill all of us. But God did not told 
me to fight Uganda people. He told me to teach the Uganda 
people how to be a democratic system, how to be in a good leader. 
How to work together. How to be in God’s law. But not to kill the 
people of Uganda.478
Dismissing any spiritual element was part of this recasting of the narrative, 
and it remains difficult to assess what role spirituality played at which 
moment and for whom in the LRA. In mid-2006, Kony and his delegates 
played down the importance of spirituality to focus on their military and 
political strength. Whether this translated into how junior LRA fighters 
related to spiritual powers is another question. A young Sudanese woman 
abducted from Parajok in January 2007, for example, told me that the 
young LRA soldiers who had taken her had asked her a range of questions 
straight after her abduction. These give an insight into what junior LRA 
soldiers still in the field at the time thought important: “Is your mother 
rich? Is your father rich? Do they have poison to kill people? Are they 
478 Author interview with Joseph Kony, Sudan/ DRC border: 12/6/2006. Agbonifo writes that when disputing religion as a cause of war, it is 
“the very process of unmasking the failings of the political order [that] provides divine sanction, and support for efforts by rebellious 
protagonists to undo repressive systems.” He argues that religion is generally used to sanction violent acts, rather than causing them. 
Debating how underprivileged groups view violence “as the only means of forcing through their objective”, he states that “the appeal to 
religion is merely to demonstrate that the gods are not against the adoption of violent tools to undo perceived injustice. Religion comes 
after the will to political action; not before.”  J.Agbonifo, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Negotiating Political Settlement and Peace in 
Africa", Peace, Conflict and Development April, Issue Four (2004), p.1 and 3.
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witchcrafters?” She had answered that no, they were not rich and had no 
poison.479
In comparing the LRA to Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Mobile Forces, one LRA 
member said: “What Alice was doing was considered witchcraft. Alice did 
not fight a strategic war, you see, because she would leave UPDF weapons 
behind after a battle. Kony was never about witchcraft. This was always a 
strategic war.”480 One commander explained to me that thanks to the LRA, 
the Acholi had regained some of the power that Museveni had wanted to 
take from them. The LRA was a way to show the world that they were 
“smart people”, rather than just soldiers. “I became a major because of my 
brain. I am a good fighter also. But with a good brain you can be an 
academic officer or a field officer,”481  he said. The reading material in the 
LRA camp emphasised the importance of learned military strategy; whether 
this was to make a publicly visible point or because the material on display 
was really what the LRA were reading is difficult to say. On my first visit 
there, I saw three young LRA soldiers with books. One was carrying a copy 
of Von Clausewitz’ iconic celebration of European warfare, On War, 
another an edition from the Idiot’s Guide series—The Complete Idiot’s 
Guide to US Special Operations Forces— and the third was poring over a 
Tom Clancy volume titled Special Forces with one of the delegates, who 
seemed to have brought the book to the bush as a present. 482 
The move away from the image of stealthy spiritual forces towards a 
recasting of the LRA as military celebrities had an unexpected side effect for 
them. In late 2008, I was having dinner with a former delegate when his 
phone rang, flashing up the number of Kony’s satellite phone. He pushed 
the phone aside. He explained to me that since his dismissal from the 
delegation, he no longer took Kony’s calls. I was surprised. Two years 
before, the same man had sounded entirely devoted to Kony—and very 
respectful of Kony’s mind-reading powers. In May 2006 he threatened me 
and told me that the chairman knew my motives. “Kony will know if you 
come with bad things in your heart,” he had told me, leaning in and 
waving a finger in my face. The chairman had for now decided that I did 
479 Author (with translator Zande/ English) interview with Sudanese abductee who spent March 2008 - December 2008 with the LRA. 
Yambio: 23/2/2009. For a detailed historical discussion on the sigificance of poisoning in Sudan’s Equtoria regions, see C.Leonardi, “The 
Poison in the Ink Bottle: Poison Cases and the Moral Economy of Knowledge in 1930s Equatoria, Sudan”,Journal of Eastern African Studies, 
1,1, 2007.
480 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/9/2006.
481 Fieldnotes, Juba: 28/9/2006.
482 C. von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege. Hamburg: rororo, 1973 (originally published 1873); M.Cerasini, The Complete Idiot's Guide to US 
Special Operations Forces. New York: Penguin, 2002; T.Clancy, Special Forces: A Guided Tour of US Army Special Forces. Berkeley: Berkeley 
Publishing Corporation, 2001.It is possible that the display of these books was a planned attempt to shift the narrative on the LRA. 
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not come with bad intentions, so I would be allowed to travel to the bush. 
Yet if I changed my intentions, I was told, I would be punished.483 It was not 
clear who would punish me—a spiritual force, Kony himself, or the people 
sitting across from me at that moment. Over the next few months, I was 
repeatedly accused of having bad intentions, ranging from charges that I 
would arrest Kony for the ICC to the claim that my chameleon-shaped silver 
pendant was a hidden recording device. I was told that the chairman was 
particularly afraid of my necklace.
In June 2005 one of the future LRA delegates told me at length that Kony 
controlled thunder and lighting and had access to his mind. “Number one 
always knows where I am and what I am planning,” he explained. “His 
power over me means I will never be able to betray him.” We were sitting 
in a private home in Gulu. Outside, rain poured down, lightning came and 
went, and thunder crashed. After one particularly loud thunderclap, the 
young man pointed to the sky and said that Kony knew he was speaking 
about him. I was reminded of this conversation when three years later, the 
same man defected from the LRA to openly work for the GoU, something 
he had reportedly been doing covertly all along. During OLT, his face was 
put on leaflets dropped over Garamba Park, telling LRA defectors they 
should seek shelter in the churches or with the Congolese army and that 
they would get amnesty in Uganda and be safe. He then proceeded to 
deliver falsified intelligence reports to donors and trying to trick the 
government out of large sums of money; he spent some time in jail over his 
trickery.484  For his time with the LRA, the young man received amnesty 
twice. His fear of Kony and the notion that Kony could always read his mind 
was thus not particularly convincing.
Middle- and senior-rank commanders spoke of Kony’s spiritual power when 
they wanted to make a strong statement. The same LRA whom I had seen in 
a television interview talking about Kony’s invincibility laughed when he 
told me a few weeks later that of course he did not really believe that the 
chairman could not be wounded by a bullet. Another LRA member said that 
in his view Kony might not be invincible, but the fact that he had survived 
for so long was proof that the cause was right: “I believe in the cause and I 
think there is a real reason why the chairman has been unharmed for so 
many years.”485  For him, this was proof of the leader’s legitimacy, rather 
than of his supernatural powers. When Otti spoke about power in the LRA, 
483 Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 25/5/2006.
484 He posed as Bwone when delivering intelligence to US sources in Kampala about Kony’s lack of interest in singing the peace agreement. 
For a summary of what the supposed Bwone said see US Embassy Kampala. “08KAMPALA410 (classified secret): Ugandan officials not 
surprised by Kony’s movement into CAR”, 17/3/2008.   
485 Fieldnotes, Nabanga: 20/9/2006.
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he was always very clear about his own importance. I never heard him 
speak with anything less than the utmost respect for Kony, but he never 
seemed scared or devout.486 He never mentioned Kony’s spiritual powers to 
me. 
In stark contrast, international observers, journalists and young abductees 
in the LRA spoke about Kony’s special powers as if they were the driving 
force behind events. Finnstroem has written about this “colonial 
imagination” that feeds outsider’s notions of the LRA.487  “Vincent Otti 
thinks Kony is the messiah,” said an international observer to me, for 
example. US sources reported, seemingly without questioning, that 
“Colonel Bwone,” acting as an informer in March 2008, had told them “that 
Kony had moved at near lightning speed, travelling 270 kilometers from 
near Duru, DRC, to his current location in a 48-hour period”.488 There was 
no comment that the steady pace of 5.6 kilometres per hour through dense 
bush, without a moment of rest or sleep, was somewhat incredible. In 
reality, the story had been peddled by a former LRA/M delegate who had 
been posing as Bwone on the phone and who had often impressed 
international observers with his seeming conviction of Kony’s superpowers.
At the dinner in late 2008, the former delegate turned off his phone after 
not taking Kony’s call. I asked him whether he was not afraid of Kony’s 
wrath at being treated disrespectfully. Were others in the LRA/M circle also 
no longer afraid? He said acting as he did—expressing his unwillingness to 
remain Kony’s interlocutor—and being afraid of the chairman were two 
different things. “People have to be afraid of the chairman, naturally,” he 
said. However, for him, that supposed ingrained natural fear no longer 
translated into obeying Kony’s orders.489  A few months before, I had met 
with another former delegate in Nairobi to talk about why Kony had not 
emerged from the bush to sign the FPA. He said there had been a very 
simple reason for this: Kony did not show up at the signing because he was 
more powerful when he could not be seen. When nobody knew the LRA 
and what Kony was like, people were more afraid. Being seen to sign a 
document surrounded by former enemies would make Kony look weak. He 
speculated that for Kony it was important to re-establish power by 
becoming mysterious and hence invincible again. Being otherworldly, he 
said, makes for someone who is very scary: “Kony was stronger when he 
486 In the end it seems that his authority led to his downfall, as it challenged Kony and led to Otti’s assassination. 
487 S.Finnstroem, “An African hell of colonial imagination? The Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, another story”, In The Lord’s Resistance 
Army: Myth and Reality, edited by T.Allen and K. Vlassenroot. London: Zed Books, 2010.
488 US Embassy Kampala. “08KAMPALA410 (classified secret): Ugandan officials not surprised by Kony’s movement into CAR”, 17/3/2008.  
489 Interview with former member of LRA/M delegate. Nairobi: 10/11/2008.
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was not exposed to the world.” 490 As a result of being so accessible during 
the Juba Talks, the “LRA is much weaker now than it was in 2006.”491
Conclusion
In Juba, among observers or facilitators at the Juba Talks, establishing how 
the LRA ticked was one of the prime pursuits. Establishing patterns in their 
behaviour that could help explain how they would react to future events 
was seen as one way of making sure the Juba Talks would become a success. 
Yet each actor searching for patterns in LRA behaviour also brought their 
own prejudices and expectations to this guessing game. Thus any mention 
of Kony’s spirituality and the power he held over his fighters and delegates 
was lapped up with a mixture of disbelief and fascination. Yet an insight 
that could have come out of the Juba Talks was that individuals within the 
LRA moved through their lives with contradictions, calculations and 
strategies that were adjusted to their changing surroundings as is often the 
case in any other human existence. The ways individuals portrayed 
themselves made it clear that inconsistency was essential to how ever-
changing situations were navigated, including the development of a certain 
fluidity when dealing with supposedly firm rules. A similar pattern occurred 
in early 2007: after the LRA/M had made the very firm statement to not 
return to Juba to negotiate, the first few month were spent on interpreting 
that claim in a way that allowed for a continuation of the talks. 
490 Fieldnotes, Cologne: 24/9/2008.
491 Fieldnotes, Cologne: 24/9/2008.
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5. 2007: “We don’t know if we can trust” 
Introduction
Towards the end of 2006, Juba had been changing rapidly. Cars were 
starting to clog the streets; a few hitherto unseen motorbike taxis were 
now hanging out on one particular corner waiting for passengers. Cafe de 
Paris, Juba’s first pizza parlour, opened in August 2006, tucked away in a 
corner of a half-finished building. The waiters navigated pizza or avocado 
vinaigrette past steel poles sticking out of unfinished concrete walls, and 
must have been amazed by the flocks of international customers who came 
to eat European food. A restaurant tucked away in a side street started to 
offer karaoke nights. Sometimes the karaoke machine ran on mains 
electricity, which from October 2006 came on occasionally. As the first 
potholes were filled with mud and sand, the Juba branch of Kenya 
Commercial Bank opened, right next to Cafe de Paris. Tented and 
prefabricated camps called the Nile Beach Hotel, White Nile Hotel, Nile 
Resort, Oasis Camp or Sunflower Camp conquered the west side of the river 
bank, gradually displacing Juba residents’ access to what was their shower 
room, laundromat, food supply and playground. Despite this curtailed 
access to the Nile, Juba’s population was growing rapidly. 
2007 brought a different character to the Juba Talks. The frayed 
relationship between the LRA/M and the mediator towards the end of 2006, 
particularly the lack of activity to deal decisively with UPDF attacks on LRA, 
meant that the day-to-day negotiations had all but subsided before 
Christmas, along with the intense media interest. To show his continuing 
goodwill, Machar had sent a bull to the LRA in the bush near Ri-Kwangba 
to enable Christmas celebrations. One delegate had spent Christmas with 
the LRA in the bush; the others had left Sudan to assess options to continue 
the talks elsewhere. 
I returned to Juba in February 2007 and found that the delegates had left 
luggage stashed away in wardrobes or under the beds in their rooms, which 
were being held by the hotel. While this seemed to hint at an expected 
return, some of those in the SPLA who had been working on the Juba Talks 
said they did not think that the negotiations could not be resurrected. 
Upon hearing that I was back in Juba, people from international agencies 
engaged in the Juba Talks who had left town because there were no 
developments, asked to me act as their “eyes and ears” to find out if the 
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Talks would resume. Neither SPLA nor international agencies had had 
credible contact with the LRA/M over the Christmas period. 2007 started off 
with uncertainty about the approach that was on offer, but without a 
credible alternative. This chapter provides an overview of how events in 
that year unfolded and what impact they had. 
What will happen to the Juba Talks? 
On January 9, 2007, the second anniversary of the signing of the CPA, Bashir 
and Kiir announced in separate speeches that the LRA was no longer 
welcome in Sudan.492 This statement reinforced some delegates’ impression 
that they would not be safe in Juba and that GoSS as a facilitator could not 
be trusted. Others were less concerned about safety, but were enraged by 
what they considered a disrespectful comment considering the LRA was still 
engaged in peace talks. Ojul announced to reporters in Nairobi: “in view of 
the statements by the two leaders and security considerations, the LRA 
delegation for the peace talks are not going back to Juba.”493 
A few days after Ojul had addressed reporters in Nairobi, news came that 
Alice Auma Lakwena, the former leader of the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces, 
had died in Kenya. Her family demanded a state burial for her, which the 
government rejected. Yet Museveni gave responsibility for arranging her 
burial in Uganda to the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs.494 
Delegates commented that Alice Lakwena seemed to get more GoU 
honours in her death than Kony did in negotiating peace.  A newspaper 
columnist wrote, “Some northerners may look at the government’s action 
of taking care of the dead, having neglected the living, as an act of 
hypocrisy.”495  When asked what he thought about Lakwena’s death, Otti 
laughed and then expressed a similar sentiment: “Museveni likes Alice 
better when she is dead… She will get a big funeral.”496  Mao (as Gulu’s 
District Chairman) and Ochora (as the RDC) flew to Nairobi to assure a safe 
return of her body, using the opportunity to meet with LRA/M delegates 
who were working from Nairobi on finding another venue. Lakwena’s 
burial in near Gulu was attended by scores of wailing people. 
On February 5, 2007, the LRA/M delegation released a statement expressing 
distrust in the agenda, distrust in Machar as a mediator, their sense that 
492 The Daily Monitor, "South Sudan’s Kiir warns Ugandan LRA of military action", 24/1/2007.
493 BBC News, "Rebels snub Ugandan peace talks", Nairobi/Kampala: 12/1/2007.
494 S.O. Egadu and C.Akena, "Museveni Issues Directive Over Lakwena Burial", The Daily Monitor, 26/1/2007.
495 O.K.Nnyago, "Lakwena’s death opens new wounds in the north", Daily Monitor, 30/1/2007.
496 Fieldnotes (phone conversations), Bremen: 1/2/2007.
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Machar had been imposed on them by GOSS, and their concerns for the 
security of fighters and delegates. On February 6, the US Government 
announced the creation of a new unified combatant command “to promote 
US national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding waters”.497 The 
new command was to go by the name of AFRICOM, and was initially to be 
headquartered in Germany. LRA/M delegates commented that it was 
disconcerting to have a permanent US command in Africa—a critical view 
that was widely shared.498  They argued that the US would now play a 
bigger and unwelcome role in Uganda in general and in the Juba Talks 
specifically. They discussed increasing US presence in Gulu and US oil 
interests in Uganda.499  They remarked on the long-standing partnership 
between the US military and the UPDF, and suggested that Museveni was 
keen to offer Uganda as AFRICOM’s headquarters. As part of AFRICOM’s 
relationship with the UPDF, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa 
now provided counterterrorism training to the UPDF, including training in 
“how to properly search a building occupied by terrorists”, as a classified US 
embassy cable put it.500
In the LRA bush camp in Garamba, the focus was still reportedly on peace. A 
Sudanese abductee who had been taken in December 2006 and given to 
Alfred “Record” Otim as a wife recounted that during her first few months 
with the LRA, Otim was always saying “we are coming out, we are coming 
out,” and that generally the LRA were excited about the peace agreement 
they were expecting.501 A Sudanese man who had been abducted said that 
during those early months of 2007, the LRA always listened to the news 
with everyone gathered around the radio and “whenever there is anything 
about the LRA on the radio, they start laughing.” When asked to clarify 
whether they were laughing because what they heard was good or bad, he 
497 L.Ploch. Congressional Research Service. "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa". 
Washington, D.C.: 2011. 
498 Menkhaus provides a summary of the criticism of AFRICOM, including the lack of consultation beyond the US inner military circle and 
clumsy communication of AFRICOM’s goals. He also engages with the more substantial issue of whether AFRICOM’s mission itself is 
questionable. K.Menkhaus, "False Start in AFRICOM", Security Policy 30, 1, 2009. Marchal argues that AFRICOM “will eventually militarize 
foreign policy, making it look increasingly imperial, and create its own opposition in Africa.” R.Marchal, "Warlordism and terrorism: how to 
obscure an already confusing crisis? The case of Somalia", International Affairs 83, 6, 2007.
499 Jendayi Frazer—at the time of AFRICOM’s establishment, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs—spelt out US interests in Africa 
in a 2009 article. Frazer wrote: “U.S. policy in Africa is not about love. It’s about advancing America’s core interests: promoting economic 
growth and development, combating terrorism, and fostering well-governed, stable countries”. J. E. Frazer, "Four Ways to Help Africa: The 
U.S. African Command should move from Germany to Liberia", The Wall Street Journal, 25/8/2009.
500 US Embassy Kampala. "07KAMPALA1172: Uganda: Roundup on Staffdel Smith and Kuiken visit”,17/7/2007.
501 Author (with translator) interview with Zande LRA-abductee, ‘wife’ of Alfred "Record" Otim. Yambio: 23/2/2009.
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said he did not know.502 In his first months with the LRA in early 2007 they 
had very little to eat: “Food in Garamba was not enough, we had to go and 
dig in the garden with child soldiers and in the evening, we still got very 
little food.” During that time, he was not aware that new guns had been 
delivered to the LRA camp.503  It is worth noting that much of the 
information of LRA activities during that time and after came from 
abductee testimony—both in my own fieldwork and in many of the reports 
written on the situation. Abductee testimony comes with its own 
challenges, as memories might be unclear or testimony might be changed, 
depending on who is asking questions. 
Meanwhile, the challenge of assembling the LRA in Owiny-Kibul and UPDF 
deployment, which had stalled the Juba Talks throughout 2006, remained 
unresolved. Officially, LRA fighters left in Eastern Equatoria were not 
allowed to cross the Nile. From their point of view, remaining east of the 
Nile was impossible because the UPDF had comprehensively deployed 
around the proposed assembly area and beyond. As the LRA and UPDF 
moved around in Eastern Equatoria, violence against civilians and clashes 
between LRA and UPDF continued. These were monitored to the best of its 
ability by a still understaffed and under-resourced CHMT. The CHMT 
established, however, that a range of actors were carrying out attacks, 
specifying that perpetrators were the LRA, the UPDF (often under the guise 
of the 105th battalion), and individual criminals and armed groups. Of other 
armed groups, remnants of the Equatorian Defence Forces (EDF) were most 
often mentioned. The EDF had been a sizeable Khartoum-aligned militia 
during the war. UN security staff considered Eastern Equatoria one of the 
most dangerous states in Southern Sudan at that time, describing it as a 
“network of insecurity”.504
How complex this network of insecurity was transpired over the coming 
months. Quite disconnected from the LRA and the UPDF, economic changes 
in the Juba Market were yet again creating insecurity for Eastern 
Equatoria’s citizens. Those who had previously held power in Juba were 
trying to stabilise their control over the market in a rapidly changing 
environment. While the CHMT was busy trying to pinpoint the perpetrators 
of specific attacks, dead bodies of Somalis were appearing in Juba, usually 
in strategic places like the road to the SAF barracks. It turned out that 
502 Author (with translator Zande/ English) interview with Sudanese abductee  who spent March 2008 - December 2008 with the LRA. 
Yambio: 23/2/2009.
503 Author (with translator Zande/ English) interview with Sudanese abductee  who spent March 2008 - December 2008 with the LRA. 
Yambio: 23/2/2009.
504 Personal email to author from International aid worker in Juba, 4/4/2007.
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Clement Wani Konga, who had been aligned with SAF during the war as 
the head of the Mundari militia and then became governor of Central 
Equatoria after the CPA, had been involved in hiring 12 Somalis to act as a 
link between northern traders in Juba and remnants of the EDF in Eastern 
Equatoria. They paid the EDF to act as mercenaries, ambushing vehicles on 
the road and again interrupting supplies from Uganda. When other Juba 
traders realised that the road ambushes were financed by Khartoum, the 
bodies of the Somalis involved started to appear in Juba.505
Despite the continued engagement of the Acholi community, the early 
months of 2007 were marked by the delegation’s reluctance to return to 
Juba. Otti continuously reiterated the LRA’s commitment to peace; 
confusion about the assembly and ongoing attacks continued. In the 
background, Acholi leaders and Chissano were working on finding a way to 
resume talks. On March 2, Chissano met Kony in DRC, with the UN rather 
than GoSS providing logistics. He was on a tour of the capitals of the region 
to drum up continued enthusiasm for the next round of talks. US 
documents say that Kampala was still reluctant to resume, although Machar 
had said to US representatives that talks would start again on March 12.506 
Both Chissano and Machar were pushing for further international 
engagement, including AU observers for the CHMT and observers from 
Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa and Kenya. Machar emphasised in 
talks with US representatives that 14 countries were now contributing to 
the UN-administered Juba Initiative Fund (JIF), with three European 
countries and the GoU putting money towards humanitarian assistance to 
the assembly areas.507 Yet nothing happened.
From March 1 to 4, 2007, a group of Acholi representatives gathered in 
Juba for a GoSS-facilitated peace conference. No LRA representative was 
present. In a final document, those attending recommended that talks 
resume in Juba, with participants’ security assured. The list of 
recommendations reads like a commentary on the flaws in the Juba Talks. 
The Acholi representatives recommended that the CoH be upheld. They 
elaborated that more countries, the UN, the AU, the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Community should 
join the mediation team, and that “women and other interest groups” 
ought to be included. Further, “the Chief Mediator should define the roles 
and responsibilities of NGOs, groups and individuals invited to facilitate, 
505 Author interview with International security staff. Juba: 1/2/2008. I have since heard this story told again in a similar way by a former 
SPLA soldier. 
506 US Embassy Khartoum. "07KHARTOUM351: UN Envoy meets with LRA chief Kony; peace talks may resume", 3/5/2007.
507 I US Embassy Khartoum. "07KHARTOUM351: UN Envoy meets with LRA chief Kony; peace talks may resume", 3/5/2007.
164
observe or participate in the Peace Talks.” The resolution further stated 
that those “involved in the peace process should be enhanced through 
training and technical assistance”, and that “the Secretariat be 
strengthened and staffed with competent, professional and accountable 
personnel to provide effective and equitable services and equal treatment 
to the parties”.508
Managing the Impasse
From the outside, it seemed as if things had largely stalled—until a press 
release from IKV Pax Christi on April 11. Towards the end of 2006, IKV Pax 
Christi had withdrawn entirely from its role in the mediation team. It had 
been instrumental in bringing about the talks, having understood its 
“collaboration with the GoSS” as one in which “Pax Christi—in the persons 
of Dr Onek, Professor Assefa and Dr Simonse—was to be responsible for the 
mediation of the peace talks while GoSS would be the host,” says an article 
written by various Pax Christi representatives.509 However, as the Juba Talks 
unfolded in 2006 it had become clear that the role of the mediator was 
fully occupied by Machar; Professor Assefa had effectively been sidelined. 
When the peace process stalled due to the LRA’s lack of trust in the security 
of their troops, and by extension in the mediator, IKV Pax Christi stepped 
back onto the scene, albeit covertly in what they called a “back-channel 
process”.510  Having met with Museveni, who agreed that such a process 
would be helpful and mandated his brother Salim Saleh to represent the 
GoU, Pax Christi organised a meeting from March 31 to April 6 between 
representatives of the LRA/M and the GoU in Mombasa, Kenya.511 The LRA/
M were represented by a selection of their delegates: Ayena, Ojul, Okirot 
and Achama. Salim Saleh, Minister of State for Microfinance, came as the 
main negotiator for the GoU. Sam Kagoda, Permanent Secretary for 
Internal Affairs and a member of the GoU delegation in Juba, accompanied 
Saleh. Also present for the GoU were Ambassador Joseph Ocwet (who had 
been instrumental in helping Betty Bigombe during her first attempt at 
peace), and Captain Ruhinda Maguru, his assistant. 
508 Acholi Peace Conference, "Resolution from the Acholi Peace Conference", Juba: 4/3/2007.
509 S.Simonse, W. Verkoren, and G.Junne, "NGO Involvement in the Juba peace talks: the role and dilemmas of IKV Pax Christi", in The 
Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T.Allen and K.Vlassenroot. London/ New York: Zed Books, 2010, p.232.
510 S.Simonse, W. Verkoren, and G.Junne, "NGO Involvement in the Juba peace talks: the role and dilemmas of IKV Pax Christi", in The 
Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T.Allen and K.Vlassenroot. London/ New York: Zed Books, 2010, p.233.
511 IKV Pax Christi, "Mombasa consultations between the government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance army may unblock Juba 
negotiations",  11/4/2007.
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Pax Christi’s motivation for the meeting was to revive the stalled peace talks 
by providing an alternative communication channel without the 
interference of the big international players. With Juba having proven an 
unstable and pressured place thanks to the significant attention the process 
had received, taking actors to a different location was seen as a good way 
to break the impasse. Pax Christi describe this initiative not as a move to 
replace the Juba process, but to help it along by inserting the 
outcomes of the back-channel process. The Mombasa-Nairobi talks 
provided a safe space away from political pressures and public 
scrutiny. This mattered because the atmosphere in the Juba process 
had become highly charged and adversarial owing to intense 
media attention and the larger number of parties involved, each 
with its own interest.512  
The inclusion of Saleh, who had been involved both in previous military 
offensives against the LRA as well as peace negotiations with them, seemed 
to guarantee a buy-in from Museveni while allowing the LRA/M to engage 
with an actor they knew. To my mind it was yet another manifestation of 
how all conflict actors brought baggage with them, but that did not 
necessarily mean that it could not be used to connect with each other. With 
Saleh becoming a significant player at this point, it became clear how 
intricate the broader conflict system was in which the actors from the LRA, 
LRM and GoU were tightly linked. 
As if to prove the point, Otti had sanctioned the meeting with Saleh and 
reportedly decreed who should attend for the LRA/M—although some 
delegates said that those attending had chosen that it would only be them 
and kept the meeting secret from everyone else. It is also not clear whether 
all parties agreed that the meeting ought to be kept private. 
Publishing a press release right after the meeting—although whether all 
attending parties sanctioned the publicity remains contested—Pax Christi 
announced:
significant agreements between the delegates were reached on 
extending the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement as well as on 
addressing blockages in its implementation; on resolving the 
outstanding issues of contention in agenda item no. 2 (called 
“Comprehensive Solutions”); and on specific provisions and 
mechanisms for agenda item no. 3, reconciliation and 
accountability in the war torn communities of northern and 
eastern Uganda. The Parties agreed that the only major issues left 
for the negotiations would be agenda item no. 4, Demobilization, 
Disarmament and Reintegration and agenda item no. 5, Formal 
Cease Fire.
512 S.Simonse, W. Verkoren, and G.Junne, "NGO Involvement in the Juba peace talks: the role and dilemmas of IKV Pax Christi", in The 
Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T.Allen and K.Vlassenroot. London/ New York: Zed Books, 2010, p.233.
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Crucially, the press release stated that the meeting had resolved “the East 
Bank Assembly Point for the LRA combatants” (i.e. Owiny-Kibul), a 
major obstacle in the implementation of the Cessation of 
Hostilities Agreement… and a real danger to the peace process… 
The location, according to LRA was unsafe because of the presence 
of UPDF in the vicinity and because of land mines. LRA combatants 
on the East Bank have repeatedly been accused of attacks on 
civilians that had in fact been carried out by members of Sudanese 
armed groups still active on the East Bank. The agreement 
negotiated by General Saleh takes away a stumbling block for 
progress in the negotiations by allowing LRA fighters that were 
supposed to assemble in Owiny-ki-Bul to move to the camp in Ri-
Kwangba and join the rest of the LRA forces that are supposed to 
assemble there. This agreement meets the express request of the 
LRA leadership.513
Pax Christi further outlined that significant process had been made on 
Agenda 2, the comprehensive political solutions to the war, by agreeing on 
measures to reinforce constitutional provisions ensuring equal 
opportunity and affirmative action for northern and eastern 
Ugandans; mechanisms, complementary to the Peace Recovery and 
Development Programme that counteract siphoning of availed 
funds to governmental and non-governmental coordination 
structures and empower the war-affected citizens to play an active 
role in their own rehabilitation and development.514  
On Agenda 3, 
the two parties agreed that traditional institutions such as Mato 
Oput, Culo Kwor, Kayo Cuk, etc. should play a prominent role in 
the reconciliation of war-affected individuals and communities. In 
addition to these traditional mechanisms and underscoring the 
unacceptability of impunity for crimes against humanity, 
alternative justice systems will be put in place that will address 
accountability and enable victims to seek justice for grievances. To 
address grievances and historical conflicts at the national level the 
parties committed themselves to establish special forums. The 
Government of Uganda has agreed to ask Parliament to enact 
legislation that recognises traditional and alternative justice 
mechanisms as key elements in dealing with accountability for the 
offences committed during the war. Once the justice systems are 
effectively in place the Government of Uganda will approach the 
International Criminal Court regarding the indictments against the 
four leaders of the LRA.515
513 KV Pax Christi, "Mombasa consultations between the government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance army may unblock Juba 
negotiations",  11/4/2007.
514 KV Pax Christi, "Mombasa consultations between the government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance army may unblock Juba 
negotiations",  11/4/2007.
515 KV Pax Christi, "Mombasa consultations between the government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance army may unblock Juba 
negotiations",  11/4/2007.
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A few days after the meeting in Mombasa concluded, the delegation, 
Special Envoy Chissano and the LRA high command met in Nabanga from 
April 13-14 to make the most of the new momentum. With both parties 
signing the “Ri-Kwangba Communique”, the LRA leadership agreed to 
restart the talks on April 26, 2007 and the GoU agreed to extend the CoH 
until the end of June.516  With an addendum signed in Ri-Kwangba, the 
renewed CoH abandoned the idea of two assembly points and instead 
allowed for an assembly in Ri-Kwangba only, giving the LRA forces six 
weeks to arrive there.517 
With the restart of the talks, a different delegation returned to Juba: Some 
old members were disgruntled that they had been excluded from the 
Mombasa meeting, or unhappy that their protest against the conditions 
they had experienced in Juba had remained ineffective. Others were keen 
to continue the talks. Some did not return at all, having been told that they 
were no longer part of the delegation, or withdrawing from a process they 
did not see as credible. 
To Pax Christi’s great astonishment, however, the continuing Juba Talks did 
not build on what had been agreed on in Mombasa.518  This was not 
necessarily surprising, considering that so far in the Juba Talks, agreements 
on paper had remained rather disconnected from how the actors behaved 
in the process and what they aimed to achieve. Much like previous signed 
agreements, the Mombasa agreement had regulated the process, rather 
than decisively moving agreements on issues forward.
Instead of building on a solid signed agreement, the process became 
considerably more tense, including between Pax Christi and UN 
representatives, who were angry about the separate initiative. Established 
LRA/M delegates felt excluded and eyed new arrivals with suspicion. James 
Obita had joined the talks in Juba properly for the first time, Santa Okot—
formerly an MP for the northern Ugandan district Pader and described by 
the Daily Monitor as “a former NRM die-hard in the Acholi sub region”519—
was now an LRA/M delegate, and David Nykorech Matsanga emerged as an 
LRA/M representative. 
516 Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/ Movement, “Ri-Kwangba Communique”, Ri-Kwangba: 
14/4/2007.
517 Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/ Movement, “Cessation of Hostilities Agreement Addendum 
3”, Ri-Kwangba: 14/4/2007.
518 S.Simonse, W. Verkoren, and G.Junne, "NGO Involvement in the Juba peace talks: the role and dilemmas of IKV Pax Christi", in The 
Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T.Allen and K.Vlassenroot. London/ New York: Zed Books, 2010, p.236.
519 C.Mwanguhya  Mpagi, "Uganda: Changing Faces of Santa Okot", The Daily Monitor, 2/5/2007.
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The official permission to abandon the endeavour to assemble in Owiny-
Kibul and allow fighters to cross the Nile to join the rest of the group in Ri-
Kwangba was broadly seen as the best way to tackle the stalemate that had 
been created through the issues regarding the assembly. The LRA was now 
crossing the Nile with official permission. To cross the river the LRA used 
empty jerry cans, to which they tied poles to pull themselves across the 
water. Sudanese abductees, such as a young woman from Parajok who had 
been abducted in January 2007 on her way back from Maridi and whom I 
interviewed in Yambio in early 2009, were told that the LRA was now 
leaving Owiny-Kibul to go directly to Garamba Park. 520
The Talks Continue
In Juba, the work continued. Agenda Item 2 on Comprehensive Political 
Solutions was signed on May 2, 2007, soon after the meeting in Nabanga.521 
However, it took until June 1, 2007, for the Juba Talks to officially restart 
amidst remaining confusion over trust, location, mediation and assembly. 
The reopening ceremony was held in Juba Raha Hotel, and was altogether 
more humble than the first opening just under a year earlier. Chissano 
listened with a stony expression as a row of speakers, including the GoU, 
listed the many achievements of the Juba Talks of the past few months and 
the LRA/M read out a long list of unaccomplished items and grievances. 
Representatives of the AU, who had been brought in to strengthen the 
process, were in the audience. From the point of view of the LRA/M 
delegates and some of the mediation team, the AU representatives were 
necessary to ensure Machar’s impartiality as a mediator. The Juba Talks had 
become a bona fide regional process, which on the one hand allowed for 
their continuation, but on the other made it more difficult to navigate the 
different interests. After the ceremony, a delegation of Ugandan women 
demonstrated in the Juba Raha grounds, holding up placards that thanked 
the mediator and demanded peace. The day after, the delegates attended a 
workshop held by the International Centre on Transitional Justice on 
attitudes to justice and accountability in preparation for negotiations on 
Agenda 3.
520 Author (with translator) interview with Sudanese LRA abductee from Parajok. Yambio: 23/2/2009.
521 Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/ Movement, “Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions”, Juba: 
2/5/2007.
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The month of June 2007 brought significant progress on Agenda 3, with 
parties agreeing that both formal national justice as well as informal local 
justice would be used to handle crimes committed during the war. A 
parallel development, however, caused a stir in the delegation: on June 10, 
2007, representatives of GoSS, the GoU and the DRC government met in 
Juba to work on the military “Plan B”—a military collaboration between 
the three countries against the LRA.522 Agenda Item 3 was signed on June 
29.523  Part of the agreement was that both delegations would consult with 
people in Uganda on their expectations of a process of justice and 
accountability and on the agreed comprehensive political solutions. These 
consultations were also to include meetings with legal experts in Kampala 
to set up new justice mechanisms—namely a new Special Division of the 
Ugandan High Court—that would comply with Juba agreements while 
being acceptable to Uganda and the ICC. However, since no agreement 
could be reached on conducting the consultations jointly, the two 
delegations departed separately. For some of the LRA/M delegates, the 
consultations provided their first opportunity to return to Uganda in years
—or in some cases, in decades.
Back in Nabanga, Otti shared his thoughts about the process so far. 
Agreeing to a reconciliation process with the local community that would 
sort out access to gardens and beehives, he said: 
I think I will be here for another year. We need to be peaceful, also 
peaceful with my neighbours. They need to understand about LRA 
and I need to understand about them, so we can all have a good 
life. Sometimes it is hard for us because we don’t know if we can 
trust. But to get to peace also means to learn to trust. To get to 
peace also means to understand when we need to stop war.524
A few days later, the LRA agreed with local residents on modalities to share 
the honey harvest from the Nabanga beehives.525 Back in Juba, other issues 
that required new management strategies were settled. After initial 
mismanagement problems emerged in the handling of the Juba Initiative 
Fund (JIF) fund—which was now also supported by the governments of 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Canada and the UK—accounting firm KPMG was 
hired in mid-2007 to manage the funds.526  It had become clear that the 
financial management of the Juba Talks had left large accountability gaps.  
522 Fieldnotes, Juba: 10/6/2007.
523 Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/ Movement, “Agreement on Accountability and 
Reconciliation”, Juba: 29/6/2007. 
524 Author interview with Vincent Otti, Ri-Kwangba: 13/7/2007.
525 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 15/7/2007.
526 US Embassy Kampala"07KAMPALA1419: Senator Feingold discusses northern Ugandan issues ", September 2007.
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Up until mid-2007, the US government had largely stayed in the 
background, although the Juba Talks had received much attention from US 
advocacy groups—namely Invisible Children, Resolve and the Enough! 
Project—lobbying for a stronger US role. Despite acknowledging the US’s 
crucial behind-the-scenes role in the Juba Talks, the GoU had advised the US 
against sending a Special Envoy to the talks. The GoU argued it “would 
disrupt the peace process and invite unwanted propaganda and accusations 
from the Khartoum government” and prompt “Khartoum to step up its 
assistance to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which could scuttle progress 
made to date”, according to a confidential US embassy cable. By contrast, 
Gulu RDC Ochora reportedly told the US that since neither Machar nor 
Chissano had sufficient control over the LRA, “a U.S. envoy to Juba would 
boost the confidence of the northern Uganda population and provide an 
authoritative voice to keep both parties committed to the talks.”527 
Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin had written to President Bush on June 
14, expressing his desire for a US Special Envoy to northern Uganda. 
Senator Feingold had been working closely with both Resolve and Invisible 
Children who had through him lobbied for a US presence at the negotiation 
table in Juba. On July 26, 2007, the State Department responded to 
Feingold’s request: 
Though President Chissano and other Ugandan leaders and 
northern Ugandans in regional government and civil society have 
quietly discouraged the United States from playing a more visible 
role as the current mediation proceeds, we believe the U.S. must 
continue to be active in seeking solutions to the situation in 
Uganda. Therefore, the Department is appointing a Senior Advisor 
on Conflict in Africa, who will, as an immediate priority, primarily 
focus on the conflict in northern Uganda. We plan to place 
Timothy Shortley, currently with the NSC’s [National Security 
Council] Africa Office, into that position.528
Thus in July 2007, Tim Shortley, former national security operative and now 
Special Conflict Advisor on the Great Lakes Region to the US Undersecretary 
of State on African Affairs, arrived in Juba. One of his first actions was to 
ask the head of the CHMT, General Deng, to arrange a meeting with DRC 
President Kabila. The delegates largely presumed that this was to seek 
further support for military action after “Plan B” discussions at the June 
meeting. Under the close watch of delegates, Shortley then travelled to 
Uganda to instruct a number of chiefs to come to Ri-Kwangba. A 
confidential US embassy cable reported that during Shortley’s visit to 
Uganda he 
527 US Embassy Kampala"07KAMPALA1419: Senator Feingold discusses northern Ugandan issues ", September 2007.
528 United States Department of State. J.T. Bergner (Assistant Secretary Legislative Affairs, "Letter to Senator Feingold of Wisconsin",  
Washington, D.C.: 26/7/2007.
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encountered a consistent request for US support in keeping both 
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda 
(GOU) to the agenda and moving forward, as well as a close eye on 
Khartoum. There is fear that the longer the Juba talks go on the 
greater the risk of support of the LR by Khartoum. Further, there 
was wide concern that the northern Ugandan diaspora 
representing the LRA at the Juba talks is not representative of the 
Acholi people (nor other northern ethnic groups), and that they 
are pursuing their own political agenda potentially jeopardizing 
the peace process.529  
Delegates were suspicious of Shortley’s motives. When they heard that he 
had arranged with Ugandan leaders to travel to Ri-Kwangba, they 
intervened to insist that such a trip by leaders from northern Uganda would 
need to be “run by Vincent first”. When Otti was told that the US were 
arranging a visit of traditional leaders, he reportedly laughed and, as one 
delegate explained, “finally said let them come”. Delegates assumed that 
Otti had asked Kony to join the meeting, but “Kony was confused,” said 
delegates, because the meeting had no clear agenda and the scheduling 
before the consultation left him “confused what the meeting was all 
about”.530 
On his way to the meeting with the traditional leaders, Kony is said to have 
realised that LRA troops “had been moved without his agreement”, 
explained one former delegate, “and during the meeting there were 
skirmishes outside, of people with guns who wanted to come in.” He said it 
was presumably Otti’s allies wanting to participate in the meeting. Kony 
reportedly distrusted the situation because Otti had brought a large 
number of people to the meeting.531 One of the leaders from Uganda who 
attended was the Paramount Chief of the Madi, Ronald Iya, who describes 
staying in Garamba for eight days, with Kony arriving on day four. Kony 
stressed that war would continue if talks failed. Iya wrote: “It was hard to 
take some of the things he said seriously. What I saw from my time with the 
LRA commanders was that the late Vincent Otti was the force behind the 
peace talks.”532 LRA/M delegates said that after the meeting Kony is said to 
have gone back to his base “with distrust because he was not sure where 
and why the meeting was held”.533 
529 US Embassy Kampala. "07KAMPALA1360: Africa bureau senior advisor on conflict resolution travels to northern Uganda “, 27/8/2007.
530 Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 11/9/2009.
531 Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 11/9/2009.
532 R.Iya, "Encountering Kony: A Madi perspective", in The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T.Allen and K.Vlassenroot. 
London/ New York: Zed Books, 2010, p.179.
533 Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 11/11/2009.
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Leadership Struggle
The GoU started its community consultations in Uganda on accountability 
and reconciliation with a three-day meeting in Gulu from August 20 to 22. 
Attending the meeting were community leaders, IDP delegates, 
spokespeople for youth and women, and representatives of LRA victims. 
Broadly speaking, the consulted community seemed to be in favour of a 
combined legal system that would allow so-called traditional systems and 
formal legal procedures to augment each other. In addition to support for 
justice, including against the LRA leadership, that would consider victim’s 
views, a US observer reported that there was “a strong desire for a truth 
telling process that includes UPDF”.534  Both the northern Ugandan leaders 
and the delegates stressed how much northern Uganda had changed thanks 
to the Juba Talks. UNHCR was broadcasting radio messages about 
education, health and security in an effort to encourage IDPs to leave the 
camps and return to their homes. With security stable and peace seemingly 
around the corner, life was notably transformed—an impression that was in 
stark contrast with Museveni’s message to the US. On August 28, Museveni 
told US Senator Feingold that he had warned President Kabila that if the 
peace talks should fail, he ought to allow Ugandan military operations on 
Congolese territory, or else team up with another military partner—he 
suggested France—to avoid the DRC becoming “a terrorist holiday 
centre”.535
The LRA/M’s consultations were delayed until October. Not everyone viewed 
the separate consultations positively: with two delegations gathering input 
from affected populations, it was seen as likely, as one of the original 
facilitators of the talks said, that “the results of both consultations may 
require a fresh round of negotiations to reconcile the divergent results.”536 
Yet in reality, the message that seemed to come out of both sets of 
consultations seemed pretty clear: the LRA should sign a deal and could 
then come home. In Acholiland, more so than in other districts visited, the 
mood generally seemed to be against the ICC, but there seemed to be 
broad agreement that legal procedures could and ought to happen in 
Uganda. A US summary of the findings of the GoU cosultations states that 
support for a “a combination of traditional systems and the formal legal 
system to achieve accountability and reconciliation” was obvious as 
“neither will be satisfactory separately. This, it was suggested included 
534 US Embassy Kampala, "07KAMPALA1351 (for official use only): Northern Uganda notes: (Aug 11 - Aug 24, 2007)”, 24/8/2007.
535 US Embassy Kampala, "03 KAMPALA 001426 (Confidential): Senator Feingold raises regional and domestic issues with Ugandan 
President”, 9/11/2007.
536 Personal email to author from S.Simonse, IKV Pax Christi. 10/10/2007.
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support to amend national laws in a way that would allow the ICC to back 
off.537
Reports from other consultations and surveys conducted at around the 
same time show broadly similar sentiments. A joint survey by Berkeley and 
Tulane Universities and the International Center for Transitional justice 
found that 90 per cent of respondents believed peace could be achieved 
“through dialogue with the LRA”, 86 per cent said peace could come 
through “pardoning the LRA for their crimes”. Seventy per cent said that 
those who had committed crimes needed to be held accountable, with 50 
wanting to hold the LRA leadership to account and 48 per cent wanting to 
see “all of the LRA” prosecuted. Fifty-five per cent wanted to see the UPDF 
on trial, with 70 per cent stating that the UPDF had committed human 
rights abuses. Twenty-nine per cent identified the ICC as the most 
appropriate justice mechanism; 28 per cent mentioned the Ugandan courts. 
20 per cent saw the Amnesty Commission as providing the most appropriate 
mechanisms.538 
However, other reports on separate sets of consultations suggest that public 
opinion was more divided on what role exactly the ICC might play. Arguing 
that the ICC had investigated in a one-sided manner, a report on 
consultations held by a range of women’s groups nonetheless supported 
the ICC because it provided “better provisions for the rights of the accused 
and role of Defence Counsel than currently available under domestic law in 
Uganda”.539 
Tensions between the two sets of consultations thus did not turn out to be 
a major issue, but other problems emerged. Although the consultations 
allowed some LRA/M delegates to visit family they had not seen in years, 
delegates eyed each other suspiciously while in Uganda. It later emerged 
that Ojul and Achama had accepted a personal invitation by Museveni to 
State House without telling the other delegates; it was unclear what they 
had discussed with Museveni. Delegates further observed a steady presence 
at the various consultations of US advisor Shortley, who seemed to 
particularly court one of the younger delegates who supposedly drew a 
map for him of what exactly Ri-Kwangba looked like. One delegate later 
537 US Embassy Kampala, "07KAMPALA1351 (for official use only): Northern Uganda notes: (Aug 11 - Aug 24, 2007)”, 24/8/2007.
538 Pham, P, P.Vinck, E.Stover, A.Moss, M.Wierda and R.Baily. “When the war ends: A populations-based survey on attitudes about peace, 
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commented that these developments “caused a great rift of trust in the 
delegation”.540 
On September 5, Assistant Secretary of State Frazer introduced Shortley to 
President Museveni. In the confidential meeting, Museveni was generally 
dismissive of the peace process, calling it a “circus”, according to a 
confidential US memo, and stating that the LRA was being “pampered”, 
that Kony was a “trickster”, and that the talks were a way for the LRA to 
reorganise. He stated that for Kony the ICC was only problematic if “he did 
not want peace”. He disputed that the process was strengthened by the 
presence of Uganda MPs. According to the confidential US embassy memo, 
Museveni 
downplayed the role of local politicians in the process. He 
described his own Government’s parallel track as part of the 
foolery and lamented that fools have a lot of audiences… 
Museveni said that he himself participated in the “foolery” and 
has taken Vincent Otti’s telephone calls and sent the LRA cows for 
Christmas.
He also stressed that he had taken care of Kony’s parents and, should a deal 
be signed, Kony “could live anywhere in Uganda where he had not 
committed atrocities”. Frazer expressed her support for Museveni’s efforts 
to “to secure Kabila’s cooperation” to prepare a military response to the 
LRA.541  On September 8, 2007, Presidents Kabila and Museveni met in 
Arusha, Tanzania. They signed an agreement of cooperation, which 
included a clause on joint efforts to remove the LRA from eastern DRC. The 
agreement stipulated that the LRA had to leave Garamba by the end of 
December 2007 or else they would face joint military action. The LRA 
responded with a warning of renewed attacks.542 
In a write-up on the peace talks by some former delegates, the authors are 
very direct in accusing the GoU and the US government of using the 
consultation period
to try and compromise some members of the LRA/M peace team. 
Of particular concern were secret meetings that Martin Ojul, and 
Lieutenant Colonel Ray Achama [then still a member of the CHMT] 
held with President Museveni, with Internal Affairs minister 
Ruhakana Rugunda (leader of the government delegation), and 
with Mr. Timothy Shortley in Kampala between the 10th and the 
16th November 2007 when the two made an unexplained break 
from consultation in northern Uganda.
540 Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 11/11/2009.
541 US Embassy Kampala. "07KAMPALA1449 (Classified Secret): Uganda: A/S Frazier discusses LRA, Congo, and Somalia with President 
Museveni”, 14/9/2007.
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Yet again, members of the 5-man LRA/M delegation that held a 
secret meeting in Mombasa with General Salim Saleh in March/
April 2007, this time secretly met in Kampala with the General 
during the consultation exercise.543
On October 1, 2007, the US officially launched AFRICOM as a subcommand 
of the US European Command.544  This followed Frazer’s Kampala visit. 
While Frazer had expressed continued support for the Juba Talks, she had 
also reiterated that the process needed to now show swift success, 
suggesting to the LRA/M’s dismay that a timeline ought to be agreed, since 
otherwise the US would publicly support regional military action to “mop 
up the LRA”. In preparation, US officials were already lobbying for UN 
support for a military strike involving regional forces.545 
While the local consultations on justice and accountability were going on, 
the LRA in Garamba was increasingly difficult to reach on the phone. Otti’s 
silence was particularly unusual, considering he had been a vocal 
communicator for the LRA during the entire Juba process and had been a 
regular caller to northern Ugandan radio station Mega FM to have his voice 
heard. The last time Otti answered a phone call from me was in late 
September 2007. In late October, the delegation spread the news that Otti 
was ill and not able to talk on the phone. With weeks passing by and no 
word from Otti, suspicions about his well-being grew. On October 2, the 
man considered the third highest-ranking commander in the LRA, Patrick 
Opio Makasi, surrendered to MONUC forces. He was handed over first to 
Congolese and then to Ugandan authorities. He reportedly informed the 
authorities that, as it was phrased in a private meeting by US officials, 
“Kony had plans to break his troops into four task forces to abduct up to 
500 Congolese girls from the Garamba area, begin new attacks in West Nile, 
Uganda, send an advance team to CAR to take up a new base of operation 
and to pick-up arms buried in a cache in southern Sudan.”546  Makasi was 
granted amnesty on November 1. 
That same day, the LRA/M delegation arrived in Kampala to meet with 
Museveni two days later. The meeting went ahead without any major 
protocol or handshaking incidents, yet the outcome was predictable. 
543 LRA/M Peace Team, "Juba Peace Talks: The Record of Sabotage by the Government of Uganda; The Reasons General Joseph Kony 
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Museveni stressed that the LRA needed to sign a deal and would be 
welcome to return to Uganda. The delegates asked for the GoU’s support to 
have the ICC warrants lifted. Both parties signed an agreement to again 
extend the CoH, this time to the end of January 2008. In a donor briefing in 
Kampala on December 4, Ojul said that the LRA would travel to Juba the 
following week to meet with Machar. He also reiterated the LRA/M’s official 
message on Otti: that he was under house arrest—it was implied that there 
had been some wrongdoing by Otti. However, in conversations with US 
embassy staff in Kampala, Achama said, “Ojul knows Otti is dead, but Ojul 
cannot contradict Kony, whom he fears intensely.”547  On November 17, 
Uganda’s notorious tabloid newspaper Red Pepper pitched in with its own 
version of what had happened to Otti: “Kony eats Otti’s penis” was the 
attention-grabbing headline548—a headline that seemed important enough 
to be communicated back by US embassy staff in Kampala to their 
Washington, DC, superiors in a confidential cable: 
In Garamba, rituals were undertaken with Otti’s body parts… with 
the intent of containing Otti’s ghost. Kony, as executioner, has 
reason to fear retribution by Otti’s reincarnated spirit… 
The “Red Pepper” specializes in sensationalist stories, and often 
(usually) pushes the boundaries of accepted journalistic practice. 
However, the paper does have sources in the Ugandan security/
military establishment. Kony’s history of using ritual and claims of 
contact with spirit mediums also lends some credence to the 
story.549 
The delegates remained adamant that Otti was alive but under arrest. 
When northern leaders requested that Otti call Mega FM as a sign of life—
otherwise they would not travel to Ri-Kwangba to conclude consultations—
Kony reportedly called Gulu District Chairman Mao to state again that Otti 
was under arrest, but not dead.550 
From November 23 to 25, Kampala hosted the summit for Commonwealth 
Heads Government and Ministers (CHOGM). It was preceded by much 
speculation in the press that Museveni wanted the LRA issue off the table 
by the time the dignitaries arrived. In the end, the focus lay elsewhere.
In the evening of December 8, 2007, my phone rang. It was one of the 
former LRA/M delegates. I had last seen him in the LRA camp in Ri-Kwangba 
in September 2006. He was calling from a Ugandan number and was 
547 US Embassy Kampala, "07KAMPALA1894 (Confidential): LRA Peace Process Update", 17/12/2007.
548 Red Pepper, "Kony eats Otti's penis”, 17/11/2007.
549 US Embassy Kampala, "07KAMPALA1853 (classified): Northern Uganda notes (November 3 - 30)”, 7/12/2007.
550 US Embassy Kampala, "07KAMPALA1853 (classified): Northern Uganda notes (November 3 - 30)”, 7/12/2007.
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shouting: “Vincent is dead, Vincent is dead.” Having calmed down a bit, he 
explained that after Kony had killed Otti, he and others had escaped from 
the bush through the DRC and that they were about to bring hundreds of 
other fighters out of the bush who had been part of Otti’s group. He told 
me that I needed to come and meet him in Kinshasa, bring a camera and 
film how a group of LRA would leave the bush, “hundreds of them”. Then 
the connection was cut off. I called back; the phone just kept ringing.551  I 
later learned that he, along with others, had reached MONUC peacekeepers 
on November 18 and had confirmed that Otti, along with some of his 
associates, had been killed.552
Otti’s death remained an increasingly credible rumour until early January 
2008, when first Kony and then Machar confirmed Otti’s death, as well as 
the deaths of his close allies Ben Achellam and Alfred “Record” Otim. They 
had been shot dead on Kony’s orders in early October 2007, probably on 
October 2. The story of what had happened transpired with many facets 
and variations. Kony had started to distrust Otti and had believed that he 
had been planning his assassination. Kony had suspected—probably 
correctly—that Otti was prepared to sign a deal even if Kony refused. Otti 
had reportedly lost trust in Kony to follow through with the peacetalks. 
Maybe he received enticing offers from various sources—options given to 
me were Museveni or Machar (by a close ally of Machar)—along the lines 
that if he helped to get Kony out of the bush or to kill him, Otti’s return to 
civilian life would be smoothly facilitated. Hence Kony lost faith in the 
commitment to the group of his number two. 
“Vincent was always the one communicating, so that led to distrust,” one 
delegate explained. His version was that Otti had been working for the GoU 
and they had promised to pay him if he eliminated Kony.553 A high-ranking 
SPLA intelligence officer gave the explanation that Machar—under internal 
political pressure to bring the talks to a close—had offered Otti money and 
a safe haven in return for eliminating Kony and securing a peace deal.554 
One delegate explained that Kony had learned that funds had been 
distributed among delegates for the consultations, but none of these found 
their way back to him or were spent on the consultations. He was said to 
have concluded that Otti and the delegation were working behind his back. 
The memory of the surprise visit by the Ugandan traditional leaders, of 
which he had been informed so late, as well as of the Mombasa meeting, of 
551 Fieldnotes (phone conversations), Cologne: 8/12/2007.
552 US Embassy Kampala, "07KAMPALA1853 (classified): Northern Uganda notes (November 3 - 30)”, 7/12/2007.
553 Fieldnotes, Juba: 2/2/2008.
554 Author interview with SPLA intelligence officer. Juba: 1/3/2009.
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which he seems to have had less knowledge than was presumed, seemed to 
him to confirm that he was being undermined.555 
The Mombasa meeting was regularly mentioned as having caused a rift in 
the leadership. Another delegate explained that Otti alone had sanctioned 
the meeting, without consulting Kony; it had been rumoured that the LRA/
M delegates in attendance had received 60,000 Ugandan shillings from 
Salim Saleh to hand to Otti in exchange for bringing down Kony.556  Most 
people agreed that the Mombasa meeting had created great confusion and 
distrust. UN staff working on the Juba Talks were furious that Pax Christi 
had taken their initiative too far without consulting the official facilitators. 
IKV Pax Christi’s argument that the Mombasa meeting broke the impasse 
and produced a set of superior agreements to those eventually signed is 
also valid.557  From Pax Christi’s perspective, the trust established between 
delegations thanks to the Mombasa meeting was evident, and the 
possibility that it had created internal distrust rather vague. However, when 
Machar met again with Simonse on an unrelated matter in June 2008, the 
Vice-President greeted Simonse—to the latter’s great surprise—as the man 
responsible for Otti’s murder because of the Mombasa meeting.558 
Many different stories circulated about how exactly Otti was killed. One 
delegate said that he knew Otti had pleaded for his life. One story, relayed 
much later from within the LRA to U.N. security, was that Kony had 
harboured suspicions against Otti and had Otti’s hut—his tukul—searched 
when he was out. When Otti returned sooner than anticipated, there was a 
quick shootout. “There was no pleading, no begging for his life, and no 
grilling of genitals,” said UN security, referring to the headline in the Red 
Pepper. “The Ugandan press has done everything possible to throw a 
spanner in the peace process.”559  The LRA’s third-in-command, Makasi, told 
the Ugandan press after his escape that Kony had asked Otti for a meeting 
and had him arrested. Makasi said that he himself had been tipped off that 
he would also be arrested, and had managed to flee with a group of 
people. 
A woman from Maridi who was Record Otim’s wife recounted how Kony 
had come or sent someone to the place where she was staying with Otim 
and “asked for his top commanders Otti, Otim, Achellam and one more to 
555 Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 11/11/2009.
556 Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 14/3/2008.
557 S.Simonse, W. Verkoren, and G.Junne, "NGO Involvement in the Juba peace talks: the role and dilemmas of IKV Pax Christi", in The 
Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T.Allen and K.Vlassenroot. London/ New York: Zed Books, 2010, p.235.
558 Fieldnotes, Juba: 5/6/2008.
559 Author interview with UN security officer. Juba: 1/2/2008.
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come for meeting”. Otim left her behind when he went for the meeting 
because she was pregnant. When Otti, travelling from his base in Garamba 
One, arrived at Kony’s place (which was called Garamba Two), Kony was not 
there. Otti reportedly asked the bodyguards, “Where is the big man?” He 
was then arrested and all four “were taken to the bush and shot to death, 
their guards also…Otti’s guards were also killed.” Record Otim’s wife only 
came to know that her husband had been killed because people had heard 
gunshots and told her about it. Kony then asked to divide the “property of 
the people shot amongst others, including the wives”, so she was given to a 
new husband.560  When asked for the reason why her husband was killed, 
she said she did not know the reason exactly. She said what she knew was 
that Otim was always saying “there would be peace, but Kony did not want 
peace, that they would get peace and Otti wanted out and Kony was not 
ready to come out,” but her husband did not give her a reason why.561 
Those who had been in Otti’s camp had reportedly been either shot dead or 
had been disarmed and were in a gloomy mood. On December 11, 2007, 
President Kabila reiterated in a private meeting at his home with Tim 
Shortley that DRC would “stick to his agreement with President Museveni 
and… keep the pressure on the LRA to leave Garamba or finalize a peace 
agreement”.562 
Otti’s death rattled the delegation, the mediation team, and the journalists. 
Speaking to various members of the delegation, I learned that it had not 
only challenged its internal coherence, but had also tainted communication 
between the delegates and Kony. One delegate told me: “Adek is really 
disturbed by Vincent’s death because he is frank with Kony. He tells him the 
truth. He was the one who called Kony and said to him your own 
delegation is afraid to visit you.”563  One delegate—speaking after he had 
just been dismissed from the delegation—said “Kony did not tell us the 
truth about Vincent. First, he said Vincent was sick, then that he was under 
house arrest. He made me lie to the press in Nairobi, saying that Otti was 
560 Author (with translator) interview with Zande LRA-abductee, ‘wife’ of Alfred "Record" Otim. Yambio: 23/2/2009.
561 Author (with translator) interview with Zande LRA-abductee, ‘wife’ of Alfred "Record" Otim. Yambio: 23/2/2009.
562 US Embassy Kinshasa. "07KINSHASA1361 (Classified Confidential) : President Kabila's December 11 Meeting with Ambassador and AF 
Senior Advisor Shortley”, 12/12/2007.
563 Fieldnotes, Juba: 2/2/2008. Adek was also quoted in a confidential US embassy memo. According to the memo “Adek confirmed that 
Kony was set on making money to ‘run his organization and run/relocate if necessary.’ Adek said that Kony was not interested in meeting or 
talking with anyone anymore and wanted to find a safe place to go. Adek said that LRA members in Garamba were terrorized and 
demoralized”. US Embassy Kampala, 08KAMPALA203 (confidential): “Northern Uganda: Juba Peace Talks Resume, LRA Sorts Out Internal 
Issues”,1/2/2012.
180
okay. This makes it hard for me to make the case for the LRA.”564  For 
another delegate the process had lost its momentum with Otti’s death, with 
the focus solely on getting signatures under agreements and with both the 
delegation and the LRA leadership split: “If we think about getting an 
agreement, but we don’t think about the future after the agreement, I no 
longer know if it will ever end.”565 
Conclusion
Where 2006 had been the year in which previously established conflict 
structures between the LRA/M and the GoU were emphasised in how the 
events unfolded, 2007 developed on a different trajectory. The challenging 
internal dynamics of the LRA/M came into sharp focus. The underlying logic 
of these is discussed in a later chapter. In addition, the many layers of the 
LRA/M’s experience of negotiating peace became much clearer. This 
included internal distrust and sabotage, but also increased engagement 
with an ever-growing collection of outside actors which also pulled the LRA/
M in different directions. One way of maintaining coherence was to exert 
control at the very heart of the LRA. Additionally, the events in 2007 
magnified the parallel processes the LRA/M was experiencing in the 
dynamics of the process and the signed agreements that emerged. The 
leadership struggle at a time when progress on paper was as successful as 
never before is a manifestation both of reclaiming control and the many 
layers of experience in the process. 
With Chissano in place as the UN Special Envoy, the international 
architecture of the talks had been strengthened, highlighting that despite 
the ICC warrants, the broader international community was committed to 
somehow finding a solution in Juba. For the LRA/M, this meant that the 
opportunity to forge outside connections also grew, and with that one of 
the LRA/M’s most powerful tools of keeping outsiders engaged by giving 
them access and then withdrawing it again. 
564 US Embassy Kampala, 08KAMPALA203 (confidential): “Northern Uganda: Juba Peace Talks Resume, LRA Sorts Out Internal Issues”,
1/2/2012.
565 US Embassy Kampala, 08KAMPALA203 (confidential): “Northern Uganda: Juba Peace Talks Resume, LRA Sorts Out Internal Issues”,
1/2/2012.
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6. “Reach Out a Hand and Pull it Back”: Engaging Outsiders
A month before the Juba Talks started in July, on the evening of June 7, 
2006, the LRA/M delegation went to the Vice-President’s office. The 
delegates had waited for a week for their first encounter with Machar 
before they could travel to the bush for the meeting with Kony in which he 
was to mandate them as his representatives. Machar had been delayed in 
Khartoum, first by political business and then by a sandstorm. Shaking 
Machar’s hand, delegates bowed their heads and clicked their heels in 
acknowledgement of his political and military authority. Once seated 
around a large table, host and visitors exchanged pleasantries. Machar said 
interest in the talks was heating up: he had received an interview request 
from Radio France International just that morning. He was jovial, confident 
and very much in control. The delegates, having become used to trying to 
draw as little attention to themselves as possible, seemed deferential.
Yet the modalities of organising and paying for the peace talks weighed 
heavily on their minds. Designated spokesperson Olweny said, “the 
financial requirement of peace is substantial. We need to leave the door 
open for sponsors, but the issue requires extensive discussion. We want the 
process to succeed. This appears to be the best chance for peace in the 
region.” Ojul, the designated delegation leader, concluded more bluntly: 
“We want donors to come into the peace process.”566
Machar agreed that the LRA could not itself facilitate the talks: “If you try 
to raise funds yourself you will fail,” he said. “We will also have trouble 
trying to raise funds, but we can facilitate. The donors need to form their 
own forum to manage funds. You shouldn’t do this yourself.”567  He 
reassured the delegation that he was in a position to gather financial and 
ideological support, pointing out that members of St Egidio had been 
waiting with the delegation in Juba to travel to Ri-Kwangba: “The Italians 
are members of the EU. The Swiss and the Americans have been asked to 
support this peace process. I have asked them to strike the LRA off the 
terrorists list.”568 Everyone seemed pleased, grateful, and in awe of Machar. 
Moreover, everyone seemed in agreement that a priority was to establish 
566 Fieldnotes. Juba: 7/6/2006.
567 Fieldnotes. Juba: 7/6/ 2006. With the Juba Initiative Fund (JIF), donors later did form their own forum from which to disperse funds 
under the auspices of the UN and GoSS, later administered and audited by KPMG.
568 Fieldnotes. Juba: 7/6/2006.
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solid international contacts to cast the net of the Juba Talks more widely. 
“You have to reach out,” Machar told the LRA/M repeatedly. “We are here 
for peace,” Olweny responded. 
During the drive back, the delegation was mainly quiet, except for one 
short conversation. Three delegates were discussing how much 
international support Machar might be able to solicit. One delegate 
responded that reaching out was “all well and good”, but there was one 
thing that would cause a problem and that the mediator had yet to 
understand: “We are very opinionated people also.”569 
Introduction 
“Keep the international community on your side but do not let it 
overpower the peacemaking momentum,” suggests Wallensteen as one 
ground rule for peace negotiations.570 The advice sums up what the LRA/M 
was trying to do: engage external or international actors, but remain in 
control, reflected in the notion of being “very opinionated also”. This 
chapter offers an analysis on the LRA/M’s procedural challenge to engage 
with external actors while maintaining ownership of the process. It is often 
assumed that international participation benefits a peace process, 
particularly if one of the actors is the state. This had certainly been 
Uganda’s experience. In assessing the role of the international community 
in resolving the West Nile War, Lomo and Hovil argue that international 
participation was “vital to the success of the peace negotiations. Their 
participation lent legitimacy to the process, validated the views and the 
concerns of the Ugandan participants, and facilitated communications and 
relationships through the infusion of resources not otherwise available”. 
They, however, also write that 
the potential negative impact of these interventions cannot be 
over emphasised, and needs to be carefully calculated. While the 
presence of international bodies does lend credibility and visibility 
to the peace process, the weight that the donor community carries 
can either sustain the process or risk derailing it by pushing for 
completion at the expense of the integrity of the process.571 
This chapter looks in more detail at how the integrity of the process played 
out through the involvement of international actors. The chapter’s main 
569 Fieldnotes, Juba: 11/10/2006.
570 P.Wallensteen and M.Eriksson, Negotiating Peace: Lessons from Three Comprehensive Peace Agreements. Uppsala/ New York: Uppsala 
University/ Mediation Support Unit UN, 2009, p.38.
571 Z.Lomo and L.Hovil, Negotiating peace: Resolution of Conflicts in Uganda's West Nile Region. Refugee Law Project Working Paper No. 
12. Kampala: June 2004, p.33-34.
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point is that it is not a challenge per se if international actors get involved, 
but rather that the international community as a set of actors works in very 
different ways from the conflict actors involved. To describe how the LRA/M 
and the international external actors functioned, I will refer to language 
used by members of the LRA/M: they talked frequently about their efforts 
to “connect” and about “surges” towards breakthroughs. The LRA/M 
progressed by alternating its levels of engagement, and kept control by 
maintaining a fluid, often vague process. Progress and change came, as they 
described it, through reaching out in certain moments; control was 
maintained by pulling back in others. I call this mechanism “connect/
disconnect”, and visualise it as an alternating current. When I asked a 
delegate why the LRA/M seemed to alternate its levels of engagement, he 
explained: “Someone in the bush does not operate like someone in an 
office.”572 
Alternating current flows in two different directions, but remains powerful 
precisely because the directional shift allows it to function without 
overloading the circuit. The image of an alternating current helps us to 
understand why LRA/M members stressed that they were always engaged 
with the process, even when external actors felt that the LRA/M had 
withdrawn. This notion also influences how the LRA/M connects to 
outsiders. My own experience with the LRA/M has been that periods of 
intense contact were followed by accusations of betrayal, yet these were 
always made while hinting at the possibility of absolving me. Contact was 
then reinstated with an emphasis that this was also done through 
forgiveness. The effect on me was that even in periods in which I was 
branded a traitor, I never stopped pursuing the connection.  
In contrast to these waves of engagement, the external international actors
—who, for the sake of brevity, are drawn here with an extremely broad 
brush—needed continuously developing momentum and consensus to 
remain committed to the peace talks. Drawing on the LRA/M description, I 
call this mechanism a “galvanic surge”. The image of direct current best 
captures what a galvanic surge is: concentrated energy flows in one 
direction, but has less power to sustain long distances or subtle 
adjustments.
The latter part of the chapter outlines how these two modes clashed. 
Running in parallel, the two approaches created a syncopated rhythm. 
Profound misinterpretation occurred in moments when external 
momentum hit a period of lesser LRA/M engagement; at other times, strong 
LRA/M engagement did not coincide with external momentum. In 
572 Fieldnotes, Juba/ Magwi: 2/10/2006.
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pinpointing how the two operational modes mismatched, the chapter 
shows why outside support and reassurances for the process were 
withdrawn just when the LRA/M had entered a time of adjustment. When 
the LRA/M pulled back from the process—often in order to consolidate its 
own position—the external galvanic surge created consensus about the 
LRA/M’s lack of commitment to a peaceful solution. Connect/disconnect and 
galvanic surges highlighted the constraints on both parties’ ability to 
pursue peace flexibly, with an open mind and a willingness to concede on 
certain points, and in a manner that sent a clear message. Both actors 
missed out because of their different ways of functioning: in retaining too 
much control, the LRA/M failed to use the opportunity to broaden its 
political support base and capitalise on the Juba agreements, such as the 
concessions made by the GoU regarding root causes of the conflict. External 
international actors displayed a lack of vision by insisting on a particular 
approach to peacemaking in a constrained environment, thus failing to 
bring about lasting change or learn significant broader lessons for future 
conflict resolution. The chapter concludes that because the LRA/M and 
international actors conducted themselves in entrenched, yet mismatched 
ways, both sides struggled to utilise the Juba Talks to move towards 
resolution of the conflict.   
The LRA/M’s Connect/Disconnect
A few days before my first trip to the bush, two LRA/M delegates pulled me 
aside. One said: “When you get to the bush, you will be very free.” The 
other added: 
Don’t be scared when you get to the bush. We have been in the 
community for a while. I might be different when I get to the 
bush. I will not talk openly to you like now. But don’t be scared by 
people in the bush. It is a bit different there, but they will not be 
scared by you. They have seen many whites.573
Having “seen many whites” is the most obvious manifestation of making an 
external connection. This obvious moment of connect, however, was only 
the peak of an almost permanent process of connect/disconnect 
engagement. The common perception of the LRA is that the world’s most 
elusive rebel group has been inaccessible for large stretches of the conflict, 
emerging only for attacks or a few scattered peace negotiations. The LRA/
M’s perception of their own role was different: in their view they had never 
not been engaged in peace negotiations, at least since the start of the 
conflict in 1986 until the military strike against them that ended the Juba 
573 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/6/2006.
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Talks in 2008.574  What from the outside seemed like inaccessibility was on 
the inside a continuous process of different kinds of engagement.
Roughly speaking, the LRA oscillates between two kinds of action. The first
—disconnect—means exerting military strength, recouping, evaluating the 
situation, fighting for survival, and closings ranks to outsiders. The second—
connect—is the time when preparations for transformation are made, and 
relationships are forged, maintained or exploited across divides within the 
LRA and with the outside world. Significant shifts often happen during this 
time. The two stages are not clearly divided: disconnect for the LRA/M is as 
much a stage of engagement as connect. Support comes through 
connecting and control through disconnecting, yet both stages are versions 
of engagement. The LRA/M’s relationship with civilians in Uganda and 
Sudan operated with this alternating current of bringing benefits and 
exerting brutal pressure, and used both to remain a powerful and 
permanent presence. 
The alternating current also ensured that the ties were never cut. The LRA/
M’s version of the story of how the Juba Talks happened highlights this.575 
Various LRM delegates offered stories about their own continuous 
contribution and long-standing and often frustrating connection to the LRA 
as a main motivation, for example in past efforts such as Kacoke Madit. 
Delegates explained to me that the Juba Talks had been three years in the 
making, having been started to make connections as an additional 
engagement while another untrustworthy process, from which they were 
slowly disconnecting, was ongoing. “We were appointed in 2003 because 
there was no trust in Kolo,” explained one of the original delegates to me. 
Because at the time, “everything with Kolo [his close interaction with 
government negotiator Betty Bigombe and his defection at the end of the 
previous peace process] happened exactly as predicted by Kony.”576 
574 LRA/M Peace Team, "Juba Peace Talks: The Record of Sabotage by the Government of Uganda; The Reasons General Joseph Kony 
Wants the Peace Agreement Revisited; and, The Way Forward”, Nairobi: 6/11/2009. The fallout of the Juba Talks is the most connection-free 
period, a manifestation of the greatness of the failure of the talks.
575 Stories abound about how and why the Juba Talks came about. Some analysts see the ICC warrants as the crucial catalyst. Opponents 
of the ICC warrants argued that they made ending violence look like an unattractive option, as Dowden holds: “Western policy, led by 
Britain, is to capture Kony and his fellow cult leaders and take them to the international court, while Museveni’s aim is a military victory. 
Kony has no incentive to talk”. R.Dowden, "Inspiration behind the 'terror gang'", The Observer, 2/4/2006. ICC supporters argue that it was 
because of the warrants that the talks came about. The ICC intervention, it was hoped by its supporters, might change dynamics in a way 
that would spell the beginning of the end for the LRA; although how precisely this would happen was never clear. Within the LRA/M, most 
shrug off the idea that the warrants triggered anything; they are seen as dictating the content of the Juba Talks rather than causing them. 
The question of cause and effect is impossible to answer, but also becomes less relevant when looking at the LRA’s patterns of connect/
disconnect.
576 Fieldnotes, 24/11/2007.
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Preparing the next peace talks “was just an order from the chairman”.577 
Thus some of the future LRA delegates met up in Nairobi from November 
2004 to January 2005 to strengthen support within the LRA/M diaspora. In 
the autumn of 2005, Otti announced on the radio that the LRA wanted 
peace negotiations, precisely at the time when opponents of the ICC 
warrants argued that the option to negotiate had been closed off. In 
December 2005, LRA/M representatives met with Pax Christi in Nairobi for 
the first time; the broader contact with Machar was thus on its way.
My own experience of connecting with the LRA/M mirrors the same pattern, 
and also how connect/disconnect keeps levels of engagement. At first I was 
warmly welcomed and invited to enter the world of the LRA. A brief while 
later, I was threatened and accused of being an infiltrator, leaving me to 
prove that I came with no bad intentions. After I had been allowed into the 
inner sanctum of the LRA by talking to Kony and staying in the camp 
overnight, I was rejected again. This was based on the very real accusation 
that I had supported misleading stories in major media that had come out 
of the interview. This accusation of betrayal was in one case underscored by 
grabbing my throat and choking me. Eager to remain engaged, I spent 
considerable time and assurance to prove that the accusation was 
unfounded. I was again forgiven and allowed back for meetings, only to be 
cut off again a few months later. This time, the reason for the cut-off was 
not clear. It took a few weeks for me to establish that this recent episode of 
disconnect was based on a case of mistaken identity and the fact that I 
share a similar first name with a scholar who works for the International 
Centre for Transitional Justice, Marieke Wierda. The LRA/M had thought I 
had failed to disclose my professional affiliation and cut me off. 
While the analysis that the ICC warrants made talks more complicated is 
correct, it overlooks the inner logic of the LRA/M’s alternating current. A 
prime motivator for the LRA/M to enter talks was to battle the absence of 
their side of the story and to use engagement in peace talks as a political 
tool to achieve that. Connecting to those who were necessary to change the 
public narrative—including, in the early ambitious days, the ICC itself—was 
a strong incentive, as was being able to talk publicly. My own experience 
with the LRA’s attempts to garner publicity for their perspective is 
interesting in this respect. One of the major motivators for the LRA to allow 
me to visit Kony was that I said that I would record him and it would go out 
internationally on radio and TV. Hoffman, in writing about Sierra Leone, 
has argued that the choice of medium is significant: “The narrative bloc of 
the violent event is shaped by the technologies and media through which it 
is transmitted.” What this means is that making oneself heard through 
577 Fieldnotes, Juba: 28/9/2006.
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official media channels brings legitimacy. He describes how in Sierra Leone, 
“having one’s story (re)told on the broadcast [BBC’s Focus on Africa] 
constituted a form of legitimacy and verification.”578  Due to the distorted 
presentation of the Kony interview—as anticipated by the LRA/M, and also 
by others involved in the conflict—the LRA failed to experience a 
verification of their side of the story. Instead, the way they interview was 
published for them underscored the point that their side of the story was 
never listened to.
Colonel Bwone took a similar view on the importance of words when I 
asked him what the LRA expected to get out of the talks: “We will capture 
power with words, not with the gun,” was his response.579 Thus connecting 
to a broader network of people to make their version of the conflict more 
widely known was a crucial incentive; the risks associated with it did not 
really change with the ICC warrants. In the end, it was precisely this 
broadening network and the series of connections that made the Juba Talks 
possible. From the LRA/M’s perspective, the Nairobi meeting with Pax Christi 
was akin to bringing in the international “umpire” that would allow a fair 
process and the establishment of vital outside connections. 
Residents of Western Equatoria experienced how this moment of 
connecting to the outside world changed the LRA’s behaviour. Stationed 
near Ri-Kwangba from early 2006 onwards, the LRA cautiously guarded 
themselves from outside intruders, including the resident Azande 
population. The locals were told by LRA soldiers passing through the village 
that they were not allowed to tend to their gardens near the LRA camp. 
The LRA thus kept the residents under control by dictating the terms of 
engagement: while the LRA were to be listened to, they were not 
reachable. At the same time but in an entirely different location—Nairobi—
the LRA connected to initiate the Juba Talks, which changed the situation in 
Western Equatoria too. The experience of Reverend Moses from Ibba 
illustrates this. The LRA had been in his region since late 2005. The local 
residents had recognised them “because of long hair. They are not shaved 
like our soldier. They speak a funny language, a mixture of Arabic and 
Swahili, less Juba Arabic.”580 The long-haired armed men had been looting 
and abducting; some children were abducted in November 2005. And 
although they had not returned at the time I spoke to Reverend Moses in 
June 2006, he explained that the LRA’s behaviour had changed: “They now 
578 D.Hoffman, "West-African Warscapes: Violent Events as Narrative Blocs: The Disarmament at Bo, Sierra Leone ". Anthropological 
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579 Author interview with Col. Lubwoa Bwone and Lt.Col. Santo Alit (LRA). Ri-Kwangba: 22/9/2006.
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come to the market and buy potato plants; they get friendly with the 
locals.”581  He knew exactly when things changed: February 2006, at the 
time when LRA/M representatives were meeting with Machar in Juba. While 
the LRA had never not been engaged with the population, the engagement 
changed from one of violent power assertion—disconnect—to a mutually 
beneficial trade relation—connect. 
It was shortly after this moment that the first meeting in the bush between 
Machar, Pax Christi and the LRA happened—the meeting Onek had 
described as being so scary, because they were accompanied deep into the 
bush by heavily armed, serious-looking LRA. When I asked several senior 
commanders why what was supposed to be a friendly meeting had had to 
be staged in such a frightening manner, they responded with a giggle. 
Lieutenant Colonel Alit in particular found the question funny: how else 
could the LRA possibly present itself to outsiders? Had they been too 
friendly, too ready to connect, the SPLA would just have killed them, he 
argued. Instead, in their encounter with outsiders, they had to 
simultaneously “reach out a hand and pull it back. In a war, you cannot just 
shake it.”582 
Making Broader Connections for Peace
If control was such a prominent issue for the LRA/M, what was their 
motivation to connect in the first place? Engaging in the peace talks came 
at great cost for them. In April 2008, former spokesperson Olweny said that 
making Kony a public figure and allowing him to be interviewed was a 
mistake: “He was stronger when he was not exposed to the world.”583 The 
LRA/M was feeding off the image of the unknown spirit-driven superhuman 
commander. So was the outside world, signalling back to the LRA/M that 
this image remained one of its strongest assets. Abandoning the unknown 
by connecting to the non-LRA world stripped the LRA of its power to incite 
fear, at least for a while. Because of this cost, it is intriguing that the Juba 
Talks, with wide international participation, became possible. 
The LRA/M largely expected externals to assume an umpire role to solve the 
problematic dynamics at the negotiation table; individuals within the LRA/
581 Fieldnotes, Ibba: 10/6/2006.
582 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 15/7/2007.
583 Fieldnotes, Cologne: 24/9/2008.
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M also felt that broader international participation would help to smooth 
the LRA/M’s internal challenges. Further using the facilitation and adhering 
to rules set by  international outsiders about how the talks would be 
conducted would allow political gain for the LRA/M.584  This makes for 
striking parallel to how the GoU utilised international rules: Clark argues 
that the GoU used the tool of state referral to the ICC for its own “political 
and legal gain”, citing a Ugandan politician who said “‘the ICC has become 
Museveni’s political tool’”.585  Both parties thus turned to outsiders for 
additional tools to use against their enemies—and both parties at 
opportune moments then argued that outsiders were interfering with a 
local process. Museveni made such statements when he stressed his own 
Amnesty Law over the ICC’s jurisdiction. Whenever the Juba Talks hit crisis 
points, the LRA/M would withdraw by, as Ojul put it in one of those 
moments, “going back to the field to consult”, which then also meant—as 
another delegate added—that “no outsiders were allowed.”586  Such 
moments of disconnect, needed by the LRA/M to regain internal strength, 
expressed the tension inherent in this kind of engagement. 
Yet once the need for the connection had been identified, the opening 
brought in as many international actors as possible which then evolved into 
the Juba Talks. Despite seeing the international community as broadly 
complicit with Museveni, the LRA/M assumed that external actors would act 
fairly and to a certain extent with goodwill towards the LRA/M as the 
initiators of peace talks. The LRA/M surmised that international 
engagement with the nitty-gritty complexities of the conflict would adjust 
international pro-government bias and help to create leverage on the GoU. 
From the LRA/M’s point of view, one purpose of connecting was to widen 
the network, to strengthen what Sarrica calls “social representation”.587 In 
the early days of the Juba Talks, strengthening those outside connections 
and securing resources was one of the major motivations for participation: 
“Maybe we need to make contact to European politicians,” a delegate 
584 I define external international actors as everyone whom the LRA/M viewed as holding a possible “umpire” position. This vague 
definition makes for a somewhat mythologised version of what the “international community” is and can do, but it draws on a notion that I 
have frequently encountered in both Sudan and Uganda.
585 P.Clark, “Chasing cases: the ICC and the politics of state referral in the Democratic republic of Congo and Uganda”, in The 
International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice, Volume II, C. Stahn and M. El Zeidy, eds.. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011, pps. 1182 and 1201.
586 Fieldnotes, Juba: 12/9/2006.
587 Sarrica explains how in an unfamiliar situation, group communication gives rise to representations as newly exchanged thoughts 
develop a new nature, a process that he calls “social representation”. M.Sarrica and A.Contarello, "Peace, War and Conflict: Social 
Representations Shared by Peace Activists and Non-Activists." Journal of Peace Research 41, 5, 2004, p.550. Sarrica’s outline of the stages 
of social representation was clearly visible in the Juba Talks. 
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explained to me. “We need support, we need much stronger support.”588 
Through stronger social representation, the LRA/M’s reasoned, new energy 
would allow movement towards finding a way to change the situation of 
the LRA and of Uganda. One delegate said that initially he had found the 
Juba process credible “because it was so internationally staffed.” He said 
that the international staff were the only option for the LRA/M to shift 
inner-Ugandan dynamics while also tackling the problems that had arisen 
through the Rome Statute. After all, he said, “the ICC remains as a biased 
court,” a bias that the LRA/M would only be able to address by engaging 
with international actors.589 
An Example of Reaching Out and Pulling Back
The practice of connecting to external actors in order to gather support 
came with a permanent weighing of power relations for the LRA/M. A look 
behind the scenes at what was interpreted as the first proof that the LRA/M 
was not serious in its peace effort will help in understanding the many 
layers of action and interpretation that converge at all times. During 
Machar’s meeting with the LRA leadership before the opening ceremony in 
Juba, everyone on the trip to Ri-Kwangba behaved as if the connection had 
been made successfully and the Juba Talks were guaranteed. Although the 
GoU’s participation was still shaky and had not been officially announced, 
LRA/M delegate Ayena was on the phone inviting people from all over the 
world to join the delegation as observers. Otto gave interviews to 
journalists in which he announced that he dreamt of being Uganda’s vice-
president. Machar, followed around by an Al-Jazeera camera crew, visited 
Nabanga’s shell of a school to assure local residents that he knew they were 
in a volatile situation, being physically wedged between the LRA and the 
outside world, but that this situation would improve as the Juba Talks 
progressed. 
Machar’s mission on this final meeting was clear: he wanted to persuade 
Otti to take another step and strengthen the LRA/M delegation in Juba 
with his own presence. Otti was at first nowhere to be found. On his 
journey from the LRA camp to make a physical connection, the LRA had 
encountered two rivers that had merged in the rainy season. Despite, as 
they said, “walking from six to six”, they needed three more days beyond 
the scheduled meeting time to get to Ri-Kwangba.590  One delegate, while 
588 Fieldnotes, Juba: 5/6/2006.
589 LRA/M Peace Team, "Juba Peace Talks: The Record of Sabotage by the Government of Uganda; The Reasons General Joseph Kony 
Wants the Peace Agreement Revisited; and, The Way Forward”, Nairobi: 6/11/2009.
590 Fieldnotes, Nabanga/ Ri-Kwangba: 11/7/2006.
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waiting in Nabanga’s school during a downpour, explained that it was a 
challenge for Otti to even emerge for this meeting, since the meetings had 
become so big and the connections expanded so quickly: “Everyone is 
nervous if they don’t know who they are talking to.” Various delegates said 
that taking Otti to Juba was not possible. They were worried about his 
security and thought that he was safe only in the bush and with the 
chairman. 
The following day, Machar and his entourage waited in the forest for the 
LRA leaders. No LRA or LRM member was to be seen, and no sound could 
be heard coming from the bush to announce the advance party that would 
signal the arrival of a high-ranking commander. In four long hours of 
waiting, the discussion about the delegation was lively. All the members of 
the SPLM who were present were engaging in conspiracy theories about 
why they were being made to wait for so long. Ideas thrown around 
included that Kony was holding the delegation hostage. Or maybe he had 
confiscated their phones? At one point, a soldier spotted and killed a black 
poisonous snake that had crawled under one of the makeshift chairs near 
Machar, prompting a member of one peacemaking organisation to ask: “Is 
that a message from our friends?”591
Onek was outraged at the delegation’s behaviour and at the fact that they 
were letting the Vice-President of southern Sudan wait in a clearing in the 
bush. “They lack respect, they should apologise to the VP,” Onek said. 
Machar himself seemed unfazed. He was engrossed in his copy of Stephen 
Hawking’s A Brief History of Time and only joined in the speculation at one 
point. “Maybe they did not deliver my letter,” Machar said—he had written 
a letter to Kony assuring him of his safety were he to come to Juba or send 
one of his senior commanders.592  This would be his fourth encounter with 
the LRA command in order to get the Juba Talks on the ground; he seemed 
to get used to waiting a lot. 
Finally, the first LRA fighters emerged, followed by a rather haggard-
looking delegation, and eventually Otti. Machar politely but firmly pointed 
out that he had been waiting for him for three days. Otti did not flinch: 
“Last time we waited for you for 11 days,” he retorted, adding that Kony 
was not coming to this meeting. In addition, because of the delay in his 
arrival, “the delegation needs more time to talk about fundamental issues.” 
Machar insisted—to no avail—that he had to meet Kony to be able to 
deliver a credible peace process. He wanted action, rather than 
deliberation: “I need an answer in a letter,” he insisted, 
591 Fieldnotes. Ri-Kwangba: 13/7/2006.
592 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 13/7/2006.
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in good handwriting. The Ugandan government delegation is 
high-ranking; you should upgrade your delegation by sending one 
of the five leaders [under arrest warrant from the ICC]. Because 
first Uganda said, we are not talking to the top five commanders. 
Now they say we want one of the five, although it is not a 
condition. It shows that they are serious.593
Yet despite this pressure from the GoU, Otti quickly made clear that he 
would not travel to Juba. “What are you afraid of?” Machar asked. He 
pressed the point that the LRA needed as much media exposure as possible, 
to broaden the connection between the LRA and the rest of the world: 
“The press has to be here. More coverage of this is good and it will be 
better than last time.”594  He wanted to firm up the commitment the LRA 
was making to connect to the outside world, to internationalise his peace 
talks endeavour.595 Otti dodged the question of what he was afraid of: “We 
want Ochora here and the Acholi elders,” he answered instead.596 If Machar 
was disappointed, he did not let it show. He appeared quietly in control, 
ready to push his agenda step by step. 
On the way back to Maridi, the convoy stopped in Ibba to buy water and 
snacks, and I asked one delegate how things had gone in the bush and why 
Kony had not appeared. “Things don’t go how we want it to go,” he said. 
He offered an explanation why Kony had not appeared at the meeting, 
even though that had been the agreement. Essentially, the amount of 
outside connection Kony made was an image question: “The rebel leader 
cannot always be at every meeting, otherwise he looks too junior. It is very 
difficult to talk to a real rebel leader.” But why, I asked, was it not possible 
for them to stick to the arrangements? Or indeed why did it seem 
impossible to send a higher rank to the negotiation table, even Otti 
himself, under the personal protection that Machar had promised him? The 
suggestion seemed ridiculous to the delegate. He was worried, he said, 
about handing anything over to the SPLA, because the LRA would thereby 
relinquish control of the process and because “the SPLA is so unorganised.” 
He had heard that Onek had requested an apology from the LRA/M 
delegation and been outraged that they had let the VP wait so long. “He 
talks to us like children,” the delegate said. “Like he is telling a girl: go to 
school. We have shown that we are serious. Vincent came out of the bush. 
593 Fieldnotes, Nabanga/ Ri-Kwangba: 11/7/2006. 
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We are here.”597 For him, Otti’s appearance in person to relay the news that 
he would not come to Juba was the strongest possible connection, and 
proof that the LRA was committed to the talks. 
Others interpreted the events differently. On the drive, the delegation 
listened to the BBC’s Focus on Africa programme. The newsreader relayed 
the information that Kony had let Machar wait in Nabanga for five days 
and that in the end Kony had still refused to send one of the commanders 
wanted by the ICC to negotiate in Juba. To the great dismay of some of the 
delegates, the BBC interpreted this as proof that the LRA had no interest in 
engaging. The short news headline was: “LRA talks run into first 
obstacles.”598 
Internationalisation and Africanisation
Connect/disconnect also helps explain obvious contradictions in the LRA/M’s 
negotiation position. On the one hand, the LRA/M argued for a liberal 
peace—a firmly “international” concept—with free and fair elections, 
accountability, and a functioning justice system. On the other, they at times 
proposed to negotiate a power-sharing arrangement with Museveni and 
avoid prosecution for war crimes. Some even wanted Museveni, now an 
elected president, deposed by the peace agreement. A seeming 
contradiction emerged. On the one hand, the LRA/M connected to the 
international actors, who brought their own set of rules. On the other, the 
LRA/M wanted to simultaneously disconnect, countering the process put in 
place by the Rome Statute with their own context-specific interpretation.
At the heart of this lies a broader tension in local or regional conflicts with 
an international reach. LRA/M members said that part of what they needed 
to do in light of the ICC warrants was to either convince the ICC that its 
warrants were biased or to get other international actors to agree that this 
was an “African conflict between Museveni and Kony”.599  When it was 
useful, the LRA cited the ICC as the instrument that had upset the fragile 
balance of the Africanness of the conflict, arguing that this conflict was to 
be dealt with in an African way. This argument is an extension of the 
broader debate about the tension between traditional local justice as 
opposed to international justice. For Mbembé and Rendall the notion of a 
return to African traditions and a sharpening of the “Africanist” 
597 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 13/7/2006.
598 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 13/7/2006.
599 Fieldnotes, Nabanga: 20/9/2006. 
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perspective will allow a more balanced discourse beyond a “the negation of 
[the traditional] self and this authenticity would thus constitute a 
mutilation.”600  In the localised and Africanised justice debate, this idea 
usually surfaced in the focus on non-state justice mechanisms seemingly 
rooted in the customs of the affected communities.601 Reaching out to an 
international community that was undecided on how to deal with the LRA 
was part of the connection that could then be severed by rejecting the new 
international order to regain control. This was put particularly pointedly in 
early November 2006, when Egeland was expected in Juba. The LRA/M’s 
spokesperson welcomed the chance to connect with Egeland to discuss the 
ICC warrants with him: “Because they are a blockade to the talks, the 
primary agenda is to request Egeland to use his offices to talk to the UN 
Security Council and the ICC to drop the warrants in the interests of peace 
in the region.”602 
Hidden behind the description of “the interests of peace in the region” was 
the plan to bring the GoU to the table (connect) and then expose it 
internationally to force acknowledgement of its part in the conflict 
(disconnect). This strategy was particularly obvious in the LRA/M’s emphasis 
on international media attention, rather than on national Ugandan or 
Sudanese media. Even though they thought little of international actors or 
the international press, they calculated that the attention pay-off would be 
bigger.603  Such coverage was guaranteed by selling the story as an 
impenetrable African war, and the LRA/M skilfully embellished and 
instrumentalised the supposedly unique African features of the conflict. 
The “Africanisation” had practical implications for the LRA/M. They said, for 
example, that the shared “Africanness” made overcoming hurdles possible 
on the personal level, as Olweny explained. At the first face-to-face 
meeting in Machar’s office after the much fought-over signing of the CoH, 
the two delegations reconnected, Olweny explained, by “shaking hands 
emphatically! Emphatically in that African way!”604  Africanisation of the 
conflict also meant that the LRA/M wanted to specifically reach out towards 
African partners. On September 2, 2006, the delegation wrote a personal 
600 A.Mbembé and S.Rendall, “African Modes of Self-Writing ", Public Culture 14, 1, 2002, p.254.
601 Allen criticises the notion that such traditional justice exists, arguing that the proposed justice mechanisms—namely the ceremony of 
mato oput—were inappropriate to deal with issues connected to large-scale violence, but were being pushed by international aid agencies. 
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602 BBC News, "Uganda rebel chief wants UN talks," 6/11/2006. 
603 The behaviour echoes what Mbembé and Rendall call “Africanity”: a “hatred of the world at large (which also marks a profound desire 
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letter to Mangosuthu Buthelezi, head of South Africa’s Inkatha Party.605 
Under the subject line “The Just Struggle of the LRA/M”, the letter 
addressed the LRA/M’s concerns about being the disadvantaged party at the 
negotiation table, stating that international support had contributed to this 
imbalance. The letter introduced the LRA/M as “an organisation that has 
been so seriously demonised and vilified for so long, but about which the 
world has known so little”, and asked Buthelezi “to grace the Juba Peace 
talks with your presence”.606 Briefly explaining the LRA’s position, the letter 
stated: 
suffice it to say that the LRA/M was formed as a response to NRM’s 
deliberate policies of persecution and marginilisation [sic] of the 
people of northern and eastern Uganda, bordering genocide. In 
due course we should be able to send you our position papers in 
the Juba talks in order to facilitate your clear understanding of the 
situation. For nearly two decades the NRM Government has thrived 
on concealment of one of the worst human catastrophe by a well 
orchestrated and sophisticated propaganda machinery procured 
through a UK Public Relations Organisation. By the use of this 
machinery Museveni has slammed a ghostly smoke screen on the 
LRA and presented it to the international community as a 
murderous organisation without any political agenda. In good 
time, Your Highness, we should be able to explain to you that the 
LRA/M is not only an organisation with a truly Pan African outlook 
with a focused national agenda, but it is also the only serious 
counterbalance to Museveni’s militaristic approach to politics in 
Uganda.607
The delegation further asked for Buthelezi’s support in reaching the 
international community, for Buthelezi’s presence at the Juba Talks, and for 
an invitation to South Africa for the LRA/M delegation to be introduced to 
more people who might be sympathetic.
Mocking the international system’s ineffectiveness in the unique LRA 
context was another way of getting rid of it. As one LRA member put it, 
laughing emphatically at the hilariousness of what he was talking about: 
“Sitting in a cell in The Hague with food and television, for an African that 
is not punishment. It’s funny.”608 Almost three months later, I was reminded 
of this exchange while walking around Nabanga with another delegate. We 
observed the outcome of a local trial: a naked man was beaten up and 
whipped by a man with a gun while a group of elders looked on. The naked 
man was then locked up in a round cage made from bamboo, his gashing 
605 The contact was established through a representative of The Earth Organisation who had come to Juba to plead with the LRA to stop 
killing the white rhino for food in Garamba Park. The letter makes reference to a phone conversation between Ojul and Buthelezi.
606 LRA/M delegation in Juba (Martin Ojul), "Letter from the LRA/M to Chief Buthelezi, Leader of Inkatha Party", 2/9/2006.
607 I LRA/M delegation in Juba (Martin Ojul), "Letter from the LRA/M to Chief Buthelezi, Leader of Inkatha Party", 2/9/2006.
608 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/7/2006.
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wounds bleeding. Without protection from the sun or rain, he spent at least 
24 hours in the cage—he was still there when I walked past at around the 
same time the next day. While observing the beating, the delegate jokingly 
commented, “This is not ICC.”609 However, he also implied that with “what 
had happened in the war”, finding some real punishment would be 
necessary. Inadvertently or consciously, his stress on the need for “proper” 
punishment meant the LRA’s inclusion in the greater circle of humanity, 
even if it was to stay firmly within an “African” definition.
This notion of punishment as a way to establish humanity is discussed by 
Bourke, who writes that even soldiers who continued to kill stressed 
that they retained a moral faculty. The insistence that men were 
causal and moral agents was crucial. Combatants strongly believed 
that they should feel guilty for killing: it was precisely this emotion 
that made them “human”, and enabled them to return to civilian 
society afterwards. Men who did not feel guilt were somehow less 
than human, or were insane: guiltless killers were immoral.610
If the demand for punishment is part of being fully accepted as humans—as 
both victims and perpetrators—the LRA/M’s demands for the respect of 
their own human rights makes more sense.
Connect/Disconnect Tensions
The LRA/M paid for connecting by submitting themselves to forces outside 
the LRA/M’s control. In war, the LRA/M controls people’s lives, fears and 
experiences. In peace, the LRA/M aimed to control the narrative about the 
conflict with the expectation that opening up would sway opponents and 
sceptics. They expected that once they reached out, the biased media would 
be educated about what the LRA/M perceived to be the real story. At 
various times delegates and LRA members talked about how the chief 
prosecutor of the ICC, once presented with their side of the story, would be 
convinced that he was wrong in pursuing the LRA alone.611 They voiced the 
expectation that if OCHA were satisfied that the peace talks were useful, 
support from the entire UN system and the international community, 
609 Fieldnotes, Nabanga: 20/9/2006. 
610  J.Bourke, An intimate history of killing: Face-to-face killing in twentieth century warfare. London: Granta Publications, 1999, pps. 
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including the ICC, would follow. In the LRA/M’s ideal scenario, making the 
connection would shift the power of the LRA from the mystical-
disconnected to the visible-connected, and would make Kony a “Big Man” 
with power over the international community on par with Machar, 
Museveni and Egeland. Visible power and its insignia were incentives to 
give up the strength that came from being elusive.612
The realisation that the way to power was more complicated than they had 
imagined came soon enough. One delegate said that in order for the LRA 
to become a widely supported player, they knew the LRA needed to 
apologise for their atrocities—and indeed Kony had done so in the July 
2006 meeting with Acholi community leaders. However, the delegate 
argued, apologising had taken away power from the LRA that needed to be 
re-established. “The problem is that now every radio station demands an 
apology,” he said, “but it is for the chairman to decide when to apologise. 
He cannot be told what to do.”613  The theme of “not being told what to 
do” emerged several times, particularly in a heated discussion I had with 
one delegation member when I questioned their ability to reliably contact 
the chairman: “It is not easy to deal with a rebel, with someone who has 
been in the bush for 20 years.” I said it was obvious how difficult it was for 
Machar or the UN to deal with a rebel, but was it equally difficult for a 
rebel to deal with a rebel? Was it also not easy for him to deal with his 
boss? “No,” he answered. “It is not easy, but we should not be pushed to do 
anything.”614
Despite Kony’s method of maintaining power by being elusive, the LRA/M 
had not expected the vision of Kony as one of the world’s leaders to be 
scuppered so quickly. With connect not bringing the amount of control the 
LRA/M had hoped for, incentives to disconnect to regain control grew. The 
arrival of Ugandan MPs in Juba in September 2006 illustrated this tension 
well. Wanting to broaden its support base, the LRA/M initially welcomed 
the arrival of the MPs. Quickly, a mechanism of proxy negotiations ensued, 
as the MPs tried to reconcile the GoU’s and the LRA/M’s position papers. At 
first, the LRA/M delegation viewed the new players as an interruption that 
created an incentive to strengthen their direct connection. “Procedures 
have broken down with the MPs shuttling back and forth,” explained a 
delegate. Increasingly, as control was taken away from them—or it could be 
said, as the connection they had made was ignored—LRA/M delegates 
612 Dowden writes: “At the heart of African politics is an attitude to power. Power whether used for good or evil, is widely revered for its 
own sake. The Big Man is given great respect because he has power”. R.Dowden, "Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles", London: 
Portobello Books, 2008, loc959.
613 Fieldnotes, Owiny-Kibul and Palotaka: 26/11/2006.
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became furious at this intervention by a force they did not consider part of 
the mediation team.615 One delegate said: “We want face-to-face talks with 
Rugunda, but everyone is learning on the job.”616 
The crisis in the talks played out in Juba Raha Hotel, with journalists and 
anxious observers watching to catch any movement coming out of the 
negotiation room. After dinner on the evening of October 5, 2006, the 
negotiators asked MPs and observers to leave the negotiation room so that 
the crisis could be contained among the negotiating parties. During a 
break, the MPs asked Martin Ojul to call Kony, who refused to talk and gave 
the strict order that nothing was to be signed if the MPs had dealt with 
it.617 Another delegate explained that the MPs simply were not sufficiently 
connected to the LRA experience: “Some of these people need to be send 
to the bush for one month to understand suffering there, then they can 
come back.”618  In the end, the measurable outcome of the MPs’ 
engagement was negligible. One member of the delegation called the 
arrival of the MPs “a big storm in a teacup. They all came, argued and went 
away again.”619  For him it was obvious that the only ones who had come 
with staying power were the LRA/M—even though to most outsiders it did 
not look that way.
The tension between the LRA/M and the MPs was at first surprising. Since 
many of the MPs were open about their anti-Museveni stance and their 
willingness to work closely with the LRA/M delegation, they seemed like 
obvious allies. Yet from the LRA perspective, the presence of the MPs 
diffused the LRA’s power as a main player in the conflict, and created a 
tension with the agenda the LRA/M had set for itself to be a political pan-
Africanist negotiation partner with a truth to tell. Since the MPs 
represented politics in Uganda—no matter what their party affiliation—the 
LRA hardliners considered cooperation with the MPs to be the same as 
cooperation with the existing system in Uganda.620  “The broader 
participation of MPs destabilises the process inside,” one delegate 
explained to me. “Some MPs are using this to stabilise their 
constituencies.”621
615 Fieldnotes, Juba: 5/10/2006.
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The LRA felt patronised. “The MPs are not advising, but lecturing the LRA,” 
said an observer who had joined the talks as an independent, but was 
clearly sympathising with LRA grievances.622 Vis-à-vis the LRA, the MPs took 
the stance that negotiating comprehensive political solutions was not to be 
part of a peace deal. One LRA/M representative said that the MPs had given 
the LRA the advice “to simply deal with combatant issues and leave all 
political issues to the MPs.”623  Reacting to the suggestion that the LRA 
should focus on combatant issues, one member said, “How? It is like telling 
us to stop this river from flowing and then we stop it and you say, now, you 
cannot cross it.”624 
The analogy of the river stopped but not being allowed to cross shows that 
in the LRA/M’s view, transformation is denied by the very same externalities 
that facilitated the move towards transformation in the first place. Another 
stated that this meant that the MPs were in a sense boycotting the peace 
talks by disconnecting the LRA/M from its political demands, implying that 
many of the LRA/M demands were already being discussed on the political 
level. This was disempowering, explained one delegate: “If you say I need 
two pens and the only answer you get is, the pens are already in place, 
what do you do?”625
Kony’s order to disregard the MPs’ contribution caused a new round of 
rumours. Amongst the people watching from the sidelines, the idea 
circulated that during the most recent visit to Nabanga, the LRA high 
command had already abandoned the peace process. This was compounded 
by the observation that a senior diaspora outside advisor had left that day. 
Additionally, Machar had reportedly become angry with the LRA/M’s 
demand to take another break for continued consultations in Nabanga and, 
at the request of the member of the team affiliated with the Uganda 
People’s Congress (UPC), to take a day off to commemorate the anniversary 
of Obote’s death. In the morning, one delegate had said to me that “the VP 
is overworked,” reportedly because he had told the LRA the day before that 
“nobody wanted to touch the LRA, you are seen as terrorists.” “We are still 
struggling with this perception problem,” said the delegate, who explained 
that the MPs’ pitching in not only put too much political pressure on the 
LRA, but also robbed them of their political viability.626 An incident in which 
the MP from Pader was overheard telling Kony on the phone that it was a 
622 Fieldnotes, Juba: 12/10/2006.
623 Fieldnotes, Juba: 11/10/2006.
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possibility that the Ugandan constitution might be changed during the Juba 
Talks caused distrust among MPs and between the MPs and the LRA/M.627 
Despite the LRA/M’s clumsiness in garnering broader political support, signs 
of significant transformation were not absent in Juba, particularly when 
both actors stepped back from their usual way of operating and a space to 
discuss Ugandan politics and its conflicts was created. One day, turning the 
corner of the Juba Raha Hotel, I caught sight of Gulu District Chairman Mao 
sitting in the shade across the yard, talking to Ugandan MPs. The MPs were 
livid. They had read in the Ugandan papers that the talks had collapsed 
because of LRA allegations that the UPDF was ambushing LRA fighters in 
the proposed assembly areas. That much was true, and it was also true that 
in return, the GoU had claimed that the LRA had not assembled and had 
thus violated the CoH. The rest was journalistic interpretation: in a press 
release the LRA/M had actually stated that they would reconsider their 
participation in the talks should the UPDF remain in their vicinity. The 
papers reported this as an LRA threat to abandon the talks in seven days. 
“This is too aggressive,” said one MP. “The LRA is not politically astute. 
Instead of calling Museveni’s bluff by not threatening to walk out of talks, 
they fall into the trap of putting blame for possible failure of talks on 
themselves.” This confirmed my observation. The LRA was so concerned 
about being the inferior negotiation partner and with maintaining control 
that they easily lost sight of when the bigger political picture might be 
advantageous for them. I asked what he meant by “calling his bluff”. 
“Museveni wants to make the LRA quit the talks,” he explained. Mao 
pitched in: “That is why every statement of the LRA is exaggerated by the 
government. It is to make these people sound unreasonable.” Mao 
suggested that the LRA should announce that they would run patrols and 
ask for a car with a machine gun from the SPLA to do so: “They can call 
Museveni’s bluff if there are now skirmishes between the LRA and the UPDF 
near the assembly area because it proves that both LRA and UPDF are 
there.” “Now that LRA is no longer in Uganda, it would be a good time for 
Museveni to have the talks collapse,” another MP said. “If talks collapse, 
UPDF will make sure that the LRA does not get back into Uganda. There are 
really no pockets left for them.” He added that Museveni had even 
admitted that new troops had been deployed to Sudan. They recognised a 
familiar pattern: “When UPDF was accused of doing stuff in Rwanda, 
Museveni deployed troops to patrol borders to prove that UPDF was not 
there. Imagine!” Generally, another MP said, an opportunity had been 
missed. It had been two weeks since the signing of the CoH, “these should 
have been used to get concessions from Museveni on comprehensive 
627 Fieldnotes, Juba: 10/10/2006.
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solutions. The LRA should have used that time while they are still in 
Uganda. Also, the UN says Agenda 2 was an impressive document. But 
nothing is being said about that in the press.”
It was interesting to see a Ugandan politician express the thought that the 
LRA might act as a political player but was at the same time depoliticising 
itself through a misplaced focus. This seemed to be a shift in perception, 
both of the LRA/M, and also of their potential usefulness to push the 
individual political agendas of MPs.628 It was a glimpse of a transformative 
process in which it would become more firmly established that both conflict 
parties were playing a role in the continuation of the conflict. The change 
was even perceptible during a UK parliamentary discussion in early 2007: 
“Museveni is a more or less democratically elected leader,” argued a UK 
parliamentarian. “But it would also be helpful if the Ugandan government 
could make clear that resolution is at the heart of what they want.”629  To 
counter allegations that they were biased in their analysis, advocacy groups, 
such as the International Crisis Group (ICG), started to qualify each record of 
supposed LRA atrocities. They now mentioned the possibility that others 
had committed the crimes, for example: “Since April, armed actions 
attributed (not always accurately) to the LRA resumed in Sudan’s Western 
Equatoria state and the Bas Uélé district of the Congo (DRC).”630  For the 
LRA/M, these admissions translated into a changing overall image of the 
LRA—a premature conclusion.
Misinterpretation of Disconnect
The waves of engagement in the Juba Talks were externally interpreted in a 
rather black-and-white manner. Moments of seemingly wavering 
commitment to the talks by the LRA/M were readily taken as signs of 
insincerity and of a plan to use the Juba Talks for military regrouping. It is 
worth looking at a few examples that illustrate how the Juba Talks were 
perceived by the LRA/M and why they reacted in a way that jeopardised the 
talks. 
After they had connected for the Juba Talks, delegates wondered whether 
they would be treated as equal partners around the table. Frustration 
visibly grew within the delegation, particularly when they felt their efforts 
to connect were not being repaid in kind. Krispus Ayena at one point 
animatedly explained to me that “Kony is very committed, Otti not so 
628 Fieldnotes, Juba: 28/9/2006.
629 Author notes from Westminster Adjournment Debate on the Juba Peace Talks, UK Parliament, 23/1/2007.
630 International Crisis Group. Northern Uganda: The road to peace, with or without Kony. In Africa Report. Nairobi/ Brussels, 2008, p.i.
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much, he is a bit more volatile and the government response so far is less 
than nothing.”631 A few months into the peace talks, one delegate said that 
the mediation team was doing a bad job of preserving the “dignity of the 
LRA”, confirming to me that the last few months from the LRA’s point of 
view had been mainly spent proving their own worthiness. At various points 
the delegation was in a state of disarray at what they perceived to be 
disrespectful treatment. When the CHMT was formed, the LRA and UPDF 
contingents on the team observed each other’s moves closely. In the early 
days in particular, the LRA members were vocal about being treated 
unfairly by the UPDF members. When I asked what they thought of their 
UPDF colleagues, I was told that the UPDF colonel especially was “a bit 
bossmatic” and was not prepared to connect with his LRA colleagues on the 
same level.632 
When the LRA/M delegation was moved to the outskirts of town to the 
Juba Bridge Hotel, delegates were sure that this was a move to get them 
further away from the proceedings. They took it as a reason to spend 
numerous days waiting around the Juba Bridge Hotel, not knowing what 
was supposed to happen, but resigned to the fact that they had no way to 
find out. “We are disconnected,” was how delegates commonly explained 
their experience in the peace talks, both around the table and in terms of 
infrastructure. It took a few months for UNICEF to sponsor a computer and 
a satellite Internet connection for the LRA/M’s use at their hotel.633 The lack 
of communication could be seen as an oversight by the mediation team, but 
it also highlighted the LRA/M’s behavioural patterns. Rather than seek out 
the (at the time admittedly few) opportunities to communicate by different 
means, they used the situation as an incentive to disconnect, emphasising 
their marginalisation and the insincerity of the peace talks. This experience 
of the peace talks would later turn out to make new rounds of talks more 
complicated. This concept has been widely reflected in scholarship: Zartman 
argues that as conflict continues, grievances become more rather than less 
complex, posing ever greater challenges to resolution.634 The same can also 
be said for peace processes: making the connections to the Juba Talks also 
meant that the process itself added new layers of conflict through the way 
the LRA/M felt treated. These new layers of conflict in turn needed to be 
peeled away before old grievances could even be addressed. 
631 Fieldnotes, Juba: 11/10/2006.
632 Fieldnotes, Juba/ Magwi: 2/10/2006.
633 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/9/2006.
634 W.Zartman, "Negotiating Internal, Ethnic and Identity Conflicts in a Globalized World", International Negotiation 11, 2006, p.258. 
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When Machar suggested that the LRA deploy two members of the 
delegation to travel to Uganda to see whether moving LRA fighters were 
being left alone by the UPDF and to be available in case LRA groups needed 
support or accompaniment, the LRA/M delegates pushed back decisively. 
One leading delegate was enraged at the VP’s suggestion that it should be 
two members of the delegation. The reason for his outrage was not clear to 
me. I asked him why he thought it was a bad idea. “We cannot,” he replied. 
“We cannot.” I kept asking him why. It transpired eventually that he 
actually thought it was a very good idea, but he felt it had disregarded the 
delegation’s authority to make their own decisions. “But it has been 
suggested to us very late, at the 11th hour. We are being cornered, 
cornered.”635 
The perceived—and real—power imbalance between all negotiation 
partners and the mediation team caused major disconnects. In late 
September 2006, Otti said that he would completely withdraw from 
communication with the GoU delegation or the mediator, because they 
treated his delegates unfairly. “Vincent does not talk to anyone any more, 
not to Rugunda or Machar,” one delegate explained. “He told Machar that 
he was turning into a headache. Machar was shocked and Vincent just told 
again Machar was giving him a headache.”636  Otti confirmed his connect/
disconnect relationship with Machar to me: “I like Riek Machar. He is 
neutral, but sometimes not neutral enough. But now I don’t speak to him.” 
However, for Otti this did not by any means signal an end of his 
engagement with the talks: his disconnecting was just supposed to usher in 
a new k ind of engagement . He saw a so lut ion in Afr i can 
internationalisation: “Maybe we can get more help from South Africa and 
some more observers.”637
At one point in November 2006, the delegation had asked for time off for 
consultations with the high command in the bush. Because progress in the 
talks was negligible at the time, Machar was reluctant to let them go. On 
the morning of November 6, a member of the peace talks secretariat visited 
the LRA/M in their hotel and threatened that if they were to go to Ri-
Kwangba, it would be a repeat of the incident in July 2006 when GoSS had 
abandoned an obstinate LRA/M delegation and left them behind in the 
bush. After hearing this threat, a visibly upset delegation gathered under 
the large mango tree. Ojul had been scheduled to fly out to Nairobi that 
635 Fieldnotes, Juba: 12/9/2006.
636 Fieldnotes, Juba: 28/9/2006.
637 Author interview with Vincent Otti. Ri-Kwangba: 22/9/2006.
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day—to connect with the German ambassador in Nairobi, he said. Now Ojul 
reiterated several times that such incidents confirmed the need to move the 
Juba Talks elsewhere: “They [GoSS] think we have nowhere to go. But there 
is German support and support from Italy.”638  However, delegates 
wondered, was the threat of abandonment by GoSS an official message 
from Machar? Or had just one member of the mediation team shown his 
temper? The connect/disconnect mechanism as it played out in the LRA/M’s 
relationship with Machar became very clear. The delegates were furious 
about being threatened, reacting with the desire to immediately drop their 
connection to Machar: it was a clear moment of disconnect. However, they 
countered their anger by connecting: shortly after, delegates went to 
Machar’s office. The LRA never fully trusted Machar, yet he was also the 
cornerstone of the peace effort—the only person who could provide 
genuine help. Internally, the LRA/M is a network of trust and distrust; their 
outside relationship with Machar was working with the same mechanism.
After the messengers had been dispatched to Machar, a delegate explained 
to me that he saw one major ongoing problem with the talks: “We never 
moved beyond this as a favour to the LRA,” he said. “We are always told we 
should be thankful more than anything else. We are beggars.”639  He 
recalled an event from mid-September, when his delegation refused to go 
and visit Ri-Kwangba because none of them had been paid the allowance 
that had been agreed as part of the Juba Talks. They did not accept 
assurances that their money would be processed later. The chartered plane, 
already on its way from Lokichokio, flew back empty, at a cost of $20,000 to 
GoSS. He felt that this was a good example when everyone had treated the 
delegates as beggars, an image that continued to haunt the LRA/M 
delegation in 2006 and the early months of 2007. Months later, one 
member said that he felt that through the last few months, not only had 
some of the LRA/M’s position papers been changed, but “the government is 
not making any concessions at all, they are treating us like beggars, they 
are not connecting.”640
Galvanic Surges
In June 2010, I received an email from someone who had worked for 
UNICEF in Uganda just before the warrants for the LRA were issued. He 
638 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/11/2006. The hope that Germany would support the LRA/M in moving the talks elsewhere was very high, and St 
Egidio’s June 2006 suggestion that talks could be held in Rome was still resonating.
639 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/11/2006
640 Fieldnotes, Cologne: 1/1/2007.
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described working in the aid community in Kampala during the time 
leading up to the issuing of arrest warrants for the LRA leaders as 
the most surreal situation, where practically everyone I knew in 
Uganda agreed on one analysis (this will make peace impossible 
and get lots of people killed) and the external analysis (this will 
force the LRA to the table) were the exact opposite. It was deeply 
frustrating, and I find it problematic when the international 
community create these narratives that then get taken up as true 
and somehow work themselves into good practice.641  
The galvanic surge of shared opinion and developing consensus among 
external international actors offered a stark contrast to the LRA/M’s 
alternating current of moving towards change and a successful peace 
negotiation. A few weeks into the peace talks, I overheard Machar speaking 
on the telephone with the White House. The US had so far shown no 
particular interest in the talks. Additionally, Machar had received a lot of 
dissension from international organisations and the press for meeting Kony, 
handing him money and facilitating the peace talks. Chatting to a White 
House representative, Machar gave a general overview of the situation in 
Juba. Defending his decision to entrust $20,000 in cash to Kony, he said that 
“we saw the money trickle back into our civilian community.” When asked 
how he would deal with negotiating peace without the main person 
present, he replied that he was “thinking about other talk models, not 
face-to-face talks”. He explained that he was looking for diplomatic 
support from Rwanda and that “Norway has offered.” Signing off, he 
emphasised that outside assistance was needed—including from the White 
House: “There is no good news unless you guys support us.”642 
In pleading for White House backing and the greater international support 
that might follow from that, Machar was onto the right mechanism to 
ensure success. When his contact with the LRA first became known, 
international reactions were largely subdued. Neither the LRA nor Machar 
had credibility to push this process through; the debate about how to deal 
with the ICC warrants in peace negotiations brought no clarity. When they 
have to overcome obstacles and break new ground, the wider international 
community, including in this case advocacy groups, the press, the ICC, the 
UN and various governments, functions best when broad consensus creates 
momentum and reinforces mutual confidence. Such a galvanic surge of 
support benefits those who are part of it in many ways. Funding is easier to 
secure if groups and initiatives can show they are close to success or 
represent a cause that is widely considered relevant. The policy 
environment is more easily convinced when multiple actors send the same 
641 Personal email to author former international UNICEF staff in Uganda. 20/6/2010.
642 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/9/2006.
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message. Advocacy groups can forge operational alliances based on 
consensus, which then allows the pitching of a streamlined mass-compatible 
message. Machar reasoned correctly that if momentum developed that 
supported the Juba Talks, the galvanic surge of outside opinion would 
allow some of the more difficult points, for example the ICC warrants, to be 
swept up in the general enthusiasm for a negotiated peace.
In other moments, Machar, needing the galvanic surge of opinion, acted 
out different versions of public support or opposition, depending on which 
would be more helpful to move issues along. One day, Machar and the then 
MP for Magwi County, Ogwaro, were waiting in Ri-Kwangba. The peace 
talks were scheduled to begin the next day, and Machar elaborated to 
Ogwaro that he fully expected some local opposition in Juba: “There will be 
demonstrations against the peace talks. People will be saying ‘we don’t 
want [the LRA] here.’” Ogwaro agreed that members from her constituency 
who had endured the most of the LRA presence in Sudan would indeed 
want to protest: “The Acholi will demonstrate,” she replied. Thinking of 
how often the Sudanese Acholi had been accused of being complicit with 
the LRA and the disharmony it had created in southern Sudan, Machar liked 
that idea. “That will exonerate you,” he said. “Let’s stage it!”643
How the galvanic surge developed in the Juba Talks was clearly visible. In 
the early days, when Machar was asking the White House for support, his 
own and Pax Christi’s initiative was backed only by a Swiss government 
willing to take a risk and stay under the radar. The galvanic surge of 
criticism, on the other hand, hit the early days of the talks: human rights 
groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch questioned the 
legality of engaging the LRA in talks, other donor governments were 
unwilling to fund, and the ICC insisted that executing the warrants had 
priority. As the talks moved along, the galvanic surge moved towards 
supporting the talks. It took a few weeks for Egeland, possibly motivated by 
the huge exposure the conflict had gained after his visit to northern 
Uganda, to involve OCHA as the lead organisation within the UN to help 
facilitate talks, and yet another few weeks for the prominent UN support to 
be no longer referred to as “Egeland’s ‘rogue project’”,644  as Baare 
recounts. Egeland explained that his support was based on the need to fill a 
gap that had arisen because other parts of the UN system were not ready to 
commit resources in the early days: 
What of course was a weakness in the process… was that the 
political department of the UN and those who know peace 
mediation, and indeed on a professional basis, were not really 
643 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 13/7/2006.
644 A.Baaré, "Opinion Paper Juba Process: Security arrangements and DDR (Draft Document)",  2008.
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involved. Because there were no resources from their side. That is 
why by default my own organisation OCHA was asked to and 
encouraged to go into… We are not supposed to deal with peace 
processes. OCHA was supposed to coordinate the humanitarian 
responses. But since nobody was able to organise a meaningful 
international support to the southern Sudanese peace effort, we 
did it. And I think that was very important because if we hadn’t, 
the whole thing would have been fell apart [sic] very early and we 
could have had a much bigger conflict again upon our hands much 
earlier.645  
The scaffolding of the peace talks strengthened week by week. With 
Switzerland and then OCHA and UNICEF on board, the galvanic surge 
meant that criticism became more subdued. Instead of stressing the need to 
execute the warrants, the ICC foregrounded its role as the force that 
brought about the promising Juba Talks and made Uganda safe again. The 
swelling of the galvanic surge does not imply that all international actors 
were heading towards unanimity; however, often the extent to which a 
range of international actors was gradually working towards signing a 
peace agreement that would satisfy the ICC to not pursue its warrants is in 
retrospect often underplayed. A few months into the talks, the UN installed 
Mozambique’s former president Chissano as the Special Envoy of the UN 
Secretary General. When success seemed probable, the broad consensus 
changed: even US advocacy groups who had been critical of the talks and in 
support of military options, such as Invisible Children, appeared in Juba as 
great advocates of the peace talks. Finally AU observers arrived to 
strengthen the CHMT. More countries started donating and sending 
observers, including from the EU, the USA and the AU (from Mozambique, 
DRC, Tanzania, South Africa and Kenya). 
Once momentum was created, the international actors were keen to move 
things along to show that their engagement was a game-changer. The 
situation had not become any less complicated with more international 
engagement, but the galvanic surge created a space in which the external 
rule book could be bent. As waves of opinion washed over Juba, the 
galvanic surge interpreted the Rome Statute at various times as the greatest 
obstacle to or the greatest facilitator of a peaceful solution. Whether 
international opinion supported the idea that the ICC warrants could be 
addressed without delivering Kony and his commanders to The Hague 
depended less on what happened in Juba, and more on how various 
international actors supported each other in believing that it could be 
done. Through this mechanism, international opinion often became 
disconnected from current dynamics in the Juba process, creating skewed 
incentives along the way. 
645 Telephone author interview with Jan Egeland, former UN-Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs, 15/10/2007.
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Skewed Incentives and Cognitive Dissonance
Those participating in the galvanic surge tried to find loopholes in their 
own rule book. For the international community navigating the new 
requirements of the Rome Statute, the Africanisation argument was useful: 
it allowed the glossing over of the lack of clarity on how to deal with the 
ICC. Depending on the power of the galvanic surge, the ICC was viewed as a 
powerful instrument, a much-needed last resort to end violence, or as the 
ultimate obstacle to achieving a negotiated solution with perpetrators 
wanted by the ICC. Those who saw the ICC as useful cited it as the main LRA 
motivation for entering talks. The International Crisis Group’s bold 
statement that “the threat of prosecution clearly rattled the LRA military 
leadership, pushing them to the negotiating table,” however, was hard to 
verify, since nobody had had a conclusive conversation to find out whether 
the LRA was rattled.646  Judging from conversations, it seemed that it was 
not the threat of prosecution that was occupying the LRA imagination. 
After all, they had a rather limited understanding of what an ICC warrant 
meant, as Otti indicated in his first phone call with me. It was rather the 
humiliation of being singled out as war criminals. This also influenced 
external actors’ behaviour, as it conveyed the idea that even if no peace 
deal was reached, there was still another obvious way to tackle the problem 
through criminal prosecution.
With increased momentum, the mismatch of international guidelines and 
the practice of galvanic surges became increasingly obvious. Having moved 
the process onto the international stage, “parochialising” it again fulfilled a 
powerful purpose: it allowed the LRA to argue that the international 
system was patronising, and the international system to show its cultural 
awareness, which effectively covered up its own contradictory frameworks. 
As Baare, the technical advisor on issues of demobilisation, wrote: 
As the stature of the Juba process grew, the international 
community, including the UN, saw in their support to the GoSS and 
the Juba process a way of possibly managing the tricky political 
situation presented by the LRA. It allowed them to describe the 
process as an “African solution for African problems” while still 
supporting the ICC warrants. In practice, this meant that donors 
and supporters of the process could engage with the parties while 
still stating that a final peace agreement should adhere to the 
Rome Statute (1998), which in principle allows national 
prosecution instead of prosecution by the ICC, one of the key 
demands of both the LRA and GoU.647
646 International Crisis Group. Northern Uganda: The road to peace, with or without Kony. In Africa Report. Nairobi/ Brussels, 2008, p.15. 
Sam Kolo reportedly talked about Kony’s fear of the ICC, however. 
647 A.Baaré, "Opinion Paper Juba Process: Security arrangements and DDR (Draft Document)",  2008.
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Egeland, reflecting on his own role in the talks, also separated the pursuit 
of solutions in Juba and possible decisions at the highest UN level: 
We were very clear always that the ICC had to be respected as an 
independent judicial entity that did what they thought was right 
in serving the law and in serving justice. My mandate was to try to 
prevent suffering, continued and future suffering… When I went 
to see Kony it was very clear that, number one, I could not and 
would not discuss the ICC. And number two I would do my utmost 
to make sure that they understood that a return to terror would 
be horrible, not only for the civilian people, but also for 
themselves. And we tried to make the alternative to continued war 
and terror as attractive as possible.648
The nature of the galvanic surge is that it attracts bandwaggoning. During 
moments when the broader conditions for peace seemed right—i.e. when it 
seemed more likely that a deal would be signed—support for the process 
increased tremendously, corners could be cut and the LRA was further 
encouraged to connect. Support was withdrawn when the process seemed 
at its weakest, contributing to a downward spiral. A former international 
aid worker who had been based in Kampala at the time of the last Bigombe 
process explained, “Within international agencies, when one thing becomes 
the narrative, it just becomes a gigantic echo. It just echoes back and 
forth.”649  A striking example of how the galvanic surge develops 
momentum was given to me after the US LRA Bill had been signed. Invisible 
Children, as one of the main lobbying organisations in support of the Bill, 
told me that they had been holding back on spending their funds in 
Uganda in anticipation of the signing of the LRA Bill. The reasoning for 
keeping cash was so “that we are able to spend a lot of money once the act 
leads to action.”650 ⁠ In my mind, this was a good example of how galvanic 
surges work. With money released as soon as the LRA Bill was signed, the 
Bill would instantly look like a success. In reality, it was just a repetition of a 
damaging self-referential pattern that creates action only through action. 
For the Juba Talks, engaging only when success was guaranteed meant that 
in the early days of the talks, Juba-based NGOs answered with dead silence 
around the table when they were asked during Egeland’s visit to step forth 
with supportive programmes at a point when the talks were extremely 
uncertain. Proposals started to come in when success seemed more likely 
and, as Eaton calls it in describing peace work in Kenya, the “business of 
648 Phone author interview with Jan Egeland, former UN-Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs, 27/8/2009.
649 Fieldnotes, New York: 24/9/2010.
650 Fieldnotes US Department of Defense expert meeting “Eliminating the threat to civilian an regional stability posed by the Lord’s 
Resistance Army”. Washington, D.C: 30/9/10.
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peace” started rolling.651  In September 2006, when the process was not 
without hitches, but certainly promising, the US Senate passed a bill to 
support the peace process.652 Aware that outside support would strengthen 
his own role and in turn solicit more support, Machar was delighted when I 
told him about the Senate resolution: “Get it to me so that I can brag!” he 
exclaimed. He was so excited about the support that when he saw me 
chatting to Ayena shortly afterwards, he interrupted to ask: “Are you 
exposing my secret?”653  He also gave a succinct description of how the 
galvanic surge was utilised by those joining it: “Museveni will only come [to 
Juba] when there is one little thing left so that he can quickly solve it and 
then be the hero.”654 
The LRA/M experienced this wave-like engagement as a double standard or 
abuse of powerful office. It alienated them from opportunistic external 
actors.655  In a meeting with UN officials, Kony addressed the crowd and 
explained where he saw those double standards: 
When Egeland went to northern Uganda, he had personal 
interviews with people in camps. People were very clear: “we were 
brought here by government.” Now people are dying by 
thousands in Kitgum and Pader. Now world is doing nothing about 
it. Is this fairness of the world? I want the world to understand 
[this double standard] if there is to be a final resolution of conflict 
in this world.656  
He expressed his bewilderment with the UN system: “What I want us to 
understand clearly is business of UN. What is UN? Me, you, and everybody. 
You go to Uganda, people working for the UN, Sudan same. UN is the 
people. Should not be used out of context like dragon.”657 What he meant 
by the dragon analogy became clearer a little later: it was the image used 
to explain that the UN chose to intervene only when it felt strong enough 
651 Eaton specifically describes the decades of inefficient peace work along the Uganda-Kenya border in which “Peace meetings are often 
only held so NGOs can display an engagement with the conflict, despite the dangers created by such events,” but pointing out that the 
cycle of inefficient peace work is unlikely to be broken because “peace work is big business”. D.Eaton, "The Business of Peace: Raiding and 
peace along the Kenya-Uganda Border (Part II)." African Affairs 107, 427, 2008. P.243. In the case of Save the Children Uganda, the 
position on whether or not to support the peace process see-sawed during the entire process.
652 The Senate of the United States,"Resolution 573 SRS ATS",109th Congress, 2nd session, 2006.
653 Author interview with Riek Machar, Vice-President of the Government of Southern Sudan. Juba: 26/9/2006.
654 Author interview with Riek Machar, Vice-President of the Government of Southern Sudan. Juba: 26/9/2006.
655 Buruma and Margalit make a similar point in their explanation of antagonism towards the US: “Some people are antagonistic to the 
United States simply because it is so powerful. Others resent the U.S. government for helping them, or feeding them, or protecting them, in 
the way one resents an overbearing father. And some hate America for turning away when help is expected”. I.Buruma and A.Margalit, 
"Occidentalism: A Short History of Anti-westernism", New York: 2005, loc118-20.
656 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 12/12/2006.
657 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 12/12/2006.
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to succeed without a doubt, invincible like a dragon. Specifically, Kony’s 
reasoning went, the UN made sure of this by only tackling tasks that were 
guaranteed success; it would not intervene when its opponents still seemed 
strong enough to stand a chance of keeping the upper hand: 
You know arms are traded across the border of Sudan and Uganda. 
What does that mean? In short while, war is going to break 
between Sudan and Uganda. What is UN doing about that? They 
are allowing to happen, provided you are the strong man.658 
There were obvious reasons for the galvanic surge, and the LRA/M were 
well aware that they were offering strong benefits to those outsiders to 
whom they had connected—including myself. They repeatedly referred to 
the business opportunities for peacemakers. St Egidio, who were very 
prominently engaged in the early days of the talks but whose commitment 
waned as the peace talks faltered, stated in a paper written by a member 
that a prerequisite for those wanting to facilitate peace was to have “no 
ulterior motives besides peacemaking. Not having a hidden agenda or 
personal interests is perceived by the parties in conflict as a guarantee of 
serious mediation marked by a spirit of justice.”659  Yet the LRA/M 
recognised that gaining recognition by being a peacemaker is itself an 
ulterior motive. If that recognition seems within reach, more people and 
organisations emerge to share it. Incentives to join peace talks, particularly 
with a galvanic surge, become skewed as a singular notion of success arises. 
Bandwaggoning pushes the galvanic surge even faster. 
Examples of how the skewed incentives played out abound: trying to catch 
the galvanic surge, those interested in making peace had for years enacted 
cognitive dissonance by pursuing methods of peacemaking that had failed 
in the past. Continuing with the same patterns was based, against better 
judgment, on the belief that somehow it would work this time. Van Evera 
has examined organisational processes of self-evaluation, and his 
assessment could help explain why neither the LRA/M nor external actors 
were able to significantly change their behaviour to move towards a 
peaceful solution. He has identified the inability of state institutions to 
evaluate their own beliefs and propaganda, 
to test ideas against logic and evidence, weeding out those that 
fail. As a result, national learning is slow and forgetting is quick. 
The external environment is perceived only dimly, through a fog of 
myths and misperceptions.
Any significant shift in perception would of course also threaten the 
standing of the incumbent leadership, including possibly the leadership of a 
658 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 12/12/2006. 
659 M.Giro, "The Community of Saint Egidio and its Peace-Making Activities", The International Spectator XXXIII, 3, July - September 1998.
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critical opponent. “As a result,” van Evera concludes, “the ‘free marketplace 
of ideas’ often creates a confusion-sowing competition among charlatans 
that generates more darkness than light.”660
An international aid worker gave me an example of how the cognitive 
dissonance between belief in solutions and their reality played out. Having 
worked closely with donors in Uganda, he commented on the relentless 
competition in the international diplomatic and aid community to emerge 
as the successful facilitator of an LRA peace agreement. In Kampala in 2004, 
donors had agreed that they would all pull the same strings to facilitate 
peace talks. Nobody would make separate attempts, to avoid a situation in 
which various peace talks facilitators were in competition with each other 
and could thus be manipulated by the LRA. Specifically, it was decided that 
nobody would pay any LRA contacts to make a connection to Kony. While 
individual donors such as the Netherlands did coordinate with NGOs to stop 
attempts at peace, donor competition remained fierce. Shortly after the 
agreement had been made within the donor and agency crowd, explained 
the aid worker,
everybody started giving money and satellite phones. The image of 
being the one person who walks into the bush, takes Joseph Kony 
by the hand and says to him, you, Joseph, and I, we will walk 
slowly to Gulu, step by step, and we will make peace—to be the 
one person that brings Kony out of the bush—that image makes 
people stupid.661
Or, as one delegate put it to me after a day when the various interests of 
other players in the Juba Talks had been foregrounded in discussions of the 
roles of the two conflict parties: “The question of who kills first is not only 
between LRA and the government. It is also the problem solving that 
becomes like a competition.”662  His point was that with the jostling for 
success among external actors, the LRA/M delegation (which at that 
particular point had been struggling with its internal dynamics) was also 
able to play the external actors off against each other. The focus, he said, 
was no longer on solving the issues, but on who would be able to take the 
most credit—in other words, who would be able to say that they were the 
person leading Kony out of the bush, holding his hand. That is why after 
initial hesitation the LRA’s connect phase was greeted with great 
enthusiasm. 
660 S. Van Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self Evaluation by States and Societies." Security Studies Program  (2002).
661 Fieldnotes, New York: 24/9/2010. The LRA knew how to sell the most powerful good they had to offer: the promise of peace. In Gulu, 
most aid workers become aware after a while that everyone runs scams by promising access to Kony. The GoU is not immune to this: a 
famous story involved a porter at Lacor hospital who conned Salim Saleh out of 50,000 Ugandan shillings by promising to take him to Kony.
662 Author interview with LRA/M delegate. Juba: 15/10/2006.
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By September 2007, the impact of the galvanic surge was impressive. In a 
confidential meeting with US Senator Feingold in Kampala, members of the 
diplomatic community emphasised their engagement in the peace process. 
The Dutch hoped for a US role in influencing Museveni directly while being 
able to provide intelligence. Norway acknowledged that while the country 
supported the ICC, internal debate on justice and peace was a lot more 
nuanced, leading to the withdrawal of Norway’s support for the EU’s 
terrorist list to allow more flexibility in the Juba Talks. The UK supported 
the US by keeping the LRA on their terrorist list to maintain the pressure to 
sign a peace deal. Several donor nations had contributed the Juba Initiative 
Fund (JIF) to pay for the GoSS peace secretariat and for LRA/M delegation 
expenses, including per diems.663  Yet at the same time, away from Juba, 
other galvanic surges were at play which would become important again. 
US diplomatic personnel on the ground acknowledged in a confidential 
briefing that there was a discrepancy between the real impact of the Juba 
Talks and the advocacy-driven narrative prevalent in Washington. 
Having witnessed IDP returns and a secure northern Uganda, US embassy 
staff filed a report stating: “It is clear to post that the briefings provided by 
advocacy NGOs to the Hill  are not giving sufficient weight to positive 
developments in the north at the Juba talks.”664  The previous year, on 
November 9, 2006, the six Gulu Night Centres had been asked to close since 
so few children were using them for night commutes. Probation and 
Welfare Officer Joseph Kilama had said that all centres with fewer than 100 
children were expected to close before November 15.665  For international 
groups whose galvanic surge of support rested on a different vision of the 
situation in northern Uganda, time seemed to have stood still. US 
confidential cables describe how on August 10, 2007, Invisible Children’s 
CEO Ben Keesey had updated the US ambassador to Uganda on his 
organisation’s activities, such as “visiting U.S. college campuses… to update 
audiences on the current night commuter statistics.666
One of the main people on the LRA side in the early stages of the Juba Talks 
came to epitomise how external actors seek out the information that fits 
their galvanic surge at that moment. A few months after his defection from 
the LRA in late 2007, this former delegate was arrested after a satellite 
phone call was traced as having been placed by him from a hill in Kampala. 
The phone call had been made to intelligence agencies to deliver inside LRA 
663 US Embassy Kampala"07KAMPALA1419: Senator Feingold discusses northern Ugandan issues ", September 2007.
664 US Embassy Kampala. "07KAMPALA1172: Uganda: Roundup on Staffdel Smith and Kuiken visit”,17/7/2007.
665 J.Eriku, "Gulu orders night centres to close", The Daily Monitor 9/11/2006. 
666 US Embassy Kampala, "07KAMPALA1351 (for official use only): Northern Uganda notes: (Aug 11 - Aug 24, 2007)”, 24/8/2007.
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information in the final stages of the Juba Talks. The caller had identified 
himself as “Colonel Lubwoa Bwone”, and had been chillingly open about 
Kony’s real motivations in the peace talks. Both the US and the GoU 
considered “Bwone”, the man on the phone, “a very reliable source”. US 
sources documented the information coming from the supposed “Bwone”, 
who said he was 20 miles inside CAR and 30 miles from Kony. He confirmed 
on March 16 that UPDF and ICC reports of Kony’s relocation to CAR were 
true, that he himself had travelled with Kony, and that he was now with 
Odhiambo and General Abudema, “who were laying landmines to prevent 
an attack on Kony”. 
“Bwone” was telling the US precisely what they had suspected as the Juba 
Talks had failed to deliver a swift peace agreement: that Kony was working 
closely with Khartoum to spread a regional war. Khartoum, “Bwone” said, 
was also supporting the Acholi diaspora. “Bwone explained that this was 
being achieved because Kony had linked up “in CAR with Chadian rebel 
leader Mahamat Nouri, who allegedly had 2,000 people with him,” as the 
embassy cable stated. It further said that Kony would also take LRA fighters 
to “Bahr-el-gazel[sic]. Rankand-file [sic] LRA call it Darfur. Several sources, 
including “Bwone”, said that Khartoum was moving the LRA to Darfur to 
work with the janjaweed. “Bwone” stated that Khartoum’s intention was 
not to allow the “SPLA fellows to have their elections in Juba”, the US 
transcript reads. He confirmed that Kony had heavy weapons, including 
“four unused large weapons that can shoot down aircraft, weapons that 
had been abandoned in southern Sudan, and ammunition delivered by the 
Arabs”.667  Having detailed Kony’s thinking—and incidentally given the US 
exactly the kind of information that confirmed their worst fears—the man 
on the phone who claimed to be “Bwone” had said he wanted to defect, 
but needed money to do so. It was the request for money that initiated the 
tracing of the call and led to the discovery that the former LRA man had 
planted exactly the kind of information international intelligence had 
hoped for in his call from Kampala, which they had unquestioningly relayed 
to their headquarters. 
In an earlier chapter I have written about information and discourse on the 
LRA. The incident of the fake insider information given by “Bwone” to the 
US embassy in Kampala shows how discourse creates galvanic surges and 
vice versa. The fake phone caller had identified which information would 
most resonate with the embassy because it confirmed beliefs already held 
and increased the chances that the US would pay money to help the 
informer escape. Because the information seemed to fit, all disbelief could 
667 US Embassy Kampala. “08KAMPALA410 (classified secret): Ugandan officials not surprised by Kony’s movement into CAR,” 17/3/2008. 
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be suspended, creating instead the next wave of opinion that was to inform 
the next steps. 
Acting in Dissonance: Connect/Disconnect and Galvanic Surges
The galvanic surge of enthusiasm sent confusing signals to the LRA. One 
example of mixed messages was the LRA/M’s interaction with the press. 
With the LRA an accessible force and a delegation in Juba ready for 
interviews, the early days of the talks attracted intense press interest. For 
many journalists, the experience of covering the LRA meant creating a 
personal connection so as to be allowed to travel to the bush—and then to 
report as if they had come to the bush on their own intrepid account. This 
contradictory set-up often translated into rather bizarre scenes, as the lines 
between being a reporter and carrying of the trophy of making it to the 
LRA camp became blurred, sending confusing signals to the LRA about their 
position. Vincent Otti, on the one hand, clearly enjoyed the attention. He 
appeared from the bush for an impromptu press conference with 
impeccably ironed clothes, his previously grey hair died jet black. Yet on the 
other hand he also often seemed puzzled during his public encounters, 
because journalists would attack him for keeping children captive as 
soldiers, as did for example a journalist from the New Vision in the press 
conference on September 19, 2006. The same journalist then asked Otti if 
he could have his picture taken shaking Otti’s hand and patting him on the 
shoulder.668 
Moments like this strengthened the LRA/M’s view of themselves as strong 
and viable negotiation partners. They also became manifestations of how 
the LRA maintained people’s interest in them. By promising different levels 
of access, then withdrawing it and reinstating it, they let outsiders to 
believe that they were important and on the cusp of a breakthrough 
towards gaining a particular insight. During my own fieldwork, I went 
through many incarnations of becoming connected and disconnected. 
As enthusiasm for a peace deal further gained momentum, the business of 
engaging in peace talks became increasingly attractive for the LRA/M. 
Promises of visits to Rome by St Egidio and of air tickets to the US by 
Shortley strengthened the LRA/M in their understanding that they had 
retained control of the situation and could increase their demands. Talk of 
ICC warrants being suspended or overruled by Uganda’s government and 
668 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 19/9/2006.
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meetings with ambassadors had the same effect.669  In those moments, the 
LRA/M was a visible and viable force. Yet what became increasingly clear 
was that by connecting, the LRA/M had also initiated their own loss of 
control over the conflict, causing a retreat into the one mechanism that the 
LRA knew to regain that control: disconnecting. 
The failure to sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) is the most prominent 
example of disconnect to regain control and to reclaim LRA ownership of 
the process. Interpreting disconnect as withdrawal and a failure of the 
process, the externals stopped support for the Juba Talks. Lack of support 
made it more difficult for the LRA/M to reconnect, as it ended the LRA/M’s 
belief in the external umpire position and moved the process onto the 
military plane. The expectation that the externals would be just had created 
the moment of connect for the LRA/M. As the galvanic surge reached 
consensus that the LRA/M was not serious and that military pressure was 
needed, no incentive was left to prevent the LRA from disconnecting. 
However, the moment of disconnect was precisely when moments of 
transformation occurred, however slowly—for example, when the LRA/M 
was slowly facing up to its own complicated internal dynamics and how 
these obstructed the path to peace. Profoundly misinterpreting it as 
withdrawal meant that support for the process faltered when time was 
needed for the conflict to be transformed. 
For external actors, interpreting moments of disconnect as “alternating 
current” rather than withdrawal was challenging to impossible. The 
misinterpretation of disconnect created a galvanic surge for ending 
support. Signalling the end of support in the eyes of the LRA/M meant that 
external actors were losing their umpire position. One international advisor 
to the secretariat blamed misunderstood linearity for the slow negotiations: 
he explained to me that one problem was that the LRA/M was negotiating 
in a linear way. They were moving back and forth, rather than approaching 
issues simultaneously on two levels: one the official level for the leaders, 
and a back-channel process to carve out deals with the GoU. His point was 
that the LRA/M was simply not tactical, displaying either full commitment 
669 How this impression might have been created becomes clear when reading the description of the “Rome Platform” by St Egidio in 
relation to the Mozambican civil war. “The Rome Platform of January 1995, organised by the Community of St. Egidio, represents the first 
and only political attempt to end this bloody war. The aim was to get all parties to sit down and recognise each other as part of the same 
nation. In the Rome Platform, the FIS condemned violence and started its return to a terrain of political confrontation. The ‘peace offer’ 
called on the military to accept the presence of political alternatives, of a new pole with which to negotiate. The democratic and lay 
opposition forces that signed the Platform were to act as buffers between the two contenders. The formula used in Rome was to bring the 
FIS back into the political framework, moderating it and forcing it to take on commitments toward the public”. M.Giro, "The Community of 
Saint Egidio and its Peace-Making Activities", The International Spectator XXXIII, 3, July - September 1998. This was the kind of process the 
LRA had expected. 
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or none at all, and this was confusing. It was a different way to describe the 
alternating current. 
Machar gave a telling portrayal of how connect/disconnect and galvanic 
surge failed to align. In the early days of the talks he said that the GoU did 
not offer any concessions, allowing the LRA/M to be heard much more 
clearly if they chose to be heard. I spoke to Machar a few days after the 
upsetting incident in late July 2006 when LRA/M delegates had been left 
behind in Ri-Kwangba and Kony in reaction had ordered the military 
representatives to stay in the bush. Machar was annoyed that the lack of 
military men at the negotiating table was sending the signal that the LRA 
wanted to quit the talks, but more so that they were losing their voice by 
sending this signal. “They behave as if they want to quit,” he said. “Cars 
have been waiting for fighters in Nabanga for the last four days. Sometimes 
they are just delaying things. The government is arrogant. The LRA can 
keep the moral high ground if they continue to be engaged.”670
The lack of continuous tactics to keep the moral high ground became 
obvious in the Museveni handshake debacle. When Museveni came to Juba 
to visit both delegations, the deputy delegation leader Apire refused to 
shake his hand unless he apologise for atrocities committed against the 
Acholi. Rather than an opportunity to gain the publicity upper hand by 
extending the hand of peace—to fully connect—it had become a moment 
in which the LRA/M had made clear that they had yet to clarify what their 
aim was in the Juba Talks—that they were prepared at any point to 
disconnect.671  The message this sent to the external actors about the LRA/
M’s commitment was devastating, as it was interpreted simply as lack of 
interest in peace. 
The ending of Chissano’s mandate as the UN Special Envoy to LRA-Affected 
Areas in 2009 was interpreted in very similar ways by both the LRA/M and 
the advocacy group Resolve: both saw it as a UN signal that there was no 
longer any interest in pursuing a negotiated peace. In his final briefing to 
the UNSC, Chissano made a very different point: he called for a principled 
approach by the UN to support the peace process. His perspective was 
clearly informed by a more flexible understanding of the process, and by 
the realisation that in this case the UN was choosing to stick to its own rules 
in some moments but not in others. For better or for worse, as one aid 
worker for a UN agency pointed out, in moments where the success of 
670 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/9/2006.
671 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/11/2006.
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bending the rules seems unlikely, “in HQ, approaches tend to become very 
principled.”672 
Conclusion
For the LRA/M, connecting and disconnecting is a way to keep actors 
engaged, but also to consolidate internal thinking. Keeping people at arm’s 
length is a way to exert control. A similar mechanism of tightening and 
loosening connections works internally and holds together the “system 
LRA”. This is further discussed in a subsequent chapter. What was striking to 
observe regarding these LRA/M characteristics was how little outside actors 
used them strategically. An understanding of the alternating current driving 
the connect/disconnect would have been beneficial to keep the process 
going with a unified commitment by external actors. Instead, each moment 
of disconnect was viewed as being of grave consequence and led to a 
faltering commitment to the talks as energy flowed backwards. An 
uninterrupted commitment to talks and cessation of violence is preferable, 
but also unrealistic as belligerents edge towards each other. The 
interpretation of disconnect as a final stance on a peaceful solution, 
however, is also detached from reality. International commitment based on 
uninterrupted forward movement of the current assumes that the process 
simplifies choices, and that if it fails to do so it has failed as a process. The 
alternating current is certainly a reflection on the challenges of the process, 
but its existence cannot be used to judge the quality or sincerity of it. 
In mismatching an alternating-current mode of engagement with direct-
current mode, the Juba Talks produced contradictions that neither actor 
was able to overcome. Crucially, this meant that opportunities for genuine 
change were missed. The LRA/M failed to strengthen their connections as 
they were too concerned with maintaining control, and they failed to 
gather support by being perceived as unreliable. They experienced the 
international actors as too focused on achieving a goal rather than on 
engaging in the long haul of addressing political solutions. In turn, external 
actors failed to pursue challenging issues and maintain the stamina to 
overcome complex set-ups in moments of crucial change. In the end, both 
actors retreated into the familiar patterns that had sustained the conflict 
before and since the Juba Talks—and each side walked away from the Juba 
672 Fieldnotes, New York: 24/9/2010.
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process with confirmation that their initial assessment of the other had 
been right in the first place. 
Admittedly, operationally it presented a great risk to manage the LRA/M’s 
connect/disconnect mode without prejudging it. Likewise, creating subtlety 
within an international response that was reliant on broad support within 
all its institutions remains one of the great challenges in international 
processes. However, the Juba Talks highlighted an unresolved tension 
within the international community: rules are not clearly defined, and tend 
to be abandoned or reinstated depending on which way the wave of 
support goes. This highlights the international inability to engage with 
complex issues in a nuanced way. Instead of adjusting their approach when 
they lacked clarity, external actors in Juba chose to reduce their assessment 
of the process to righteous judgments of the LRA/M’s motivations. This 
assessment strengthened support for leverage through military pressure 
and ultimately a military strike, causing those motivations to falter. The 
fallout of this chain of reasoning was a prolonged conflict, thousands of 
lives lost and many more displaced or subjected to horrible living 
conditions, much more money spent on continuing the war than was spent 
on trying to make peace, and a diminished possibility for a nuanced peace 
process in the future. 
The implications of this conclusion take us toward a broader assessment of 
current approaches to peacemaking. The clash of operating modes led to 
both the LRA/M and external actors feeling confirmed—often in a righteous 
way—in their thinking. A transformative process needs a very different 
mindset and a willingness to engage on all levels with the complexities of 
how rebel groups seek peace and how the international system best and 
most credibly navigates its own set of rules. External actors had made their 
peacemaking framework much more complicated through the introduction 
of the Rome Statute, and were struggling to navigate it. Thus neither the 
LRA nor the external actors were able to credibly establish a working 
mechanism that would steady the LRA/M’s modus of connect/disconnect, 
deliver credible concessions from both belligerents, and be implementable 
regardless of divided international opinion.
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7. 2008: “Maybe We Came Too Close to the Enemy” 
Introduction
When I returned to southern Sudan in mid-January 2008 for a four-week 
stay, I found a vast range of moods in the LRA/M delegation. Some 
expressed frustration over the uncertainty of the peace process; others were 
intimidated by or defiant towards the LRA leader. Machar and some of the 
international observers acknowledged the LRA/M’s internal struggles, but 
seemed determined to separate these from bringing the talks to a 
successful conclusion. On my follow-up stays during almost all of March and 
the first half of April, and then most of June, these two parallel strands of 
the Juba Talks seemed to continue. 
2008 was to be a confusing year and this chapter gives an account of the 
events that made it so. Previously less obvious patterns of mistrust and 
miscommunication came to the fore, as did the parallel preparations for 
war and peace. Of the international actors, the US took on a new and 
prominent role, working behind the scenes to assure military preparations 
while being an observer at the talks. Within the delegation, roles of 
individuals became increasingly confusing, facilitating the often lazy 
assertion that the LRA/M just did not want peace. Nonetheless I mistakenly 
thought throughout most of the year that despite increasing brinkmanship, 
the peace process would somehow continue. This chapter chronicles the 
events that led to the end of the Juba Talks with a particular focus on the 
flows of information and various backchannels that contributed to the 
return to war in December 2008. 
January Changes
In January 2008, delegates and UN staff from Juba met with the LRA in Ri-
Kwangba for the first time since Otti’s death had been confirmed. Amongst 
those representing the LRA was Caesar Achellam. A member of UN security 
asked Achellam if he was at the meeting as the new number two, replacing 
Otti. Achellam responded that he was only representing Kony because Kony 
had “another engagement”, and that he was not number two. In fact, he 
said, “applications for the post are being screened.”673 An LRA/M delegate 
said that when he had asked Odhiambo whether he would be the new 
number two, Odhiambo had been unwilling to comment directly on Otti’s 
673 Author interview with UN security officer. Juba: 1/2/2008.
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death, but instead mentioned that nobody who had ever held the post of 
second-in-command survived.674 
Delegates recalled the January meeting as extremely difficult; they felt 
betrayed, mourned for Otti, and no longer knew how to engage with those 
in the bush. Just after the delegates had left Ri-Kwangba, Kony ordered a 
personnel reshuffle in his delegation, dismissing Ojul and Ayoo as chair and 
spokesperson, to be replaced by Matsanga and Obita respectively. A little 
later, a letter was delivered by the new chairman Matsanga to Machar in 
which Kony asked for the dismissal of Achama and Okirot from the CHMT. 
They were both ordered to return to the bush. The dismissals again fuelled 
rumours that the reason for Otti’s death and for the dismissal of a range of 
prominent delegates was to be found in the Mombasa meeting, at which all 
of those dismissed had been present. Former delegates wrote in their 
disgruntled repudiation of the Juba Talks:
The dismissal of Martin Ojul in particular and the reconstitution of 
the LRA/M delegation on the 22nd January 2008, and the dismissal 
of two LRA officers in the CHMT from the LRA in early February 
were partly a result of the above secret meetings [with Museveni 
during consultations and the Mombasa meeting], which were 
meant to compromise, infiltrate, lure and/or destroy the LRA peace 
team during the consultation exercise in Uganda.675
Having just been dismissed from the CHMT, one of the two young men was 
visibly distraught. He was twiddling his chunky satellite phone in his hands 
and barely looked up from the sheet of paper he was reading. “I am not 
sure what to do,” he said, describing his mission in the Juba process.
How is this possible after all the hardship? We walked hundreds of 
miles through the bush, breaking through security, getting to 
Kitgum, hiring a car, meeting Martin, meeting Assefa and Simon, 
then the first meeting with the VP on February 14, the first 
meeting ever! It was the first time the VP spoke to Vincent; we 
were getting everything off the ground.
But now, he continued, the delegation was being “renewed” and he and 
his colleague were “said to be Martin’s partners, so we have to go”. He had 
last spoken to Kony a few days before: “The chairman said nothing to me 
on Tuesday night. But the chairman is now being influenced by Matsanga; 
there are many stories about Matsanga. Matsanga only went to Nabanga 
last time, he did not even go to Ri-Kwangba.” I asked him what he was 
going to do—was he going back to the bush as ordered? “I am not sure if I 
should go and have no future at all,” he replied. “But I cannot stay in Juba, 
it is too expensive.” He looked at the paper in his hand. “I am not sure 
674 Fieldnotes, Juba: 2/2/2008.
675 LRA/M Peace Team, "Juba Peace Talks: The Record of Sabotage by the Government of Uganda; The Reasons General Joseph Kony 
Wants the Peace Agreement Revisited; and, The Way Forward", Nairobi: 6/11/2009.
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whether this is really the best for Ugandan people.”676 His colleague, also 
freshly dismissed, was more matter-of-fact. I asked him whether he was 
following the order to return. He answered: 
We are just on standby, next time you might not find us here. 
What has been decided has been decided. You cannot ask 
questions. This is how it has been decided; there is nothing I can do 
about it. There was an assassination attempt on Kony so this was 
what happened. But this demoralised the delegation and myself.
In the end, all those dismissed departed for Nairobi. In the delegation, the 
dismissal of Ojul, Ongom, Ayoo, Okirot and Achama was widely discussed. 
One delegate speculated that their having found agreement on too many 
issues was the reason for the breakdown of trust, confirming the division 
between the process and the agreements it produced, and that those now 
leaving “had come too close to being settled. Look at the timing: all of this 
comes after our tour of Uganda with all its implications. Maybe we came 
too close to the enemy.” I was not sure I understood what that meant. Did 
he mean that travelling to Uganda to meet the president was a bad 
decision? I asked if that was not precisely what was needed in a process 
that aimed to bring two parties together. He answered: “Maybe the 
delegation had gone too far in what they have negotiated? But then why is 
the new delegation saying that it is now very easy? I am not sure it makes 
sense to me. I can only speculate about motives.”
“LRA is now split into two camps,” explained another former delegate 
when I asked him how he felt about his dismissal. He was upset about Otti’s 
death and described to me the scene in Ri-Kwangba when he learned that 
Otti had been killed. “That man is a madman, killing Vincent when 
pleading for his life. I was going to resign but [another delegate] held my 
mouth shut,” said the same man who had previously boasted about his 
tight connection with the high command.
“It’s all fixed now,” said another delegate. “[One delegate] and [another 
delegate] are government moles so from now on it will be GoU and GoU at 
the table. But there is nothing more we can do. We have taken it this far; it 
is to our colleagues now to run the last laps. If they want to run the laps 
with the government, there is nothing we can do.” 
In contrast, Obita, who was taking over as delegation leader, seemed in a 
good mood. “I would say we look at the first week of March to sign the 
agreement, otherwise we will give Machar a heart attack,” he joked. Then 
he became serious. “Kony is ready to sign. We have to renew the CoH and 
then consult the consultations documents for a few days and then get back 
into it. We can start with Agenda 3 because it is easier to deal with 
676 Fieldnotes, Juba: 2/2/2008.
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implementation protocols than with Agenda 2. Two is more complicated. 
But I am in very good spirits.”677
Yet despite Obita’s optimism, with Ojul and Ayoo dismissed, the delegation 
in Juba was struggling to maintain coherence. One delegate commented 
that it was unfair that Ojul, who had led the delegation for close to two 
years, was now being blamed for the perceived failure of the talks. “It is 
not good how they said it that [Ojul] was leaving with disgrace. He needs a 
rest. Sometimes troubles come up and then you have to be careful and 
withdraw for a while. Maybe you can come back later, maybe you 
cannot.”678 
In the midst of the confusion, Museveni reiterated that everything needed 
to be signed by January 31, 2008. “The UPDF is all over the place now for 
the 31st deadline,” said a UN security advisor. “It is now all very political, 
with the US pushing for military and with the DPA playing stupid political 
games. They want it fixed once and for all, so it will just all go back to the 
beginning”, elaborating that the push for military action would void the 
progress made.679  With much talk of the deadline on the radio, the LRA 
withdrew deeper into Garamba Park. A woman who was abducted from 
Ezo in March 2008 said that she often had to walk from Garamba to collect 
food in Ri-Kwangba. From January, it took much longer, 24 hours, to walk 
from the LRA camp in Garamba to reach Ri-Kwangba.680 Despite the shaky 
situation, said one Sudanese abductee, the LRA was still talking about 
peace: “They were digging, waiting for outcome of peace talks. Everyone 
was waiting for outcome of peace talks.”681 
With another GoU deadline looming, Chissano travelled to Kampala from 
January 25-27 to discuss the resumption of talks with Museveni. Museveni 
had agreed to give progress at the talks another month; Chissano needed 
him to confirm this in writing to President Kabila, as it went against the 
agreement Museveni and Kabila had struck in Arusha. A confidential US 
cable states: “Chissano said that Kabila felt under pressure from the United 
States to take action against the LRA at the same time Congo had agreed 
with Uganda to take no action until January 31. As a result, Kabila was 
insisting on a letter from Museveni.” Despite reports that an increased 
number of Congolese troops were in the area around Dungu, to protect 
677 Fieldnotes, Juba: 30/1/2008.
678 Fieldnotes, Juba: 2/2/2008.
679 Fieldnotes, Juba: 2/2/2008.
680 Author (with translator) interview with female Sudanese LRA abductee from Ezo. Yambio: 23/2/ 2009.
681 Author (with translator Zande/ English) interview with Sudanese abductee who spent March 2008 - December 2008 with the LRA. 
Yambio: 23/2/2009
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civilians from LRA attacks and contain the LRA—action that Chissano saw as 
critical—it was also clear that the DRC’s military attention was focused on 
the offensive against General Laurent Nkunda, who had been very active 
and had committed atrocities against civilians.682 
On January 27, Chissano met for three hours with Shortley, during which he 
asked whether the US “were interested in supporting action against the 
LRA. Senior Advisor Shortley said that we would get back to him,” reads a 
US memo about the meeting, further stating that Chissano “did not come 
across as opposing military actions, as long as it did not push the LRA, which 
would likely scatter into small groups, deeper into Congo. He did not have 
a high level of confidence in the capability of regional forces to take on the 
LRA.”683
The internal LRA/M developments radically altered the dynamics between 
the negotiation parties. In the early days of the Juba Talks, the mediator 
had seen the LRA/M as holding the “moral high ground”,684 despite tension 
and often unreasonable demands. In Machar’s view, the LRA/M seemed to 
have come to the talks willing to address issues—unlike the GoU, who in his 
view had simply wanted to clinch an unchallenging deal; Machar had 
experienced the GoU as the obstinate party. When the LRA/M delegation 
unravelled during the process of consultations, when Otti’s death became 
official, the delegation split and communication with Kony became near 
impossible, the GoU now displayed reason, patience and understanding, 
argued Machar. An international advisor to the talks described the position 
of the GoU: 
GoU is really very constructive, and says there is no such thing as a 
deadline in the sense of an ultimatum. But things are not moving 
at all, so far… A situation of no progress whatsoever will of course 
lead to deadlines indeed becoming ultimatums. If they don’t get 
their act together soon, we might seriously getting [sic] at risk of 
military action.685
The GoU stated that it remained positive towards the peace process, and 
would allow time for the LRA to sort out their internal problems until the 
process was to start again. For some of the delegates, the GoU’s stance was 
not surprising. They argued that the GoU had never wanted a deal; with a 
deal less likely they could of course appear to be more generous. Behind 
the scenes, the GoU was indeed pursuing different avenues. In meetings 
with the US, the GoU delegation said that 
682 US Embassy Kampala,"08KAMPALA197 (confidential): Northern Uganda: U.N. Envoy on resumption of talks “, 1/2/2007.
683 US Embassy Kampala,"08KAMPALA197 (confidential): Northern Uganda: U.N. Envoy on resumption of talks “, 1/2/2007.
684 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/9/2006.
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the GOU would contain Kony’s ability to act, by denying him access 
to arms caches in southern Sudan and northern Uganda. The GOU 
also has alerted the Central African Republic of Kony’s reported 
intentions to relocate there. The GOU would continue to 
encourage LRA defections, and take all measures to defend its 
borders from incursions. Second, while the GOU was highly 
sceptical of the current LRA negotiating team’s authority to 
negotiate for Kony, the GOU would continue to participate in the 
Juba Peace Talks.686 
New rumours about continued upheaval within the LRA emerged. A 
statement by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) said that 
Odhiambo had been in touch with them, wanting to defect. A US cable 
recounted that IOM’s Uganda country director was maintaining contact 
with people claiming to be Odhiambo and Ongwen, believing them to be 
genuine callers, “despite indications to the contrary and warnings from the 
External Security Organization (ESO) that the callers are not genuine”.687 
Analysts publicly speculated about the likelihood of Odhiambo’s defection. 
Unsurprisingly, Odhiambo never appeared at IOM-facilitated meeting 
points to aid his defection. It later transpired that the phone calls had most 
likely been made by a former LRA soldier. This man, who was also featured 
in documentaries by Invisible Children, had been trying to extract money 
from international and GoU officials in return for the promise of defection. 
It was a similar scheme to that pursued a year earlier by a former delegate 
who had impersonated LRA commander Bwone to extract donor money 
and plant information. A confidential US government document showed 
that Invisible Children had implicated the person purported to be behind 
the Odhiambo rumour to the GoU, and that he was arrested on March 5, 
2009.688 
Meanwhile the security situation in Sudan had again deteriorated. On 
January 20, 2008, an LRA group was seen moving from Morobo to Tore in 
Western Equatoria; another moved in Central Equatoria from Lire towards 
Kajo Keji. This movement caused great concern and coincided with—or was 
the cause of—a few violent incidents. Eastern Equatorians thought that 
some LRA were still among them, but that they were not causing any 
trouble, and might be waiting for new orders. Rumours of airdrops 
circulated, but could never be verified. It was clear that coordination 
between GoSS, GoS and security forces was limited. Residents around Obbo 
686 US Embassy Kampala, "07KAMPALA1894 (Confidential): LRA Peace Process Update", 17/12/2007.
687 US Embassy Kampala. "09KAMPALA207 (confidential): Uganda/DRC: Museveni and Kabila summit set for March 1", 25/2/2009.
688 US Embassy Kampala,"09KAMPALA587 (confidential) Uganda: Games the Acholi Diaspora continue to play", 11/6/2009.
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reported that the UPDF there was selling guns and ammunition to civilians. 
They had reported it to the UPDF in Kajo Keji, to no avail.689
Many attacks in Equatoria were apparently misattributed to LRA—although 
some attacks were clearly traceable to be LRA—and this affected talks. A 
number of attacks were reported in Central Equatoria; the area around Yei 
was particularly unstable. In an ad hoc meeting for aid agencies in Juba, the 
attacks were described as following “known LRA patterns”, with systematic 
and extensive looting and abductions, but the release of abductees in many 
cases after they had done their work as porters.690 In Kajo-Keji, three SPLA 
soldiers were killed in a suspected LRA attack, but one of their killers was 
recognised to be a former SPLA soldier. In February 2008, AFP ran a story 
about a massacre of 136 people by 300 LRA near Kajo Keji. The UN was 
unable to confirm that such a massacre had happened. Reporting on the 
Kajo Keji attack on February 4 was confusing. The Danish Refugee Council 
and UN security spoke of 36 killed—100 fewer than AFP had reported—
while the SPLA said four.691  With the overly large number of LRA fighters 
(300) reportedly involved in the attack, even the Ugandan military 
dismissed the reports.692 Some of the security problems indeed turned out 
to be home-grown. One victim of the attacks described his experience: “The 
people who attacked spoke Arabic and wore green uniform. They were 
those that call themselves ‘No Unit’.”693  “No Unit”, it came to be known, 
were a group of disgruntled SPLA soldiers who had defected from the SPLA 
after receiving no pay.694  They had started attacks in the Yei area, 
renouncing their SPLA loyalty through their name “No Unit”. 
I followed up with the AFP reporter who had written about the supposed 
large massacre. He said that he had received his information from three 
sources in southern Sudan and a western diplomat. One government source 
told him “that the dead were indeed 141”. Because the official did not 
want to go on the record, he had been unable to publish the higher 
number. “All the three/four sources have confirmed that the LRA killings 
will be downplaed [sic] or censured [sic] for the sake of talks.”695  This 
689 Author interview with local journalist. Juba: 31/2/2008.
690 Fieldnotes, Juba: 13/2/2008.
691 US Embassy Kampala. "KAMPALA 000284  (Confidential): Northern Uganda: Government views on progress at Juba, reported LRA 
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particular massacre was never confirmed, but it was clear that suspicions 
were also growing within GoSS that Machar was keeping a lid on LRA 
activities in order to conclude the talks. Small-scale abductions by the LRA 
in Sudan were definitely happening at this time. Also in early 2008, the UN 
in Juba was informed about a substantial LRA attack in CAR, in which an 
unconfirmed but large number of people were killed or abducted. Such 
atrocities were politically impossible to square with continued perseverance 
in the peace talks. An international member of the mediation team 
commented on the news about LRA activity in CAR: “The only solution in 
Juba was to swipe this under the carpet. I found that at the time quite 
difficult to swallow.”696
A young Zande man who was taken by the LRA in March 2008 from Ezo 
recounted what happened to him after he was abducted around that time: 
“When they abduct people they gather them and pray from them in Acholi, 
they then put crosses on forehead, chest and foot using a mixture of water 
and ashes. After that, there were no more prayers. I never saw the LRA pray 
after that.” He was forced to speak only Acholi from his first day with the 
LRA: “We were told ‘forget your mother tongue or you will be beaten to 
death if you say you don’t know Acholi. When you understand first, you are 
better. If you are slow to learn you will be beaten until you know it.’” He 
also noted that while Acholi remained the language of the LRA, some of 
the LRA fighters spoke other languages, “but not fluently. Some Lingala, 
Zande, Kiswahili. When they come to someone’s house and are confused 
with geography, they ask for directions in local language.” He mentioned 
that one LRA “speaks Lingala like a Congolese, but he is Acholi. He also 
speaks Arabic.”697 
Final Talks
 In the midst of confusion and accusations of a cover-up from all sides, talks 
restarted on January 30 with Matsanga leading the LRA/M delegation. The 
process was strengthened by EU observers, in addition to a number of 
African dignitaries and military personnel who had been engaged in the 
process since the previous November. This last round was the first to see the 
presence of US representative Shortley in the mediation room, mandated by 
US Assistant Secretary of State Frazier “to work with the mediator and 
parties on moving the peace process forward” in a process that, a US 
696 Personal email to author from an international advisor to the Juba Talks, 7/8/2011.
697 Author (with translator Zande/ English) interview with Sudanese abductee who spent March 2008 - December 2008 with the LRA. 
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statement read, “cannot be open-ended”.698 Another extension of the CoH 
was one of the first points to be discussed. The latest version of the CoH 
was to expire on February 29, 2008, and the GoU was unwilling to discuss a 
further extension, stressing instead their confidence in progress in Juba and 
their expectation that an agreement on a permanent ceasefire would be 
signed by that date.699 
From what then followed, this did not seem an unreasonable expectation. 
From the end of January 2008 and into March, events accelerated. With 
Matsanga as the head of the delegation, the talks proceeded at previously 
unknown speed. After only four days of negotiations on the issue, on 
February 19, 2008, the parties signed an annex to Agenda 3 on 
accountability and reconciliation that stipulated Uganda’s commitment to 
establishing a Special Division of the High Court to deal with crimes 
committed in this war. Agenda 5—a permanent ceasefire—was signed on 
February 23, with the ceasefire to come into force 24 hours after the 
signing of the Final Peace Agreement. Former delegates watched from 
Nairobi as Matsanga signed the outstanding agreements despite the fact, as 
they wrote later,
that all the major points contained in the LRA “Position Papers” 
which the LRA/M wanted dealt with seriously, were thrown out 
without consultation with chairman of LRA peace talks. For 
example, the matters on Agenda No. 2, dealing with “The Root 
Causes of the conflict” were brutally handled and put to rest, 
without clear solution, to bring about lasting reconciliation! All 
other items were likewise manipulated and concluded in a manner 
that tantamount to mere adoptions of Uganda government 
“Position Papers” and without detailed consultations with General 
Joseph Kony!700
In Juba, various facilitators of the peace talks commented with dismay on 
their observations of US representative Shortley, who was, in the view of an 
international security official “going around to the donors to ask them to 
stop funding the talks, while being an observer and now he is also involved 
in money giving to the delegation,” explained an international staff 
member.701
In late February 2008, Machar was making plans for an official grand 
signing ceremony for early April in Juba, coupled with the expectation that 
all agreements would be signed by March 25. Talking to US officials, who 
698 US State Department, "Resumption of the Peace Talks in Juba (2008/068)", Washington, D.C.: 2008.
699 US Embassy Kampala. "KAMPALA 000284  (Confidential): Northern Uganda: Government views on progress at Juba, reported LRA 
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also asked that GoSS “be prepared to take military action in coordination 
with its neighbours against the LRA in the event that Kony refuses a peace 
agreement and returns to fighting”, Machar reportedly expressed 
confidence that Kony would sign, and replied: “Let me be a peacemaker 
now,” before agreeing that military action “would be the outcome of failed 
talks”. In a confidential memo, the US representative commented on the 
meeting: 
Given reports that Kony has no intention of reaching an 
agreement, the negotiations in Juba appear to proceed in a 
parallel reality. However, the process keeps his fighters engaged in 
peace rather than war and could ensure some defections from 
frustrated LRA fighters if Kony doesn’t follow through with his 
half-hearted participation in the peace process. The wily Riek 
Machar cannot be trusted, and we hope he is passing along sound 
information and not just stringing us along.702 
On February 28, the LRA/M delegates travelled to Ri-Kwangba to present 
the texts of the final agreements to Kony. They travelled without the legal 
advisor who had been a delegate from the first gathering of the 
delegation. Krispus Ayena had resigned or been dismissed, fuelling further 
speculation that ethnic divisions between Acholi and Langi were widening 
in the delegation.703 
What exactly happened at the February meeting remains unclear. The 
broadest consensus seems to be that Matsanga stayed behind in Nabanga 
when the delegates went to Ri-Kwangba. In Ri-Kwangba, delegates 
reportedly met with LRA commanders Alit and Thomas Kwoyelo, but it 
seems they spoke to Kony only on the phone. Because of pressure to 
conclude things in Juba, the delegates stayed in Ri-Kwangba only a short 
time. Initially, it was unclear what message they had been given by Kony. 
Nevertheless, events the following day seemed to imply that Kony had liked 
the agreements. As the rumour spread in February 2008 that 400 members 
of the LRA were moving in CAR, the information situation once again 
became unreliable. While the rumour was widely reported, even a UPDF 
spokesman called it unreliable, since it stemmed from a single source.704
702 US Embassy Khartoum. "08KHARTOUM429: LRA Peace Talks to resume in Juba”, 23/2/2008.
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On February 29, the final two documents were signed: an agreement on 
DDR, and the implementation protocol. 705  Some of the observers were 
baffled at the speed at which things were now progressing, lauding 
Matsanga’s leadership and lambasting Ojul. Most of the LRA/M delegates, 
however, were less impressed and instead felt relegated to the sidelines. At 
this stage, they already talked about that the agreements might turn out to 
be meaningless. It had become clear that successes happening on paper and 
how the LRA/M delegates were experiencing their peace process were two 
entirely different things. 
What remained unsigned was the agreement that would validate all the 
others, the chapeau document Final Peace Agreement (FPA). The signing of 
the final Agenda on implementation caused a confrontation: Matsanga 
claimed that the GoU had agreed that they would not push for a signing 
date in exchange for some language changes in the implementation 
protocol. He said the LRA/M needed time to travel to The Hague to argue 
against the ICC warrants, and had also asked for time to prepare for Easter 
celebrations. The GoU insisted that signing should take place no later than 
March 28 (which was when the latest round of the CoH was due to expire), 
which prompted Matsanga to walk out of the negotiation room, calling the 
GoU delegates “thieves” and “liars”.706  LRA/M delegates insisted that it 
would need to be signed by Kony himself. Before that could happen, 
however, they wanted reassurance from the ICC that it would honour the 
agreement. No commitment from the ICC was forthcoming, and after days 
of debate and changed dates, Machar finally managed to have the LRA/M 
agree to a signing ceremony in Ri-Kwangba. For the GoU, Rugunda would 
be present as the most senior GoU representative to avoid a confrontation 
between Kony and Museveni at this late stage. A few days later, a 
celebratory ceremony in Juba was to be held at which Museveni was 
supposed to countersign; guest passes for the ceremony were handed out 
by GoSS.
In the LRA camp preparations were made for both war and peace. A 15-
year-old boy from Central Equatoria who was abducted in January 2008 
said he was kept in a group of about 30 Equatorians. His group was only 
used to carry things, and they were told that they would be trained 
militarily “once he understood the LRA policy”, but others who had been 
705 Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/ Movement, “Agreement on DIsarmament, Demobilisation and 
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231
abducted earlier were trained.707  A man from Ezo who was abducted in 
March 2008 said that while he was in captivity, “the LRA used to tell them 
that they were preparing themselves to take over Uganda government and 
those who are Sudanese could then stay in the professional army.” He said 
that when he was abducted in March 2008, he was told the LRA “are not 
fighting and were going for peace”. He noted that at the time of his 
abduction, most LRA were wearing their hair shaved.708 When in the bush 
and actively fighting, the LRA had been famous for wearing dreadlocks. A 
number of the commanders who interacted with outsiders during the Juba 
talks did so only after cutting their hair to shed the bush fighter image. One 
abductee said that in early April 2008, the LRA camp was unchanged, but 
also that he might not have noticed changes because he was kept isolated: 
“I only heard of Riek Machar when they were coming for peace and there 
were big people coming from Juba.”709
From all accounts from within the LRA camp and from the LRA/M 
delegation, it remains impossible to say with certainty whether at this stage 
the LRA believed in war or peace. No clear evidence exists to conclude that 
either Kony was planning to definitively sign or that he was just stringing 
everyone along to play for time. Judging from how he had acted all along 
in the Juba Talks, it seems most likely that Kony was considering—and 
preparing for—both options, depending on what developments might still 
occur.
The Missing Signature
For six days, from April 9-15, 2008, the basic AFEX compound in Nabanga 
played host to a tight concentration of rumours, narratives, politics, threats 
and hope. 150 people waited for developments a few kilometres away in 
the bush. The people were Sudanese, Ugandans, Kenyans, Europeans and 
Americans. Local civilian village leaders waited alongside a former president 
of Mozambique; journalists sat with those desperate to avoid press 
exposure. Soldiers stood guard over pacifists, priests chatted with atheists, 
activists and victims lined up behind each other for food at mealtimes. 
Members of Kony’s family were there: a sister, who looked just like him, and 
707 Author (with translator) interview with male teenager from Central Equatoria,/ 15 years old, abducted by the LRA for 12 months 2008 - 
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his uncle. A few cooks scrambled to feed the masses with ever dwindling 
supplies. They had expected to cook for 70 mouths for two days, and now 
had to feed 150 for a week. Local women watched with worried 
amazement as dozens of foreigners pumped dry one of two local 
boreholes. In the midst of all this sat an LRA/M delegation, unsure whether 
its leader would follow through and deliver a signature under the FPA, the 
contents of which had been being negotiated for almost two years. 
The wait for Kony’s signature began when, on April 9, press and observers 
were flown to Nabanga in UN helicopters. Machar and senior visitors 
arrived on the morning of April 10, greeted by ululating women and a 
joyous reception. Everyone travelled onwards to Ri-Kwangba and found a 
space to sit under a canopy tent. A generator for the printer and 
photocopier was ready to go; hot food was waiting to be served. 
Ri-Kwangba was guarded by a handful of junior LRA soldiers; nobody of 
rank was in sight. Some of the LRA/M delegates, including the leaders 
Matsanga and Obita, walked into the bush. When the two leaders of the 
delegation re-emerged not much later with long faces, it was clear that 
something was wrong. They had not been able to meet with Kony. Machar 
told everyone to relax and have lunch. Matsanga insisted that the signing 
would still go ahead. After lunch, the Acholi elders walked into the bush, 
because they had been told that Kony wanted to talk to them. As it turned 
out, he only spoke to them on the phone, and said that he was 10 days’ 
walk away.710  Beyond this discouraging news there was little information, 
so everyone returned to Nabanga for the night—including the LRA/M 
delegation, which on previous visits had stayed in the bush behind Ri-
Kwangba with the LRA.
Simultaneously in Nairobi and London, the broader LRA/M system was at 
work. One of the delegates, who had been dismissed from the delegation 
more than a year before this signing ceremony, said Kony called him in 
Nairobi. The LRA leader reportedly told his dismissed spokesperson that he 
was unsure what exactly the delegation had negotiated regarding Agenda 
3 on accountability and reconciliation and whether it was safe for him to 
come out of the bush. Olweny said that he suggested that Kony renegotiate 
with a new delegation that, crucially, would include him, Olweny. Kony’s 
doubts about Agenda 3’s clarity were reportedly also communicated to a 
710 Iya describes this moment R.Iya, "Encountering Kony: A Madi perspective", in The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. T.Allen 
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London-based anti-Museveni hardliner, Alex Omoya, who headed a group 
calling itself Atoocoon.711
On April 11, Matsanga resigned as leader of the delegation. In an 
improvised press conference at which journalists crowded around him, he 
cited lack of clarity about Kony’s wishes as a reason.712  Apparently, Kony 
had said that he was unclear about parts of the agreement, despite the fact 
that each individual component of the agreement had already been signed 
by his delegation. The UN called this one of the expected scenarios; the 
GoU seemed relaxed. The elders went back to Ri-Kwangba and encountered 
an LRA colonel who had little to say about what would happen with the 
signing ceremony. There was no sign of further activity in Ri-Kwangba. 
Upon hearing this, the GoU delegation climbed onto one of the UN-
provided helicopters; most reporters, some of the diplomats and the 
representatives of St Egidio who had come to attend the signing ceremony 
joined Ugandan government officials in travelling back to Juba. Machar 
withdrew into a tukul and held private meetings. It transpired that he had 
wanted to meet the high command before the signing, but was advised by 
the delegation that Kony would only arrive on the day itself. The second 
day passed. Everyone was waiting for a phone call from Kony. At night, 
more than 20 people squeezed into the lunch tent to sleep on the dirty 
floor.
On April 12, rumours surfaced about a leadership struggle between Kony 
and Odhiambo. Odhiambo had reportedly been killed three weeks 
previously by a group of former LRA soldiers who had defected with Otto in 
late 2007. The story was that the former LRA had come back with the well-
equipped 105th battalion of the UPDF. Another version said that Kony 
himself had shot Odhiambo on their way back from the January meeting 
with the delegation. The whispers accused one of the delegates of lying 
because he claimed to have spoken to Odhiambo just a week before. 
Nothing could be verified. Nobody openly claimed to have had recent 
contact with Kony. My phone rang. It was one of the former delegates 
calling from Nairobi. He wanted an update, and nobody else in Nabanga, 
including his former colleagues in the delegation, was taking his calls. He 
said he also could not get through to Kony.
Then more information transpired about a statement by the London-based 
group called Atoocoon, headed by Alex Oloya. The statement purported to 
come directly from Kony: “The Lords Resistance Army suspends all contacts 
711 “Atoo” in Acholi is the “name given to a child, many of those brothers and sisters have died”. F.K. Girling, The Acholi of Uganda. 
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with the Uganda government and dissolves peace negotiation team with 
immediate effect. Agreements 2,3,4,5 nullified.” The statement accused 
“observers, Mr. Chissano (UN) and other parties associated with the peace 
talks” of having misled the LRA. The mediator was accused of not being 
neutral, the international community of lacking “Understanding and Full 
Commitment”, the ICC of being biased, Chissano of incompetence and a 
lack of “expertise and experience in all fields of Conflict Resolution”. As 
well as judging the talks poorly managed, the statement also lamented that 
IDPs in Uganda had remained in camps and the “Lack of Seriousness by the 
Government of Uganda in which it has rejected all demands made by the 
LRA. The intimidation, bullying and bribery of LRA delegates and its 
programs of ending the war with military force is not helpful to ending 
conflict.”713
 Oloya concluded in his electronic press release that Kony would not sign, 
and that
In the interest for peace the High command has appointed Mr 
Alex, Mr Obonyo and Mr Bill to forge a new negotiation 
delegation under a political structure to salvage the peace 
negotiation which has now collapsed. We have the confidence 
under this credible formation; peace is achievable with the correct 
modalities for negotiation with Uganda.714
The detailed news of the press release was received with confusion in 
Nabanga, and was noted in Juba, New York, London and Washington, DC. 
Kony still had not called; delegates were reluctant to comment on the 
authenticity of the statement. With everyone confined to the small camp in 
Nabanga, more rumours circulated. Someone said that more LRA soldiers 
were arriving in Ri-Kwangba, and this was usually a sign that the leader was 
near. Another rumour contradicted this: apparently Ri-Kwangba was 
deserted, and Kony nowhere in the vicinity. The handful of LRA still present 
in the camp were meant to keep up the pretence. Someone claimed that 
the ICC had sent word that they had military intelligence about Kony’s 
whereabouts. According to this source, Kony was far away. Delegates 
dismissed this as ICC propaganda and said that in fact Kony was close. 
It was unclear who had the most reliable information: Obita was considered 
closest to Kony, although some delegates said not to listen to Obita. They 
argued that only Anywar (who could be seen standing aside from everyone, 
speaking into a mobile phone with a concerned expression) had contact to 
713 LRA/M (attributed to Joseph Kony, distributed by Alex Otoya)."Press Release Lord's Resistance Army/ Movement: Peace talks between 
LRA and Uganda Government is suspended", 10/4/2008.
714 LRA/M (attributed to Joseph Kony, distributed by Alex Otoya)."Press Release Lord's Resistance Army/ Movement: Peace talks between 
LRA and Uganda Government is suspended", 10/4/2008.
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Kony. A third delegate said to not trust Anywar, because Kony had asked 
for Dr Onek to come by and explain the few pages of the Final Peace 
Agreement that were not clear to him. When Onek went by himself to Ri-
Kwangba to meet Kony, he found nobody. It was said that Oryem could 
have predicted that Kony would not be waiting; after all Oryem was closest 
to Kony. Maybe it was not Oryem but one of the Ugandan traditional 
leaders, Rwot Oywak who was closest to Kony, someone said. Kony, it was 
said, had asked Rwot Oywak to be the new chairman of the delegation 
because he no longer trusted Obita. 
People were talking about friction in the delegation and the Acholi 
diaspora. It was said that before leaving Juba to join the signing ceremony 
in Ri-Kwangba, Matsanga and Obita had been fighting. Text messages had 
been sent to Kony from the diaspora, saying that he would be attacked 
within minutes if he came out. One seasoned delegate explained that LRA 
infighting had become bad ever since Otti’s death. “Every time there is a 
visit, people defect. Phone numbers are exchanged, so Kony worries about 
meetings.”715 Another mentioned that the CIA now had a Gulu base on the 
top floor of the Bank of Uganda, and that all those who had defected from 
the delegation were now working with Ugandan intelligence, the External 
Security Organisation (ESO). Neither development had made it easier to 
convince Kony to commit himself to peace. 
If he was surprised or frustrated, Machar did not let it show. “There is still a 
strong sentiment within the Acholi community against peace,” Machar said, 
seated under the straw roof of a tukul in the less crowded half of the 
compound. “I have no clear information.” The Ugandans were impressed 
that Machar had not left: “He is sitting it out, he is gaining confidence and 
trust that way, he has always done that,” explained one Ugandan leader. 
Machar seemed calm, still: “The CoH is no longer valuable to Kony since he 
has broken it,” he explained. “Neither Kony nor I have trust in the 
delegation, so we need direct contact. Because Kony can negotiate an exit 
package, but he needs to negotiate it. The Acholi are very divided. Many 
are ashamed of the LRA, but they use them as a mascot.”716
News transpired that after returning from Nabanga, Matsanga had been 
arrested in Juba airport with $20,000 that he had been given by Museveni 
to deliver to Kony but had stolen instead. Matsanga also reportedly had a 
letter from Museveni to Kony, offering safety guarantees and advising the 
LRA leader to spend the money on a function in Ri-Kwangba. Before his 
resignation, Matsanga had mentioned this letter from Museveni. He said 
715 Fieldnotes, Nabanga: 12/4/2008.
716 Fieldnotes, Nabanga: 12/4/2008.
236
Museveni had written it in “begging language” because “a golden 
handshake was always an option from the US or Kampala.”717  Later it 
turned out that the stories were untrue: Matsanga reportedly had handed 
the money back to the GoU. The letter Matsanga had carried, promising 
safety and money for the Ri-Kwangba function, was addressed to himself, 
not to Kony. Or he might never have had a letter at all; it remained unclear. 
It turned out that Matsanga had donated $1,000 to the process and handed 
a $100 dollar bill to every Acholi leader just before he left. 
It now seemed certain that both Odhiambo and Achellam had been 
killed.718  UN security confirmed that three LRA groups were moving: one 
with Kony, one anti-Kony, and one moving towards Kony for extra 
protection. Ongwen was reported to be in CAR. US Special Envoy Shortley 
was giving out information on the phone in a loud voice: “You can write 
this if you want. I am not saying you have to, I just want to give you a sense 
of things.”719  Later, to the great amusement of some of the journalists, 
Shortley walked around the camp complaining that there was no cold 
water to drink. 
On April 13, Chissano arrived. The news spread that the CIA had tracked 
LRA phone calls and they were coming from near Nabanga. The dignitaries 
gathered in different corners of the compound or disappeared for long 
meetings in Machar’s tukul. Over lunch the representative of the Canadian 
government handed around paperwork regarding military action against 
the LRA prepared for the UNSC. When asked why the Canadians had done 
this work despite not being members of the UNSC and whether they had 
discussed their suggestion with Uganda, they admitted that they had not, 
but that it had been debated with other countries. When challenged, the 
Canadian had to concede that none of these other countries was African.
Later that night, beer provisions ran out. Someone claimed that contact 
with Kony had been established; a phone call had been made. One of the 
journalists had learned that Condoleeza Rice had offered assistance, but 
that Museveni had declined. “He does not like interference, or only if it is 
absolutely positively good for him,” explained one of the Ugandan 
community leaders.
On April 14, news came that groups had been tracked moving towards 
Nabanga from Yei and CAR, but were still a long way away. The last 
remaining reporters prepared to leave; the three founders of Invisible 
717 Fieldnotes, Nabanga: 12/4/2008.
718 This was later found to be untrue, but stayed as a persistent rumour.
719 Fieldnotes, Nabanga: 12/4/2008.
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Children loaded their video equipment and then themselves onto the 
helicopter. Once the press had left, everyone seemed to relax. Politics were 
now discussed more openly. One story was that in a phone call the previous 
night, Kony had asked for $500,000 to be paid to him directly in exchange 
for his signature. Another story was that no money had been discussed, it 
had only been transmitted that the high command was meeting and that 
they were near Nabanga, but nobody believed it. Uganda’s civil society 
leaders suggested sending the message that they would go into Ri-
Kwangba one last time to say goodbye. By the time I got into a helicopter 
on April 15, the rumour was that the LRA had asked for a payment of US$2 
million to be shared by everyone, and an extra $800,000 for Kony.720  On 
April 18, Kony called and demanded a meeting with Ugandan leaders to 
discuss Agenda 3 on May 10.
A few weeks after the first failed signing ceremony, the London group 
around Alex Oloya issued another statement. “We condemn without 
reservation in the strongest terms it deserves, the tactics being used by the 
Ugandan government in which it’s using the name of United States Army as 
a gunboat system to persuade LRA in signing the bogus FPA or be 
attacked,” it said.721  The LRA/M saw the military option coming, more 
sharply in focus than during the better days of the talks. Olweny argued 
that the talks had entered a different stage as their lack of sincerity had 
been exposed, the rifts in the delegation pointing to government 
infiltration. “The answer is a new, proper delegation, we start afresh and 
from the beginning,” he said.722
When the Ugandan leaders returned with Machar and UN representatives 
for the meeting on May 10, they did not see Kony, nor did they have any 
communication with him. After seven days of waiting, a member of the 
mediation team gave a frank assessment of the situation: “Of course the 
peace process is tits up. Everybody kind of agrees that Joseph has closed the 
door with a big bang. No communication so no dialogue so we are back at 
square one!”723
So what had happened? Some in the LRA/M argue that Kony was unsure 
about a few points in the FPA, particularly regarding accountability and 
justice. He had not been able to discuss and clarify these points with his 
delegation, particularly the issue of whether using so-called traditional 
justice procedures like mato oput, a reconciliation ceremony after a 
720 Fieldnotes, Nabanga: 16/4/2008.
721 LRA/M/Alex Oloya."LRA condemn Gunboat tactis being used by Uganda", Nairobi/ London: 25/4/2008.
722 Fieldnotes, Cologne: 24/9/2008.
723 Personal email to author (name of writer withheld), 24/8/2008.
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homicide, really was the answer to ICC warrants.724  He had asked for the 
“signing ceremony” to be a meeting with the delegation, the Acholi 
religious leaders and Rwot Acana to clarify those points. He had not 
clarified his concerns in April or in May. The meeting in May failed, claimed 
the delegation in a written statement, because the former delegation 
leader “Matsanga had called Kony and informed him that Dr Obita was 
coming with American snipers to assassinate him, and that a large number 
of UPDF tanks had also crossed the border from Uganda into Sudan headed 
for Ri-kwangba.”725  However, lack of communication about the FPA or 
security concerns and Kony’s unreliability meant that even supporters of the 
peace process were losing patience: “The LRA’s failure to attend the 
scheduled meetings and to advance the peace process undermines its own 
interest,” Machar wrote in a statement.726 
Machar himself was coming under increased pressure. His commitment to 
the peace talks with the LRA had always been closely scrutinised by other 
members of GoSS. Various points of criticism had been mentioned: that he 
should focus on southern Sudanese business only, or that he was doing this 
only to increase his international profile, that the talks were costing GoSS 
too much money, that he was trying to appease the LRA to call on them in 
case of an armed struggle within southern Sudan similar to the SPLA split of 
1991. In late May 2008, during the second SPLM convention in Juba, Machar 
declared his candidacy as SPLM chairperson, openly challenging Kiir. The 
move almost cost him the vice-presidency, with opposition to his desire for 
power voiced loudly. In an emergency meeting of the SPLM Interim Political 
Bureau, provisions were made for three deputies to make Machar withdraw 
his leadership challenge. 
LRA/M delegates suspiciously eyed a number of parallel developments, 
increasingly aware that time was running out for a peaceful solution. 
Former delegates who had been sidelined in the various internal struggles 
724 The LRA/M later published “the main reasons he [Kony] cited for wanting the agreement to be revisited”, such as increased clarity on 
accountability procedures, implementation of DDR as well as welfare arrangements for LRA soldiers, and “the absence of a clear and 
satisfactory provision in the Agreement as a whole for the participation of the LRA/M in government in the post-conflict dispensation”. LRA/
M Peace Team, "Juba Peace Talks:  The Record of Sabotage by the Government of Uganda; The Reasons General Joseph Kony Wants the 
Peace Agreement Revisited;  and, The Way Forward”, Nairobi: 6/11/2009.
For discussions of Mato Oput, see B.Afako, "Reconciliation and justice: 'Mato oput’ and the Amnesty Act" in Accord: Protracted conflict, 
elusive peace: Initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda, ed. Lucima Okello. London: Conciliation Resources, 2002; B.Afako, 
"Traditional drink unites Ugandans", BBC Focus on Africa Magazine, October 2006; and T.Allen, "The International Criminal Court and the 
invention of traditional justice in Northern Uganda", Politique Africaine 107, 2007.
725 LRA/M Peace Team, "Juba Peace Talks:  The Record of Sabotage by the Government of Uganda; The Reasons General Joseph Kony 
Wants the Peace Agreement Revisited;  and, The Way Forward”, Nairobi: 6/11/2009.
726 Office of the Vice-President Government of Southern Sudan/ Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon, "Statement of the Chief Mediator concerning 
the status of the peace process between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army”, Juba: 11/9/2008, p.2.
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published a statement highlighting the GoU’s collaboration with other 
armies, including the US:
Many times the government has used the threat of foreign or 
regional troops coming into an alliance of operation to crush the 
LRA. This even when peace talks are in progress. The SPLA, 
Congolese troops, Rwandese and Ethiopian troops are often said 
to be preparing for a joint operation. Even the UN troops in 
Congo, MONUC, whose mandate is to keep peace, are thrown into 
the fray. When, since the Korean War of the 50s, has the United 
Nations ever fought a war on behalf of a sovereign state, not 
against another sovereign state but against a rebel force? The 
Uganda government seems to have succeeded in roping in the 
United States Army and Marines in the conflict. These powerful 
forces are now all over Northern Uganda carrying out 
humanitarian, development and capacity building activities. All 
this certainly have not gone down well with the LRA forces in the 
bush who see themselves as besieged from all sides. Very recently, 
in the past couple of weeks, large movement of UPDF troops has 
taken place from the UPDF 4th Division base in Gulu towards 
Garamda Parks [sic]. 727
For the LRA/M, the reported troop movement was proof that these peace 
talks would also be betrayed in favour of military action. For most observers 
and most advocacy groups, it showed on the contrary that finally the day of 
reckoning for the LRA through military action had come. News of a second 
meeting between military officials of GoU, GoSS and the government of 
DRC emerged on June 2; it was instantly obvious that these were meetings 
to discuss joint military operations against the LRA. 
On June 5, the LRA attacked the SPLA detachment in Nabanga. The SPLA 
had acted as a buffer between the LRA in Ri-Kwangba and the civilians in 
Nabanga since 2006. In the attack, the LRA killed 14 civilians and seven 
soldiers. A Sudanese abductee in the LRA camp said that after the attack on 
the SPLA, the LRA fighters brought home SPLA guns, new uniforms and 
new bags they had looted.728  From the point of view of one of the SPLA 
commanders in charge in Nabanga at the time, the LRA attacks on the SPLA 
were prompted by news of the military meeting on the radio. He said: “I 
also heard the news on the radio that SPLA, UPDF, DRC were going to team 
up against LRA, so I think that was the reason.”729  Members of the 
mediation team provided a different perspective. Considering that Kony 
had not been engaged with the negotiations on the final two agreements, 
727 O.Olweny and J.Otukene, "Re: Juba Peace Talks: Who should be blamed for the refusal of Joseph Kony to sign the peace agreement?", 
Nairobi: 30/5/2008.
728 Author (with translator Zande/ English) interview with Sudanese abductee who spent March 2008 - December 2008 with the LRA. 
Yambio: 23/2/2009.
729 P.Amoru and A.Mugyema, "Uganda: Government Resumes War on LRA Rebels", The Monitor, 4/6/2008; BBC News, "Congo 'to attack 
Ugandan rebels'", 4/6/2008.
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an international advisor suggested that the attack was also partly prompted 
in order 
to violate the holy peace-ground of Nabanga, to make the peace 
process more difficult without saying no. And it worked, the next 
meeting was cancelled because the SPLA, angry as they still were, 
did not allow food to go through. And the GoU reacted to that by 
working towards a peace agreement that as they knew had not 
been shown to Kony by Matsanga and would not be signed. After 
all, to have the peace agreement ready would make it more 
difficult for Kony and others to say that a new round of talks 
should be started.730
From the point of view of some of the LRA/M delegates, the reasons for this 
attack were entirely different and highlighted a broader structural issue: 
Having struggled in the past with the notion of being protected by the 
SPLA--a force very friendly towards Museveni--they had repeatedly reported 
to the mediator that they distrusted the SPLA detach in Nabanga. Their 
claim was that one of the soldiers, who had been introduced to them as a 
Sudanese Acholi, was in fact a UPDF soldier disguised by SPLA uniform. 
According to the LRA/M, he had been there since at least 2007. They 
interpreted his presence not only as proof that the UPDF was preparing to 
attack the LRA in Ri-Kwangba, but further that the peace talks were never 
mediated and supported by a neutral party in South Sudan.731
Delegates in Juba became uncomfortable. The rumour mill became 
noticeably more active. UN security personnel had monitored intelligence 
that showed that Kony was still in the DRC, despite the delegation’s 
information that he had moved to CAR. Activity had been observed across 
the DRC border near Yei, where an unscheduled and unidentified helicopter 
had landed in the last week of May—it was unclear whether it had brought 
or taken people, brought supplies or been piloted by UPDF or SAF. In Tore, 
further north, an arrest was made of a SAF soldier who said he was waiting 
for a plane. The speculation there was that he was supposed to coordinate 
LRA who were being transported to Chad to fight for SAF there, yet none 
of this could be verified.732 
On June 18 Kony re-emerged, calling Chissano’s office to schedule another 
meeting with him. Two days later, Matsanga popped up in Juba to 
announce that he had been reappointed by Kony to lead the LRA/M 
delegation. The only remaining member of the LRA on the CHMT, Michael 
Anywar, left the CHMT to become a negotiating delegate. Chissano’s office 
followed Kony’s request and scheduled a confidential meeting for July 30—
730 Personal email to author from international advisor to the Juba Talks. 7/8/2011.
731 Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 26/06/2013.
732 Fieldnotes, Juba: 10/6/2007.
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the former president of Mozambique judged Kony’s wish for clarity 
justified, because the agreement on accountability was particularly complex 
in its implications and groundbreaking within international justice.733 
Before the meeting, Kony demanded food and water to be delivered by 
Caritas, because since the attack on the SPLA detachment, the SPLA had no 
longer been willing to deliver provisions to the LRA. Engaging Caritas 
swiftly proved impossible, since the contract with them to support the LRA 
assembly had expired. Machar, expressing goodwill, organised two trucks of 
food, which the LRA refused to accept since they had come from the SPLA. 
On July 30, the scheduled meeting between Kony and Chissano did not take 
place; several other attempts to meet also failed. Looking back on these 
months, an advisor to Chissano stated that he had limited sympathy with 
Kony’s claim that he needed more clarity, because Kony did not appear at 
meetings and because he had said in a phone call: “Please tell Machar and 
Chissano to come. I understand now that I do not have to go immediately 
to Uganda when I sign, and that I am the one being seen as blocking 
progress. Therefore, when they come I will sign.”734  However, another 
suggested signing date at the end of August came and went without 
progress. On September 11, 2008, Machar wrote in a statement that Kony 
had talked about his lack of understanding of some of the elements of the 
negotiated settlement, namely the clauses on justice and accountability and 
on how the DDR procedures would actually treat and integrate the LRA. 
This lack of understanding had caused his reluctance to sign: “Whilst that 
failure came at great cost and inconvenience, General Joseph Kony’s desire 
to understand the full implications of the agreement is not invalid,” Machar 
wrote.735
Although the CHMT had inspected the site before the agreed meeting date 
of August 24/25, skirmishes ensued between the LRA and SPLA. Machar 
described the situation as having been caused by “uncoordinated troop 
deployments along the borders”, which resulted in an interruption in food 
supply to the LRA.736 Although initially another meeting had been proposed 
for September, it was clear that whoever was trying to get the LRA/M back 
together for a credible peace effort was scrambling—even Kony himself. 
Reportedly, he was trying to meet his delegation, but many had since 
733 Personal email to author from international Advisor to the Juba Talks. 7/8/2011.
734 Personal email to author from international Advisor to the Juba Talks. 7/8/2011.
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turned their backs on their own time as delegates. After it had reportedly 
been communicated to Kony that Obita was planning to come with 
American snipers, it became increasingly difficult to make contact.737 
On August 28, the US State Department named Kony a Specially Designated 
Global Terrorist in Executive Order 13334, which under the US’s declared 
War on Terror allowed increased military action against the LRA and its 
leader. The mechanism behind using the terrorist label is spelt out by 
Marchal, who writes:
The current “war on terror” allows the US administration to 
militarize its African policy through the establishment of AFRICOM. 
US military officials claim that this new structure will work hand in 
hand with civilians to build boreholes and schools, as European 
colonial armies did. The problem, as with their predecessors, is that 
that is not all they do.738
On 17 September, the LRA attacked Dungu in Haute Uele district in DRC’s 
Orientale Province in what they said was a response to increased 
deployment of Congolese forces in the area. In the next few months, LRA 
attacks would occur in the area stretching from East Faragi to Western 
Duruma, a distance of about 450 kilometres. As a result, schools were closed 
for fear of abduction, and residents in Dungu protested at the DRC 
government and international community’s inability to provide protection. 
OCHA and MONUC offices in Dungu town were destroyed.739
On October 1, 2008, AFRICOM became a stand-alone command.740  Kiir 
countered his deputy’s positive attitude towards the peace talks, stating 
that GoSS was no longer prepared for the process to continue indefinitely. 
In a meeting in Kampala, Machar and Chissano agreed on a final deadline 
for Kony’s signature: November 30. In parallel, preparations for a military 
strike continued. 
The final deadline of November 30 was “properly communicated” to Kony, 
explained one delegate to me.741  However, Kony had argued that he had 
been under the impression that the April, May and September meetings 
were to be opportunities to see the negotiated agreements. Kony had then 
737 Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 11/11/2009. The delegates who had heard about this threat said that the information had been relayed to Kony by 
Jolly Okot, Uganda’s Country Director for Invisible Children, who was working as an informant for the US government. This allegation has 
also been made publicly.
738 R.Marchal, "Warlordism and terrorism: how to obscure an already confusing crisis? The case of Somalia", International Affairs 83, 6, 
2007.
739 Fieldnotes, Kampala: 1/2009.
740 L.Ploch. Congressional Research Service. "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa". 
Washington, D.C.: 2011.
741 Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 11/11/2009.
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arranged a meeting with his delegation for November 18, to clarify 
outstanding issues before the November 30 deadline. One Sudanese 
abductee said that until November, the LRA in the camp “were saying there 
would be peace.”742  The delegates tried to get to Ri-Kwangba in time for 
the meeting on November 18. At that point, however, patience with the 
LRA to-and-fro had largely expired. “We tried to get transport and food 
support, but we could not,” explained a former delegate to me. “So we 
only arrived on 28th, too late to discuss before the deadline.”743  In the 
evening of November 28, Kony came to greet his visitors, returning for an 
afternoon meeting the following day.
Along with the delegates, a group of leaders from Uganda had also joined 
the meeting. The visitors were subjected to unusually harsh security checks. 
Afterwards, some of the leaders were more complimentary than others 
about their encounter with Kony: while some said that Kony was still 
willing to go for peace, even if the time seemed not right, Iya for example 
found that “much of what [Kony] said was not coherent; at times he 
seemed to not remember things he had just said.” Kony made a few major 
points, according to Iya. He expressed his distrust of Machar, the SPLA and 
the Congolese forces, said that he did not fear the ICC but also would not 
sign an agreement if the warrants were still in place, that he did not know 
all the details in the signed agreements and that he wanted to speak 
directly to Museveni. He accused his delegation of being thieves, and said 
that his commanders felt the agreement did not give them much.744  An 
account of the meeting from a confidential US cable—with information 
provided by Acholi leaders—states that Kony reportedly accused his 
previous delegation leader, Ojul, of stealing donor money and being on the 
GoU payroll, thus voiding the agreements that had been signed by Ojul. 
Kony said that Matsanga, with Labeja present as his trusted person, should 
lead his delegation. Further elaborating, Kony stated that Chissano had 
failed to meet his promise to request UNSC deferment of the ICC warrants 
after the signing of Agenda 3 in June the previous year—an action that, as 
Chissano’s team emphasised had never been promised before the signing of 
the FPA. Asking to be paid the $10,000, which Museveni had sent for him, 
Kony said that Machar had blocked the payment. The money, notes a US 
742 Author (with translator Zande/ English) interview with Sudanese abductee who spent March 2008 - December 2008 with the LRA. 
Yambio: 23/2/2009.
743 LRA/M Peace Team, "Juba Peace Talks: The Record of Sabotage by the Government of Uganda; The Reasons General Joseph Kony 
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memo about the meeting, was “diverted by the mediation team”.745  Kony 
then left Ri-Kwangba without speaking to Chissano or Machar, who were 
waiting not far away. In a side meeting with elders, Ongwen reportedly said 
to the Acholi Paramount Chief Acana that senior LRA commanders would 
not allow Kony to sign a deal unless future prospects and demobilisation 
packages for senior commanders were clearly defined.746 
Young Sudanese abductees who had been staying at the LRA camp in 
Garamba said that after Kony returned from the November meeting, 
something changed. A young woman from Eastern Equatoria who had been 
with the LRA since January 2007 said that from November onwards LRA 
fighters were talking about failure of the Juba Talks, and she saw that 
“they started now killing, they went into villages differently.”747 The young 
man from Ezo who had remarked on the shaved hair of the LRA at the time 
of his abduction in March 2008 said that after the last meeting in November 
with the elders, the LRA fighters “came back and said there is no more 
peace” and started turning their hair into dreadlocks. “After they came 
back from Nabanga, the LRA told us to grow our hair into dreads, women 
should stop plaiting their hair because peace talks are no longer there.”748
From December 5 to 8, LRA/M delegates and Machar travelled to Kinshasa. 
Not all LRA/M delegates were allowed in the meetings with the president, 
but Machar said that Kabila was supportive of maintaining dialogue with 
Kony as the cheaper and safer option to prevent attacks on civilians. To the 
two LRA/M delegates accompanying the SPLM/GoU delegation to Kinshasa, 
Kabila said that he was against military action because “you don’t disturb a 
beehive.”749  In recounting the days between the meeting in Nabanga and 
the launch of the military offensive against the LRA, delegates said that 
Kony asked for clarification on a few outstanding issues. One clarification 
concerned the sequencing of dealing with the ICC warrants: did Kony have 
to sign first, or could the warrants be withdrawn first? On December 8, in a 
meeting of Museveni, Machar and Matsanga in Kampala, Museveni said 
that Kony had to sign the document first before he could deal with the ICC 
warrants.750  He expressed his willingness to talk to Kony directly, but also 
insisted that the LRA ought not to receive any further assistance until they 
745 US Embassy Kampala."08KAMPALA1579 (confidential): Uganda: Kony living in a fool's paradise", 10/12/2008.
746US Embassy Kampala."08KAMPALA1579 (confidential): Uganda: Kony living in a fool's paradise", 10/12/2008.
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748 Author (with translator Zande/ English) interview with Sudanese abductee who spent March 2008 - December 2008 with the LRA. 
Yambio: 23/2/2009.
749 Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 11/9/2009.
750 Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 11/9/2009.
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were fully assembled in Ri-Kwangba.751  Delegates said that all 
misunderstandings about the challenges inherent within the agreement 
were clarified by December 10, 2008: “On December 10, Kony was ready to 
sign.”752 
Operation Lightning Thunder
On December 13, 2008, recounted a 27-year-old female Sudanese abductee, 
residents of the LRA camp were called to Kony. “Kony told forces you 
people have to scatter, there will be an attack tomorrow, on 14,” she said. 
However, she and the people she was with did not believe Kony’s 
prediction, so they went to the garden they were tending instead. Kony 
had left his camp at 12, and soon afterwards they heard what sounded like 
aerial bombing of Kony’s camp.753 A 20-year old man from Ezo said that on 
December 13, he had been chosen to leave the LRA camp to carry meat 
from some buffaloes and fish, “but Kony sent a message to come back 
quickly because war has started.”754 Another young Sudanese man who was 
at Kony’s camp said that “when Kony told people of the attack, Kony took 
off during bombardment, Kony’s camp split in three forces.” He said that 
during the bombing, he was told to run with Kony’s forces, “but the forces 
ran into an ambush so I could take off from the ambush. When we heard 
gunshot we ran away, so I don’t know what happened to the others.”755 
The young woman described the attack: “People were scattered. The 
helicopter went back to DRC. People went back to get some things.” Her 
group of more than 50 people, many of whom were not LRA, then walked 
for two months to reach CAR.756
The bombs were the beginning of what came to be known as Operation 
Lightning Thunder (OLT). A joint press statement from all involved forces 
said
The Armed Forces of Uganda (UPDF), DRC (FARDC) and Southern 
Sudan (SPLA) in a joint intelligence-led military operation this 
morning, the 14 Dec 2008 launched an attack on the LRA hideouts 
751 US Embassy Kampala."08KAMPALA1579 (confidential): Uganda: Kony living in a fool's paradise", 10/12/2008.
752 LRA/M Peace Team, "Juba Peace Talks: The Record of Sabotage by the Government of Uganda; The Reasons General Joseph Kony 
Wants the Peace Agreement Revisited; and, The Way Forward”, Nairobi: 6/11/2009.
753 Author (with translator) interview with female Sudanese LRA abductee from Ezo. Yambio: 23/2/2009.
754 Author (with translator Zande/ English) interview with Sudanese abductee who spent March 2008 - December 2008 with the LRA. 
Yambio: 23/2/2009.
755 Author (with translator) interview with male teenager from Central Equatoria, abducted by the LRA for 12 months 2008 - 2009. 
Yambio: 23/2/2009.
756 Author (with translator) interview with female Sudanese LRA abductee from Ezo. Yambio: 23/2/2009.
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of terrorist Joseph Kony in Garamba, Democratic Republic of 
Congo. The three Armed Forces successfully attacked the main 
body of bandits and destroyed the main camp of Kony codenamed 
Camp Swahili setting it on fire. Military operations against these 
terrorists are continuing.757 
The operation had been prepared with the aid of US AFRICOM, which had 
provided aid in planning and logistics to the tune of about $7 million. 
Within days, it was clear that the image of lightning and thunder had been 
ill chosen. Plans of dividing up the area into a neat grid and having infantry 
jump out of planes into each square had remained fantasies.758  The quick 
strike had been delayed, and the delayed aerial action had failed to kill the 
LRA leadership and instead had scattered  the LRA across a wide area with 
no ground troops to prevent the spread, fulfilling precisely what Chissano 
had outlined as the worst-case scenario.
On December 16, 2008, Chissano gave a closed briefing to the UNSC to 
inform them that military action had been launched. He outlined how Kony 
had seven opportunities to sign the FPA and had not done so, but on the 
contrary had continued to fight civilians in the DRC, CAR, and southern 
Sudan. The UNSC was supportive of the military operation as a way to put 
pressure on Kony to sign the peace deal.759  However, both Chissano and 
Machar maintained that other roads to peace needed to stay open. In an 
interview on Al-Jazeera, Machar said that he had been arm-twisted by 
Undersecretary of State Frazier to go for the military option. Despite the 
military pursuit, the GoU reiterated periodically that the option to sign the 
FPA remained open for Kony. 
In the December 2008 issue of its report, the UNSC mentioned various ideas 
regarding “what role regional stakeholders, Chissano and the Council can 
play in the developing and implementing a new strategy to bring the LRA 
back to the peace process, or if Kony does sign, to support implementation 
of the Final Peace Agreement”.760 Distancing itself from UN obligations of 
civilian protection, the report stated that “a consideration for the Council 
may be what role, if any given the current situation in eastern DRC, the UN 
and stakeholders in the region could have.”761
757 Office of the President, Uganda Media Centre. "Press Statement on the Joint Operation Against the LRA", UPDF Brig James Mugira, 
Chief of Military Intelligence Chief of Military Intelligence Brig Matual Majok, SPLA, and Chief of Military Intelligence Brig Deodenne 
Kitenge, FARDC. Kampala: 14/12/2008.
758 R.R.Atkinson."From Uganda to the Congo and beyond pursuing the Lord's Resistance Army", New York: International Peace Institute, 
2009.
759 UN Security Council. "Update report: Northern Uganda and LRA-affected areas”, New York, 22/6/2009.
760 UN Security Council, "Security Council Report: Northern Uganda and LRA-Affected Areas", December 2008.
761 UN Security Council, "Security Council Report: Northern Uganda and LRA-Affected Areas", December 2008.
247
The council stated that in September the 
Secretary-General indicated that a continued facilitation role of 
the Envoy was critical to help the parties overcome current 
obstacle and create a propitious environment for implementing 
the future Final Peace Agreement. If the Final Peace Agreement is 
signed, the Secretary-General would expect the Envoy to play a key 
role in supervising its implementation. In the event of further 
delays, the Special Envoy was expected to continue to provide 
good offices and facilitation.762 
The council explicitly stated “another option, albeit unlikely given the 
fragility of the peace process and instability in the region, would be to 
terminate the mandate.”763  Chissano’s mandate as the UN Special Envoy 
was, however,  allowed to expire on June 30, 2009, because, as the 
Secretary General now stated, Chissano had 
achieved the main objectives of his mandate with the conclusion of 
negotiations in March 2008 when agreements were signed on all 
substantive issues, including by the representatives of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA). While the final peace agreement has yet to 
be implemented due to LRA leader Joseph Kony’s refusal to 
honour his commitments and sign the agreement (he maintains 
the position that the arrest warrant of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) against him and other LRA leaders must first be lifted), 
the Secretary General considered that Chissano had completed his 
assignment.
The support office for Chissano established in Kampala was closed as of 30 
June. The Council responded in a letter of 29 May saying that members had 
“taken note” of the Secretary General’s intention.764
As non-military options diminished, the Enough! Project published a paper 
that further advocated military pursuit of the LRA, emphasising this point in 
briefings with diplomats in Kampala, where, according to a US embassy 
cable, analyst Spiegel recommended
that the military operations continue with a focus on killing the 
senior LRA leadership and increasing efforts to protect the 
Congolese civilian population. She advocated a multi-lateral 
discourse on planning and increased MONUC capability, along with 
increased U.S. Government support, including planning support, 
intelligence, and logistics. She explained that Congolese President 
Kabila’s internal problems, including opposition to the operation 
from eastern DRC parliamentarians, had been a problem, but that 
the lack of human rights abuses by the UPDF coupled with 
continued LRA depredations resulted in a positive perception of 
the UPDF presence among Congolese civilians.765
762 UN Security Council, "Security Council Report: Northern Uganda and LRA-Affected Areas", December 2008.
763 UN Security Council, "Security Council Report: Northern Uganda and LRA-Affected Areas", December 2008.
764 UN Security Council. "Update report: Northern Uganda and LRA-affected areas”, New York, 22/6/2009.
765 US Embassy Kampala."09KAMPALA551: Uganda/ DRC: Operation Rudia II Update”, 1/6/2009.
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Other assessments of OLT are less jubilant, and view the option of a 
targeted assassination more critically. In August 2007, Museveni had told US 
officials “a military operation against the LRA would be ‘easy’ or ‘not 
hard’”.766  His confidence might have lulled the US military into a false 
expectation of success. Yet it was clear that Kony had been warned of the 
impending air strike through his contacts in the UPDF. OLT scattered the 
remaining LRA forces across Sudan, the DRC and CAR at great cost to 
civilian lives.767  That protection of civilians had quickly become a problem 
was spelt out when Ugandan Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa asked MONUC 
on February 9 whether it could provide logistical support for the 
deployment of a further 2,000 UPDF troops to strengthen protection. 
Unable to transport Ugandan troops under its mandate, MONUC offered to 
support OLT in different ways, for example by improving roads and air strips 
and moving its own troops closer to areas of OLT action. Additionally, 
MONUC was providing logistical support for Armed Forces of the DRC 
(FARDC) troops under its DRC-focused mandate.768  The LRA conducted a 
series of brutal attacks; the combined presence of soldiers of various 
government armies created a volatile environment in which civilians were 
exposed to human rights violations. A confidential but leaked report 
commissioned by the Social Science Research Council provided fieldwork-
based evidence that in 2011 UPDF soldiers in CAR were plundering 
resources; in DRC the Ugandan soldiers were accused of systematic rape, 
violence and of profiting from prostitution.769
Without a credible protection force, civilians were on the run from aerial 
attacks just as much as the LRA. What abductees with the LRA were 
supposed to do during OLT was unclear. Leaflets thrown out of planes by 
the UPDF to persuade LRA fighters to come out stated that fighters or 
abductees should surrender to barracks or churches. Barracks and churches 
had not been told to welcome LRA fighters, and in any case LRA fighters 
would not have been able to reach them without passing through villages, 
likely causing havoc there or being killed. “The military operation was not 
766 US Embassy Kampala, "03 KAMPALA 001426 (Confidential): Senator Feingold raises regional and domestic issues with Ugandan 
President”, 9/11/2007.
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Thunder- Part I." The Observer Uganda June, 1-6/6/2009; R.R. Atkinson et al., "Do no harm: assessing a military approach to the Lord's 
Resistance Army", Journal of Eastern African Studies iFirst article, 2012; M.Schomerus and K.Tumutegyereize. Conciliation Resources. "After 
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properly planned, that’s why it is dragging on,” commented an SPLA officer 
in early 2009. “It is more difficult and complicated the longer it drags 
on.”770
Drag on it did. From the military perspective of one of the supposed 
partners, the SPLA, OLT had been ill conceived, ill planned, ill executed and 
extremely damaging, setting up the region for years of further instability—
as was certainly still the case in 2012. Assessing the UPDF preparations for 
the strike against the LRA, a senior SPLA commander commented that they 
had used MIG-21 planes to bomb them, and that they had stationed tanks 
near the border in Koboko. 
It was as if they were going to fight a conventional army, but that 
was not the case… Also, SPLA, UPDF and DRC forces never sat 
down together. SPLA was supposed to seal the borders and they 
were drunk. The US helped plan this, but Western systems normally 
undermine how our systems work. US officers will rely on 
equipment. They want to do their own intelligence gathering 
without relying on basic local intelligence. The State Department 
has no experience with realities on the ground. The UPDF troops 
were in Koboko for days. It was like they were going to a party. 
There was no alliance between SPLA and UPDF. The GoU wanted 
to keep the operation secret from Machar. The SPLA was not very 
happy. The SPLA just said to some forces, just go and sit there, let 
the Ugandans see if they really are the best. The LRA needs a 
counterinsurgency force. SPLA could do it, but they were not 
involved because the Ugandans in their mambas [military vehicles] 
are too arrogant.771 
The SPLA officer explained to me that he knew OLT would be a disaster 
when he heard reports that the UPDF was in the DRC preparing for the 
strike, but that the Ugandan soldiers were eating sardines and rice every 
night in their camp. “But really! It was the UPDF eating rice and sardines. It 
takes a long time to cook and eat rice. If you are in a hurry, you don’t eat 
rice. But this is the UPDF arrogance. Wherever they go, they come with 
their own problems.”772
Arrogance was also brought up by an international advisor to the talks: 
“The US pressure for the military option also comes from American military 
arrogance,” he explained to me almost a year before OLT. At the time he 
thought it would be impossible for the UPDF to remain engaged in a 
military operation on Congolese ground for more than a few months at 
most: “The UPDF is also under performance pressure. This needs to be a 
770 Author interview with Yambio-born former UNICEF Ops manager. Yambio: 25/2/2009.
771 Author interview with SPLA intelligence officer. Juba: 1/3/2009.
772 I Author interview with SPLA intelligence officer. Juba: 1/3/2009.
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neat and successful military operation; they cannot hang out in DRC and 
certainly not plunder any more.”773 
Yet on March 1, 2009, Presidents Kabila and Museveni met to sign a 
Memorandum of Understanding about extending the military cooperation 
indefinitely, with reviews every three months. In 2012, the UPDF remains in 
the DRC and CAR. UPDF news about OLT success came trickling in from the 
beginning, often disproved as quickly as it had been disseminated. In June 
2009, the US reported that the UPDF was continuing “to make steady 
progress”, measured on, amongst other things the fact that “between May 
18 and 29, the UPDF killed 41 LRA fighters, including Brigadier General 
Cesar Achellam and Lt. Col. Okello Okuti.”774 Achellam, however, emerged 
from the bush in 2012, very much alive. Civilian reports about the failures of 
UPDF engagement and atrocities committed by all sides continued. Yet, a 
confidential memo regarding US/Ugandan military cooperation outlined in 
December 2009 that the US had “received verbal assurances” from the 
Ugandan Defence Ministry that US intelligence was being used in the 
pursuit of the LRA “in compliance with Ugandan law and the law of armed 
conflict”. The memo elaborated that 
furthermore, Uganda understands the need to consult with the 
U.S. in advance if the UPDF intends to use US-supplied intelligence 
to engage in operations not governed by the law of armed 
conflict. Uganda understands and acknowledges that misuse of 
this intelligence could cause the US to end this intelligence sharing 
relationship.775 
The memo thus implies that failure to notify the US constitutes misuse of its 
intelligenc, rather than giving a general condemnation of any violation of 
law of armed conflict. The implication of this memo is far-reaching: it 
allows the conclusion that the military partnership was to work along 
rather fluid interpretations of international obligations.
Conclusion
2008 was marked by competing forces in the Juba Talks and ultimately a 
conservative view of how peace talks were measured and deemed 
successful. The final year in a process that stretched out over three became 
a moment when the peace process even more so than previously narrowed 
773 Fieldnotes, 24/11/2007. The International Court of Justice had found the UPDF guilty of plundering in DRC in a 2005 judgement. 
International Court of Justice, "Case concerning armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo vs. 
Uganda)", ICJ, 2005. 
774 US Embassy Kampala."09KAMPALA551: Uganda/ DRC: Operation Rudia II Update”, 1/6/2009.
775 US Embassy Kampala."09KAMPALA1397 (confidential): Uganda: Intelligence Sharing Agreement", 16/12/2009.
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towards achieving milestones, rather than acting as a catalyst for a broader 
process. Additionally, challenges that had existed since the beginning came 
to the fore. In a conflict that had been substantially driven by rumours, 
2008 showed how powerful rumours can drive those divorced from reliable 
information structures to action, emphasising the importance of 
information and how muddled it in reality was. In Kony’s case, it will remain 
impossible to conclusively say what his intentions were, but it is fair to 
argue that the different signals sent by different parties added to the 
confusion.
The military fall-out that began in December 2008 and continues to this day 
shows the gravity of the decision to abandon the often frustrating process 
in favour of what mistakenly continues to be sold as the quicker solution. 
Leverage had certainly worked in exerting pressure on the LRA. For some of 
the LRA/M delegates, the final choice between signing a peace deal or 
facing military action, however, underscored the perception they had held 
all along: that the Juba Talks were not comprehensive peace talks or a deep 
peace process, but a way to ultimately pressure the LRA/M into signing an 
agreement. Of course, such an assessment is cursory and neglects the many 
concessions the government made in the agreements, and which influence 
northern Uganda’s development until today. But in terms of how delegates 
perceived the Juba Talks at this point, they argued that ultimately, the Talks 
reinforced the power structures they were trying to address in which at 
some point, the GoU would again revert to badly-executed military action. 
Abandoning the talks in favour of a military strike also meant that many 
actors failed to capitalise on the many advances made in the process thus 
far. The juxtaposition of process and pressure, which crystallised particularly 
in the final frantic weeks leading up to OLT, meant that broader political 
gains remained unacknowledged as the whole process was unfairly branded 
a failure. Some of the achievements of Juba are discussed in the final 
chapter.
On the international and facilitation side, the hawks and doves fought in 
the background over which approach would ultimately prevail. This 
dichotomy also brought yet again to light the profound challenges in 
engaging with an unreliable actor such as the LRA/M. Most international 
actors by the end of 2008 had simply lost patience with an inept delegation 
and an obstinate LRA leader; letting negotiations end could thus be done 
from the moral high ground. As the events show, within the LRA/M, 
relationships had broken down, and different agendas were being played 
out. As these internal dynamics unfolded, they were generally seen as proof 
that the LRA/M was dysfunctional. However, the insights into the inner 
working of the LRA/M which were particularly obvious in 2008 actually 
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showed something very different: how in times of crisis the LRA/M system 
worked and why ultimately the LRA/M stood as much in the way of an 
agreement as the GoU. 
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8. “LRA Has Already Become a System”: Representation and 
Distrust
On a normal negotiation day in the first part of the Juba Talks in 2006, the 
LRA/M delegates were driven from their hotel to the negotiation venue, 
Juba Raha Hotel, the white minibus crawling and climbing through the 
potholes on the road that connects Hai Cinema with Konyo Konyo Market. 
It was the worst road in town. On the minibus dashboard sat a sign reading 
“Delegation”. On a good day, a usually bored-looking soldier was riding 
shotgun; however, on many days, the delegation’s armed escort did not 
show up. 
In the first few months of the talks, reporters from Uganda’s New Vision 
and Daily Monitor as well as various news agencies such as AFP and AP 
would hang around at the Juba Raha Hotel. Reuters was the only 
international news agency with a local stringer, a young man from Ikotos 
who had fought against the SPLA on Machar’s side. The BBC Khartoum 
reporter occasionally made an appearance for important events. At various 
points, foreign freelancers with television crews showed up. For Uganda’s 
Daily Monitor, keeping a reporter in Juba for this length of time was “the 
most expensive story we have ever done”, said the reporter.776  Whenever 
members of the delegations appeared in the doorways, the journalists 
jumped up to collect a quote or engage in an informal chat. On bad 
negotiation days, they were handed a written statement. On particularly 
bad days, the LRA/M delegation would read out a written statement and 
then disappear without further comment. 
Overall, most people at the margins of the peace talks spent most of their 
days waiting. Waiting for decisions to be made, waiting for transport, 
waiting for the LRA/M delegation to appear. From the day of the opening 
of the talks, when the LRA/M was three hours late because their transport 
had not materialised, it had become their habit to be late. There had been 
considerable tension over the LRA/M’s tardiness. The delegation leader had 
promised the mediator and the GoU delegates to change and to “keep 
better time”.
The day after this promise had been made, I was sitting in the LRA/M’s Juba 
Bridge Hotel. The GoU delegation was staying at the Civicon camp—much 
to the resentment of the LRA/M delegation, who liked to point out that 
776 Fieldnotes, Juba: 30/9/2006.
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while the GoU enjoyed self-contained prefabricated housing units, their 
own Juba Bridge Hotel had no functioning toilet. GoSS had replied that it 
had been necessary to move the LRA/M to the more remote hotel to stave 
off attention. On this particular day, an important afternoon meeting about 
the next steps was scheduled for 3pm. I was waiting with another delegate
—a usually quiet man from the diaspora—to hitch a lift in the minibus back 
to the Juba Raha Hotel. Just before three, the familiar white vehicle pulled 
up. Apart from my conversation partner, nobody from the delegation was 
anywhere to be seen. At a quarter past three, one of the leading delegates 
walked through the camp wrapped in a towel on his way to the washrooms 
to take a shower. The LRA/M delegate sitting next to me let out an audible 
sigh. “Now I understand why the LRA never made it out of the bush,” he 
said.777 
Introduction
His remark was a playful expression of weariness. It revealed the delegate’s 
realisation that, along with the outside pressure the LRA/M was 
experiencing at the Juba Talks, internally they were also stuck in their own 
detrimental ways.  “The LRA has its own problems and I am the first to 
admit it,” said a former delegate in November 2009. When asked why in his 
opinion the talks had failed, another delegate said it was because “Kony is 
being used and allowing himself to be used. But if you think there is only 
one human being at the heart of it, it is wrong.”778  In the opening speech 
of the talks, Olweny had made a similar point: “Even if they were to 
succeed, God forbid, in apprehending the five indicted leaders, LRA has 
already become a system. The war can only become more intensive,” he 
said. 779  However, much analysis of the LRA continues to see it as a group 
gathered around Kony as the centre of gravity and of the conflict.780
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Recent scholarship allows to call into question such simplified and 
personified analysis. Particularly more nuanced understandings of conflict 
networks have called into question the straight lines of command that have 
been emphasised in conflict resolution, military strategy, and more recently 
international criminal prosecution. Grabher and Stark advocate shifting 
attention “from the attributes and motivations of individual personalities 
to the properties of the localities and networks” in which war happens.781 
Wassermann and Faust suggest that examining networks, rather than 
individual relationships, might allow better analytical insight into complex 
conflicts.782  This is a particularly poignant insight when looking at the LRA 
conflict also as a conflict of marginalisation both in the national and 
broader international context. Sorbo et al. write in their description of 
internal wars “rather than being a transitory problem… internal war can be 
seen as the emergence of essentially new types of social formation adapted 
for survival on the margins of the global economy.”783 It is in these insights 
about connecting local, seemingly personalised conflicts to broader 
processes of political and economic marginalisation that a different 
perspective of the LRA conflict makes sense. 
The Ugandan government, the US military and various advocacy groups 
have pushed the notion that if Kony were put under pressure, the LRA 
would automatically falter.784  I had a typical conversation with a former 
employee of a UN agency in Kampala. He was convinced that Kony was the 
“linchpin”, and that killing him would turn the LRA’s military behaviour 
into criminal behaviour “where individual interests supersede group 
interest, thus it will be easier to coax them out of the bush”.785 Jackson—
without particularly grounding the claim in empirical evidence—echoes this 
typical assessment: “Kony himself holds the key to peace—a cult cannot 
function without its high priest. Remove the high priest and the structure 
falls apart.”786 Kaplan describes the LRA as a “paradigmatic exemplar” of a 
group that has 
781 G.Grabher and D.Stark, "Organizing Diversity: Evolutionary Theory, Network Analysis and Postsocialism”, Regional Studies 31, 1997.
782 S.Wassermann and K.Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
783 G.Sorbo, J.Macrae, and L.Wohlgemuth. Chr. Michelsen Institute,"NGOs in Conflict - An Evaluation of International Alert". CMI Series. Bergen: 1997.
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example, in an ICG report: “Whether [Kony] comes out of the bush to sign a peace agreement is less relevant to avoiding an eventual new 
revolt in northern Uganda than whether the government makes serious efforts to keep its promises to that region.” International Crisis 
Group. "Northern Uganda: The road to peace, with or without Kony”, Africa Report 146. Nairobi/ Brussels: 10/12/2008.  A similar argument 
appears in a follow-up report. International Crisis Group. "LRA: A Regional Strategy beyond Killing Kony”, Africa Report 157, Brussels: 
2010. 
785 Fieldnotes, New York: 24/9/2010. 
786 P.Jackson, "Negotiating with Ghosts: Religion, Conflict and Peace in Northern Uganda", The Round Table 98, 402, 2009, p.326.
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turned inward, becoming localistic rather than international, and 
manifest[s] intense ethnic, racial, or tribal mysticism. They are 
millenarian and chiliastic in nature, and seek to create a new 
society—based on the creation of new men and women—in a 
single generation.787
Kaplan’s description is at once one-dimensional and profound. In a sense, 
the LRA/M did seek to create a new society by pushing for profound change 
and for the overhaul of Uganda’s politics. At times it seemed as if the 
delegation wanted to turn back the clock by comprehensively addressing 
Museveni’s betrayals from 20 years ago, and in doing so to provide a 
different history that would be more in the Acholi’s favour. Many delegates, 
however, were aware that such ambitious goals would require a change not 
only in LRA violence, but crucially in internal LRA/M dynamics. The rather 
unreliable behaviour in negotiations, including the lack of clarity on who 
the dependably mandated negotiators were, and the sketchy link between 
the high command and its civilian negotiators had earned the group the 
reputation of being dysfunctional. In his letter to Machar on-and-off LRA/M 
delegation leader Matsanga gave a similar description: “But sir LRA issue is 
a complex that one shouldn’t blame you for the total chaos that reins the 
movement of LRA.788
This chapter analyses how the perceived chaos served a distinct purpose: it 
confirmed the LRA/M’s status as a marginalised group, unable to create 
inner cohesion and bring about change because of pressure exerted by 
hostile structures. By extension, the battle against such disempowering 
structures also implied that all LRA/M actions were justified. By maintaining 
this status quo, the LRA/M permanently remained in the position of 
expressing their desire for peace but not being able to get it, without 
having to examine their own role in the failure of the talks.
The chapter first discusses the representation structure of the LRA/M. It 
then examines the LRA/M’s understanding that its organisation and all its 
individuals were deeply embedded in a hostile context. This maintains the 
LRA/M’s notion of itself as representing all marginalised people in Uganda 
against a belligerent political system that had no interest in allowing such 
representation. In the LRA/M’s self-assigned role as spokespeople for 
everyone with a grievance, encounters with the hostile political system 
created an internal understanding that if any LRA/M demands were 
rejected or their behaviour criticised, this was proof that broader forces 
were at work to silence its voice. As a result, the LRA/M was weak at 
787 J. Kaplan, "The fifth wave: The new tribalism?", Terrorism and Political Violence 19, 2007.
788 D. Nyekorach-Matsanga, "Letter to Riek Machar re: Continued support for the peace process and clarification",  30/4/2008. 
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assessing its own performance and making necessary concessions and 
compromises.
Second, individuals within the LRA/M deeply mistrusted each other. The 
network of distrust meant that others interpreted individual support for 
concessions at the negotiation table as having been manipulated by 
systemic forces. At the same time, distrust acted as glue in the delegation. 
Having been infiltrated by government agents, LRA/M delegates chose to 
react by keeping the enemies close to allow for better control. The chapter 
concludes that distrust amongst delegates, seeming disconnect between 
LRA and LRM and also infiltration through government agents are what 
maintains the broader LRA system. 
Representation in a Hostile Environment 
Who Represents the LRA?
When it became clear that the negotiation would be conducted by a team 
of LRA sympathisers from the diaspora—the LRM—discussions in the media 
and international organisations centred on whether this “diaspora 
delegation” was the right negotiation partner.789  A delegation drawn 
mainly from people in the diaspora meant an acute lack of high-level LRA 
command at the negotiation table. Ugandan opposition politician Mao 
commented in a newspaper article on November 8, 2006: “It is good that 
those who have been backing the LRA have come out in the open, but their 
biggest problem is that they are still stuck in the politics of 1986. They seem 
to think that being in exile is a badge of honour.”790  An article in the 
Monitor described the LRA/M team as “a group of people who have 
maintained contact with the LRA over the years” who were now pushing a 
political agenda that had not existed before. The newspaper quoted 
Ugandan MP Odonga Otto: “I think the talks will be lukewarm because I 
know some of these people on Kony’s team like Ayena (Odongo). They have 
just been hanging around town but Kony is in his own world.” The lack of 
789 Contested representation is not a new issue in LRA peace talks: in 1997, Pain wrote that as a prerequisite for future peace talks “some 
would want first to test out the credibility of claimed representatives to influence the fighters in the field or to represent them”. D.Pain, 
“‘The Bending of Spears’: Producing consensus for peace and development in Northern Uganda”, London: International Alert/ Kacoke 
Madit, December 1997. The LRA and LRM have a long history, however volatile. In the 1990s and leading up to the Juba Talks, the 
relationship was usually described as one that was invoked whenever convenient to either side. While the LRM stands accused of providing 
material support to the LRA ever since the war started, the LRA certainly draws much of its views on the outside world from members of the 
diaspora. The LRM at times used the existence of the LRA to make a political point, but seemed to have very little direct contact with their 
supposed military wing. However, whenever the political development moved from issuing statements towards having to be a legitimate 
negotiation partner, the two groups converged. Overall, viewing LRA and LRM as part of the same system is a more appropriate description. 
790 N.Mao, “‘It is good..’", The New Vision, 8/11/2006.
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direct access to Kony and Otti—exacerbated by the fact that complicated 
information had to be relayed on expensive and bad-quality satellite phone 
lines—created convoluted and often unreliable communication paths for 
the GoU and the mediation team, as well as for the LRA/M delegates 
themselves. 
The New Vision latched onto “the striking contrast between a mostly 
illiterate rebel army hiding out in the bush and their educated 
representatives flown in from abroad”. The paper questioned whether 
these could be legitimate representatives of Kony: “Of 17 LRA 
representatives at the peace talks, only five are rebel fighters, while 10 are 
Ugandans living in the UK, the US, Kenya and Germany. The remaining two 
are LRA sympathisers from Kampala.”791  Egeland described the LRA/M 
delegations as “more professional mediators… these are the people of the 
diaspora. They are pretty good, actually too good because they were 
demanding more and more per diems and more and more projects and 
assistance and agreements that went far beyond what should be in such 
talks.”792  It was a standard joke among UN support staff at the peace 
process that the Juba Talks for some delegates were mainly a period of 
personal improvement: “As the talks went on, watches were growing,” 
observed one international staff member. “A few months into the process I 
saw [one of the delegates] with a $5,000 dive watch on his wrist.”793 One 
alienated former delegate put down his thoughts about his former 
colleagues’ claim to the ownership of the peace-process in a letter to 
Machar and various northern Ugandan and Sudanese leaders:
[Two delegates] told me in no uncertain terms that although I had 
been requested by their principals to support them, I should know 
from the start that the peace talks was their DEAL and hence I 
should follow what they told me to do and say not what I thought 
was the correct thing to do and say. I could at first not believe my 
ears, but as time went by, what I heard was true. And by the way 
the two don’t follow the proceedings in the conference hall as 
they partially understand English, the language of communication 
during the talks. The two are also the ones who give out per diem 
to the delegates and give what they think is enough not what they 
are given by the GoSS and the rest they pocket. If asked why not 
the amount given by GoSS, they simply say that is enough for 
delegates, the rest they would take to Otti, which is never true as 
the GoSS always have special package for Otti and the rest of the 
LRA soldiers. They also solicit funds from other sources without 
Otti and other members of the delegation knowing. But they 
make sure they send to Otti whatever he wants and at all costs. 
That is why they have acquired property such as mataus [sic], 
791 The New Vision,"Why do Ugandan exiles support LRA?", 16/9/2006.
792 Author telephone interview with Jan Egeland, former UN-Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs.15/10/2007.
793 Author interview with international security expert. Nabanga: 13/4/2008 .
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houses and plots in Nairobi. The peace process is really their DEAL!
794 
Summarising his impression of the delegation, one international advisor 
said “the problem with a group like the LRA is that they have very few 
friends and therefore you end up with a delegation of funny people.”795 
Each individual delegate had brought their own story with them to the 
negotiation table. One delegate recalled his time as an opposition soldier in 
the UPDA as a time of suffering. Another had endured personal losses, with 
family members still suffering harassment in Uganda. Delegates had left 
behind in Uganda possessions or careers, or the hope of careers and success 
that they had held in 1986. Very few of them had spent time in Uganda in 
the last years or decades; those who did had experienced either 
government scrutiny or a failure to launch a political career. They deeply 
mistrusted each other, as discussed further below. In his first meeting with 
the soon-to-be delegates, Machar was frank about his concerns and 
reminded the delegation that during the least peace talks, the LRA’s 
negotiator Sam Kolo had surrendered to the UPDF: 
The president of Uganda committed to the peace process, but are 
you a solid delegation representing the LRA? If you are, you have 
to avail yourself to the rest of the world. The leader of the 
movement must have confidence in his delegation. The first thing 
to resolve is how many should be in the delegation. When Betty 
Bigombe negotiated the peace, the leader of the delegation 
defected.796
Many instances during the talks seemed to confirm that the delegates and 
the high command were rather detached from each other. Despite publicly 
endorsing his delegation, Otti also emphasised that he remained crucial in 
expressing the LRA’s standpoint: “If I don’t speak for LRA, there is no LRA,” 
he said.797 On September 27, 2006, Otti contradicted a position taken by his 
delegation. Reportedly at the request of the high command, the delegates 
had tried to get Rugunda off the GoU team. Otti weighed in via the press 
to say that he wanted Rugunda to stay. The delegation’s legitimacy was 
shaken, and talk about the need for direct negotiations with Kony heated 
up. 798
In the online discussion space Acoli Forum, the relationship between the 
LRA leadership, the LRM delegation and the Acholi elders was the subject 
794 Name of writer withheld by author, "Letter to Riek Machar re: Acholi Peace Conference in Juba", April 2007; sender’s caps.
795 Personal email to author from international Advisor to the Juba Talks. 7/8/2011.
796 Fieldnotes, Juba: 7/6/2006.
797 Author interview with Vincent Otti, Ri-Kwangba: 14/11/2006.
798 T.Cocks, "Ugandan rebel commander overrules own peace team", Reuters, 27/9/2006.
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of heated debate after a newspaper article reported that Otti had called 
RDC Ochora after the opening of the peace talks to say that Olweny’s harsh 
speech “was not cleared with the High Command”. This had followed initial 
confusion over whether Kony and Otti had accepted an amnesty offer from 
the GoU after the delegation had declined it.799 One participant, signing his 
post Alfred, argued: 
the RDC Walter Ochora is playing his gimmick in order to create 
confusion between the LRA High command and their negotiating 
team. I wonder why the LRA high command want a separate talk 
with Acoli delegation when they entrusted their representative?… 
Otii Vincent must also learn to be Respectfull [sic] of his 
representative doing a very difficult job to defend him and his 
commanders in the talk. Un necessary [sic] phone call interviews 
with the government officials and press interviews regarding the 
negotiation is not the best way forward. The LRA High Command 
must leave press interview to their leader of the delegation.800
Reacting to the debate about the delegation’s legitimacy, LRA/M delegate 
Ayena stood up in the Juba Raha Hotel meeting hall. He was reportedly 
angry and argued that the delegation as it stood before the mediation 
team had been fully mandated by Kony. Even if Kony had appointed a dog, 
he said, and written a letter confirming the mandate and attached it to the 
dog’s collar, the dog would need to be treated with respect. There was thus, 
he concluded, no reason to doubt the legitimacy of the delegation. When 
asked about their legitimacy to represent the high command, most 
delegates, referred to June 12, 2006, when Kony had signed off on the list 
of delegates.801
The East African quoted GoU deputy delegation leader and Minister for 
International Affairs Okello Oryem as having declared “in frustration… ‘If 
we were dealing with Kony’s real demands, we would have signed an 
agreement by now and been out of this place.’” Oryem made the point that 
the demands set out by the delegates were “mainly the personal position of 
the non-combatant arm of the LRA”, which he saw as an attempt “to derail 
the process”.802  Kony, reported the government, had only asked for his 
personal safety and the removal of his name from the list of terrorists.803 
The demands Oryem saw as expressing personal positions covered a range 
799 A.Izama and E.Gyezaho, "More Hurdles In Juba Talks", The Daily Monitor, 19/7/2006.
800 Alfred, "Subject: Re: [Acoli Forum] More hurdles in Juba talks", in Acoli Forum, 19/7/2006.
801 On June 12, 2006, Otti met with Machar and the delegates in a clearing near Nabanga to finalise the delegation. I was meeting with 
Kony in a clearing further in the bush. During the interview Kony received a phone call from Otti to clarify some issues with the delegation. 
Kony okayed the delegation then, and later signed the official appointment letter.
802 The East African, "LRA 'externals' accused of killing talks", 24/7/2006.
803 The East African, "LRA 'externals' accused of killing talks", 24/7/2006.
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of issues. These included the closure of IDP camps, disbandment of the 
UPDF as Uganda’s national army, the establishment of an army that would 
pledge loyalty to the people rather than the president, army reform to 
establish forces whose composition would reflect Uganda’s national 
character, the admission of atrocities committed by the UPDF, and a power-
sharing agreement between the LRA and GoU. 
Referring to these demands as of great importance to Uganda’s population 
as a whole, the delegation rejected suggestions that they might not have a 
good grasp on what the LRA wanted to negotiate. A member of the 
mediation team concluded after the Juba Talks that the delegation 
did not have any (or at least not much) influence on the 
leadership. I always felt that LRA-leadership used them to be 
between them and the rest of the world. And that the delegation 
did not have much of a political opinion, and that the opinion that 
they did have was not necessarily of relevance for the LRA… There 
was a link between them and a political problem, but they were 
only the consequence of the Northern Ugandan problem (and later 
a cause, as the conflict itself and the IDP-camps became the biggest 
N-Ugandan problem). That poses a difficulty, because there was 
something to talk about, but who was supposed to talk? Of course 
that was the reason the parliamentarians came on board, but that 
didn’t necessarily help the “LRA-problem” (in terms of getting 
them out of the bush and ending the violence).804  
In an untitled and unsigned discussion paper that the LRA never used 
publicly, the writer developed the LRA/M’s counterargument against the 
accusation that the delegation was not a bona fide representative of the 
LRA or indeed of a political agenda:
Before LRA did a human face-lift to its political wing by naming 
about 16 persons to its peace negotiation team, the NRM Kampala 
regime, its backers, governments and organisations in USA and 
Europe claimed it was impossible to engage LRA because it neither 
had a political wing nor a political agenda. They went further 
arguing that business can only be done with LRA, if its leader 
Joseph Kony publ ic ly named a spokesperson/and his 
representative(s).
It is therefore alarmingly socking [sic] that the proponents of the 
views above, with ease are changing goal-post by questioning the 
genuineness and credibility of the political representatives named 
by Joseph Kony witnessed by the authorities of southern Sudan. 
None else except LRA and its leadership can say who genuinely 
represents their course [sic] and interests…
Annoying too is the notion that the LRA team must only be 
considered genuine if it has a military representation on its peace 
negotiation team. This notion exposes Uganda as a state pervaded 
by the culture of military supremacy. It also means in essence that 
804 Personal email to author from international advisor to the Juba Talks. 7/8/2011.
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nothing binding can be done without the involvement and 
endorsement of the military.805
The text above is a good example of how the delegates viewed their role in 
the broader context: despite individually admitting that the delegation 
lacked technical capacity, as a group they tended to define every obstacle 
they encountered in Juba as a manifestation of the system they were trying 
to battle. They often framed the shortcomings of the LRA/M at the Juba 
Talks as a result of their being the lesser negotiation partner and the 
symbolic representation of a much larger systemic conflict. Criticism of their 
representatives confirmed that their marginalisation was so entrenched in 
the broader political context that it was impossible to represent political 
demands. The system as they knew it had thus continued to work. 
Battling a Hostile Environment
On September 30, 2006, the New Vision published a photo of LRA/M 
delegates carrying white plastic chairs into the mediation hall of the Juba 
Raha Hotel. It was quite a common sight to see people carrying chairs back 
and forth, and the delegation was amused that the newspaper had picked 
this up. One delegate said to me jokingly that this proved that a level 
playing field had not been established at the Juba Talks: “I want to say to 
the mediator we are so disadvantaged, we even have to bring our own 
chairs.”806  While said in jest, it expressed a sentiment that I had 
encountered before: that the LRA/M’s marginalisation was so entrenched 
that not even outside help was able to create the conditions in which their 
situation could change. An SPLA officer who had observed the Juba Talks 
commented on how ingrained the dynamics between the conflict parties 
were—possibly too ingrained to be changed even in peace. He had 
observed it in Kony’s refusal to sign the FPA, and in Museveni’s treatment of 
the peace process which he considered lacked the necessary concessions: 
“When Museveni sees opportunity for peace, his rhetoric changes from 
partner in peace to victor in peace. You need to concede pride and ego that 
you are the victor. If you don’t, I will think your peace deal is bait.”807 
Many analysts agree on Uganda’s politics of exclusion and marginalisation. 
It is not surprising that the LRA/M sees itself deeply embedded in them. 
Delegates and fighters viewed their own actions as reactions to systemic 
constraints imposed on them. Systemic marginalisation and depoliticisation 
805 Unnamed author (LRA/M member of the Juba Delegation), unpublished and undated.
806 Fieldnotes, Juba: 30/9/2006.
807 Author interview with SPLA intelligence officer. Juba: 1/3/2009.
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had a wide reach, in their view. Delegates remained adamant that they 
were on a political mission and had been fighting or living in exile for the 
opportunity to be at the negotiation table to address Uganda’s problems. 
They argued that the hostile political system in Uganda was now 
deliberately depoliticising their cause. This impression was enhanced when 
international actors seemed to pursue a similar route of the depoliticisation 
of northern Uganda’s most obvious problem. Enough! wrote that Shortley, 
the US government representative at the Juba Talks and senior advisor on 
conflict, called “for the de-linking of the Juba peace process from returns 
and redevelopment in the North. Other international donors should join 
the call to press the Ugandan government to deliver on these promises 
now.”808 
In January 2008, one LRA/M delegate made the connection between their 
fight and the post-election violence in Kenya. President Kibaki of Kenya, he 
argued, was launching an anti-Luo campaign similar to Museveni’s anti-
Acholi campaign, and Ugandan “Opoko” were helping Kibaki.809  Another 
member, commenting on the Kenyan riots, which he perceived to be anti-
Luo, said “Museveni is pushing his politics across the border.”810 The LRA/M 
certainly wanted to stress the importance of the regional perspective, 
pointing out “that unless a collective and committed approach is made to 
finding a lasting solution to them now, it may become too late for the 
stability of the Great Lakes region as East Africa’s political unity would be 
disrupted by Museveni’s politics.”811  Years of subdued reaction from the 
international community to what the LRA/M referred to as the genocide of 
Acholi was seen as part of the broader hostile system. The LRA/M argued 
that the international community had misused “a golden international 
human rights opportunity, attention and focus”. Uganda had shown its true 
colours in its refusal to include the situation on the UN agenda, thereby 
“denying… us, the people of Uganda to reap from, benefit and enjoy the 
collective universal defence and promotion of the respect for men’s 
fundamental rights to life, security, peace and development”.812
The powerful LRA/M notion that they were speaking for a wide affected 
constituency had a direct impact on how delegates described themselves in 
808 J.Spiegel and J.Prendergast,"A new peace strategy for northern Uganda and the LRA", ENOUGH strategy paper, 19/5/2008.
809 Fieldnotes, Juba: 28/1/2008. ‘Opoko’ is the Acholi word for a calabas container in which milk is kept. In Uganda, opokos are associated 
with Banyankole cattle keepers in western Uganda. In political terms, a person subscribing to Museveni’s policies is called an opoko.
810 Fieldnotes, Juba: 28/1/2008.
811 LRA/M Delegation in Juba/O.Olweny, "LRA/M opening speech at first Juba Peace Talks opening ceremony", 14/7/2006. 
812 LRA/M Peace Delegation Information and Publicity Secretariat, "Press Release: Stop the concealment of genocide in Uganda", 
13/10/2007.
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Juba. In their view, they represented all those who had been aggrieved by 
Museveni’s politics. If this representation had violent flaws, it was because 
the system had silenced the LRA/M’s political capacity to have a voice 
without violence. I asked Otti why at the time of the assembly in Owiny-
Kibul he had not allowed his soldiers to be transported by the SPLA, but 
had instead encouraged civilians to provide bicycles and food to LRA 
soldiers passing through. He explained that he had had to make a 
distinction between those who were “part of LRA” and those, like the SPLA, 
who were not. I noted that I was unsure that all civilians in northern 
Uganda would agree with the characterisation that they were “part of 
LRA”. Otti responded with conviction: “LRA is northern Uganda. We are 
northern Uganda.”813
From Otti’s perspective, the Juba Talks strengthened this mandate. “I am in 
really good spirits about the peace talks,” he said in September 2006 when I 
asked him how he was judging the progress. “I am happy to have more 
family connection now, more contact.”814 I asked him to elaborate: why was 
it so important to have contact? I had always been told that LRA fighters 
could not go home because they had committed violence. Otti found this 
rather amusing. He explained to me that of course, for LRA it was the most 
important thing to connect with their families and the people back home, 
because now they knew again from speaking to people during the peace 
talks that what they were doing in the bush was the best for northern 
Uganda.815 
Individual delegates expressed similar sentiments. They saw their mandate 
as connecting with others affected by the conflict. They argued that bush 
fighters, exiled Ugandans and Ugandan civilians all shared the experience 
that the government was not providing peace and development and did 
not allow them to speak up. This description is reminiscent of Kalyvas’ 
description of a conflict’s “deep structure” which informs the most basic 
and persistence analysis of why a resolution is so difficult to achieve. In this 
case, the “deep structure” is the LRA/M’s understanding that Museveni had 
robbed people of their political capacity to speak up against the very 
marginalisation that was robbing them of their voice..816  It has been one of 
the remarkable characteristics of the conflict in northern Uganda that the 
LRA’s mission to resist the government has lacked consistently vocal non-
violent competition, despite northern Ugandans’ recognised grievances. As 
813 Author interview with Vincent Otti, Ri-Kwangba: 13/7/2007.
814 Author interview with Vincent Otti. Ri-Kwangba: 22/9/2006.
815 Author interview with Vincent Otti. Ri-Kwangba: 22/9/2006.
816 S.N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War.  ed. Margaret Levi, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.9. 
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a result, the LRA/M was guided in many of its actions by its understanding 
of itself as a social movement—or as the last man standing in an oppressive 
system. 
This view of themselves is not surprising, as it increases the broader 
relevance of the fight. Scholarship has established that the boundaries 
between a violent civil war and a social movement is fluid since, as 
Koopmans argues, both civil wars and social movements express 
discontent. ⁠817  Mamdani has broadened our understanding of the internal 
fluidity of social movements that need not be coherent or internally 
consistent “or be the agent of realising a trans-historical agenda.” ⁠818  Yet 
describing the LRA as a social movement is not only too benevolent 
regarding its methods, it also simplifies the group’s connection to its 
surroundings. The particular term “social movement” is associated, writes 
Tilly, with the participation of groups claiming to represent larger groups 
with a limited political voice. ⁠819  This definition does not include 
demonstrative violent behaviour against the very people the movement 
claims to represent. Tarrow’s definition of a collective challenge to 
authorities might bring us closer to a suitable description of what the LRA 
is. ⁠820  Tilly and Tarrow establish that contentious politics can be expressed 
with both violence and non-violence; the mode of expression does not 
change the cause. ⁠821  Such a perspective on the LRA—as a group with a 
defined cause which has chosen violence to pursue it—allows for a more 
nuanced and less judgemental perspective on the LRA. 
Such a perspective is important to understand how other actors utilise the 
LRA/M and use their resistance as a catalyst to voice their own grievances. 
When in the early days of the talks a range of actors, including MPs from 
Uganda, claimed that the LRA cause of resisting Museveni was also their 
own, the LRA/M’s view of themselves as representatives of the broader 
political context was confirmed, despite their being a little annoyed by the 
MPs’ presence. A Ugandan journalist who was covering the peace talks in 
Juba summed up why he felt the LRA/M’s view of themselves was justified:
817 R.Koopmans, "Protest in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention", in The Blackwell Companion 
to Social Movements, ed. D. A.  Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. New York: Blackwell: 2004.
818 M.Mamdani, "Introduction", in African Studies in Social Movements and Democracy, ed. Mahmood Mamdani 
and E. Wamba-di-Wamba. Dakar: CODESRIA,1995, pps. 9-10.
819 C.TIlly. Social Movements, 1768-2004. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2004.
820 S.Tarrow, Power in Movement: Collective Action, Social Movements and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994.
821 C.Tilly and S.Tarrow, Contentious Politics. Boulder: Paradigm Press, 2006.
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Northern Uganda is definitely full of LRA supporters. Even people 
on [National Resistance] Movement positions are very excited to 
see Kony. You cannot get elected in northern Uganda unless you 
support the LRA. Even now people are dying in the camps and an 
entire generation has been rendered useless. That is why the LRA 
has become a political force to be reckoned with.822  
One delegate described the LRA as the channel through which others could 
voice their grievances. As an example, he recounted that “one LC [Local 
Council] 5 in Soroti got up during consultations and said: ‘Kony might have 
messed this war up by what he did. But it was not his war in the first place. 
If the government does not want to settle this issue, we might have to 
fight.’”823  Such a description evokes Tilly’s concept of “brokerage”: a 
mechanism to link actors in both violence and non-violence.824
Yet not everyone was enthusiastic about the “brokering” that allowed for a 
strengthening the LRA mandate by renewing ties. Colonel Bwone told me 
that he “did not want to give more headache to my mum by seeing her and 
then going back to the bush again”.825 Others were critical because families 
of LRA fighters were rounded up by RDC Ochora and MP Mao to come and 
visit, underscoring that there was political currency in being seen to support 
the peace process with the LRA.826  This feeling was strengthened in early 
December 2006 when Ochora brought Kony’s ailing mother to the bush. In 
his angry swansong to the Juba Talks, written after the failed signing 
ceremony, former delegation spokesperson Olweny launched an all-out 
attack on the wider participation: 
While it is recognized and appreciated that the cultural leaders, 
political leaders, administrators and elders in northern Uganda, 
particularly Acholi, would make a credible and substantive input 
into the talks as representatives and voices of the people, they 
instead sought to hijack the process and became themselves key 
movers and central figures in the process. It didn’t help that some 
of them were sympathetic to the government. Many a time in the 
plenary hall, the LRA delegation were actually debating with this 
lot rather than the government delegation. It is commendable that 
some of the political leaders—MPs—have stood up firm against the 
822 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/9/2006. Druckman’s writing on ingroup-favouring bias helps us to understand these shifts in attitudes and 
association. He makes the point that “the desire to form groups and to differentiate them from others is so strong that it is easily activated 
under a variety of conditions”. D.Druckman, "Group Attachments in Negotiation and Collective Action", International Negotiation 11, 
2006, p.232. In this case, it seems that the desire to form an alliance against the government supported the ingroup-favouring bias.
823 LRA/M Peace Team, "Juba Peace Talks: The Record of Sabotage by the Government of Uganda; The Reasons General Joseph Kony 
Wants the Peace Agreement Revisited;  and, The Way Forward”, Nairobi: 6/11/2009. 
824 See C.Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003; C.Tilly, Trust and Rule. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
825 Author interview with Col. Lubwoa Bwone and Lt.Col. Santo Alit (LRA). Ri-Kwangba: 22/9/2006.
826 Fieldnotes, Juba: 19/11/2006.
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government for the war in the region, but many other leaders 
lacked the spine to forthrightly tell the government off. Moreover, 
the victims of the war were never adequately and independently 
represented at the talks. The government side only used them to 
reinforce their arguments against the LRA.827
These were huge systemic issues to tackle—much bigger in the eyes of the 
delegates than, for example, negotiating a way to deal with the ICC 
warrants. Quickly, the resigned perception set in that it was almost 
impossible to take on the wider political context. LRA/M delegates at times 
mentioned the ill-fated Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human 
Rights (CIVHR) set up by Museveni to investigate government atrocities 
between 1962 and 1986. They agreed that not much had come of the 
Commission, despite what had been written about it on paper, and said 
that any negotiated agreement that looked good on paper might go the 
same way. Quinn, in her examination of the truth commission, comes to a 
similar assessment: she argues that the commission was left without 
funding and its ability to have an impact on the social fabric of Uganda was 
deliberately undercut. The broader implication of this was that without a 
record of human rights abuses, victims of government atrocities were left 
without recourse and without a path towards social healing. If events are 
left unmentioned and unaddressed, victims lose their voice, whereas 
“bringing these events out into the open, the power of the perpetrators 
over their victims is finally severed.”828  This assessment echoes the LRA/M’s 
often-repeated point that their voice to talk about the crimes against the 
Acholi had been silenced through violence and oppression.
They could have made a much stronger statement about the Commission’s 
bias against the Acholi. For the LRA/M, this realisation translated into an 
implicit understanding that their own attempts to tell the truth and resolve 
the issues might also remain unheard. This would be the case even in an 
internationally sponsored peace process: “Already our leaders feel that the 
international community, and indeed the ICC has already passed a verdict of 
guilty by the way the indictees are being called ‘killers’, ‘murderers’, ‘most 
wanted war criminals in Africa’, etc,” read one statement.829 For them, this 
was another indication that Museveni’s power to control information and 
understanding was too far-reaching to be countered. In fact, as a further 
expression of the “deep structure” of marginalisation and loss of voice, 
sceptics within the delegation argued that the talks had been set up by the 
827 O.Olweny and J.Otukene, "Re: Juba Peace Talks: Who should be blamed for the refusal of Joseph Kony to sign the peace agreement?", 
Nairobi: 30/5/2008.
828  J. R Quinn, "Constraints: The Un-Doing of the Ugandan Truth Commission", Human Rights Quarterly 26, 2, 2004, p.406.
829 LRA/M Delegation in Juba/O.Olweny, "LRA/M opening speech at first Juba Peace Talks opening ceremony", 14/7/2006.  Calling 
someone a criminal before they have been found guilty of the crime by a court could be a libellous offence in some contexts.  
268
GoU as a way to avoid touching on issues that would threaten Museveni’s 
position. Winslade has described such a phenomenon occurring in a conflict 
situations where actors develop narratives that “see all events as taking 
place within, and being shaped by, larger stories. A whole mediation 
process itself might be seen as a plot development in the story of a 
particular relationship which endures through time.” 830
This understanding of the negotiation process as being firmly embedded 
within a hostile system which was to remain untouched in its essence by 
participating in such a process also meant that any agreement would not 
only be a compromise, but a confirmation of the system. When bombs 
dropped on the LRA in December 2008, communication between Kony and 
others in the bush and their representatives outside broke down. For many 
critics of the Juba Talks, Kony’s retreat into the bush served as proof that 
the representation had never worked in the first place. For some of the 
remaining delegates, however, it was proof that the hostile system would 
always return to its established tools, and that the LRA/M had come up 
against destructive forces too powerful to allow their voices to be heard. 
They said that their mission to address Uganda’s structural conflict had 
never stood a chance—it was, in their eyes, unfortunate but unavoidable 
that the LRA had also returned to its proven ways of operating as a highly 
mobile force committing atrocities against civilians. 
System of Distrust
“Everybody lies and cheats in these talks, even on the delegation,” one of 
the LRA/M delegates said to me.831  Some delegates blamed the systemic 
political forces for the failure of the Juba Talks; but others were more 
critical of the role of the delegation. One delegate said that in the midst of 
the most comprehensive effort to address a national conflict, many of the 
delegates around the table had been pursuing personal agendas. They had 
indulged in their distrust of each other, he explained, which had destroyed 
any cohesion in the LRA/M to pursue the goal of peace: “If we all, in the 
delegation, had worked on one common goal, we would not have 
disintegrated to this level.” “The Acholi in the early 1980s were very 
stupid,” said one delegate, who was very frank in describing the LRA’s 
destructive role in the war. For him, the actions of previous generations, 
830  J.Winslade, G.Monk, and A.Cotter, "In Theory: A narrative approach to the practice of mediation." Negotiation Journal, January, 1998, 
p.24.
831 Fieldnotes, Juba: 19/11/2006.
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even though they had had it bad, had contributed to his terrible 
situation.832
They relied on their wealth and cattle and they failed to send their 
children to school. I myself missed out on seven years of school 
between 1983 and 1989. And because of that we now have a big 
problem in Acholiland, a general problem. We have become very 
disunited and stupid. People are only out for their own interest.833
Another delegate told me that in mid-2006 he had been living in the 
diaspora when he was contacted by others already working in the 
delegation. They had asked him to come to Juba as a delegate. He said he 
was shocked to hear who else had been appointed to the delegation. “I 
could not believe it. [Name of one of the delegates]? Why him? He took 
amnesty. I could not believe it. You, [delegate’s name]?” he explained his 
reaction. “[Another delegate] used to work for Ugandan intelligence. Why 
him?”834  Another delegate recounted that the background of two of the 
original delegates was 
not clear. People assumed [one of them] was close to Kony because 
he was somehow part of his security. [Another leading delegate] 
had worked for internal affairs before joining the peace talks; 
[another delegate] was NRM and it was never clear how he came 
to be on the team. [Another delegate] was clearly Vincent’s man 
and was working with the government. In addition, it was not 
clear why Justice Onega [from Uganda’s Amnesty Commission] was 
the first to be contacted. Did Vincent want amnesty and a deal for 
himself? Kony seems to think so.835 
I regularly encountered such assessments when asking people what they 
thought of their co-delegates. One delegate described a leading delegate 
as a “well-known thug”.836  Another delegate was known to double-deal, 
working for both Kony and the GoU. One early delegate was so distrusted 
by the others that they wanted him arrested because he was accused of 
interference—but he had clearly been approved by the high command, 
since he was allowed to stay overnight in Ri-Kwangba. It was mentioned 
that some delegates had stolen money when Okello fell and were hoping 
that in exchange for bringing Kony to the table, their crimes would be 
832 There is an element of “competitive suffering” in LRA culture. Miller introduces the term “competitive suffering” when discussing Art 
Spiegelman’s Maus. N.K. Miller, Bequest and Betrayal. Bloomington/ Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996, p.107; A. Spiegelman, The 
complete MAUS.  (New York: Penguin, 2003). “Competitive suffering” occurs when an essential part of one’s personal identity is the ability 
to survive with that suffering identity intact. This captures one of the paradoxes of attempts to resolve this conflict.
833 Fieldnotes, Juba: 18/12/2006.
834 LRA/M Peace Team, "Juba Peace Talks: The Record of Sabotage by the Government of Uganda; The Reasons General Joseph Kony 
Wants the Peace Agreement Revisited; and, The Way Forward”, Nairobi: 6/11/2009.
835 Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 11/11/2009.
836 Fieldnotes, 24/11/2007.
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forgotten.837  One delegate explained “members of the delegation are on 
file with the GoU. This information will be used to demoralise the 
delegation. They will walk on each and every single item that is brought 
up.”838  For the delegate who was so shocked at who his colleagues were 
going to be, the make-up of the delegation was a sign that the GoU was 
firmly controlling the Juba Talks from the start. Nonetheless, he decided to 
join the delegation in Juba, precisely because he did not trust those at the 
centre of the peace effort.
Mistrust motivated many of the delegates. Other reasons for joining the 
delegation were kinship, a shared narrative of loss, or a shared antagonist 
identity. Some delegates were long-time associates of Kony, either inside 
Uganda, as organisers of LRA meetings in Nairobi, or as having travelled to 
LRA bases in Sudan to deliver goods for support. Others brought their own 
family relationships into the delegation.839  Yet not all stories allowed the 
straightforward interpretation of a long-standing LRA connection. The story 
of how the delegation’s legal advisor, Krispus Ayena, came to work in Juba 
shows the reach of the conflict across GoU and LRA affiliates, as well as how 
lack of trust created the delegation. Ayena said that he had been on the 
2004–05 peace team as a member of the NRM “until Betty Bigombe 
hijacked the process”. He claimed to have been instrumental in persuading 
Kolo to come out because our “tactics back then was to weaken LRA by 
extracting key commanders to then speak strongly to LRA, but it did not 
work”. After withdrawing, he stopped following what happened between 
January 2005 and March 2006, but heard that the LRA “was making quiet 
connections”.
In March 2006 two of the LRA’s liaison people came to see him in Kampala 
and asked him to join their quest for peace talks. At the time, Ayena was 
recovering from a lost election campaign, having run on an NRM ticket so 
as to, as he said, “work from within the system because I am a strong 
believer in national unity and national diversity.” At first he did not believe 
that the LRA was starting a new peace process, but when his visitors 
showed photos of Onek, Assafa and Machar, he grew convinced that this 
was a genuine attempt. He flew to Nairobi on May 31. At the time of his 
arrival in Juba in early June, he said, he did not know he was going to be 
on the delegation, but soon realised that he did not trust the delegates 
837 Author interview with local journalist. Juba: 31/1/2008.
838 Author interview with member of the LRA/M delegation. Juba: 14/7/2006.
839 Fieldnotes, Nabanga: 20/9/2006.
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with the big job in hand: “I am in the right place. I am the only one to draft 
all papers. I said yes when I saw the capacities of the delegation.”840
An internal letter by a former delegate showed how this internal distrust 
also created opposition to everything the delegation negotiated: 
Because of the weaknesses of the majority of the LRA delegates, 
[Two delegates], who are at least enlightened members of this 
delegation took advantage and hijacked the entire system and 
used it to articulate their personal interests and the national ones 
which do not auger well, not only for the Acholi community but 
also for the LRA at this time in question. In fact [two delegates] 
and [a Ugandan MP], are the ones to produce the position papers 
for the LRA and they do this at night in [a delegate’s] hotel room. 
The following day they continued to the conference room to 
present the papers without discussing their contents with other 
members of delegation. Does this move surprise any Acholi when 
the interests of the LRA and those of Acholi community are not 
raised explicitly in such position papers? For instance the first 
agreement between the warring parties was Cessation of 
Hostilities. Here they agreed that the LRA soldiers who were still in 
Uganda should assemble at Owiny ki bul. Certainly this is UPDF 
control zone! The security of these soldiers was at stake Secondly, 
the security of those in the IDPs camps were not also catered for in 
the agreement. Those in the camps have always been the victims 
of both UPDF and LRA, hence they required some protection from 
the observer team from this time until the comprehensive peace 
agreement is some and most of it, if not all, are implemented.841
Another delegate accused some members of being government agents 
while calling others “opportunists’’. The sentiment that the GoU had 
planted agents within the delegation was shared by some of the Ugandan 
journalists who were covering the story. One reported that he had seen “[a 
delegate] with a Ugandan intelligence officer at midnight in Juba in a 
hidden place. He knows that I know what he was doing. I believe he is 
planted by the government to keep information flowing.”842  President 
Museveni himself claimed in a meeting with US officials “that the GOU had 
infiltrated the LRA and knew what its members were talking about”.843 
Some former LRA/M delegates were assumed in 2008 to be working closely 
with the GoU, since they were staying at the Fairway Hotel at government 
expense, presumably as informers. 
Disillusionment amongst delegates about the delegation’s and the LRA’s 
behaviour was omnipresent; crucially, some delegates felt that improper 
840 Fieldnotes, Juba: 11/10/2006.
841 Name of writer withheld by author, "Letter to Riek Machar re: Acholi Peace Conference in Juba", April 2007.
842 Personal email to author from Ugandan journalist (name withheld). 21/3/2007. 
843 US Embassy Kampala. "07KAMPALA1449 (Classified Secret): Uganda: A/S Frazier discusses LRA, Congo, and Somalia with President 
Museveni”, 14/9/2007.
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and unprofessional behaviour made their already weak negotiation 
position even weaker. Delegates expressed despair that money given to the 
delegation leadership by Pax Christi for the purchase of laptops went 
missing; other delegates remarked on a striking absence of receipts for 
supposed delegation purchases.844 Delegation meetings centred on missing 
money as those seen as responsible were called to account.
Distrust and Approval
Being an LRA member, it transpired, meant permanently seeking validation. 
If one declares commitment to the cause, permanent scrutiny by other 
commanders follows. An LRA member has to permanently prove him- or 
herself in order to maintain safety and status. Approval can easily be 
withdrawn if Kony or the person’s peers sense a lack of commitment. 
However, it can also be reinstated, in a process of waxing and waning 
engagement that the LRA also uses with outside actors. This process creates 
a strong network of distrust and a permanent process of self-assessment, 
and is mirrored in how the delegation acted in Juba. Because most 
individuals aim to remain acknowledged members of the group—even in 
moments when they seek to disconnect, the ability to disconnect shows the 
strength of the association—permanent self-control strengthens the 
internal group. One delegate explained to me how the LRA/M associates 
control each other and keep watch on what each member of the group is 
up to. Sometimes this is done in online discussions on Acholinet, sometimes 
it is obvious in the interactions. You can never be sure that you are trusted 
and dealing with trustworthy people. He gave me an example: once one of 
the former LRA members had left the LRA, the former LRA member called 
the delegate several times from a satellite phone, pretending to be Bwone. 
The delegate thought this was an attempt to find out if he, the delegate, 
had been in touch with the high command, because the man who called 
him was planning to pretend to the high command that he himself was that 
very delegate in order to regain access to the inner circle.845
I encountered the idea that being an individual within the LRA meant 
undergoing a permanent approval process in various guises. Superficially, 
the coherence within the LRA seemed extremely tight. Even among lower 
ranks, connections established through the shared and often forced “LRA 
identity” tended to continue even after individuals had left the bush. 
Former LRA fighters were likely to spend most of their time with comrades 
844 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/6/2006.
845 Fieldnotes, Cologne: 24/9/2008.
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from the bush.846  From the point of view of individual LRA members, 
however, individual identity as an LRA member was a lot less consistent 
than the group identity suggested. It was easy to be moved from the 
internal group to the outside group. All LRA commanders I spoke to 
expressed a strong distrust in outside actors. I was not surprised by this 
distrust, but by how outsiders were described. It seemed a rather fluid state 
to be an insider, and it was very easy for a previous insider to end up on the 
outside.
Two of the delegates who were considered military representatives on the 
delegation were soon regarded as outsiders by their comrades in the bush. 
Despite the fact that they were representing the LRA as public faces, those 
in the bush no longer saw them as belonging to the LRA. On the day the 
two came to visit the LRA in the bush, two commanders in the bush said 
those two were not with the LRA any more. In public meetings, one of 
them still acted as Kony’s bodyguard, positioned behind Kony wearing a 
military vest and stony face behind sunglasses. However, he was no longer 
one of them, other commanders said.847
I asked the two military representatives on the delegation how they saw 
their own situation within the LRA; both gave a similar assessment. They 
were proud to have been part of the inner circle, trusted enough to be 
chosen as the outside ambassadors. Moreover, they were puzzled or 
uncertain why they had lost their former inner-circle status due to their 
elevated status as outside “ambassadors”. They had expected to be 
elevated in the hierarchy, having proven their commitment. One of them 
explained that he and his colleagues on the delegation were now walking a 
tightrope: 
I have to be honest with you, sometimes it is hard for us to be 
trusted. The guys [in the bush] think we have been in Juba, maybe 
we are a different person now. If I come, I have to empty my 
pockets and be searched. I am relying on the commander now to 
trust me. I cannot command.848
As soon as they were dismissed from the delegation in early 2008, other 
delegates pointed out that the two men, although they had always been 
greeted with great enthusiasm in the bush, had never truly been LRA 
members or trusted. 
846 T.Allen and M.Schomerus, A Hard Homecoming: Lessons learned from the reception centre process on effective interventions for 
former 'abductees' in northern Uganda. Washington DC/ Kampala: USAID/ UNICEF, 2006.
847 Fieldnotes, Palotaka/ Parajok: 3/10/2006.
848 Fieldnotes, Juba/ Magwi: 2/10/2006.
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Abusing trust did not lead to being shunned. Instead, abuse of the system 
and an attempt to return to the inner circle could strengthen the bond. 
[One of the early delegates called O. from here on] betrayed the LRA, but it 
did not lead to his exclusion. [He] had originally been part of the group 
sent out to make outside contacts in Uganda, Nairobi and Juba. [O] was one 
of the first people I met and was said to be a real nephew of Kony. He sat 
next to me when I first spoke to Otti on the phone. He was one of the men 
who established contact with Pax Christi. After the first trip to see Otti, he 
was asked by Pax Christi to take $10,000 to Kony. He did not go to see 
Kony; he did not deliver the money. Instead, he disappeared with the 
money and tipped off the UPDF about the route other LRA contact persons 
were about to travel. He told the army that they would be coming through 
Lira. The two denounced people narrowly escaped the UPDF. 
When two of the initial delegates had to admit to Pax Christi that [O] had 
stolen the money, they pleaded with them to not let Machar know. For Pax 
Christi, this incident damaged confidence in the LRA/M delegation.849  The 
LRA seemed to be less troubled by the incident. For a while, nobody knew 
where [O] was. Suddenly he reappeared in Juba in November 2006. I walked 
into the hotel yard to see the very delegate who had accused [O] of 
betraying him to the UPDF shake hands and greet him with enthusiasm. I 
asked him why he was happy to see [O] who had betrayed him. He 
answered: “I will greet [O], but not talk to him.” 
Delegates accused each other of having brought [O] back. One was very 
vocal: he said the issue of [O] was a big headache and that whoever 
brought [O] back should leave the delegation. He said if [O] went back to 
the bush, he would be killed. Nonetheless, [O] was given accommodation 
and hung around, usually by himself, outside his prefabricated room in Juba 
Bridge Hotel. When Dr Onek came for a meeting with the LRA to vent his 
anger at what the public perceived to be the LRA dragging their feet in the 
talks, he spotted [O]. He became very angry; after all, the money [O] had 
taken had been provided by an organisation. Onek noisily called [O] a 
“thief” and the LRA/M “idiots” for allowing him back. The delegation was 
very upset about the public humiliation, and now became very protective of 
[O].850  Rather than being sent home, [O] was taken into the bush on the 
next journey. I saw him in Ri-Kwangba a couple of times after that. Clearly 
no deadly revenge had been taken on him. Instead he approached me and 
asked if I could give him $200. That was the last time I saw [O]. He later 
defected again from the bush with [another delegate], and was then jailed 
for trying to trick the GoU out of money. 
849 Author interview with Sudanese advisor to peace talks. Juba: 8/12/2006.
850 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/11/2006.
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Just after I had seen [O] back with the LRA in the bush, I spoke to one of 
the delegates and said how surprised I was how [O] was treated. The 
delegate explained to me that watching each other strengthens the LRA, 
especially watching those you cannot trust. The delegation, he said, do not 
trust anybody because “it keeps up attention” and “you know better who 
your opponent is.” He elaborated that that was why the delegation could 
not really trust Machar, because they knew his history. However, because 
they knew his history, their distrust also meant that they trusted him to pay 
back his dues. It was a circle, he explained. Once you have done something 
wrong, the expectation that you will do it right next time is there. But 
mainly, said the delegate, his own distrust of Machar made it easier to 
understand what was being “played”, what the real intentions were. 
Distrust brought a sharper image of the truth.
An intriguing relationship between mistrust and the re-establishment of 
collaboration had long been part of the LRA. The frayed relationship with 
the Khartoum government provides another example. One LRA member 
explained to me that in the early days in Sudan the LRA had no need to 
abduct fighters, they were “well taken care of in Juba”. Nonetheless, the 
LRA did not trust Khartoum: “Khartoum tried twice to arrest the chairman, 
in 2002 and 2004. In 2002, the chairman could only escape through a quick 
movement across the bridge.” Asking why Khartoum had turned against 
the LRA, the LRA commander said: “Khartoum just thought we could be 
their slaves.”851  Another story told amongst the LRA was that a 
confrontation between Machar, when he was still aligned with Khartoum, 
and Otti almost led to the killing of Otti. He was able to escape—reportedly 
without his clothes—but “we thought we had lost him.” This experience of 
betrayal, however, as discussed earlier, was also a reason why the LRA 
trusted Machar with the Juba Talks.
Internally, distrust acted as a control mechanism. Externally, it contributed 
significantly to the LRA/M’s failure to establish itself as a reliable 
negotiation partner. The struggle for recognition translated into having to 
pull together an unwieldy fabric of internal interests with often 
contradictory motivations. The most obvious manifestation of this was the 
steady growth of the LRA/M delegation in Juba—at one point, 28 officially 
appointed members of the LRA/M delegation were seated at the 
negotiation table.852  With more participation, turnover became rapid. 
Olweny lasted only a few months as spokesperson; Apire did not return to 
Juba in 2007. One Sudanese member of the mediation team explained to 
me that it struck her as inward-looking of the LRA that “the LRA has not 
851 Fieldnotes, Ri Kwangba: 13/9/2006.
852 Fieldnotes, Juba: 12/9/2006.
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managed to form alliances with organisations here in Juba or with the 
media to advance their cause. Much of what is going on between Nabanga 
and here and getting more people on the team makes it rather unclear 
what is going on. All the LRA always say is the more the better; they seem 
to be quite open to have more people on the team.”853 She thought rather 
than beefing up their numbers, the LRA/M would be better off focusing 
their demands regarding the safety of the assembly areas and working on a 
clear message to donor governments. 
In wanting to include everyone, the delegation seemed increasingly 
dysfunctional. As LRA/M representation grew, so did the chief mediator’s 
doubt that this approach would lead to a peace deal. Asked how he felt 
about the Nabanga meeting attended by more than 100 family members, 
elders, community leaders and politicians in late July 2006 (at which I was 
not present), he said: “You missed the show last week, but you did not miss 
much. I should have done something useful and gone to the funeral of my 
best friend.”854 
Internal distrust and the belief that individuals were primarily pursuing 
personal agendas created speculation early on. As early as July 2006 the 
East African reported that “parallel talks are likely to start in the next two 
weeks in the Southern Sudan town of Maridi between the government, 
Kony, Acholi cultural leaders, elders and religious leaders” due to “suspicion 
that some of the Lord’s Resistance Army’s negotiators are scheming to 
scuttle the ongoing Juba peace talks”.855  From October 2006 onwards, it 
was clear that a “twin track” had developed, with Gulu District Chairman 
Mao and RDC Ochora increasingly playing out their own rivalry.856  The 
Mombasa meeting was another incarnation of such a parallel track. 
Museveni was said to be relying increasingly on direct feedback he was 
getting from Ochora, rather than going through his own or Kony’s 
delegation.857 However, Museveni confirmed in a confidential meeting with 
US representatives, that he himself thought the parallel government track 
was “foolery”.858  The issue of representation had grown even more 
confused, and the level of distrust along with it. 
853 Fieldnotes, Juba: 12/9/2006.
854 Fieldnotes, Maridi: 13/6/2006. 
855 The East African. LRA 'externals' accused of killing talks, 24/7/2006. 
856 Fieldnotes, Juba: 11/10/2006.
857 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/12/2006.
858 US Embassy Kampala. "07KAMPALA1449 (Classified Secret): Uganda: A/S Frazier discusses LRA, Congo, and Somalia with President 
Museveni”, 14/9/2007.
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In addition to the distrust within the Juba delegation, the broader network 
of those wanting to attack the political system in Uganda also influenced 
progress and failure in Juba. The press release issued by Alex Oloya on April 
10, 2008, that said Kony would not sign the FPA and that the delegation 
had been infiltrated by the GoU was the most obvious manifestation of 
distrust and infighting in the much broader network of LRA/M affiliates. 
Another example of internal distrust comes from late 2007, when LRA/M 
delegates travelled around northern Uganda to consult with the population 
on issues of accountability and reconciliation. While on the road, the LRA/M 
delegates received angry dispatches from members of the anti-Museveni 
diaspora. The delegates were accused of selling out to Museveni by even 
entering Uganda. One delegate told me, rather frustrated, that “there was 
lots of trouble from the diaspora during consultations, people who 
complained that it could not be the real thing if they were not present.” I 
asked him why those who wanted to be present did not travel to join the 
consultations. “Exactly,” he answered. “Why did they not come?”859  His 
view was that they did not trust that they would be safe in Uganda, but 
that they also did not trust the delegates to make it safer for them in the 
future by negotiating a peace agreement. As a result, they believed so 
much in Museveni’s power to spoil everything that in the end they ended 
up wanting to spoil peace for everyone, he said.
Pécaut’s work might help us in understanding what happens when the 
concrete geographical space of a rebellion is abandoned. His point is that 
by abandoning a particular location with which resistance is attributed, a 
new space is located in which damaging patterns can be projected: “The 
non-place is the domain of generalized distrust.”  The distrust within the 
vastly scattered Acholi diaspora--which became worse after the leadership 
struggle within the LRA--is a good example of this phenomenon. 860 In early 
2008, after Otti’s death had been confirmed, the delegation’s leadership 
was handed to Dr David Nyekorach-Matsanga. Matsanga —whose CV is a 
little unclear, including as to which university bestowed a PhD on him—had 
been meddling in Ugandan politics since the early 1980s, and had been on 
the fringe of the LRA/GoU conflict on and off since 1998. A brash presence, 
he was touted as the official LRA spokesperson in the late 1990s before 
publicly renouncing the LRA in 2000.861 He became an image consultant for 
Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe through his UK PR company Africa 
World Media Ltd, also claiming that he was working as a consultant stringer 
859 Fieldnotes, Juba: 28/1/2008.
860 D.Pécaut, "Configurations of Space, Time, and Subjectivity in a Context of Terror: The Colombian Example", International Journal of 
Politics, Culture, and Society 14, 2000, p.136. 
861 See for example C.Kiwawulo, "Who is David Nyekorach Matsanga?", Daily Vision, 15/8/2009.
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for news outlets such as Sky News. His UK business address was given at the 
time of the Juba Talks as a hotel in Croydon—where nobody had heard of 
either Matsanga or his company.862  In the early days of the Juba Talks he 
had denounced the delegation’s attempt as “peace jokes” in polemical 
write-ups on his website in a typically audacious style.863  Since the end of 
the Juba Talks, Matsanga has been active in criticising the ICC in its work on 
Kenya and DRC.864 
When Matsanga first arrived in Juba, delegates showed a range of reactions 
towards him, from detachment to outright hostility. In crucial public 
moments they maintained their united front, appearing as a stony-faced 
group with closed ranks. Internally, however, delegates were outraged. It 
did not help Matsanga’s standing in the delegation that he instantly sought 
one-on-one talks with Machar in which he reportedly denounced the 
delegation’s work and offered his own services to bring the Juba Talks to a 
successful close. However, Matsanga seemed to have unlimited financial 
means to support the peace process, including money he spent on items for 
the LRA in the bush, so his membership of the delegation was not openly 
challenged. 
After Kony had had Otti killed in October 2007 and his death had been 
confirmed in early 2008, one of the leading delegates made clear that he 
was shocked about the turn of events. He called the loss terrible, both 
because he had had a personal relationship with Otti and because Otti had 
been indispensable to the peace talks. He also indicated that he felt the 
LRA/M delegation had been infiltrated by government agents—something 
he himself had been accused of being—and that it had been government 
agents who had convinced Kony that Otti had been making deals with the 
GoU behind his back, including taking money in exchange for guaranteeing 
a peace deal. Wanting to resign after a last visit to Nabanga in early 2008, 
Ojul said he was persuaded by Ayoo to remain as chairman—only to then 
be publicly dismissed by Kony along with Ayoo. 
Ojul, argued other delegates, had gambled his own credibility by pursuing 
parallel tracks with government representatives, first in Mombasa and then 
in Kampala. There was talk of money having been exchanged during Ojul’s 
862 Fieldnotes, London: 14/10/2007.
863 See for example D.Nyekorach-Matsanga, "UGANDA EXCLUSIVE: I have quit casino politics of Uganda", in Africa News Flash, London: 
2007; D.Nyekorach-Matsanga, "UGANDA:  The dishonesty of the peace process in Juba", in Africa News Flash, Khartoum: 
2006;D.Nyekorach-Matsanga, "UGANDA: The Dark clouds on the Uganda/LRA peace talks. Frankly Speaking Column. The last lap of 
marathon in Juba talks peace", in Africa News Flash London: 2006; D.Nyekorach-Matsanga, "UGANDA" What a tragedy for LRA/ Uganda 
talks?", in Africa News Flash, London: 2006.
864 For a range of press releases on the issue, see Matsanga’s website http://africaworldmedia.com
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private late-night meeting with Museveni. An international military advisor 
reiterated that the delegation had been outraged that two delegates had 
worked closely with Shortley while on consultations in Uganda, and had 
responded to calls for individual meetings at State House without including 
the rest of the delegation.865  One delegate argued that Ojul was a good 
example of how individuals had used the broader quest of the LRA/M for 
their personal advancement. He said that Ojul had always kept his 
government contacts open to assure his personal soft landing within the 
system. The dismissal/resignation had been part of a bigger plan: “Martin 
made his red carpet for this return by distancing himself from Kony.”866 
Having dismissed Ojul, Kony nominated Matsanga as the delegation leader; 
Obita took Ayoo’s position as spokesperson. For some delegates, the change 
in leadership made little difference: both Ojul and Matsanga were equally 
suspected of being steered by the government. One delegate described 
Matsanga and Obita as opportunists, explaining that “Obita’s family is in 
Canada, and he did not get visa for Canada, so he came to Juba.”867 Olweny 
wrote: 
Internal schisms and rivalries, lack of cohesiveness, cliquism, greed 
and personal posturing began to unravel the delegation. It was 
already apparent that there were moles of the Uganda 
Government within the LRA delegation, lending credence to the 
claim that the Juba peace talks were actually between the two 
delegations of the Uganda Government!868
Freshly dismissed, one of the now former delegates expressed his distrust of 
the very organisation he had supported. He said that Kony’s paranoia that 
everyone was out to get him was out of hand. He recounted that during his 
last meeting with Kony in the bush, Kony had complained that Chissano 
had received the inaugural Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African 
Leadership.869 Kony had stated that Chissano had received the prize because 
of the work he had done with the LRA, stating that he, Joseph Kony, was 
hence entitled to at least $250,000 of the $5 million prize money. According 
to one of his former spokespeople, this was yet again proof to Kony that 
nobody wanted to give the Acholi credit for their contributions and that 
865 Fieldnotes, Nabanga: 15/4/2008.
866 Fieldnotes, Nabanga: 12/4/2008.
867 Fieldnotes, Cologne: 24/9/2008.
868 O.Olweny and J.Otukene, "Re: Juba Peace Talks: Who should be blamed for the refusal of Joseph Kony to sign the peace agreement?", 
Nairobi: 30/5/2008.
869 The Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership was inaugurated in 2007. It is “awarded annually to a former African 
executive Head of State or Government who has demonstrated excellence in African leadership”. Since its first award, to Chissano, the prize 
has never been given again because, as Mo Ibrahim says, no African leader has met the stringent conditions of the award. Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation, "The Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership", 2007.
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the system was set up against them. “These are the words of a lunatic,” he 
said. “Kony is now obsessed with money. He wants to make a runner. He 
does not know that the planet has become too small for him.”870 
 With Ojul, Ayoo and Ongom leaving Juba, the delegation’s numbers were 
quickly diminished; success in the final round of negotiations in early 2008 
seemed unlikely. Yet under Matsanga’s reign outstanding agreements were 
signed in swift succession. In the eyes of the remaining delegates, such 
success came too quickly. They complained that Matsanga was not engaging 
Kony in the matter: he had failed to meet Kony in Ri-Kwangba on a number 
of occasions, citing personal security concerns as the reason for staying 
behind in Nabanga. Having concluded the final negotiations, Matsanga 
agreed to a scheduled ceremony to sign the FPA. When Kony failed to 
attend the April 10, 2008, signing ceremony, Matsanga resigned in a huff, 
citing Kony’s lack of interest in ending the war as his reason—although it 
remained unclear whether he had actually communicated directly or met 
with Kony at any point. 
The lack of direct communication and Kony’s failure to arrive in Ri-Kwangba 
confirmed what other delegates had suspected all along: “Matsanga was a 
government agent hired to make it look as if Kony did not want to sign.”871 
Delegates had grown increasingly suspicious of Matsanga; the facts that he 
lived in a lavish suite at the Intercontinental Hotel in Nairobi when not in 
Juba and was freely spending money fuelled speculation.872  In addition, 
Matsanga’s information seemed to be different from anyone else’s. From 
their own communication with Kony, delegates said Kony had asked for a 
detailed workshop on Agenda 3 after the protocol had been signed, but 
Matsanga had instead gone through with preparations for the signing 
ceremony.873  Kony, delegates said, had understood the signing ceremony 
meetings in April, May and September 2008 as opportunities to read the 
negotiated agreements—but the lack of progress took its toll on delegates’ 
belief in the Juba Talks. One delegate was so disillusioned with the failure 
870 Fieldnotes, Juba: 28/1/2008.
871 LRA/M Peace Team, "Juba Peace Talks: The Record of Sabotage by the Government of Uganda; The Reasons General Joseph Kony 
Wants the Peace Agreement Revisited; and, The Way Forward”, Nairobi: 6/11/2009.
872 Matsanga countered the suspicions in a letter to Machar, written at the end of April 2008: “I have used my hard earned money to buy 
clothes, shoes, and other humanitarian goods for the women and children in Garamba Park. I am Professional earning at least good money 
from my job that paid for my accommodation in Nairobi while in the peace process.” D. Nyekorach-Matsanga, "Letter to Riek Machar re: 
Continued support for the peace process and clarification", 30/4/2008.
873 LRA/M Peace Team, "Juba Peace Talks:  The Record of Sabotage by the Government of Uganda; The Reasons General Joseph Kony 
Wants the Peace Agreement Revisited;  and, The Way Forward”, Nairobi: 6/11/2009.
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to sign the FPA and the increased LRA violence that he said: “If we treat the 
LRA as normal humans, we all lose. Kony is paranoid.”874
Such disillusionment from a formerly enthusiastic delegate confirmed that 
the LRA/M were also experiencing a contradictory group process. As the 
Juba Talks gained credibility, their position as members of the LRA/M 
became more credible. This also meant, however, that individuals within the 
group used that reputation for their own purposes. In the case of Ojul, 
delegates argued, he felt powerful enough to pursue his own interest, but 
in the process of doing so risked the accomplishments of the group. His 
dismissal was also an assertion of power and a reminder to the group that 
getting too close to the other side would be considered betrayal. A high-
ranking SPLA intelligence officer who had been involved in the peace talks 
saw a similar mechanism leading up to Otti’s death. When mistrust of Otti 
was growing, Kony had to re-establish control. Killing Otti was one part of 
that; minimising communication and giving the leadership of the 
delegation to someone who was not trusted was another way. “[Otti’s 
death] reinforced the LRA’s leadership in having more control and people 
became more scared”, the officer explained. 875
Matsanga, it seemed, spent most of April 2008 fuming over Kony’s failure to 
sign the FPA. On the last day of the month, he sent a letter of almost 7,000 
words to Machar, decrying the delegation’s shortcomings and praising his 
own capacity to solve the conflict. He did not hold back when judging his 
fellow delegates—and specifically his spokesperson—and their criticism of 
his reign over the delegation: “My debates during the negotiations can not 
be erased by any biological substance that looks like that of Dr James Obita 
whose genes are too short for my likings.”876  To add another twist to the 
story of representation, Kony reinstated Matsanga as the leader of the 
delegation in the early summer of 2008, leaving question marks over 
whether he trusted Matsanga after all. Rather than speculating about this 
question, viewing Kony’s reinstatement of Matsanga as another expression 
of distrust as a control mechanism might be more useful. 
For the facilitators of the Juba Talks, Matsanga’s larger-than-life presence 
caused confusion. Having been reinstated presumably to oversee the 
signing of the FPA, little tangible success seemed to be possible with 
Matsanga as the intermediary between Kony and the mediation team in 
Juba. Amongst facilitators it was accepted knowledge that Matsanga was 
probably “bought by Ugandan intelligence and that is why he had money 
874 Fieldnotes, Cologne: 24/9/2008.
875 Author interview with SPLA intelligence officer (name withheld by author). Juba: 1/3/2009.
876 D. Nyekorach-Matsanga, "Letter to Riek Machar re: Continued support for the peace process and clarification",  30/4/2008.
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to buy goodies”. An international advisor recounted that at one point the 
mediation team had decided that they needed to establish direct contact 
with Kony, as Matsanga’s role as gatekeeper had stalled progress. The 
initiative fell flat: “Kony called me and reiterated several times, shouting, 
that I should only talk to Matsanga and nobody else, that Matsanga was his 
only chairman. I think Kony was very cynical there. He liked the goodies, did 
not bother to meet Matsanga most of the time, and wanted us therefore to 
continue with him.”877
In September 2008, when delegates and leaders from Uganda met with 
Kony in Ri-Kwangba, Matsanga again failed to accompany them. He later 
explained that he had been harassed by Ugandan security in Nairobi and 
thus was unable to travel. Leading up to the military offensive against the 
LRA—Operation Lightning Thunder in December 2008—the story of what 
happened and Matsanga’s role in it gets ever murkier. Delegates explained 
to me that it had been communicated to Kony in late 2008 that the 
absolute final deadline for signing the FPA was November 30, 2008. On 
November 18, Kony asked his delegation to come to discuss the document, 
but reportedly indicated to delegates that he was ready to sign. The 
delegation only managed to get to Nabanga by November 28—too late to 
discuss and sign the final agreement. At that point, Matsanga had 
withdrawn entirely from discussing peace matters and did not join the 
delegation. Just over two weeks later, the UPDF dropped bombs on the LRA 
camp in Garamba Park. The following year, Matsanga physically assaulted 
two former delegates when they encountered each other in Nairobi in a 
radio station. The assault was so bad that the two former delegates 
reported Matsanga to the Kenyan police. Amongst some former delegates, 
Operation Lightning Thunder and the closed doors on the peace process 
served as proof that they had been betrayed again: 
The LRA, however, is aware of certain forces at work behind the 
curtain, undermining and taking advantage of the great desire for 
peace in the region, by corrupting and attempting to divide the 
ranks of the LRA/M; to the extent that some of their operatives 
might have managed to infiltrate the ranks of the outgoing 
delegates
read one communiqué.878
Why delegates had not withdrawn entirely from the process once they felt 
Matsanga and his suspected government connections undermined it was 
unclear to me. One delegate explained that everyone had benefited from 
Matsanga’s lavish spending on the peace process, despite being aware that 
877 Personal email to author from international Advisor to the Juba Talks. 7/8/2011. 
878 LRA/M/Alex Oloya."LRA condemn Gunboat tactis being used by Uganda", Nairobi/ London: 25/4/2008.
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he was possibly spending government funds set aside specifically to keep 
LRA/M delegates quiet. Other delegates said they had accepted Matsanga 
on the team and later as a leader to avoid a replay of what had happened 
in previous peace negotiations when delegates had been killed. The most 
prominent case was the death of Kilama, as Pain writes, “who had taken 
part in and surrendered following the 1988 Peace Agreement signed with 
the UPDA in Pece, Gulu, and had since been killed as well as other UPDA 
commanders”.879  The question of what had happened to Kilama was of 
crucial importance to the LRA/M. It was one of the two main questions 
raised in the 1993/94 peace talks. With the question unanswered, having a 
government agent as delegation leader seemed to afford a certain 
protection to the rank and file of the delegation.880 
Having listened to many complaints about Matsanga, I was surprised when 
in June 2008, Anywar, who at the time was the last remaining member of 
the LRA on the CHMT, decided to leave the CHMT and join the delegation 
under Matsanga. Anywar had always been very critical of Matsanga. His 
move seemed to make no sense. When I had the chance to ask Anywar 
about it, he explained that he had indeed always been deeply distrustful of 
Matsanga, but that he had also realised that Matsanga brought some skills 
that the delegation had been lacking, namely an ability to place items in 
the media. With Matsanga in charge, it had become easy to get an LRA 
message printed in the GoU-owned New Vision.881 Before that, neither the 
Ugandan nor the international media had been willing to devote any 
reporting to the LRA/M message. Playing the hostile system by getting a 
voice through someone who was seen as a traitor, argued Anywar, was 
better than not having a voice at all. From his point of view, by using 
distrust as an internal control mechanism he could at least partially counter 
the possible negatives of having a GoU agent on the delegation. Kony was 
also reportedly aware that Matsanga might be a government agent, which 
might have been the reason why he kept him on board, but only at arm’s 
length. After all, a few times in conversations LRA/M delegates had quoted 
Sun Tzu’s idea that it was best to keep one’s friends close but one’s enemies 
closer.882
879 Pain reports that in 1994 Kony stated, “What happened to Kilama will not happen to me”. D.Pain, “‘The Bending of Spears’: Producing 
consensus for peace and development in Northern Uganda”, London: International Alert/ Kacoke Madit, December 1997.
880 C.G.Dolan, "Understanding War and Its Continuation: The Case of Northern Uganda", PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, 2005, 
p. 447.
881 LRA/M Peace Team, "Juba Peace Talks: The Record of Sabotage by the Government of Uganda; The Reasons General Joseph Kony 
Wants the Peace Agreement Revisited; and, The Way Forward”, Nairobi: 6/11/2009.
882 Paraphrased after Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.
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These developments created a straw man situation in the peace process, in 
which what was achieved on paper bore no resemblance to how indecisive 
and sluggish the LRA/M delegation had become. Crucially, the way distrust 
was handled also maintained the LRA/M’s view of itself as caught in a 
system that would not allow the conflict to change. The LRA/M’s only way 
to counter this was by also maintaining their status quo—or, in the words of 
the international advisor, by approaching the Juba Talks with great 
cynicism. 
Maintaining the Status Quo
When the LRA/M entered the Juba Talks, they proclaimed grand aspirations 
that this would be the chance to comprehensively address the root causes 
of the war. One root cause as identified by some delegates was the GoU’s 
lack of acceptance that the LRA/M had a legitimate political agenda--a 
pattern that Dolan describes as the GoU’s tactical “belittling”  of the LRA as 
having no political programme in the 1994 peace talks.883  From early on, 
however, the LRA/M thus found itself in a bind: on the one hand they were 
there to solve the conflict, on the other they found it hard to accept that 
solving the conflict might involve dissolving the LRA/M. One delegate 
argued in July 2006 that 
the regime’s mouthpiece, the New Vision Newspaper in an 
Editorial of July 21, says LRA is a defeated small rebel group whose 
demands must not be granted. The editorial advises the rebels to 
forget ever being part of a government of national unity. It says 
the best it can offer LRA is to integrate the rebel soldiers into the 
UPDF. To the NRM, one is only a criminal if he or she has picked 
arms against the regime, but one’s crimes are washed away if one 
joins the regime.884
So while on the one hand the LRA/M said it had come to Juba for change, 
on the other it wanted to maintain its own status rather than being 
dissolved into a system it despised. Negotiating their own organisation’s 
dissolution—which was clearly the aim of both the GoU and international 
facilitators—turned out to be a frightening endeavour. Maintaining the 
status quo as the marginalised group under permanent covert attack from 
the GoU became an attractive option. At one point a Sudanese Acholi 
leader commented on progress in the peace talks. He said it would be 
difficult for the LRA to sign a peace deal because if they did “they can then 
no longer say that they are being mistreated.”885 
883 C.G.Dolan, "Understanding War and Its Continuation: The Case of Northern Uganda", PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, 2005, 
p.109.
884 G. Ayoo, "Ethical debate" Cologne: 2006.
885 Fieldnotes, Owiny-Kibul and Palotaka: 26/11/2006.
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Various participants and observers of the talks used different ways to 
describe how they saw the LRA/M’s behaviour in the talks. One delegate 
described his colleagues’ attempts to maintain the status quo: “The 
delegation is reluctant to accept outside advice. They feel threatened by 
any kind of expertise.” He explained that not accepting advice helped to 
underscore the LRA/M’s position. Pointing out that the GoU delegation 
consisted of state ministers with PhDs, he said: “The power balance 
between delegations is indicative of the power balance between 
communities.”886  Yet the LRA/M was not using the support available to 
address this imbalance. One day a delegate discussed with me the lack of 
research material available to the LRA/M delegation. He said that research 
resources were a real problem and that this made it impossible for the LRA/
M to genuinely participate in the Juba Talks. “We have no statistics on the 
[IDP] camps,” he explained to me, “no people to do research. Instead we 
are told to get statistics off the Internet by Machar.” I did not find that 
unreasonable, considering that large amounts of data and analysis, 
particularly on conditions in the Ugandan IDP camps, were readily available 
online. The delegate was genuinely surprised—he had no idea that it would 
be easy for the LRA/M to back up their claims with published research.887 In 
the end, no LRA/M statement or position paper showed evidence of having 
used the extensive resources available online. Instead, most arguments 
remained centred on the person of Museveni. One of the international 
advisors saw the LRA/M’s maintenance of the status quo in their denial of 
current realities by aiming unrealistically high: “The LRA/M need to be 
smarter in negotiating concessions, but they do not want to take advice 
because they still think they can negotiate Museveni out of power.”
In December 2006, a group of European ambassadors travelled to Juba to 
meet with participants of the Juba process, including the LRA/M delegates. 
Most of the delegates had gathered at the agreed meeting time with the 
ambassadors; delegation leader Ojul and legal advisor Ayena arrived half an 
hour late. They explained their tardiness with their having forgotten a 
letter—a letter which they then proceeded to read to the ambassadors, 
rather than engaging in conversation. An observer explained that the letter 
was “written in old communist UPC style about 1986 events”, and the 
debate never moved much from there. Afterwards, however, members of 
the delegation were in a low mood, realising that their emphasis on the 
past paralysed them in their quest for a better future. “We lost today,” was 
how one delegate described the scenario.888
886 Author interview with member of the LRA/M delegation. Juba: 14/7/2006.
887 Fieldnotes. Juba: 10/8/2006.
888 Fieldnotes, Juba: 15/12/2006.
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Pushing for change while maintaining the disempowered and marginalised 
status that gave the LRA carte blanche to use violence or remain reactive to 
GoU action proved an unsolvable dilemma. LRA identity is caught in a 
perfect cycle of continued self-pollination, where the sheer existence of the 
LRA proves its need to exist. The ability to survive with the LRA identity 
intact is an essential element of this identity, setting up one of the 
paradoxes for resolving this conflict. Giving up this existence also would 
mean being reduced to meaninglessness. One of the international advisors 
described to me how he had experienced these internal dynamics of 
pushing for change and maintaining the status quo. He argued that 
there is a small group of voluntary allies and a much larger group 
that in principle would like to get out. Juba was very instrumental 
in strengthening this group. So successful that Kony had to kill Otti 
to get the ghost back in the bottle. And that is why he was not 
able to say “no” to the peace process categorically, that he had to 
be seen by his men to be seriously working on peace (indeed, to 
create the narrative that LRA is all for peace but that the outside 
world doesn’t want it). And that explains a lot of the strange 
happenings especially in the last year.889  
One former delegate would have disagreed with this assessment. He argued 
that the LRA/M were within their rights not to sign the FPA, because they 
had yet again become victims of the broader context in which government 
forces had infiltrated them and created rifts and internal distrust. He 
concluded that the best way forward was to rewind to the beginning and 
start again: “Negotiations need to be reopened. So far, they can justifiably 
be considered worthless.”890 With this statement, he maintained the status 
quo for his organisation, but also confirmed to many that negotiating with 
the LRA/M was a pointless endeavour.
Conclusion
The LRA/M’s messy representation, and their way of justifying their own 
shortcomings as manifestations of their inhibition by a hostile system, 
created the impression that they were dysfunctional, and as such they were 
not credible negotiation partners. This impression turned outside sentiment 
against them: donors withdrew and support waned when the label 
“dysfunctional” became the dominant assessment. Yet what this chapter 
has tried to establish is the function that the messy representation and 
reactive attitude fulfilled: they allowed the LRA/M to blame outside 
interference for each shortcoming, including the often unclear position 
Kony was taking vis-à-vis the Juba Talks. Further, the chapter shows 
889 Personal email to author from international advisor to the Juba Talks. 7/8/2011.
890 Fieldnotes, Cologne: 24/9/2008.
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interlocking structures between the LRA and the LRM, as well as between 
the LRA/M and the GoU. Most debates about the LRA and LRM try to 
establish to what extent these are separate entities; a natural follow-on 
discussion is to what extent the GoU infiltrated the delegation. The chapter 
suggests that such a fragmented interpretation of the three seemingly 
separate entities is misleading. Instead, part of the conflict dynamics stems 
precisely from the network of control, mistrust and infiltration—particularly 
because infiltration went both ways, with LRA/M sympathisers infiltrating 
the GoU, too.  
Unable to get a peace deal signed, thanks to the LRA/M’s characteristics 
described here, the conflict system of LRA/M and GoU still emerged from 
the Juba Talks internally strengthened. Each actor in the “system LRA” 
received confirmation that their behaviour continued to be necessary since 
nobody else could be trusted. This meant that the Juba Talks had served to 
confirm beliefs and the conviction that it was correct to act on them. 
Individual delegates maintained that the way Juba was conducted proved 
that conflict in Uganda was deeply rooted in a hostile system, confirming 
the need for resistance through an organisation such as the LRA/M. Fighters 
used the slow progress in the talks to maintain that the use of violence 
remained their only option.
The notion of being subjected to a hostile system and mutual distrust 
damaged the peace process. It fuelled an internal understanding that 
addressing those broader issues would be impossible; even smaller items on 
the Juba agenda became for the LRA/M unmanageably huge and impossible 
to tackle. Of course part of conflict transformation—possibly the crucial 
part—is to transform the internal dynamics of the actors. In current 
approaches to peacemaking, it remains unclear how this could be done 
without losing focus on achieving a peace agreement. Yet in having been 
unable to find a way to navigate internal dynamics and use them 
constructively, Juba also confirmed the LRA/M’s notion of their own position 
in the conflict, thus inadvertently strengthening the very conflict structures 
the talks were supposed to tackle, while in a parallel process initiating 
significant change beyond the LRA/M. Indeed, some of these insights come 
from lessons that could have been learned in earlier peace talks. None of 
these finer points, however, was of particular interest to those facilitating 
the peace talks.
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9. “We Are All Learning in This Peace Process”: Juba’s Legacy
Introduction
The broad endeavour of this thesis is to untangle why the Juba Talks did 
not produce a Final Peace Agreement and what the broader implications of 
this realisation are. A snapshot of the current situation post-Juba is 
sobering. Immediately after the initial military strike against the LRA in 
December 2008, the humanitarian situation was unsettled and unsettling. In 
early February 2009, Congolese IDP numbers stood at 160,674, with 20,000 
having fled across the border into Sudan. The World Food Program had only 
been able to access 54,511 of the IDPs, and only those who had reached 
major towns or villages. Food delivery was slow on dry season roads—
taking 12 days to deliver food from Beni to Dungu, a distance of 500 km—
and forecast to be impossible during wet season. IDPs scattered further 
away from the substations were even harder to reach; some IDP camps were 
simply considered too dangerous for humanitarian workers due to lack of 
army or police presence.891  The area was at the time supposed to be 
protected by 6,000 FARDC soldiers—who had little interest in fighting the 
LRA while battling problems in the Kivus—about 2,000 UPDF (although this 
number was never verified) and 400 MONUC troops.892  In early 2009, the 
number of civilians killed by the LRA since OLT stood at 729, with 286 of 711 
abductees rescued since OLT started.893  While the official UPDF line 
remained that the LRA was now weakened, local civil society actors saw the 
LRA “traverse the jungle with relative ease”, most notably a new, young 
and strong generation of fighters.894 
Ever since the bombs first dropped on Garamba Park in December 2008, 
military operations against the LRA led by the UPDF have continued under 
various names with varying intensity, but with continued US assistance, 
including ground support. Violence against unprotected civilians has been 
dramatic; LRA violence against civilians escalated or was more carefully 
recorded when international interest spiked, such as after the Kony 2012 
891 Fieldnotes, Kampala: 15/2/2009.
892 Fieldnotes, Kampala: 15/2/2009.
893 Fieldnotes, Kampala: 15/2/2009.
894 Fieldnotes, Kampala: 15/2/2009.
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campaign.895  Internationally, opinion has been galvanised around the 
notion that an improved military response will end the conflict. On May 24, 
2010, US President Obama signed into law the LRA Disarmament and 
Northern Uganda Recovery Act, making it a domestic legal obligation for 
the Obama government to end LRA violence—an obligation on which the 
government is accountable to Congress.896
In October 2010, countries affected by LRA violence and AU representatives 
met in Bangui, CAR. The primary outcome was an agreement to establish an 
AU-backed joint military brigade, with expected funding from the US and 
the EU, to eradicate what was referred to as the broader terrorist threat, a 
need for which was underscored by a Centralafrican politician who said, 
“for us, LRA elements are terrorists exactly like Al-Qaeda. The international 
community must not be stingy with the means to help Centralafrica to get 
rid of the insecurity created by this rebellion."897 In October 2011, President 
Obama announced the deployment of 100 special military advisors to help 
the regional armies in their hunt for Kony. In March 2012, a video by the 
Californian advocacy group Invisible Children calling for Kony’s arrest and 
continued US military support to the Ugandan army became the biggest 
social media sensation ever. With political representation of the LRM 
reduced to a few press releases, the notion that this conflict could be ended 
through peaceful means and political negotiations was off the table. 
In December 2006, Kony spoke to a group of leaders from Uganda, UN staff 
and his own delegation in the LRA camp in the bush. Sat in a large circle, 
the visitors weighed Kony’s every word, searching for an indication whether 
the LRA remained committed to the peace negotiations. The preceding few 
months had been rocky, with attention primarily focussed on the challenges 
of safely assembling the LRA. Kony, speaking in Acholi, gave his assessment 
of the Juba Talks.898 He spoke about being under threat from the UPDF and 
the LRA’s continued need to protect itself. He criticised what he saw as the 
unjust approach of the ICC: "I want to emphasise that in our view the 
895 The LRA Crisis Tracker—run by Invisible Children and Resolve and in itself a controversial tool—shows that generally “attacks and 
abductions by the LRA doubled in the first six months of 2012 relative to the latter half of 2011” and that in early 2012 “LRA violence in 
CAR spiked following Ugandan military operations”. Invisible Children/ Resolve, "LRA Crisis Tracker Mid-Year Security Brief January - June 
2012". San Diego/ Washington, D.C.: 2012. 
896 Congress of the United States of America,"Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, Public 
Law 111-172", 2010. There had been previous attempts to regulate Uganda’s conflict through US law: U.S. House Congressional Resolution 
309 had twelve years prior condemned “Joseph Kony and the LRA’s use of abductions and child soldiers” and called  “for the immediate 
release of all abducted children” and urged “the US President and Secretary of State to support those groups attempting to end the 
abductions”. The resolution also called upon the UN to become more involved and for Sudan to stop supporting the LRA. Congress of the 
United States of America,“Congressional Resolution 309", Washington, D.C., 1998.
897 AFP, "Central Africa says 'fight LRA like Al-Qaeda'",14/10/2010.
898 One of the LRA/M delegates translated Kony’s words into English on the spot; it is his translation that is quoted here.
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fairest way to go about this matter: the ICC should avail themselves to come 
and talk to us so that at least they know our view about this matter." He 
talked about being considered the weak partner in the negotiations and 
gave his analysis of how power and weakness played out in African and 
international politics:
The international justice system is insincere. If UN really wants the 
world at peace, UN should not turn to [provide/support] justice for 
[the] strong. If they see Kony as a weak man, they pursue him. If 
that is the rule of the game, the only option is to fight so that 
international community sees you are strong and let you walk free. 
Museveni’s hands was heavily involved in Rwanda and DRC when 
Museveni went to support the late Kabila against Mobutu. After 
removal of Mobutu, there was disorder: Between Kabila and 
Kagame and Museveni on the other side. Museveni and Kagame 
supported the rebel group that [wanted to] remove the regime 
that was in power. Charles Taylor tried to help Sankoh who did not 
succeed. Taylor was taken to justice because he was now 
vulnerable. If that is the rule of the game, it means that getting 
powerful is enough [to be safe]. If UN wants that to be the rule of 
the game, let it be clear.899
Kony argued that the reality of targeting the weak left the LRA in a bind: 
they had to show strength and to continue to use violence. Reiterating the 
LRA’s commitment to resolving the problem, he concluded: 
It would appear that we are hostage to our own pursuit, we seem 
to have built our own deathbed by committing to this peace 
process. We want government to be honest about it, no trickery 
about the peace talks. If its peace, let it be peace. If not, let’s call it 
something else.900 
In late 2006, this seemed a prematurely disillusioned assessment of the Juba 
Talks. Yet a few years later, the Juba Talks are generally considered a 
failure. Reasons given tend to be that it was an insincere, messy and corrupt 
process, involving an unreliable LRA, an incompetent LRM, and a 
contradictory international framework that pitted international standards 
of justice against local needs, making a principled international approach 
impossible. Measures of success, such as a signed Final Peace Agreement or 
a clear framework for dealing with the tension that arises from the 
intervention of the ICC, are absent. 
This concluding chapter argues that such cursory assessments overlook two 
crucial points: what the Juba Talks did achieve and the value of Juba’s 
broader lessons about contemporary peacemaking. The theoretical insights 
to be gained from the Juba Talks are multi-layered and possibly fleeting, as 
many of the lessons seem to be so context-specific and the detailed 
899 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 12/12/2006.
900 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 12/12/2006.
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ethnography of the talks presented here might serve to reinforce the 
notion that this was a unique case. 
However, what makes a grounded theory distinct from other types of 
ethnography, most notably reflexive ethnography, is that it allows for a 
partial decontextualisation towards identification of broader issues without 
aiming for a fully-fledged abstract generalisation. Grounded theory 
encourages the exploration of the usefulness of the emerging 
interpretation for everyday live in other settings. It also aims to identify 
main concerns of the people studied, including how they continually 
address those. While the Juba Talks were a unique process, the specific 
emphasis on emerging patterns and concerns allow for broader lessons 
about peace processes in other contexts. The exploration of the Juba Talks 
as presented here, which intersperses a rich ethnography with broader 
conceptual analyses of specific patterns and underlying structures allows me 
to do that. 
Using Grounded Theory comes with an unresolved tension. Purity of method 
would suggest to go into a situation with a blank slate of knowledge, then 
code data, construct a theory from the coding and then see whether it 
connects with existing scholarship. In the most extreme cases, it is suggested 
that Grounded Theory can only be used in a context for which no theory yet 
exists. In my particular case, I was naturally drawing from the scholarship on 
conflict resolution as I was going through collecting and coding my data. As 
such, the broader conclusions on offer here are both drawn from the data 
directly and from looking out for how the challenges of conflict resolution 
established in the literature manifest themselves in the Juba Peace Talks. 
While this might not make for purity of method, it does allow for grounded 
conclusions.
Three critical inferences need to be considered: First, the focus on the 
primarily technical conduct and legal implications of the Juba Talks glossed 
over the developing dynamics of the process. In the end, it was the 
dynamics and events of the process, rather than technical or legal 
challenges, that reshaped the peace effort into the next stage of violent 
conflict, but that also caused significant change almost as an unintended 
immediate consequence. Juba’s most valuable conceptual contribution 
might be an understanding that the experience of the process rather than 
finding solutions to technical problems or signing agreements holds the key 
to conflict transformation; and that measuring success through reached 
milestones can be misleading. Second, Juba entrenched existing power 
dynamics between the LRA/M and the GoU. Because the achieved 
agreements were rather disconnected from how the process was 
experienced, the conflict system LRA—which includes actors from the LRA, 
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the LRM and the GoU—retreated into their established ways of doing 
things. And third, the Juba Talks also reveals the difficulties of scholarly or 
operational investigation of peace processes. Recording, analysing and 
possibly utilising the dynamics of a peace process is a challenge.
A Thumbnail Assessment of the Juba Talks
It is easy to look at the Juba Talks and the damaging military fallout and 
conclude that the talks were an overall failure. Yet many groundbreaking 
steps were taken along the way. Egeland summed up his assessment of the 
Juba Talks in 2009: 
So to end up with a sustained cessation of hostilities and a 
situation where millions of people’s lives are permanently 
improved, it seems, that is not a bad result in the real world. 
Because the alternatives are not as many believe between perfect 
war and perfect peace. It is between perfect war and imperfect 
peace. Those are the two alternatives, I know so far in real life.901
Foremost, since the Juba Talks, northern Uganda has had reliable physical 
peace. While LRA activity in northern Uganda had been minimal just before 
the Talks started, possibly due to the changing environment since Sudan’s 
CPA, and thus a direct attribution to the Juba Talks is impossible in absence 
of a counterfactual, it is an important achievement to consider. The 
difference between a largely inactive rebel group and the population’s 
knowledge that the rebel group has now left the territory lies in the 
perception of the security situation. The latter makes for a more stable 
environment that allows other peaceful changes to be put in place--some of 
these are discussed further below. Despite difficulty in direct attribution it is 
important to note that the Juba Talks led to a complete withdrawal of the 
LRA from northern Uganda. This achievement is now often falsely 
attributed to the UPDF having pushed the LRA out of Uganda or the ICC 
issuing warrants of arrest, with the implicit message being that in the end, 
it was the military or international justice that brought peace. In reality, the 
LRA left Uganda to fulfill the CoH agreement and the ICC’s impact is too 
nebulous to allow such clear conclusions. Yet peace in northern Uganda was 
achieved. Taking only the cost of the Juba Talks over two years, this was 
done for US-$15 million. Estimating the cost of the military operation since 
2008 is difficult, but considering that a fighter plane worth a few million 
dollars was lost in the first days of OLT and the military operation has gone 
on for four years, the cost of creating more insecurity for civilians in DRC, 
901 Author telephone interview with Jan Egeland, former UN-Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs. 27/8/2009.
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South Sudan and CAR is considerably higher in both time and money than 
bringing peace to Uganda through the Juba Talks. 
The Juba Talks crucially opened a discussion space. The often tedious 
debates around the negotiation table helped spell out the intricacies of the 
conflict in a more public setting. These included current power relationships 
and underlying politics, the history of grievances and political voice in 
Uganda, divisions within the Acholi community, the complexities of peace 
and justice, as well as the operational challenges of what is euphemistically 
called a “military solution”. 
Looking back, former LRA/M delegates acknowledge that Juba had 
achieved something—although what exactly was hard to pin down. “It is a 
step, but where to?”, reminisced a former delegate in November 2008.902 
Former spokesperson Ayoo said that despite many outstanding issues, the 
LRA/M in the Juba Talks had “achieved a lot. We got the government to 
admit that there is marginalisation.”903  Indeed, the political debate about 
the marginalisation of Uganda’s north had never been had so publicly and 
with such intense regional and international interest. Uganda had 
previously not been open to a broader UN role in ending the conflict, nor 
had accepted outside mediation. With Machar and Chissano in crucial roles, 
the process was to no small extent regionally owned. The Juba Talks were 
also the first time that the somewhat mysterious diaspora emerged in the 
bigger arena to address its own politics, even if that process remains 
inconclusive. Involving a broad range of affected people in consultations is 
a remarkable achievement for a peace process.904 
At least temporarily the Juba Talks challenged entrenched block thinking 
on military versus negotiated approaches. The peace versus justice debate 
became much more nuanced, nationally in Uganda, locally in affected 
areas, and internationally.905  The Juba Talks helped to sharpen debate on 
what kind of justice procedures would be possible drawing on the 
stipulations of Agenda 3 and on previously unconsidered aspects and 
902 Author interview with former member of LRA delegation and Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team. Nairobi: 10/11/2008.
903 Fieldnotes, Juba: 28/1/2008.
904 Hemmer argues rightly that Juba’s virtues became also its shortcomings: international influence became overpowering, the broadening 
of the process created “a cacophony of voices” and blurred communication channels. J.Hemmer. Clingendael Institute. "Expert meeting 
report: The Lord’s Resistance Army: In Search for a New Approach", The Hague: 2010. 
905 The delicate national judicial process on Agenda 3 was negotiated largely also as a political statement to allow some breathing space 
from the ICC.
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challenges of international justice.906  The Agreement on Comprehensive 
Solutions included a commitment to facilitation of returns, as well as 
economic development of northern Uganda.907  The fact that these 
agreements have been signed has opened up a different kind of 
negotiation space in northern Uganda, where people call on the 
government to fulfill what it has agreed to—which in turn pressures donors 
to follow up. These are important stepping stones to conflict 
transformation, thus making the Juba Talks worthwhile.
In Uganda’s broader political arena, the Juba Talks triggered unprecedented 
political engagement, perhaps the most promising transformative aspect of 
the negotiations. People spoke up about the need for political debate, for 
example in an open letter to Museveni by one of his opponents who argued 
that the president had treated “every expression of opposition to your rule 
as a military, rather than a political matter.”908 Dialogue between Museveni 
and opposition parties increased, with the President inviting leaders of the 
main political parties to State House to develop a framework for 
“constructive dialogue with the opposition”, as the Daily Monitor reported, 
calling the meeting “a good start.”909  Prior to the meeting, the 
opposition Uganda Peoples Congress submitted a list of neglected issues to 
discuss because 
there is always a multiplicity of complimenting and competing 
ideas on any matter and especially on affairs   of an entire nation 
like Uganda.    It is this belief that has over the two decades of the 
NRM administration guided us in our constant demand for serious 
dialogue among the political stakeholders in Uganda.   There has 
been no such dialogue.910
Mamdani called those developments “a good indication that the balance of 
power in Ugandan politics is shifting.”911  It was one of the LRA/M’s major 
shortcoming that they prioritised ownership of the Juba Talks over 
widening the political base for anti-government grievances. 
906 Clark has argued, for example, that the LRA case exposed a contradiction in the court system: since Uganda was not unwilling to 
prosecute, but unable to apprehend, international support was hardly needed for criminal prosecutions, but for apprehension, which is 
outside the ICC mandate. P.Clark, "Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and Case Selection in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo," in Courting conflict? Justice, peace and the ICC in Africa, ed. N.Waddel and P.Clarke. London: 2008.
907 Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/ Movement, “Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions”, Juba: 
2/5/2007.  
908 J.Oloka-Onyango, "Open letter to President Museveni and the Movement Caucus", in Uganda Net (2006).
909 K.Ssemogerere, "Will Juba turn out to be a historical mistake?", The Monitor 26/7/2006.
910 Uganda Peoples Congress (signed by Mama Miria Kalule Obote), "Memorandum submitted to H.E. The President of Uganda Yoweri 
Kaguta Museveni by The Uganda Peoples Congress at State House, Nakasero, Kampala", Kampala, 28/7/2006.
911 M.Mamdani, "Kony not the real issue in peace talks", The New Vision, 10/7/2006.
Yet while Uganda’s internal political debate and the discussion of peace and 
justice was at least temporarily boosted in its sophistication, the discourse 
on humanitarian intervention seemed to grow more monolithic, particularly 
in the US and within US-headquartered advocacy organisations, who 
supported the notion of strengthening the Ugandan army in its pursuit of 
the LRA and broader anti-terror fight. In the end, the Juba talks ended with 
international support for what the LRA/M called a “'Rambo' type 
solution”.912 A consequence of this was that also the political space that had 
for a while opened up was again closed down. With the Juba Talks 
receiving the label “failure”, some who had used the negotiations to push 
political dialogue were reluctant to continue to do so to avoid being 
affiliated with a failed endeavour and dodgy LRA/M participants. The slow 
and reluctant opposition to the abolishment of Uganda’s Amnesty Law in 
2012 might serve as an example for this backlash, as does the general 
rejection of the idea that the LRA conflict can be solved through 
negotiations, a sentiment that seems prevalent across most UN agencies 
and in US political circles. 
The GoU reasserted control soon after the Juba Talks had opened up a 
space: In April 2011, UPDF soldiers and police killed nine people (in 
Kampala, Gulu, and Masaka) who had been protesting against the 
government’s management. Two demonstrators were shot in the back, two 
others were killed while inside a building. One of those killed in a building 
was a child. Several times, opposition leader Besigye was arrested and kept 
under house arrest in what was called “preventative detention”.913  While 
the events were noted internationally, pressure on the GoU was limited and 
US support to its military remained unchanged. 
In November 2009, one of the LRA/M delegates who remained active in 
voicing the need for a negotiated solution talked about the urgent 
necessity to shift from the military situation to something that yet again 
opened up space for change and negotiation. He made no excuses for LRA/
M shortcomings in the talks and said that for him, the fact that there were 
now soldiers hunting young LRA men in DRC highlighted both the military’s 
short fuse, but also the LRA/M’s shortcomings: “Military action exploits the 
weakness of the LRA, the weakness to communicate their grievances,” he 
explained.914  As a result, the LRA/M had also failed to settle on a shared 
understanding of what they wanted to achieve through negotiations and 
912 Lord's Resistance Army/Movement Peace Team (Justin Labeja), "Press Statement on the Bangui Meeting on the Lord's Resistance 
Army", Nairobi, 18/10/2010.
913 Human Rights Watch. “Country Report: Uganda”. New York, 2012.
914 Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 1/11/2009.
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had not taken advantage of the momentum for change that had developed 
temporarily during the Juba Talks. 
This list of success criteria of the Juba Talks seems to be in blatant 
contradiction with my core argument that the process was more important 
in determining success and failure than the negotiated agreements. It 
makes my analytical disregard for the texts of the agreements in this thesis 
seem an oversight. Yet what the disconnect between the knock-on effects 
of the negotiated agreements and the continuing conflict shows is a useful 
illustration to inject meaning into the notion of ‘holistic peace talks’. The 
actors from the LRA who directly experienced the dynamics of the process 
continue their armed struggle. Those for whose benefit the LRA/M 
purportedly negotiated during the process--the civilians of northern 
Uganda and the citizens who live under what the LRA/M describes as an 
oppressive regime--might in the end experience more significant positive 
change in their situation. This points to a broad contradiction in current 
peace talks set-ups: to be holistic, that is to encompass credible positive 
chance for all conflict actors and victims, process and agreements achieved 
ought to be aligned. Instead, I argue here, the experience of the process 
was not that of a peaceful path to conflict resolution for one of the conflict 
actors. Yet, in the more public arena of implementation of technical 
agreements, the situation was arguably changed for the better, with some 
changes in legislation and some corridors for political dialogue opened. 
That the conflict continues highlights that the former part of a holistic 
process is not only much more difficult to manage, it is also much more 
difficult to implement. 
Implementation seems to rest on technical agreements to act as road maps. 
Yet, as I have argued in the introduction, ultimately implementation of 
these often fails, leaving behind a smattering of broken agreements. A 
holistic solid experience of a process that has changed dynamics for all 
actors possibly holds the key to supporting implementation when it 
flounders. Technical implementation without changed broader dynamics 
seems to most of the time run out of steam. Developments in Uganda in 
2013, with President Museveni’s assertion of power through arrests or 
dismissals of opponents and internal critics seems to be an indication of 
this.
Dynamics
In this thesis, I have attempted to show how the LRA/M experienced the 
peace negotiations, arguing that this in the end posed a greater challenge 
to ending the conflict than having to figure out ways to navigate the ICC 
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warrants. Moore writes in her work on the importance of the individual 
experience of everyday live that “hopes, desires and satisfactions can never 
be fully captured by forms of regulation.”915 Likewise, the end of a conflict 
such as this one cannot be achieved through expecting power dynamics to 
change, such change needs to be noticeable during the negotiations. This 
means that transformation needs to be tangible in how the process is 
conducted and experienced. Mistakenly, the ICC caused actors in the Juba 
Talks to focus more on how to navigate the Rome Statute’s regulations; one 
way of dealing with this technical aspect was seen as getting a signature 
under an agreement which would, it was assumed, automatically open the 
door to the next steps. As such, the ICC warrants might have posed a 
technical challenge, but in garnering so much attention also reduced how 
success was measured in an unhelpful way. 
The intense attention on technical challenges obscured the understanding 
of dynamics and events. This contributed to a game-theoretical view of the 
process with a focus on two crucial elements of political game theory as 
identified by McCarthy and Meirowitz: who is to get which concession and 
whether the outcome is achieved in an efficient manner.916  Yet an 
untangling of the complex dynamics could not happen using measurable 
indicators. Duffield has critiqued conflict resolution approaches as 
promising grand social engineering aimed at modifying behaviour, rather 
than tackling the context.917  Applied to the Juba Talks, the aim was to 
modify the LRA’s behaviour into signing a deal without attempting 
fundamental structural changes in Ugandan society. The dynamics of the 
talks, however, meant that the LRA/M did not go along with that as 
planned.
Machar, in a confidential meeting with US representatives before the failed 
signing ceremony, reportedly said that since the terms of the negotiated 
agreements were “generous to the LRA, on the whole” and because the 
LRA had become so used to the comforts provided to them during the Juba 
Talks that “even Kony was discovering that life is better with peace”, a final 
signature was inevitable.918 A former LRA/M delegate gave an assessment, a 
few months later, why this was a profound misjudgment. For the LRA/M, he 
argued, the Juba Talks had been conducted in an offhand manner, driven 
by the assumption that for the LRA/M any agreement would be a bonus 
and more than they could have hoped for. This created a sloppy process 
915 H. L. Moore, Still Life: Hopes, Desires and Satisfactions. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011, p.22.
916 N. McCarthy and A.Meirowitz, Political Game Theory: An Introduction. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.275.
917 M. Duffield, Evaluating conflict resolution: contexts, models and methodology. Birmingham: 1997.
918 US Embassy Khartoum. "08KHARTOUM429: LRA Peace Talks to resume in Juba", 23/2/2008.
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that coupled basic procedural oversights with the LRA/M’s lack of capacity 
and professionalism. “There was not even clear terms of reference set out 
for the exercise of the mandate for mediation. Imagine that! All this talk 
and somethings as simple as the terms of reference for the mediation are 
missing”, the former delegate said. 919
Eager to maintain that their fight had been legitimate and that the 
population of northern Uganda was facing physical threats and political 
repression by a corrupt government, the LRA/M upheld one major criticism 
about the Juba Talks: that they were never meant to be a political process. 
One delegate explained what he considered the peculiar logic of 
international support for the Juba Talks: if the international community had 
really believed that the conflict had legitimate root causes and that 
violence had been committed by the GoU, how could they square this with 
the expectation that military action against the rebels conducted by the 
GoU would bring peace? He argued that this proved that in most people’s 
minds the Juba Talks never moved beyond the notion of creating a ‘soft 
landing’. In a 2006 statement, LRA/M spokesperson Ayoo wrote: 
The NRM Kampala regime must know that the peace negotiations 
is [sic] an admission that the military option has failed, hence Juba 
becomes a political forum to arrive at some political end. Juba is 
not a moment to further war, but a venue and moment to get into 
a serious political search and discussion of the causes of the war 
and how to end it.920 
“The conflict is still not accepted as a political conflict,” said another former 
LRA/M delegate in November 2009. After three years of frustration with the 
GoU, the UN, his own delegation colleagues and the LRA leader, he seemed 
puzzled that the LRA/M had not managed to change the most basic 
perception about the war in northern Uganda. At that moment, he said, he 
did not even know what a future initiative for peace might look like or who 
could be a good mediator. From his perspective, everything that could have 
gone wrong in Juba went wrong. “Of course it’s possible that Kony might 
get killed,” he said. “But it will not make a difference to the problem and 
the situation in the country.”921 
From his point of view, the experience of the Juba Talks had turned out to 
be a monolithic choice between a state the LRA/M is comfortable with—war
—and the rather vague idea of a peace agreement administered by the very 
structures of their adversary they had been fighting and that they were 
919 LRA/M Peace Team, "Juba Peace Talks: The Record of Sabotage by the Government of Uganda; The Reasons General Joseph Kony 
Wants the Peace Agreement Revisited; and, The Way Forward”, Nairobi: 6/11/2009.
920 G.Ayoo. "The absence of Kony doesn't jeopardise the Juba Peace Negotiations”, Cologne: 14/7/2006. 
921 Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 1/11/2009.
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forced to sign through violence. The UNSC expressed a similar notion: 
“There seems to be general agreement in the Council that only an effective 
military offensive can put enough pressure on the LRA to return to the 
negotiating table.”922
In 2006, one LRA member explained to me that because of the peace talks, 
his organisation was losing control over the analysis of the conflict and the 
portrayal of the conflict actors. For him, the Juba Talks were looking 
increasingly like an exercise in reducing the conflict to agreeable 
declarations and in making the LRA/M vulnerable. Another member of the 
LRA, who considered himself instrumental in bringing about the Juba Talks, 
explained how entering peace talks had exposed him to future trouble in 
an unchanged political landscape: 
I was very committed to my work in the peace process. I now have 
a bad record in the government because I was also the one who 
brought on the peace process. And the government was trying to 
get out of the peace process. They were trying to give us money 
and said we might bring the women out of the bush who might be 
sick.923 
In his December 2006 speech, Kony had emphasised what he saw as the 
most prominent obstacle to reaching a peace deal: 
The thing I want to add for us is the reason why it is difficult to 
stop war in this situation—is the attitude of disrespect, disregard 
and abuse. Disregard is shown to us whereby ICC just ignores us, 
our sentiments, how this matter should have been handled. One 
morning we wake up and are told we are now wanted in The 
Hague. Undermining of people must stop and disregard and 
disrespect. If there is a level of understanding of this conflict, [it is] 
like at the crucifixion.
Because of this disregard and lies made it was the case between 
Barabbas and Jesus who should be released. Crucify Jesus, they 
said, he is the sinner and criminal. 
It is the same with ICC: emphasis is on those who have committed 
less crimes, not on those who have committed massive crimes that 
are just being pushed under.924
After the Juba Talks had turned into the gateway for the next military 
phase of this conflict, another delegate gave me his view on what had 
happened. For him, the threat of military action as the antidote to a 
negotiated peace agreement had been paralysing from the start. With OLT, 
his worst fears about how both the GoU and the international community 
were juxtaposing the signature with a military strike in an either-or option 
922 UN Security Council."Update report: Northern Uganda and LRA-affected areas". New York, 22/6/2009.
923 Fieldnotes, Juba: 18/12/2006.
924 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 12/12/2006.
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had come true. He explained why he felt that the either-or choice was so 
damaging: 
In reality, solving conflict through the military and solving 
conflict through a peace process are as related as battling 
the banking crisis by giving the banks more power and 
allowing them to issue more shares, rather than limiting 
their power and making the bank’s balance sheet a weaker 
incentive for bank’s performances.925 
In his opinion, the use of military leverage in a peace process had not only 
ended the Juba Talks, but had also discredited the integrity of the process 
itself as a way to resolve the long-standing conflict. It was, to him, proof 
that the Juba Talks had missed the point. 
Another separate set of dynamics also warrants attention: the dynamics of 
what I have called the galvanic surge of international opinion. With 
complete disregard for the reality of the situation, external actors for 
months and years perpetuated the notion of their own capacity to solve the 
situation, convincing themselves that a properly implemented “solution” 
was just around the corner. After the issuing of the ICC warrants in 2005 the 
Washington Post wrote “there are growing indications…that the days of 
this bizarre and brutal rebel force might be numbered”. The article quoted 
Kofi Annan saying that the warrants “had sent a ‘very powerful message’ 
that ‘would-be warlords’ must be held accountable for their actions.”926 At 
an August 2009 conference in South Africa, a representative of a European 
government dismissed my point that a solution to the LRA problem was not 
to be found through the threat of prosecution or a military strike. He 
argued that international contacts at an informal level were already being 
forged and that it was just a matter of weeks until an international LRA 
strategy would be made public: “LRA festive days are over.”927 
In January 2011, I was told by one of the main funders for a US advocacy 
group that they were certain that within the following 12–18 months, the 
LRA would be defeated militarily.928 This was at odds with the opinions held 
by those closely engaged on the ground: Three-and a half years after 
Operation Lightning Thunder started, six months after the deployment of 
US military advisers and two months after waves of enthusiasm for a quick 
military solution brought on by the Kony2012 campaign, a resident of 
Yambio was told by the commanding UPDF officer in his area that the UPDF 
was convinced that they would have to stay in the area for “ten years” to 
925 Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 1/11/2009.
926 E.Wax, "Net Tightens Around Northern Uganda's Brutal Rebel Militia", Washington Post, 8/10/2005.
927 Fieldnotes, ISS/Egmont conference on DRC, Kloofzicht, South Africa: 25/8/2009.
928 Fieldnotes, Juba: 6/1/2011.
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end the LRA insurgency.929 Yet the dynamics of the galvanic surge regularly 
drowned out these realities.
They are ignored because maintaining the galvanic surge momentum is also 
a material decision. A young Sudanese man at a Uganda/Sudan/DRC borders 
workshop explained to me that with so many international organisations 
and so many different kinds of people now invested in finding a solution to 
the LRA war, “LRA has become the biggest business in these three 
countries.”930  Being engaged in finding a solution is great currency—for 
acknowledgement, for fund raising, for Hollywood film scripts, for 
potential Nobel Peace Prizes, for graphic novels, for scholarship, and for 
doctoral dissertations. 
Entrenchment
When the FPA remained unsigned, analysist, observers and those affected 
by the conflict gave a whole list of reasons. Conspicuously absent was the 
explanation that with a signed agreement the LRA/M would have entered 
into a partnership with the same enemy that they had experienced as 
unchanged during the negotiations. The basic contradiction of ending 
violent resistance in an untransformed political environment remained 
largely unaddressed.
Change was difficult for all actors. The LRA/M to a great extent maintained 
its own reputation as an unreliable and violent negotiation partner torn 
apart by infighting. The GoU was seen as making few genuine political 
concessions and instead relying on the military; the international actors 
failed to establish themselves as principled with clear guidelines and in 
some cases maintained the often criticised complicity with the GoU. These 
dynamics had been present in the conflict and continued during the Juba 
Talks and beyond, confirming the LRA/M’s perception of being trapped in 
hostile and unchangeable system. Being themselves caught up in their 
narrative that the GoU was solely adversarial, entering into a peace 
agreement would have also come with the concession that the GoU was 
capable of change—and would have required the LRA/M to change, too. 
The scholarship on peace negotiations mostly falls short of empirically 
capturing these finer dynamics of peace processes, although the argument 
that peace talks can entrench conflict dynamics rather than change them, is 
well established. Sinn uses the concept of ‘viable peace’ introduced by 
Dziedzic and Hawley, which, amongst other things, stipulates that 
929 Fieldnotes, London: 18/5/2012.
930 Author focus group discussion with leaders from Eastern and Central Equatoria attending a workshop on the LRA. Juba: 3/3/2009.
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“violence-prone power structures must be dislodged.”931 Lesch writes about 
the Sudanese peace talks that "the negotiations illustrated the pitfalls of 
negotiating in a polarised political context in which talks heightened 
mistrust rather than bridged differences."932  DeRouen and Sobek make the 
point that in a civil war, “defeat could mean the loss of existence. The high 
stakes generally make compromise difficult.”933 Politically, argues Mamdani, 
the Juba Talks were 
likely to constitute the most serious political challenge for both 
Kony and Museveni. As more political options open up for the 
northern political class, Kony will run the risk of being eclipsed by 
another, more explicitly political movement, whether armed or 
not.934  
Adek, a long-term ally of Kony and the most senior member of the 
delegation, at one point commented that the disrespect the LRA/M 
experienced in Juba was similar to what was happening at home. It was all 
too familiar, he said, because “I have been a victim of peacetalks before.”935
However, “dislodging” the existing structures poses an existential problem 
to those who exist to oppose them. Zartman outlines the contradiction 
inherent in negotiations between the state and rebels: 
Rebels need the recognition that negotiation brings, but they also 
need iron-clad assurances of continued existence and recognition 
once combat is terminated. Formulas that dissolve the rebels into 
the current political and military structures deny the basic needs of 
the rebels and are non-starters.936  
Kony had put the same argument into his own words (muddling the 
mandates of the ICC and the International Court of Justice):  
The solution for the peace talks is war. In the past, many great 
things have happened. In Rwanda, people died in thousands. The 
cause is Museveni. And what happened in Congo? It is Museveni. 
Museveni was accused in International Court of Justice. He was not 
arrested. Why? Because he is in power. That means we should also 
capture power.937
931 M.Sinn, "Sudan: In Search of a Model," in SSRC: Making sense of Sudan, ed. Alex de Waal. New York: SSRC, 2010; M.J. Dziedzic and 
L.Hawley, "Introduction", in The Quest for Viable Peace: international intervention and strategies for conflict transformation, ed. Jock Covey, 
Michael J. Dziedzic, and Len Hawley.Washington D.C.: 2005, p.14.
932 A.Lesch, The Sudan-Contested National Identities. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.
933 K.DeRouen and D.Sobek, "The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome", Journal of Peace Research 41, 3,2004.
934 M.Mamdani, "Kony not the real issue in peace talks", The New Vision, 10/7/2006.
935 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 11/6/2006. Adek had also been imprisoned on charges of collaborating with the rebels and had been on 
probation with the need to regularly report to the police in Kampala.
936 W. Zartman, "Negotiating Internal, Ethnic and Identity Conflicts in a Globalized World", International Negotiation 11, 2006, p.260.
937 Fieldnotes, Ri-Kwangba: 12/12/2006.
303
Peace processes tend to be viewed as the critical point, an opportunity to 
debate root causes and events in the past. Yet in Juba this approach and 
how it was used by the two negotiation partners further entrenched 
memories of the conflict without a genuine commitment to changing 
structures going forward. To settle on peace within those structures would 
have meant to solidify them without access to recourse through the waging 
of war. If, however, continuation of having access to this recourse, no 
matter the cost to civilians, is the motivation behind the war, the LRA has 
been tremendously successful—as has the GoU in maintaining its enemy 
and all the benefits that brings. 
The notion of conflict resolution as a reduced and regulated process that 
can be captured in models or conducted along legal guidelines reduces the 
range of internationally acceptable option to end conflicts, entrenching the 
limited and often unsuccessful tool set that is available. To understand the 
broader implications of this, it is useful to take a look at the context that 
unfolded around the Juba Talks. 
Critics have long argued that criminalisation of violent conflict or the 
notion of legal frameworks as conflict resolution tools are problematic. 
From the LRA/M’s point of view, legislating peace and disarmament rang 
hollow. Having called for equal justice for all perpetrators—although to 
what extent the LRA leadership was prepared to go to court is hard to say—
they argued that notions of justice in this conflict suffered a considerable 
setback when on February 12, 2008, a UPDF colonel accused of having 
committed human rights abuses in northern Uganda, was promoted to a 
prominent position within the UPDF, while the US signaled its preparedness 
to support the UPDF in its strike against the LRA. Even after the botched 
and disastrous operation, the UPDF seemed certain of their friendship with 
the Americans since they had in 2009, as Grignon writes, given “a new 
shopping list of requests from the Ugandan government to help them hunt 
down” the LRA.938 
From the point of view of the opposition parties in Uganda, this was a 
strengthening of the existing structures of militarised politics, which  the 
UPC had critised in a memorandum to Museveni:”The NRM legacy on 
politics is one of fostering militarism as a pillar of politics…. As a nation, we 
must discuss practical means to de-militarise our politics once and for all.”939 
That support for a military operation contributed to militarisation 
seemingly came as a surprise to international observers, including the US 
938 F. Grignon, African Peace-building Agenda: "Elements of a New Strategy to Disarm the LRA", Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2009.
939 Uganda Peoples Congress (signed by Mama Miria Kalule Obote), "Memorandum submitted to H.E. The President of Uganda Yoweri 
Kaguta Museveni by The Uganda Peoples Congress at State House, Nakasero, Kampala", Kampala, 28/7/2006.
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sponsors of Ugandan military activity against the LRA. Most international 
observers were reportedly nonplussed by the number of Ugandan troops in 
DRC following the implementation of “Plan B” against the LRA. The GoU 
had always emphasised the Congolese ownership of the military operation, 
hiding the rather large number of its own troops. A US report in June 2009 
noted “the  Ugandan Government has  deliberately (and successfully) kept 
quiet its  troop strength and regular engagements with the LRA in order to 
keep  a Congolese face on the operation.”940
Besides entrenching uneven justice and military structures, the crucial 
structure that was confirmed in the Juba Talks was the depolitisation of the 
LRA/M’s grievance. Chomsky, in his evaluation of NATO’s engagement in 
Kosovo, states that open dissent was systematically suppressed with a very 
easy blow: whoever criticised NATO’s bombs was labelled a supporter of 
Milosevic.941  Keen has written about the repeating pattern in conflict 
situations of stymying discourse.942 Kaufmann describes a similar process of 
monopolising discourse in the lead-up and during the Iraq war. Sold as an 
honourable intervention to liberate oppressed Iraqis, the systematic 
streamlining of coverage, including the embedding of journalists, made 
Kaufmann describe the situation as a “failure of the democratic 
marketplace of ideas.”943 For many of those arguing against military strikes 
against the LRA and for political dialogue—including myself—being 
labelled an LRA apologist is a familiar experience.
Along with passing the LRA Bill, the US took further steps to entrench its 
viewpoint that peace, especially with unsavoury groups, was not to be 
gained through political processes. In June 2010, the US Supreme Court 
ruled that “knowingly providing any service, training, expert advice or 
assistance to any foreign organization designated by the US State 
Department as terrorist” even without any proof that the aid was 
“intended to further any act of terrorism or violence by the foreign group” 
could lead to a prison sentence of up to 15 years.944 The law, first adopted 
in 1996 and strengthened by the Patriot Act, had been questioned by the 
Obama administration after a ruling of the US Appeals court had declared 
“parts of the law unconstitutionally vague.”945 In the definition of the US 
940 US Embassy Kampala."09KAMPALA551: Uganda/ DRC: Operation Rudia II Update ", 1/6/2009.
941 N.Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo. Monroe: Common Courage Press, 1999.
942 D.Keen, Complex Emergencies. London: Polity, 2008.
943 C.Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War", International Security 29, 1, 
2004, p.30.
944 J.Vinci, "Supreme Court upholds terrorism support law", Reuters, Washington, D.C., 21/6/2010. 
945 J.Vinci, "Supreme Court upholds terrorism support law", Reuters, Washington, D.C., 21/6/2010.
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Supreme Court, assistance now includes giving advice on how to find a 
peaceful solution. 
As the LRA was still a terrorist organisation in US definition, the ruling 
strengthened the point that finding a solution through talking—and giving 
advice on international criminal procedures—would be almost impossible 
for a US organisation. Andy Carl, Executive Director of Conciliation 
Resources, wrote in an op-ed piece for the BBC that the US government was 
on the one hand “calling for inclusive and political solutions to the world's 
most intractable conflicts” and that this naturally “sometimes means 
talking to 'terrorists.”946 He pointed out that “the quiet diplomacy with IRA 
[the Irish Republican Army] and loyalist paramilitaries which helped bring 
about the Good Friday agreement—meetings, training seminars and 
facilitated dialogues—would now be deemed a terrorist offence” including 
for US citizens working abroad for organisations that do not fall under US 
jurisdiction or receive US funding.947  Similar although somewhat vague 
legal provisions exist in the UK under the Terrorism Act 2000. As this makes 
organisations vulnerable to prosecution, pursuing peace by peaceful means 
falls back onto governments or the UN—which also has strict guidelines on 
not engaging with groups deemed terrorist.948 
As laws, conflict resolution, peace making, military intervention and 
humanitarianism continue to blur, concerns that are seemingly specific to 
each of these areas lose clarity, allowing for entrenchment of ideologies 
that support particular actions. Terry’s discussion of how refugee camps in 
Congo were used strategically by Hutu genocidaires to find cover and 
regroup has fueled concerns that feeding the LRA would legitimise them 
politically and facilitate their return to violence.949  To avoid such 
politicisation of the LRA, the negotiations suffered from depoliticisation. 
Mbembe draws a clear line of distinction between politics and war. To shift 
war into politics, “a project of autonomy” needs to be developed and 
“agreement among a collectivity through communication and recognition” 
needs to be achieved.950  Neither are possible in a situation in which one 
partner needed for the agreement has both depoliticised itself and is 
systematically depoliticised by its negotiation partners. Thus, the crucial 
946 A.Carl, "Viewpoint: Ending wars peacefully just got harder," BBC News, 29/6/2010.
947 A.Carl, "Viewpoint: Ending wars peacefully just got harder," BBC News, 29/6/2010.
948 A.Carl, "Viewpoint: Ending wars peacefully just got harder," BBC News, 29/6/2010.
949 F. Terry, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002.
950 A.Mbembé, "Necropolitics." Public Culture 15, 1, 2003, p.13.
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element of politics needed for the more “holistic” peace process, called for 
by Nan, remained elusive.951 
Understanding 
This thesis aims to make visible why the LRA/M “bit its tongue”. Yet this 
presented a whole range of methodological and analytical challenges which 
are just as important to consider as the lessons learned by all other actors. 
Vincent Otti, in a conversation, admitted that while everyone involved in 
the talks wanted to maintain the notion of being in control and 
knowledgable about what was going, the opposite was more the case: 
“See, for the UN this peace process is difficult. For the LRA, this peace 
process is difficult. For the VP, this peace process is difficult. We are all 
learning in this peace process.”952
Scholarship on modern peacemaking also has much to learn. For years, 
investigations of peace processes tended to look for the “spoilers”—readily 
identifiable actors that pursued a counterproductive interest which could 
then be tackled to bring a conflict to a resolution. What the Juba Talks in 
their complexity, fluidity and their vast range of individual and group actors 
have shown is that no single spoiler exist, nor does the notion hold water 
that in these kind of processes once actors have made concessions and 
investments in the process, there is a point of no return. Instead the 
realisation that peace talks are a multi-layered part of a conflict trajectory 
also means that individual experiences matter, possibly more so than the 
more technical matters that are being discussed at the table. Yet what to do 
with this realisation that throws open more questions than it answers? 
Fearon writes that ”a creeping lack of confidence among social scientists as 
to whether they can really provide universally applicable explanations 
makes it all the more important not to ignore people's own understanding 
of why they act.”953 
Adequately capturing that individual understanding is a daunting task.  To 
understand the rich human tapestry requires thorough and time-consuming 
investigation of a nonlinear coalescence of ever-changing events, 
experiences and context through detailed multi-disciplinary observation. 
This would need to include engagement with all actors, a process after 
951 S.A.Nan, "Shifting from coherent towards holistic peace processes", in Handbook of conflict analysis and resolution, ed.D.J.D. Sandole, 
et al. London/ New York: Routledge, 2009.
952 Author interview with Vincent Otti, Ri-Kwangba: 13/7/2007.
953 J.D. Fearon, "Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others?" Journal of Peace Research 41, 3, 2004, p.420.
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which in an ideal scenario the researcher would emerge as an omniscient 
narrator able to produce a sequential analysis of unsystematic human 
experiences while appreciating that success and failure need new 
measurements if the whole process and all the dynamics it sets into motion 
is taken into account. Indeed, investigating peace processes with a holistic 
perspective presents a broader challenge to the scholarship of complex 
processes. 
A scholarly approach that provides reliable information on years of 
multifaceted and ever-changing motivations in a developing process and 
then draws constructive conclusions that help make the peace talks a 
success is realistically outside the remit of individual researchers. Scholarship 
has yet to learn how to investigate complex processes with incomplete and 
manipulated information and draw nuanced, yet operationally informative 
conclusions. 
Implications for Contemporary Peacemaking
The three main insights from the Juba Talks on dynamics, entrenchment, 
and understanding serve as a reminder that transformation of conflicts 
requires a self-reflective process. For this to happen, facilitators and conflict 
actors need to find a way to record and reflect on ongoing non-linear 
experiences in a confusing environment. Additionally, for transformation to 
occur external actors need to examine occurrences of galvanic surges and 
cognitive dissonance. This means scrutinising whether decisions taken are 
supported by realistic insights or by ideological believes that a particular 
approach simply ought to work. 
To allow such a process to happen without furthering entrenchment as seen 
in Juba, it is necessary to radically rethink what a peace process means and 
is supposed to achieve. Most peace processes are still run as if they can be 
project-managed, with a clearly defined start and end-point. Notably, 
signed agreements are considered the most important aspect of a peace 
process. This is at odds with how actors experience change—through 
realisation, experience and a transformed perspective, rather than through 
signatures. When the Juba Talks came to be called a failure, broader 
achievements were dismissed, such as the improved situation in northern 
Uganda, the starting point for dealing with war crimes in Uganda as 
stipulated in Agenda 3, or the at least temporarily improved political 
dialogue in Uganda. Crucially, the peace process was entirely abandoned as 
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a lost cause, replaced by an uncertain military approach and a dishonest 
discourse that stipulated that broader political issues could only be tackled 
once the military problem was solved. 
“We are aware of our limitations, but we cannot quit now,” said a former 
LRA/M delegate in November 2009. Him and a few of the others had 
maintained a voice as the “LRA/M Peace Team”, primarily to issue press 
releases to comment on military and political developments.  It was not 
clear to me what they thought they might be able to do, particularly 
considering that the press releases generally were not much more than 
rebuttals. “We will try to change the thinking on this issue,” he said. 
I want to find funding for a permanent peace secretariat that 
looks at peacebuilding without a signature, to look at all the issues 
that need to be resolved to make Uganda a peaceful country 
without judging success of making peace on signing an agreement 
or hunting down Kony.954
Considering that the LRA/M failed to establish itself as a credible 
peacemaker during the Juba Talks and the Talks generally developed a 
tainted reputation, it is not surprising that funding has not been 
forthcoming and organisations have been reluctant to work with LRA/M 
representatives. Yet for peacemaking to work, it is likely that it is precisely 
this kind of long-term engagement with conflict actors that can become 
transformative. 
What the Juba Talks illustrate is that both information and analysis pose 
challenges: information is difficult to get, impartial analysis that 
acknowledges the extent to which evolving dynamics influence how 
information is viewed poses an intellectual and operational challenge. In 
the Juba Talks, an ongoing record of what happened and how the actors 
viewed the events was not kept, but an analysis of such information could 
have served as an additional track to maintain focus on the present, rather 
than on root causes or a future military threat. It is difficult to know how 
exactly such records could have been helpful and establishing a theoretical 
counterfactual devalues my point that the key to conflict transformation 
lies in unpredictable dynamics. In the end, the broader lesson from the Juba 
Talks does not come as a concrete recommendation, but as a list of 
omissions. Since the Juba Talks and other similar peace processes tend to 
bring limited success, close attention to these omissions might be the key to 
transforming views on how conflicts are transformed. 
Rethinking of current approaches will require a much deeper 
understanding of a conflict, its actors, its context and the processes aimed 
at resolving it. In the introduction to this thesis, I discussed the greatest 
954 Fieldnotes, Nairobi: 1/11/2009.
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challenge in contemporary peacemaking: the gap between theory and 
practice. This thesis has shown in great detail the practice of peacemaking 
and the constraints experienced by all actors: the LRA/M’s internal 
constraints and external pressures, as well as the somewhat inflexible and 
template-driven approaches of an international community that found 
itself in unchartered waters between international justice and regional 
peace. Yet how precisely does the experience of the Juba Talks allow for 
broader theoretical insights? 
The answer to this question lies in the quite clear conceptualisation of the 
kind of peace process the LRA/M was aiming for, the moments of failure 
when the negotiation space tightened from transformative to technical and 
the lack of a broader political vision. Diamond distinguishes between 
conflict resolution—which seeks “to discover, identify and resolve the 
underlying root causes of the conflict”-- and the transformative process 
which endeavors “to change the conditions that give rise to the underlying 
root causes of the conflict.” ⁠955  Galtung rejects the idea of conflict 
resolution, as it implies that conflict can be ended, and instead supports the 
notion of conflict as part of political life which needs to be managed to 
remain constructive. ⁠956 Only with a holistic approach to managing the ebbs 
and flows of political conflict—which in this thesis might also be captured 
in the ebbs and flows of engaging during a peace process—can interaction 
and systems in entrenched situations be changed over the long-term. 
Transformation scholars such as Väyrynen have identified the various ways 
in which transformation occurs: through internal transformation in actors, 
through a changed understanding of the issues at the heart of a conflict, 
through changed or new rules which regulates how actors behave with 
each other, and through structural transformation which make up the 
broadest change to the system in which the conflict occurs. ⁠957 Babbit, Chigas 
and Wilkinson speak about the type of change that is needed to mitigate or 
even manage conflict: change in attitudes, change in behaviours, and 
change in institutions.958  Each of these theoretical themes prominent in 
conflict resolution resonates directly with the analysis of the Juba Talks 
955 Diamond, L. “On Developing a Common Vocabulary: The Conflict Continuum”. Peace Builder, Vol.1, No. 4, Spring 1994, p. 3,  cited in 
Botes, J. “Conflict Transformation: A debate over semantics or a crucial shift in theory and practice of peace and conflict studies?”, The 
International Journal of Peace Studies. 8, 2, 2003.
956 Galtung, J. “Conflict Resolution as Conflict Transformation: The First Law of Thermodynamics Revisited.” In: K. Rupesinghe, ed., 
Conflict Transformation. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, p.1
957 Väyrynen, R. “To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and Internaitonal Conflicts” In: R. Väyrynen, ed., 
New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation. London: Sage, 1991. p.163
958 Babbit, E., D. Chigas and R. Wilkinson. Theories and Indicators of Change Briefing Paper: Concepts and Primers for Conflict 
Management and Mitigation, Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2013. 
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presented in this thesis and why they failed to transform the dynamics of 
the conflict.
In Place of a Conclusion: How It Continues
At the time of finishing this thesis in mid-2012, the African Union Regional 
Task Force (AURTF) against the LRA—established in March 2012—was 
strengthened with a further 2,000 UPDF soldiers and 500 SPLA.959  Civil 
society leaders from Uganda and the region expressed their concern about 
the GoU’s move to let the Amnesty Law lapse, citing the Law’s significant 
contribution to bringing stability to northern Uganda and the region and 
calling on the GoU to reinstate it.960 The US Senate passed Resolution 402, 
condemning Kony and the LRA and commending AFRICOM for their work 
and reiterating US commitment to staying militarily engaged and fulfilling 
other commitments laid out in the LRA Act.961   Meanwhile, the security 
situation in the affected areas remained bad, with numerous armed actors 
identified. Whether Kony was alive or dead, whether he was in CAR, DRC or 
Darfur was unclear. There had been no credible communication with the 
LRA leadership since the Juba Talks had broken down.
In 2005, Vincent Otti had written me a letter. He had asked who I was, 
whether I was trustworthy and whether I could buy 
two good mobile phones with enough airtime in the line of Celtel 
because with M.T.N or U.T.L. (mango), it is easy for it to be trapped 
or monitored. The mobile phone the chairman had, one of the 
high ranking commander surrendered with it so currently there is 
nothing.
Nobody could speak to the LRA, his representatives in Gulu told me, 
because there was no way to communicate. Also, nobody trusted the LRA. 
“Nothing more to say,” Otti had concluded in his letter. “But more will 
come its way” if I managed to get the phones and stay in touch with him 
while I was in Europe. “I understand you are soon going back.”962
959 Sudan Tribune, "East Africa: Additional Ugandan and S. Sudanese Troops Join Anti-LRA Force", 18/9/2012.
960 Traditional and religious leaders, civil society and other organisations. "Fairway Communique and Note accompanying the Fairway 
Communique: ‘Reinstate the Full Amnesty Law’”, Kampala: 12/6/2012.
961 US Senate. "S.Res. 402: Condemning Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army for commiting crimes against humanity and mass 
atrocities, and supporting ongoing efforts by the United States Government and governments and regional organizations in central Africa to 
remove Joseph Kony and Lord's Resistance Army commanders from the battlefield". Washington, D.C., 2/8/2012.
962 Vincent Otti, "Personal letter to author," 25/8/2005.
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When I had first spoken to Otti, he wanted to know more about the ICC. He 
thought he would be publicly executed. The last time I saw him, some 
weeks before he was killed, I asked him if he now knew what to expect 
from the ICC. “Hm hm,” Otti replied, somewhat vaguely. ”It is very hard to 
understand how you get to peace.” He changed the subject, asking me if I 
at least had now come to fully understand the LRA. I was not sure, I replied, 
it was all very complicated. “It is very difficult to understand LRA, to 
understand Uganda,” he replied. 
We have a big problem in Uganda and it needs to be solved. I want 
peace, but the problem needs to be solved. It is good you 
understand because we need a lot of support. Some who 
understand, after a while they go back home to their country. 
We are still here.963
963 Author interview with Vincent Otti, Ri-Kwangba: 13/7/2007.
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